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The separation of powers
political system.

is

an institution which

The theory underlying

commonly produce

conflict.

On

performing the task for which

it

this

Goldman

lies at the

core of the American

method of structuring power

is

that

it

will

the other hand, separating powers, with each branch

is

best prepared, can be an efficient

way

to structure the

allocation of responsibilities in a political system. This dissertation
asks which of these
theoretical assumptions

is

most prevalent when the separation of powers

is

put into action.

analyzes the role of the state supreme court of Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court,
that state's political system.

were analyzed
and then

to

to

activities

how

it

moved

outside traditional judicial roles

such activities are viewed by the primary policy making body

legislature.

This study found that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was involved
regularly in

making policy

for the state through statutory interpretation

development of both common and

in

of this court from the 1970s through the 1990s

determine the degree to which

determine

democracy, the

The

It

and through the

constitutional law. Contrary to the widespread

assumption underlying the separation of powers, however,

Vll

this activity

has not generated

in a

major

conflict.

In questions as important
as the right-to-die, the death
penalty, funding for

abortions, and governmental tort
immunity, the state's high court has
been a major player
setting public policy for the citizens
of Massachusetts,
in

sometimes by

itself

and

at

other times

cooperatton with the legtslature. While
there were a few challenges leading
to conflict

these years, and

some examples of an

efficient allocation

the system of separated powers in
Massachusetts led
difficult political questions,

happy

to

of powers leading

more frequently

in

in

to cooperation,

to avoidance of

allow the appointed justtces of the state's
high court to

lead the way.
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CHAPTER

1

WHAT IS THF nn rciAL POWFR?
Students of American political thought
ideals to the

American founding.

In the

tell

of the importance of liberal

minds of the majority of these

political

theorists,

principles of liberty and equality provide
the foundation for the American
political

regime.

1

Debates have occurred over the degree

dominated America's early
history to focus

economic

self-interest or a hybrid

which

is

which these

liberal principles

years, with other writers finding the
founding period in

American

first tier

to

on republican

principles, classical ideals, basic notions
of

of ideas.

2

All of these debates, however, concern the

of founding principles, the ideological

tier.

There

is

a

second

tier

of principles

also deserving of attention. These are the
organizing principles of

politics that structure

separation of powers.

American governance

American

in practice, particularly federalism

The second of these provide

and the

the focal point for the analysis

which follows. 3

1

The classic statement of this theory is found in Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1955). See also Daniel Boorstin, The Genius
of American Politics
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

For instance, see Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (New York:
Macmillan, 1930) for a discussion of the founding which emphasizes economic principles and J.G.A.
Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republic Tradition
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975) for a view of the founding from a republican perspective.

For two views which see the founding as

pluralistic,

recognizing a variety of philosophical influences on

the this era, see Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the

American Revolution, Enlarged edition
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) and Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The
Intellectual Origins of the Constitution, Reprint edition (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986).

For the classic statement on the founding as essentially

a brilliant political act, see John Roche, "The
Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, American Political Science Review 55 (1961), 799-816.
For a historical view which confronts the paradox of America's tradition of exclusive definitions of

citizenship in a democratic system of government, see Rogers Smith, Civic Ideal

(New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1999).
3

There

is,

of course,

a strong connection

principles. This will be discussed in

between these organizing principles and the theoretical

more

detail

below.

1

In Federalist #47,

James Madison highlighted the
importance of this system of

separated of powers which was
incorporated into the Constitution.

No political

truth is certainly of greater
intrinsic value, or is stamped
with the authority of more enlightened
patrons of liberty than that on

which the objection [to the newly written
U.S. Constitution] is founded
The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary in
the same hands...may justly be
pronounced
the very definition of

tyranny[.]

The importance of the separation of powers
politics has

to

an understanding of American

been assumed since these words were written
by Madison

study of the American regime can ignore

this

No

in 1787.

foundational principle. Studies of the

public policy process have been particularly
attentive to the influence which the
separation of powers has on the political system
since the cooperation of at least two

branches of government
This

is

necessary to the enactment of any coherent public policy.

is

whether the policy deals with education, health

true

From

this perspective the focus is often

being

how

(or whether) the gap

An

various policy goals.

however,

in

containing

4

nod

on the separation as

between

institutions

can be (has been) bridged

institutions in the political system.

to the fact that the institution

James Madison, Federalist #47

in

5

a barrier, with the question

emphasis on the separation of powers becomes

most studies of specific

at least a

care, or national defense.

to obtain

less obvious,

While always

under study must interact with

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist

Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: Mentor, 1961), 301.
5

For instance, see Bryan C. Hassell, The Charter School Challenge: Avoiding the Pitfalls, Fulfilling the
Promise (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999) regarding educational policy; Deborah R.
McFarlane and Kenneth J. Meier, The Politics of Fertility Control: Family Planning and Abortion
Policies in the American States
policy; and

James M.

Scott,

(New York: Chatham House, 2000)

Deciding

to Intervene:

regarding a component of health care

The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy

(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996) regarding defense policy. For a compilation of studies
which assesses legislative-executive interaction in policy development see Robert Gilmour and Alexis A.
Haley, eds., Public Policy?: The Struggle for Control Between Congress and the Executive (New York:

Seven Bridges

Press, 1994).

2

other branches of government,
the foeus of these works tends
to be on developing a

deeper understanding of the internal
workings of that particular
individuals

who

fill its

ranks.

is

and the

While the democratic relationships
(those between the

branch and "the people") are recognized
as
the branches

institution

vital in these

works, the interaction between

often relegated to secondary status. 6

This study adopts a somewhat different
approach, emphasizing the separation
of

powers while focusing on
determine

how

a single branch of

American government,

such a separation has framed the

of this

activities

the judiciary, to

institution.

7

While

studies of political institutions which focus
on internal operations and on the

individuals

who perform

institutional portraits

the duties within these institutions are
valuable, the

which they paint can be incomplete. Placing the

institution

and

actors in the sometimes cooperative, sometimes
conflictual, arena created by the

separation of powers provides a deeper, albeit

government and
judicial

the

power'?" as

more complex, look

powers which they wield.
distinct

It

at

our institutions of

asks the question: "what

is

'the

from the other powers of government. 8

Many

of the classic works on the Congress, the President, and the Courts would fit in this category.
not to criticize the importance of such works, only to recognize that no one study can do
everything. As this is a generalization there are, of course, exceptions. One is Morris Fiorina's seminal
'

This

is

work, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (Mew Haven: Yale University Press, 1977)
which emphasizes Congress' relations to other branches, especially the executive branch agencies. Other
examples are those works which focus on specific tasks requiring interbranch cooperation. For instance,
see

Henry Abraham, Justices and Presidents, 2nd

appointment of Supreme Court

Justices;

ed.

(New York: Oxford,

1985) regarding the

Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges (New Haven, CT:

Yale University Press, 1997) regarding the appointment of lower court judges; Louis Fisher,
War Power (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 993) and Presidential Spending

Presidential

Power
7

From

studies,
8

1

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).

this perspective, the separation

of powers

is

less a barrier to

and more a "crcational" principle which shapes judicial

U.S. Constitution, Article

Court, and

in

III:

"The judicial power of the United

such inferior Courts as the Congress

may from

3

be overcome, as

it

is in

policy

activity.

States, shall be vested in

one supreme

time to time ordain and establish."

1

1

This study also differs from
others
States

Supreme Court but on

Massachusetts' eourt of last

the

Supreme

resort.

To

in that the speeifie

foeus

Judicial Court (SJC), the

is

not on the United

Commonwealth of

the degree that the judiciary's
place in a system

of separation of powers has been
analyzed by others the emphasis has
been on the
federal judicial system, usually on
the
judicial

power"

is

really

knowledge of "the

which could be drawn from
separated powers

This assumption
principle" in

is

is

the

Supreme Court, so

this national

same whether

it

that

federal judicial power." 9

focus

is

that the judicial role in a

politics, federalism.

in the history

state level.

in the

way

in

which they

legislators,

system of government. Bearing

in

and

in

mind such

unreasonable to expect that the kinds of power-sharing relationships

which developed

in the

two systems necessarily would be

well-known scholar of state high

courts, has said, "[sjtate

the same.

As Henry

supreme courts

Glick, a

are not simply

duplications of the national court at a lower level of the judicial hierarchy. Instead,

they are distinctive institutions which are integral parts of state political and legal

systems."

9

1

It is

important to look more closely

at the states.

12

While there have been an increasing number of studies of state high courts

in the past

20 years, the

studies tend to emphasize the place of the state high court within a system of federalism rather than

within
10

A

own

state's

system of separated powers.

second assumption could be

study.

1

its

The problems with

Supreme Courts

10

Beginning and developing within different

of their relations with executives and

their respective places in a federal

it is

system of

be exercised on the national or the

kinds of political systems, federal and state
judiciaries differ

differences,

The assumption

problematic, predominantly because of the
"other organizing

American

were created,

our understanding of "the

this

that the

work of the

states

and

assumption will be addressed

in State Politics

(New York:

their courts aren't important

later in this chapter.

Basic Books, 1971

4

),

5.

enough

to

The theory underlying
conflict; the question

the central questions

of how

which

branch should possess the

sounds nice and neat

the separation of powers
contains seeds for potential

this conflict is operationalized
in

is

explored

legislative,

in theory.

in the

Massachusetts

pages which follow. Stating

However, the

actual exercise of

of demarcation between one power and
the next tend

moves

to the

one assumes

realm of practical
that the separation

one of
one

that

one the executive, and one the judicial
power

power

definition of what the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers are. 13
lines

is

politics.

to run into

requires a clear

The

theoretical

each other as one

This problem can be envisioned as follows.

of powers establishes a

political

If

system with three

separate and co-equal parts of government, the
system can be seen as three circles of

equal size which meet

in the

middle, overlapping slightly. 14 Those areas where there

no overlap are widely recognized
in question.

Much

as legitimate activities for the branch of

of the work of any one branch

institutional legitimacy. Conflicts that

do occur

is

in these

realms rest on ideological

imposed by the separation of powers.

acting within

While the authority of the

Chapter 2 provides a more detailed discussion of the differences between the Massachusetts and U.S.

systems and the effects of these differences on
1

is

A prime example would be the

politics that surround passage of a state or national budget.

12

government

uncontested, at least on grounds of

differences and not on questions of whether the institution in question
the boundaries

is

Some

theoretical literature will

make an

their respective judiciaries.

important distinction between the terms "power" and

"authority," with authority indicating that the activity
entity in question

implying

that the

is

acting.

power

to

which

I

refer

is

may

lie in

recognized as legitimate by those over
I

act

of power

is

whom the

will use the terms interchangeably,

being exercised legitimately.

always be debatable since the view of whether an
beautiful,

is

However, unless indicated otherwise

Of course

this assertion will

legitimate, like the

view of what

is

the eye of the beholder.

14

Whether one describes the "circles of power" as having only slight overlap (perhaps 5-10% for
purposes of description) or a greater degree of overlap (25% plus) depends, of course, on how one
defines each of the powers. In addition, whether these "circles" are of equal size is probably also open
debate.

5

to

legislature to pass the budget

the details of

The
intersect

is

unquestioned, there

is

often a great deal of debate
over

what these economic documents
should contain.

conflicts

change

in nature as

one moves closer

to point at

and overlap. Here, while ideological
overtones may

potential for conflict

becomes increasingly

being whether the activity

Some of this

government.

separation of powers as

generally

in

known

it

question

conflict

is

is

institutional, with the

has been established

in all

American

power which may

traditionally understood.

fall

legislature's

To

predominant query

in

it

of the

the United States through what are

in the

is

recognized by most

"overlap") but this power

constitutions, federal

into the overlap but

and

state.

in

some

instances,

is

to

clearly

There arc other

which arc not checks as

Rather, they represent the exercise of a recognized

branch of government which may,
the other branches.

be present, the

built into the constitutional structure

as "checks." For instance, the executive
veto

granted to executives

circles

being performed by the appropriate branch
of

be an exercise of legislative power (placing

exercises of

still

winch the

compromise

power by

a

the independence of

use the budget process as an example again, while a

power over

the budget includes the ability to determine overall spending

for a governmental unit, this action

may

seriously affect another branch

when

the

legislative determination limits the operation of the executive or the judiciary.

This study focuses on the judicial power

in

an attempt

to

determine what

activities fall within the circle.

While some time

Court, the primary emphasis

on the areas of overlap, particularly

between the SJC and

is

is

devoted

will be

work of the

in the relationship

the state's legislature, the General Court of Massachusetts.

includes those activities of the state's high court which

There

to the "routine"

some discussion of judicial-executive

come

15

This

closest to the legislative

interactions as well, but these arc less frequent.

domain

(circle) as well as

which touch upon
1)

SJC

in a

some

the judiciary.

What do

administrative oversight performed
by the Legislature

Two

closely connected questions
guide tins research:

the justices of the state's high
court understand to be the role of
the

system of separated powers and

to

what degree do they

feel free to

pursue that

role?

2)

How

does the system of separated powers

in

Massachusetts shape or

influence the activities of the state's high
court?

Before presenting the results of this study

it

is

important to provide a broader

context within which these more detailed findings
can be placed. This begins with a

review of the most
separated powers

common

-

debate regarding the place of the judiciary

system of

the courts and policymaking.

JUDICIAL P OLICYMAKING The

in a

role that should be played

IS IT

LEGITIMATE?

by the justices who

sit

on the United

States'

highest courts has been a subject of debate throughout the nation's history. Not
surprisingly, the debate has been the

touched on the most
role the state

economic

most heated when the

politically divisive issues.

courts' decisions

have

These have included questions of the

and national governments should play

in the issues

of slavery, of

regulation, of balancing standards of due process with public safety, of

regulating abortion and, most recently (again), of limiting school sponsored prayer.

Much

of the debate stems from the volatile nature of the subject matter.

which

institution

of government has made decisions on these questions

subject to criticism.

The

critique

No
it

matter

has been

of the courts, however, takes place on a different level

7

smce

the concern

is

not only over the direction a
policy question should take,
but also

over whether the judiciary

The impetus

the proper institution for

is

making policy decisions

at all.

for this additional concern
generally stems from questions of
democratic

accountability. Justices of the U.S.

Supreme Court and of the high

courts of almost

one-quarter of the states are appointed to
their positions for extended
periods of time

and are

immune from

virtually

direct democratic action in response
to their decisions.

These individuals are unlikely candidates

for deciding important policy
questions in a

democracy. Yet they do make such decisions.
Frequently
of what right they have
20th century as legal

to

do

so.

this

has raised the question

This question became even more important

in the

destroyed the myth of the neutral role which justices
play.

realists

If justices aren't able to apply principles

some

16

of statutory and constitutional interpretation by

objective standard, their role in determining public policy
questions

is

more

problematic.

Despite these concerns
state

and national,

dealing with

all

life.

all

Supreme Court

(life);

These

by the President, with the advise and consent of the
employ an appointment process for choosing the justices of

are appointed

fifty states

states include the following

(numbers

in

parentheses indicate the term

are eligible for reappointment): Connecticut (8); Delaware (12); Hawaii (10);

Massachusetts
Island

and appellate, make "public policy." 17 In an edited work

Eleven of the

their highest court as well.

of office;

recognized by almost everyone today that courts,

types of American courts, Gates and Johnson note that "American

Justices of the U.S.

Senate, for

trial

it is

(life

-

age 70);

New

Hampshire

(life

South Carolina (10); and Vermont

(6).

-

age 70);

New Jersey

(7);

New York

Maine (7);
Rhode

(14);

(The Book of the States, 1998-1999 [Lexington,

KY:

National Council of State Governments, 1998], 129-137.)
17

"Stated most simply, public policy

is

the

sum of governmental

through agents, as those actions have an influence on the

lives

activities,

whether acting directly or

of citizens." B.

Guy

Peters,

American

Public Policy: Promise and Performance, 4th ed. (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishing, 1996),
Technically any decision of a court, whether
individuals or interpreting the First
citizens.

More

it

5.

be interpreting the details of a basic contract between two

Amendment of the

U.S. Constitution, will influence the lives of

its

frequently, however, judicial policymaking generally refers to the second type of action,

will clearly have influence beyond the parties to the suit. As will become clearer in the
methodology discussion below, however, which decisions should be called judicial policymaking and
which should not is not so easy to determine.

one which

courts do

make

enduring."

18

public policy and...much of this
policy

Stumpf and Culver echo

this

systems. "Courts and judges are seen
not

is

politically significant

sentiment in their work on state
judicial
in legal isolation

nor as separate from politics

but inevitably and inextricably part
of the larger political process." 19
state

and

And

speaking of

high courts, Tarr and Porter noted that
«[s]tate supreme courts have always
been

active policymakers, particularly in
the development of complementary
and
institutional policy."

policy.

20

Normative debates

aside, the reality

is

that courts

do make

21

These two perspectives create a
judicial decision making.

On

one side

sure the United States does not

which provides

conflict

is

become

the

demand

hotbed for studies of

for judicial accountability to be

a legal dictatorship.

desire to guarantee the judicial independence which

a

is

On

the other side

is

a

necessary for justices to decide

22
cases on something beyond what the most vocal interest
group demands.

Explorations of judicial decision making generally examine the actions
of justices
within the framework of this accountability-independence debate. Especially
John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson, The American Courts: A Critical Assessment (Washington
D.C.:
19

20

CQ

Press, 1991),

1.

Harry B. Stumpf and John H. Culver, The Politics of State Courts (New York: Longman, 1992),

Mary Cornelia Porter and G. Alan Tarr, State Supreme
Greenwood Press, 1982), xxii-xxiii.

Courts: Policymakers

in the

5.

Federal System

(Westport, CT:
21

Shortly after beginning this project

understanding of this fact

I

found an interesting anecdotal quote which

in the legal world.

reflects an

A newspaper account of a Cape Cod case involving the

fishing rights of Wampanoags quoted a Barnstable

County assistant district attorney as saying, "Our plea
Supreme Judicial Court and the Legislature. Give us an answer that has some clarity to it
so that members of the Native American community, who want to hunt, and police, who are charged with
enforcing the laws fairly, know what their rights are out there when everybody is carrying a gun." New
Bedford Standard Times, July 17, 1998, B2. There was little concern about who made the policy
is

to both the

determination, just that
22

it

be made.

Continuing concerns about judicial independence

policymaking proves

and

that

that

while justices

make

in the face

policy there

of legislatures and executives.

9

is

of an increasing awareness of judicial

a difference

between judicial policymaking

interesting to study are opinions

which involve

differences, whether these be
between

various eourts of a similar jurisdiction
over time, within one court on a
specific case, or

even

in the

make

jurisprudence of one justice

the judicial process

explained primarily
a

problem inherent

in

in

admittedly imperfect

seem most

25

"political."

medium

For some these differences are

for expressing ideas. 24

at the

differ in their

for

still

it

is

others, the difference

view of what may account

for legal factors in decision making, if they

the potential explanatory

And

various strategic circumstances confronted

variations; they also diverge in the degree to

this

these differences winch

any endeavor requiring the interpretation
of language, an

These explanations

job of a justice,

It is

21
terms of the political ideologies of the
justices.
For others

can be explained by looking
case.

in different cases.

which they

power of any of these

at all.

each

for court

are willing to

acknowledge any

in

concede

a role

While not denying

three approaches to understanding the

study presents a supplement to these views. Rather than

emphasizing questions of democratic accountability, the focus
judiciary as an institution within a democracy which

is

is

on the place of the

premised upon the separation of

For the most prominent, current work which presents this view see Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth,
The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). This
perspective has generally been at the heart of criticisms of the Supreme Court. For instance, see Robert
Bork, Tempting America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990).
24

See, for instance, John Brigham, Constitutional Language (Westwood, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987)
James Boyd White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990).
25

The foundational work

in this regard

is

Walter Murphy's Elements ofJudicial Strategy (Chicago,
can be seen as a part of the

University of Chicago Press, 1964).

Much contemporary work which

"positive theory of institutions" also

Fits this

Choices Justices Make (Washington, D.C.:
Paul Wahlbeck, Crafting
University Press, 2000).

category such as "Order

IL:

mold. See, for instance, Lee Epstein and Jack Knight,

CQ

Press, 1998)

and Forrest Maltzman, James Spriggs, and

Law on the Supreme Court: The Collegial Game (New York: Cambridge
Much of the work of Melinda Gann Hall and Paul Brace also fall in this

in the

Courts:

A

Neo-institutional

Political Quarterly 20 (1987), 147-168 and Melinda
in State

or

Gann

Approach

Supreme Courts, Journal of Politics 54 (1992), 427-446.

10

to Judicial

Consensus," Western

Hall, "Electoral Politics

and Strategic Voting

powers. This approach incorporates
the democratic perspective,
but moves beyond
look

at the

parameters circumscribing the role
of the courts

government

American

in

in the

it

to

system of

states.

A VIEW FROM THE STATFS
Professors Paul Brace and Melinda

newly developed
Judicature

State

article.

In

Supreme Court Data

doing

so, they

questions that needs to be addressed
at all'?"

it is

a

26

This

is

good place

Gann

a question with

Hall, the

moving

forces behind the

Project, described this project in a recent

noted that "[p]erhaps the most fundamental
in this project is

which

all

scholars

'Why

who

study state supreme courts

study state courts

is

faced, so

to begin.

"WHY STUDY STATE SUPREME COURTS AT ALL?"
There are

fifty-three courts

of last resort

in the

United States.

27

One of these,

however, has received the majority of attention from judicial scholars over the
In

comparison

supreme

to the U.S.

courts, operate in relative

"Comparing Courts Using
27

Supreme Court

Throughout

paper

this

I

American

the other fifty-two institutions, the state

academic (and public) obscurity.

States, Judicature 83 (2000),

supreme court,"

will use the terms "state

last resort" interchangeably.

Only 43

the

years.

250-265,

28

at

The

253.

"state high court,"

This allows for some linguistic variation although

it is

attraction to

and "state court of

not technically

term "supreme court" for a single court of last resort. In Maine and
Supreme Judicial Court; in Maryland and New York it is called the Court
of Appeals; and in West Virginia it is called the Supreme Court of Appeals. Oklahoma and Texas also
differ from the other states having two courts of last resort (which explains why there are 53 courts of last
resort), the Supreme Court for civil cases and the Court of Criminal Appeals for criminal cases. To
round out the confusion in names, the Supreme Court in New York refers to the highest level trial court.
accurate.

Massachusetts

28

it

See, Lawrence

Discipline, ed.

states use the

is

called the

Baum,

Ada W.

Martin Shapiro, "Public

"Judicial Politics: Still a Distinctive Field," in Political Science:

The State of the

Finifter (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1983);

Law and

Judicial Politics," in Political Science:

i

I

The State of the Discipline If

the U.S.

Supreme Court

eaeh year (eighty-one

in

body have wide-ranging
are issued.

One need

is

understandable. While

it

issues a small

number of opinions

1999/2000) the opinions issued by the
justices of this august
effects, influencing

think only about

many

citizens for years after the decisions

American public policy

in

areas as diverse as

affirmative action, redisricting, and
prayer in schools to realize this impact.
in this

Court

research.

is

also aided

In contrast, the study

problem associated with

which

The

is

by the

fact that

it

2"

Interest

provides a centralized focus for purposes
of

of state high courts presents scholars with
the perennial

the study of any state institution:

how

to

conduct a study

small enough to be manageable while not
being so small as to be parochial/ 0

benefits of looking at these important
political institutions, however,

worthwhile challenge

It is

make

this a

to tackle.

true that the activities of any one state

supreme court

rarely have the

immediate, wide-ranging impact which most decisions of the Supreme
Court have.

There are

at least four reasons,

however,

as important as a study of the U.S.

some

why

the study of these courts of last resort

Supreme Court. Looking

at

numbers alone we get

indication of the potential importance of these "other" supreme courts.

highest appellate court in each state issues at least as

perspective in the decade between the two analyses, he

focused on the federal courts

in

still

many

general focus of most judicial research

is

at

The

written opinions (and often

critiques the field for being too narrowly

Supreme Court in particular. While am addressing
the state level I do not address the other, that the

general and on the

one concern of these commentators by looking

is

on appellate courts

I

at the

expense of trial courts.

29

For a discussion of the impact of Supreme Court decisions, see Charles A. Johnson and Bradley C.
Canon, Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 19X4).
3(1

"Because of daunting data collection burdens, scholars in most instances have been forced to choose
between intensive case studies of single states or small numbers of slates, and 50-statc studies conducted
have chosen the single state
at high levels of aggregation." Brace and Hall, "Comparing Courts," 252.
approach. This problem with this will be discussed in more detail in the next few pages.
I

12

more) as the nation's highest

court.

31

Minimally,

this

means

there are fifty times

more

opinions being .ssucd on an annual
basis by these relatively
neglected bod.es. While
quantity alone

may

not establish a sufficient reason
for pursuing an interest in
these

courts, the substance of their
decisions should.

American law, common law precepts
probate, divorce and child custody.

arc

still

Most

Despite the ongoing "statutification"
of

vital to the

law regarding

legal controversies involving

torts, real estate,

such questions

arc resolved on the state level, with
the state high courts being the most
prominent legal

voice

in settling these

questions of law. 32 Additionally, most
criminal law

in the

United

States originates in the states and state
supreme courts regularly apply and interpret

these laws in the cases before them. Substantively,
the

work of these

courts seems to

33
be as important as the work of the U.S. Supreme
Court.

The

quantity and substance of the decisions issued by
state high courts have

always been sufficient grounds

to justify

American

twenty years, however, make

politics

over the

last

an interest

in their activities.

interesting time to study institutions of state government.

of the guard

American

that occurred in

federalism.

this

Trends

in

an even more

The congressional changing

1994 marked the potential for a dramatic change

The new Republican majority had campaigned on

in

a platform

31

ln the 15 years studied for this project the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) issued an
average of 244 opinions/year. This compares with the 81 full opinions issued by the Supreme Court

the 1999/2000 term. Data for

all state

supreme courts

in the

in

1990s was developed by Brace and Hall.

"Based on data we collected for 1994, we have estimated that each state court of last resort issues an
average of 228 decisions per year, while some issue as many as 1,500." ("Comparing Courts," 263.)
3

"

"In certain areas of the law, basic legal rules have been established almost entirely through state court

decisions rather than statutes. ...The most important

common

law areas arc property law. ..contract

more active role in the common law fields, courts
remain the primary decision makers." Lawrence Baum, "Supreme Courts in the Policy Process," The
State of the States, ed. Carl E. Van Horn (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1996), 144.
law... and tort law.

I

do not mean

to

While

imply

reviews are

full

done on the

institutions

legislatures today play a

that

no studies have been done on

of such studies.

I

am

which "make"

state

law as developed by

referring, instead, to the limited
this law, the states'

13

supreme

state courts.

Law

amount of research which has been

courts.

which included several items
between

states

limitation on

legislation

much

to challenge the existing
status

and the federal government. 34
They began

unfunded mandates

,n

which broke with over

1995. This

fifty

quo

this

in the relationship

change with the

was followed by 1996's welfare reform

years of practice, giving state
governments a

larger role in the development
of welfare policy. Congress

was aided

in

making

these changes by former Arkansas
Governor William Jefferson Clinton, a
Democratic

who

president,

the U.S.

signed both pieces of legislation. Adding
to

Supreme Court's opinion

the Court struck

down

power under

commerce

the

a piece

in U.S. v.

Lopez when,

for the first time since 1936,

The Court determined

legislation to regulate guns within 1,000 feet
of a school

with

shift

that the

continues,

it

of power from the federal

becomes even more important

that

we

enactment of federal

was beyond Congress'

increased responsibilities for the states' high courts.

it

wave of change was

of federal legislation as extending beyond
Congress's

clause.

recognized authority. 35 This

this

to the state level brings

If this political trend

understand

all

we can

about these

institutions.

A

final

reason for studying these institutions

is

that they

can provide a unique

lens for comparative study, not only between state courts themselves, but also with the

U.S. Supreme Court. Because the nation's high court stands alone atop the hierarchy of
the federal court system

there

34

is

it is

generally studied as a single, unique institution. While

an increasing number of comparatives works which look

See Newt Gingrich, Bob Schellhas,

Gingrich, Rep. Dick

eds.,

at the

U.S.

Supreme

Contract with America: The Bold Plan by Rep. Newt

Armey and the House Republicans

to

Change

the Nation

(New York: Times Books,

1994).
35

U.S.

v.

Lopez 115 U.S. 1624 (1995). While the Court in 1976 did find that applying the Fair Labor
state and local employees extended beyond Congress' commerce power, the intervening

Standards Act to

federalism issue makes the case less clear. The Court did not strike
limited the application of the law. See National League of Cities

14

v.

down

the law in

its

entirety.

Usery 426 U.S. 833 (1976).

It

only

5

Court from a comparative perspective
with other national high courts,

it

is still

understudied from a comparative
perspective.- There are enough
similarities between
the U.S.

Supreme Court and

valid as well.

state

supreme

courts,

however,

that

comparisons here arc

37

In both instances

one finds a high court with supervisory
power, both

as regards the law and administrative
questions, over a cadre of lower
courts. Both are

the final voice in interpreting their
respective constitutions, and both
operate as a co-

equal branch of government with a
legislature and an executive

system of separated

in a

powers. These similarities allow for
comparisons regarding questions of judicial
administration, development of constitutional
law, and the use of judicial review and

bring us back to an earlier question:

is

the role of the United States

democratic system of separated powers the prototype or
different sets of relationships?

The comparison between

and Massachusetts which

States

is

presented in Chapter

and constitutional place of every court within

same

as that of the U.S.

answer than the

state

Massachusetts (or any single

is

such a system produce

the high courts of the United

Two shows

that the historical

system of separated powers

high courts are deserving of attention

related question

Massachusetts which

its

in a

is

not the

Supreme Court.

The question of why
to

may

Supreme Court

state)

which

this

an easier one

study inevitably must tackle

alone worth studying?

What can be

of interest more broadly? For citizens of the

learning about Massachusetts alone has value.

is

Beyond

-- is

learned from

state,

this local interest,

of course,

however, an

36

See, for example, Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in
Comparative Perspective (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998) and Theodore L. Becker,
Comparative Judicial Politics: The Political Functionings of Courts (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970).

37

This

is

not to deny the differences between these institutions, not the least of which

is

the authoritative

place which the Supreme Court holds in questions of federal-state conflict. These differences do not
necessarily preclude comparison in

all

instances, however.

1

in-depth study of the high court
of one state

is

be added to an ever-growing number
of single

of interest

for

state studies

two reasons.

First,

it

ean

which are being done.

While not organized around a common
theme or organizing perspective, book
length
studies have been done of the
supreme courts of Alabama,

Washington.

which

to

38

As more works

are completed, there will be

draw comparisons. With

one of the

a long

states included in the first

There

is

New

a second reason

why

and proud

York, Virginia, and

more substantive

data upon

history, Massachusetts should be

round of studies.
relying only on multi-state, quantitative
studies

provides an insufficient basis for understanding
the role of state supreme courts. While
they provide good data for comparative purposes,
studies of much more than three
states

must be somewhat

superficial.

The more

states

which are incorporated

study, the

more

analysis.

The shortcomings of such an approach can be seen

the researcher

SJC

the role of the

is

in the state's

in a

required to rely on quantitative data over qualitative

in this study.

policymaking process by looking only

data (exercise of judicial review, constitutional interpretations,

To

assess

at quantifiable

number of advisory

opinions issued) would have underestimated the degree to which the SJC has
influenced major areas of the law in the Commonwealth. The Court's extensive

involvement

38

See, Robert

J.

in

developing policy through both statutory construction and the

Frye, The

Alabama Supreme Court

(University,

AL: Bureau of Public

Affairs,

University of Alabama, 1961); Francis Bergan, The History of the New York Court of Appeals, 18471932 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); Thomas R. Morris, The Virginia Supreme Court
(Charlottesville,

A

VA:

A related type of
State

Supreme Court

(Seattle: University

study which should not be overlooked

Supreme Courts

A Century ofJudging:
of Washington Press, 1988).

University Press of Virginia, 1975); and Charles H. Sheldon,

Political History of the Washington

in State

is

G. Alan Tarr and

and Nation (New Haven, CT: Yale University

Mary Cornelia Aldis

Porter present an analysis of the high courts in three different states, Alabama,

They use

a

model which

New

Jersey, and Ohio.

views the states' high courts in relation to the federal courts (vertical

federalism), to courts in other states (horizontal federalism), and to

system.

16

its

Porter,

Press, 1988). Tarr and

place in the state's political

development of common law would be
overlooked." While there
comparative advantages of large-scale
quantitative studies, they
incomplete picture

if

j.

no denying the

w

will pan,, only

they are not supplemented by
in-depth, qualitative studies.

On

the

other hand, single-state stud.es like
this must rely heavily on the
research which has

been done by others

in

order to

make most use of its

"data."

A

look

at

some of these

studies follows.

WHAT DO WE ALREADY KNOW?
While the Supreme Court has been

the

dominant focus of much research, a

variety of interesting and informative studies
have been conducted on state supreme

courts over the past thirty years.

They can be divided broadly

into three categories:

those which focus specifically on one or more state high
courts and

which focus on the place of state high
which consider the place of the

Added

to this is the rapidly

state

its

justices, those

courts within a system of federalism, and those

high court within a system of separated powers. 40

growing body of comparative

state court research

from

those associated with the State Supreme Court Database Project, especially Brace and
41

Hall.

See Chapter 4 for an analysis of this
40

41

As

activity in Massachusetts.

previously noted, there are also studies on the law of each

state.

See, for instance, Brace and Hall, "Comparing Courts Using the American States," Judicature 83

Supreme Courts," Journal of
Model of Judicial Voting Behavior,
American Politics Quarterly 20 (1992), 147-168; Hall and Brace, "The Vicissitudes of Death by Decree:
Forces Influencing Capital Punishment Decision Making in State Supreme Courts," Social Science
Quarterly 15 (1994), 136-151; and Hall, "Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual
(2000); Hall and Brace, "Integrated Models of Judicial Dissent

Politics 55 (1993), 914-935; Hall and Brace,

"Toward an

Notes and a Case Study," Journal of Politics 49

(

1

987),

17

1

in State

Integrated

1

1

7-

1

1

24.

Much
to states

of the research which

of research questions

Court and other federal courts.

fits

into this first category has

wh 1C h were
42

first

been an appli
lication

raised in the study of the U.S.

For instance, a plethora of studies

in the

Supreme

1960s and

1970s were published on the relationship
between partisan and ideological variables

and the decisions of state supreme court
43
justices.
Individuals have also followed
concerns from the federal level to the
setting

44

courts.

and of the

45

supreme courts have taken

which focused on

is in

amicus curiae participation

A prominent series

institutions.

This

of state high court agendain the

opinions of state high

Like some of the most famous works on
the U.S. Supreme Court, some

studies on state

42

affect of

states in the study

the

a historical

approach

to research

on these

of studies was conducted by a team of researchers

workload of state supreme courts over a 100 year period between

addition to the comprehensive single states studies
mentioned above.

Attitudinal studies of state supreme court justices include, David
Adamany, "The Party Variable in
Judges' Voting: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study," American
Political Science Review 68 (1966), 57;
Kathleen Barber, "Partisan Values in the Lower Courts: Reapportionment in
Ohio and Michigan," Case

Law Review 20 (1969), 401-416; Lawrence Baum, "Policy Goals in Judicial
Proximity Model of Discretionary Jurisdiction," American Journal
of Political Science
21 (1977), 13-33; Edward N. Beiser and Jonathan Silberman, "The Political Party Variable:
Workmen's
Western Reserve

Gatekeeping:

A

Compensation Cases in the New York Court of Appeals," Polity 3 (1971), 521; Malcolm Feeley,
"Another Look at the 'Party Variable' in Judicial Decision-Making: An Analysis of the Michigan
Supreme Court," Polity 4 (1971), 91-104; Robert A. Heiberg, "Social Background of the Minnesota
Supreme Court Justices: 1858-1958," Minnesota Law Review 5 (1969), 901-937; Dean Jaros and Bradley
C. Canon, "Dissent on State Supreme Courts: The Differential Significance of Characteristics of Judges,"
Midwest Journal of Political Science, 15 (1971), 322; John W. Patterson and Gregory J. Rathjen,
"Background Diversity and State Supreme Court Dissent Behavior," Polity 9 (1976), 610-622; Glendon
Schubert, "The 'Packing' of the Michigan Supreme Court," in Glendon Schubert, ed., Quantitative
Analysis ofJudicial Behavior (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959); S. Sidney Ulmer, "The Political Party
Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court," Journal of Public Law
(
963), 352-362; and Kenneth
1

1

1

Vines, "Southern State Supreme Courts and Race Relations," Western Political Quarterly 18 (1965), 518.

44

Lawrence, Baum, "Decisions

to

Grant and Deny Hearings

Court and Individual Behavior," Santa Clara

"Case Selection by Courts

in the

Georgia and

Law Review
Illinois

in the

California

Supreme Court:

Patterns in

16 (1976), 713-744 and Victor E. Flango,

Supreme Courts," Justice System Journal

12

(1987), 398-401.
45

Lee Epstein, "A Comparative Analysis of the Evolution, Rules, and Usage of Amicus Curiae Briefs in
Supreme Court and in State Courts of Last Resort", paper presented at the annual meeting of the

the U.S.

Southwestern

Political

Science Association,

Little

Rock,

IK

AR (1989).

1

1870-1970.

46

approached

Specific studies and edited works
on individual courts have also
their topic

from a

historical perspective. 47 All

of these works prove the

value of state high court research as
a tool for comparison, both
between

state courts

and with the U.S. Supreme Court. 48

The second broad category of research on
the place

state

which these

institutions play in a

state

supreme courts has focused on

system of federalism, analyzing either the

high courts' interactions with the U.S.
Supreme Court ("vertical federalism") or

their interaction with sister courts in
other states ("horizontal federalism"). 49
Analyses

of the relationship involved
general categories. The

in vertical

first

federalism can be further divided into two

of these are compliance studies which focus on the

reaction of state high courts and other implementing
populations to controversial
rulings of the U.S.

process.

50

Supreme Court,

especially in the realm of religion and criminal

The second category of studies focuses on

Lawrence M. Friedman, Robert A. Kagan,

the

movement known

as the

new

and Stanton Wheeler, "State Supreme
(1981), 733; Kagan, Cartwright,
Friedman, and Wheeler, "The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970," Stanford Law Review 30
(1977), 121; Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman, and Wheeler, "The Evolution of State Supreme Courts,"
Michigan Law Review 76 (1977/1978), 961; Kagan, Bobby D. Infelise, and Robert R. Detlcfsen,
Courts:

Bliss Cartwright,

A Century of Style and Citation," Stanford Law Review 33

"American State Supreme Court Justices, 900- 970," American Bar Foundation Research Journal 37
(1984); and Wheeler, Cartwright, Kagan, and Friedman, "Do the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead? Winning
and Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970." Law and Society Review 21 (1987), 403. For a critical
1

review of this

series, see

Stephen Daniels,

1

"A Tangled

Tale: Studying State

Supreme Courts," Law and

Society Review 22 (1988), 833.
47

in

Bcrgan, The History of the New York Court of Appeals; Russell K. Osgood, ed., 77z<? History of the
Massachusetts: The Supreme Judicial Court 1692-1992 (Boston, MA: Supreme Judicial Court

Historical Society, 1992); and Sheldon,
48

The works of Brace and

Law

A Century ofJudging.

Hall can be seen as following newly emerging trends on general judicial

research (begun, as usual, on the national level) as they apply concepts from the rational choice "class"

new

supreme courts. For a discussion of "new institutionalism"
see Cornell Clayton and Howard Gillman, eds., Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist
Approaches (Chicago: Unversity of Chicago Press, 1996).
the "school" of

49

institutionalism to state

Terms come from Tarr and

Porter, State

Supreme Courts

19

in State

and Nation.

in

judicial federalism, the action taken
by

some

state high courts to decrease
their reliance

on the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court
and

to increase their efforts to

51
independent body of state constitutional
law.
Stud.es which look

at

the horizontal perspective have
included studies of judicial innovation

developing areas of law such as "right

to die"

develop an

federalism Iron,

m

newly

and the diffusion of these and other

legal

precepts from one state to another. 52

we come

Finally,

to the third category

of research which raises questions about

a state supreme court's position as one of
three co-equal branches of government.

While some research has focused on
separation of powers,

it

is

the place of the state high courts in a system
of

here that our knowledge

is

thinnest.

53

Judicial selection

studies are concerned with this relationship at the
point of appointment or election but
54
they do not consider the ongoing relations between the
branches.
State policy

50

See studies

cited in Stephen

Wasby, The Impact of the United State Supreme Court: Some
Dorscy Press, 1970) and in Charles A. Johnson and Bradley C. Canon,
Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press,
1984).
Perspectives

M

Many

(Homcwood,

articles

IL:

have been written on

works can be found

in

this topic since the 1970s.

G. Alan Tarr's "Bibliographical Essay"

Courts, 201-209. Also see the Selected Bibliography
Justice

more
5

(New York: Greenwood

detail in

Chapter

Press, 1991). This

in

A

and Tarr,

Barry Latzer's State

phenomena

in

some of the earlier
Supreme
Constitutions and Criminal

bibliography of

in Porter

eds., State

Massachusetts will be discussed

in

5.

These studies include Caldeira's research on

the reputation of state high courts, his seminal piece being

Gregory A. Caldeira, "On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts," Political Behavior 5 (1983), 83-108.
Also included in this category arc studies on the diffusion of policy innovations among state courts. See,
for instance, Lawrence Baum and Bradley C. Canon, "Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innovations,"
American Political Science Review 75 (1981), 979-987; Henry R. Glick, "Judicial Innovation and Policy
Re-Invention: State Supreme Courts and the Right to Die," Western Political Quarterly 45 (1992), 71-92;

and Peter Harris, "Structural Change in the Communication of Precedent
970," Social Networks 4 ( 982), 20 -2 2.
1 8701

1

51

In addition to a

1

Among

State

Supreme Courts,

1

view from the perspectives of horizontal and

vertical federalism, Tarr

and Porter also

incorporate this intrastate perspective into their broader study of the stale high courts of Alabama,

New

Jersey, and Ohio.
54

Among

Elections

the

and

many

From Ballot to Bench: Judicial
TX: University of Texas Press, 1980); Henry R.
Systems and Judicial Characteristics: The Recruitment of Stale

studies on judicial selection sec Philip L. Dubois,

the Quest for Accountability (Austin,

Glick and Craig

F.

Emmert, "Selection

20

analyses

may

occasionally include discussions of
the courts, but the activities of
the

other two branches

more frequently

is

generalization, however,

was

highlighted.

55

The exception

the study of role theory and

its

to this

application to state

supreme courts which was pioneered by
Henry Click and Kenneth Vines
1

960s and early 70s.

vacuum,

in the late

56

Starting from an assumption that
justices do not operate in a

that their activities

on the bench are constrained by the

institution

on which

they serve and by that institution's relationship
to the other branches of government
within the

place

state, role

in the

theory

is

vitally

connected

to

broader political system and can help

place of the judiciary

in the

an understanding of the judiciary's
to

provide some perspective on the

development of public policy.

Supreme Court Justices," Judicature 70 (1986), 228-235; Charles H. Sheldon and Linda S.
Maule,
Choosing Justice: The Recruitment of State and Federal Judges (Pullman, WA: Washington University
Press, 1997).
55

An exception to this may be in the area of school financing where some state courts have taken a
leading role in policy development. See Richard Lchne, The Quest for Justice: The Politics
of School
Finance Reform (New York: Longman, 1978) and Doug Reed, "Twenty-five Years After Rodriguez:
School Finance Litigation and the Impact of the New Judicial Federalism," Law and Society Review 32
(1988), 175.
56

Henry R. Glick and Kenneth N. Vines, "Law-Making

in the State Judiciary:

the Judicial Role in Four States," Polity 2 (1969), 142-159.

A

Comparative Study of

Other role theory works include: Theodore

Becker, "A Survey Study of Hawaiian Judges: The Effect on Decisions of Judicial Role Variations,"

American

Political Science

Review 60 (1966), 677-680; James

L.

Gibson, "Discriminant Functions, Role

Orientations and Judicial Behavior: Theoretical and Methodological Linkages," Journal of Politics 39
(1977), 984-1007; James L. Gibson, "Judges' Role Orientations, Attitudes and Decisions: An Interactive

Model," American Political Science Review 12 (1978), 91 1-924; Henry Glick, Supreme Courts in State
Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1971); John Patrick Hagan, "Policy Activism in the West Virginia

Supreme Court of Appeals," West

Virginia

Law Review

89 (1986), 149-165;

J.

Woodford Howard,

Jr.
,

Courts of Appeal in the Federal Judicial System (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981); Charles
Sheldon, "Perceptions of the Judicial Roles in Nevada," Utah Law Review, 1968 (1968), 355; Kenneth
Vines, "The Judicial Role

in

American

States:

An

Exploration," in Frontiers in Judicial Research, eds.

Grossman and Joseph Tanenhaus (New York: John Wiley, 1969); and John T. Wold, "Political
Orientation, Social Backgrounds and Role Perceptions of State Supreme Court Judges," Western

Joel B.

Political Quarterly 27 (1974), 239-248.
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Views on

RRCQMF. 1NVOI

vi

n

>

the appropriateness of judicial
policymaking do not tend toward the

absolute. Rather, there

is

a

continuum of positions

in

answer

to the question

of "when

can courts legitimately make policy,"
marked on one end by the absolute
position of

"never" with "always"

at the

other end.

57

Most individuals who

question would put themselves somewhere
in the middle.
other,

however, advocates of judicial

restraint

each other toward the ends of the spectrum. 5 *

extreme position taken by Justice Roberts

When

think about this

pitted against

each

and advocates of judicial activism push

On

in U.S.

the one

v.

hand are views

like the

Butler which makes the job of a

justice almost mechanical.

There should be no misunderstanding as to the function
of this court
such a case. It is sometimes said that the court assumes
a power to

in

overrule or control the actions of the people's representatives.
This is a
misconception.. ..When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged
in
the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate,
the judicial
branch.. .has only one duty; to lay the article of the Constitution which
is
invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the
latter

squares with the former.

59

At the other extreme are arguments
speak, of course, from the viewpoint of one
alert to construe the Constitution

like that

who

believes that the judiciary should be

and laws of the United States as providing a strong

arsenal for protection of the individual, whatever his place in the spectrum of ideas

57

According

to

James Gibson,

this is the perspective

the degree to

which legitimate opportunities

Judicial Research," in

Goldman and Austin
58
1

59

(New York: Longman,

use these terms to differentiate those

policymaking

297 U.S.

for decisional creativity

American Court Systems: Readings

Sarat

at best (restraint)

in

do

exist."

making
"The Role Concept in

Judicial Process

and Behavior,

cd.

1989), 441.

who feel the judiciary should have only a limited role
who would justify a role in this realm (activism).

from those

1

22

may

adopted by role theory. "In essence, the role

orientation construct represents a unidimensional continuum of legitimate discretion in decision
-

"1

of Justice William O. Douglas.

in

-

Sheldon

be."

60

Yet, if these two individuals
were to work together to search for

in their positions rather than
for differences,
far apart.

Justice Roberts

would admit

it

is

likely they

that justices must, at

while Justice Douglas would note that
there are some limits

The question then moves from "should they
appropriate?" This

is

the question

would

some

ground

find they aren't very

times,

to judicial

or shouldn't they" to

common

make

policy

policymaking.

"when

is it

which a separation of powers view of the
judicial

role can help to answer.

ROLE THEORY - A PARTIAL EXPLANATION
Differences between justices in their willingness
to engage injudicial

policymaking have been described and analyzed from the
61
perspective of role theory.

"Used

in its technical sense, role refers to the sets

of normative expectations which

individuals have regarding the proper behavior and personal qualities
of the occupants

of specific social or
appropriate to a role

(alters)

limit

with

political positions."

come from

whom the

an actor even

if

62

These expectations regarding the

the actor (ego) herself.

They

also

activities

come from

others

individual interacts in her role. Expectations of "alters"

her

own

role orientation

would

dictate otherwise.

may

In the field

of

judicial decision making, these orientations have generally been placed on the

policymaking continuum with "law interpreters"

60

at

one end, "lawmakers"

at the other

The Court Years, 1939-1975: The Autobiography of William O. Douglas (New York: Random House,

1980), 245.
61

According to one researcher who has actively employed this method, "role theory to date has generated
few empirical payoffs — the potential of the approach has not been realized.... As a heuristic device, role
theory may have some utility: As a theory of decision-making its utility has only rarely been
demonstrated." Gibson, "The Role Concept in Judicial Research," 440.
62

Glick,

Supreme Courts

in State Politics, 7.

Much

23

of this paragraph draws from Glick's description.

and "pragmatists"

in

between.

between justices which

63

This theory can help to explain
unexpected variations

attitudinal variables

may

not.

If a justice is a liberal
but

internalized a role orientation as a
'law interpreter," she

move

to

the law in a

Conversely, a

new

liberal

direction even if

who

is

also a "law

it

is

unlikely to use her position

matches her ideological position.

maker" would be

less hesitant.

In addition to providing
explanations for judicial decisions

may

not, there are

two other advantages which

which analyze judicial decision making with
or partisanship.

that

it

starts

when

other theories

role theory has over those theories

a focus

on judicial ideology, background,

64

First

of all, role theory presents a model which

from an assumption

that their activities

and by

has

that justices

do not operate

on the bench are constrained by the

that institution's relationship to other actors.

in a

is

vacuum.

institution

operate.

It

recognizes

on which they serve

Rather than focusing only on the

personal characteristics of the individual justices, role theory looks

which these individuals

closer to reality in

at the

context within

65

These categories are Glick's. The law-interpreter represents the traditional orientation to the law
which is similar to "Blackstone's essentially passive view that judges decide cases on the basis of
established law and that they never legislate[.]" (26) It is the view represented by the quote from Justice
Roberts presented above. A law-maker is a justice who "was fully aware of the debate over lawmaking

and law-interpreting, but usually did not acknowledge

that the distinction between the two positions was
meaningful." (40) The pragmatist rests in a halfway position between the two extremes. "Judges must
remain flexible in their outlook, however, because deciding cases requires them to adhere to precedent as

well as to innovate depending upon the circumstances raised in specific cases." (28).
64

This

is

not to deny that

some of this

difficult to operationalize, has

research has benefits which role theory does not. Role theory
depended largely on the self-reporting of justices, and may be only a

surrogate for other motivations.

As with

the debate over the appropriateness of judicial policymaking

which is pushed to extremes when in opposition, the debates in public law over the appropriate
methodology and theory for best understanding judicial behavior would probably be best served by
various schools working together rather than fighting for dominance in the field.
65

This

is

the

also an advantage of much of the scholarship which falls under the rubric of "new

institutionalism." For the

more

positivist

Choices Justices Make. For a variety of

and Gillman,
the

is

eds.,

approach

articles

to this

Supreme Court Decision-Making: New

work by Brace and

method of study see Epstein and Knight,

which emphasize

Hall cited above.

24

the historical approach, see Clayton

Institutionalist

Approaches. See also much of

The second advantage
and ideological

institutional,

attitudinal studies

is

that role theory recognizes
the influence of legal,

factors in the judicial decision-making
process. Unlike

which emphasize the ideological
motivations of justices,

role theory

allows room for legal and institutional
motivations as well. Chief Justices
Taft and

Burger come

to

mind

as jurists

who appeared

to

be

at least as

motivated by institutional

concerns as ideological ones, being as
concerned with the reputation of the Court as
with the outcome of the cases. 66

On

the state level, Chief Justices Heflin of

and Vanderbilt of New Jersey would also

some

strict attitudinalists

assume

that

this characterization.

fit

any justice

who

Alabama

67

In addition, while

claims to be motivated by legal

factors like precedent or deference to the
legislative branch are only posing to further
their

own

ideological perspectives, role theory stems from an
assumption that political

explanations alone are not sufficient. 68 This assumption
to Glick's 1971

A

work, State Supreme Courts

task for judicial politics research

is

is

made

clear in the conclusion

in State Politics.

not that of determining whether

legal or political interpretations are

most useful in explaining judicial
behavior, but in understanding the interactions between both sets of
values and demands and identifying those aspects of the courts which

most affected by features of both systems. It is also important to
note that legal and political values frequently cannot be separated easily
and that each may have implications for the other. 69
are

66

Chief Justice William Howard Taft

is

widely

known

building. Chief Justice

Warren Burger

also lobbied hard for a variety of administrative reforms to ease

the workload of the federal judiciary. See David O'Brien, Storm Center, 5

2000), chapters 2 and
67

See Tarr and

which
Supreme Court

for his efforts at institutional reform

resulted in the Judiciary Act of 1925 and in funding for the building of the present
lh

ed.

(New York:

Norton,

3.

Porter, State

Supreme Courts

in

State

and Nation.

68

For a particularly strong criticism of the validity of the legal value of judicial restraint, see Jeffrey Segal
and Harold Spaeth's critique of Justice Felix Frankfurter in The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 299-332 passim. This second advantage which claim
for role theory obviously stems from a personal bias that judicial decision making is framed by more than
personal attitudes. I hope this research will show that this is at least true for the justices who serve on the
I

SJC

in

Massachusetts.

25

Role theory provides
different justices

at least a partial

when presented with

explanation for the varying reactions
of

the opportunity to

make

public policy. Whether

justices see themselves primarily as
lawmakers, law-interpreters, or pragmatists
will
affect the decisions

which they make on the bench. One

has been used to study state high courts,
however,

is

that

limitation of this theory as

it

it

assumes a judge adopts a

single role orientation and maintains
this no matter what kind of question
she

is

confronting. While helping us to understand
general differences between justices (and

between high courts of different

states), this

assumption does not provide any

explanation for those differences between one case
and another on the part of a single
justice.

70

Strict attitudinal theory

would have us believe

ideological preferences of the justices.

more

An

this results solely

alternative theory,

from the

and one which comports

closely with the approach taken by role theory, can be found
through a closer look

at the institution

of the separation of powers.

A SUPPLEMENTAL EXPLANATION - SEPARATION OF POWERS
The concept of separation of powers

is

generally recognized as a fundamental

building block in the creation, development, and operation of government

Glick,
70

Supreme Courts

in State Politics,

in the

United

150.

This need not be the case from a theoretical perspective. As Glick notes, the ego-alter relationship

really a set of relationships or dyads.

may

set

The

up one type of expectation while

relationship

that

a justice

may

adopt different roles depending on which dyad

in that specific case.

As

it

judges' beliefs about the limits of proper behavior are also complex. Simplistic typologies of role

lawmaker-law

interpreter distinction

and orientation toward precedent, are

unlikely to be of much utility for understanding judges' role orientations or behavior." "The Role

Concept," 445.

26

is

has been opcrationalized, however,

each justice is generally seen as adopting a single role orientation throughout her career. Gibson has
been critical of this simplistic view. "The position of judge is incredibly complex. Consequently,
orientations, such as the

is

and her colleagues on the bench

between the justice and the governor who appointed her

creates a different expectation. Individual justices

exercising the most influence on them

between

also

States

on both the national and

of the actors

state levels.

It is

also a basis for understanding
the roles

each of the three branches of government.
Because of the concept of

in

separation, legislators are expected to
perform certain functions and executives
others.

The same holds

true for justices of the nation's
courts.

As

a result, the principles

underlying this theoretical construct provide
a helpful lens through which

to

view the

judicial role.

This building block
its

primary purpose being

to

one scholar

who

is

to

an important second-order principle

ensure

has studied for

in

American

politics,

democratic government. However, according

free,

many

years

how

the theory of separation of

powers

plays out in practice, "the concept of 'separation of
powers'. ..has few rivals for

ambiguity. There are wide differences of opinion as to what
the Framers intended by
the expression."

assigned to

71

More

specifically, there are at least three purposes

this institution called the separation

which have been

of powers. Powers are separated:

1) as

a check to protect citizens from the minority in power in the formal organs of

government, maintaining democratic
government; and

3) as a

check

the tyranny of the majority.

71

1

72

2) to bring about greater efficiency in

rule;

to protect the

An

fundamental rights of the individual from

analysis of these three theoretical justifications for

Louis Fisher, "The Efficiency Side of Separation of Powers " Journal of American Studies 5 (1971),
13. This ambiguity puts the separation of powers in the same position as the theoretical concepts which

lie at

the core of American politics, liberty, equality, and individualism, for they also engender debates

over their specific meanings.
72

More

specific support for each of these claims will be presented below.

Most commentators combine

these into two categories: efficiency and preventing tyranny. "The most familiar [reason for the

separation of powers]

is

a fear of tyranny, but another

is

promoting the

efficient operation

of government

of law." Roger Kersh, Suzanne B. Mettler, Grant D. Reeher, and Jeffrey M. Stonecash,
'"More a Distinction of Words than Things': The Evolution of Separated Powers in the American
States," Roger Williams University Law Review 4 ( 998): 7. "Preventing tyranny and ensuring effective

and the

rule

1

governance may be the chief aims of separation of powers law." Robert A. Schapiro, "Contingency and
Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse," Roger Williams University Law Review 4 (1998),
107. "A careful re-examination of the origins and the classic elaboration of the American separation of

27

separating the executive, judicial, and
legislative powers

is

key

interplay of the formal institutions
of government in the policy

each purpose

may

result in a different kind

some

to

which

making process because

of interbranch relationship.

legitimacy of judicial policymaking this
means justices
in

understanding the

to

may

be willing

In regard to the

to

cases while limiting their role to that of
law-interpreter in others. The degree
their

acceptable

involvement

may

development of public policy

in the

vary according to

which the powers of government

how

is

found

are separated in the

policymaking may be legitimate

in

some realms but

The most common purpose which has been
is

to protect the majority

to

be

that policy category Tits" the purposes
for

place.

first

The ambiguity

surrounding the purpose of the principle of separation
of powers means

powers

be lawmakers

from the minority

person or group of powerful persons can impose

that judicial

not in others.

put forward for the separation of

in

power by ensuring

their will

that

on the citizens of a

no one
state or

the nation through their control of all the powers of government. 73 James Madison

usually cited as a primary supporter of this position.

accumulation of all powers,

legislative, executive,

He

noted

in Federalist

and judiciary,

in the

is

#47, "[t]he

same hands

powers doctrine demonstrates that constitutional structure embodies a dual commitment to ensuring
effective governance as well as to protecting liberty." Jessica Korn, The Power of Separation: American
Constitutionalism and the Myth of the Legislative Veto (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 14.

The differentiation of tyranny of the minority in government from tyranny of the majority seems to be
more aptly applied to separation of powers discussions involving the judicial branch as in this study. "As
important as the 'protection' of one branch from another
legislature, the underlying goal of judicial

"Rhode

is,

in this

case the executive from the

enforcement of separation of powers principles

is

the liberty of

Powers Question of the Century:
Reverse Delegation and Implied Limits on Legislative Power," Roger Williams University Law Review 4
its

citizens." Robert F. Williams,

Island's Distribution of

(1988), 171.
73

"The impression pervades

not merely college textbooks but scholarly circles as well." Fisher,

Efficiency Side of Separated Powers,"
in

government was the purpose of the

1

14.

Bill

and Reconstruction (New Haven: Yale

"The

For an argument that protection from tyranny of a minority

of Rights sec Ahkil Reed Amar, The

University Press, 1998).

28

Bill

of Rights: Creation

...may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny." 74 These

were echoed

in the

same sentiments

Massachusetts Constitution of 780. 75
1

In the

government of this Commonwealth, the
legislative department
never exercise the executive and judicial
powers, or either of themThe executive shall never exercise the
legislative and judicial powers, or
either of them: The judicial shall
never exercise the legislative and
executive powers, or either of them: to the
end it may be a government
ot laws and not of men.
shall

From

this,

the Madisonian perspective, powers
of government are divided

between three separate and co-equal branches

becomes powerful enough

to

be certain that the government never

to

develop an interest separate from the

citizens.

It

aims

to

protect democratic government, guaranteeing that
the will and actions of those in power
will result in policies

which represent

results in a policy process

to this view, the

government
Issues

--

which

to

fall

slow

under

of one branch

down and

it

this

frustrate the designs

not the few.

efficiency.

It

"According

to obstruct the process of

of one branch over another."

77

category would involve questions of the constitution's

between the branches of government and questions regarding the
maintain

to

its

independence from the other branches through

"checking powers." While admitting
74

many and

which often favors obstruction over

Framers adopted a separation of powers

distribution of powers

ability

the interests of the

The Federalist Papers, 30

1

.

that the line

For purposes of labeling,

I

its

between process and content

have called

although Madison could just as easily be associated with what

I

this the

have chosen

Madisonian purpose,

to call the "libertarian"

purpose, as well.
75

Constitutions of 40 other states contain a similar provision. G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State

Constitutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 14.

^Massachusetts Constitutions, Part the

commonly

First, Article 30.

called the Declaration of Rights and

I

Part the First of the Constitution

will use that

name throughout

is

more

the rest of this work.

Similarly, references to an article in the Declaration, as well as in the Articles of Amendment to the

Massachusetts Constitution, are always referenced by the justices as
as well.
77

Fisher,

"The Efficiency Side of Separated Powers,"

29

1

14.

"art.",

and

I

will follow that practice

questions

is

often hazy, these type of questions

which public policy

is

would generally

by

determined, the attempt being to maintain
some sense of

Madisonian balance between the three branches.
this

affect the process

view, would be most acceptable

Judicial policymaking, according
to

when undertaken

to restore balance in a

legislative-executive conflict.

The second purpose

which the separation of powers has developed

for

mechanism of governmental organization
promoting
Framers.

this perspective, Fisher

"1

do not claim

is

to

achieve efficiency. In his seminal

emphasizes the importance of this goal

that their search for administrative efficiency,

adoption of separated powers for that purpose, represents
the whole
to

it

be more than half the
should be told."

and since

truth,

as a

this side

of the story

is

to the

and

their

Yet

truth.

given so

article

little

I

find

it

attention

7
*

Separation

is

not intended to achieve efficiency in the same

way

as

a dictatorship might (the trains

may

each activity of government

being performed by the branch most adequately prepared

for the task.

is

not run on time) but

it is

designed to ensure that

designed

to

recognize the strengths of each branch and divide

governmental power so as

to

make

It is

best use of these areas of expertise.

79

representative democracy, the most appropriate branch of government to
the legislature.

set

to

up

It is

designed so that

to gather the variety

develop democratic

n Ibid.,

its

members

In a

make laws

are the closest to the citizens and

of information on problems and solutions which

legislation.

The administration of the

is

is

it

necessary

laws, however, requires a

115.

79

See Fisher, "The Efficiency Side of Separated Powers," for review of the views of Adams, Hamilton,
Washington which support this position. See Korn, The Power of
Separation, for an argument which counters the critique of the separation of powers as being inefficient
Jay, Jefferson, Madison, and

and unable

Woodrow

to

respond

to the

needs of a modern, democratic nation. This view can be traced to

Wilson's Congressional Government: A Study

Gloucester,

MA:

Peter Smith, 1973).

30

in

is

American Government (1885.

reprint ed.,

greater degree of dispatch than can
be obtained by a collective body so
American
political theory has generally
supported

lines

energy and efficiency

of authority and providing them with
sufficient authority

the laws.

powers

80

is

The judiciary's

responsibility according to this

to resolve conflicts

in the executive,

to adequately carry out

view of the separation of

between individuals, between the individual
and the

government, and between different branches
and levels of government. This
the courts do best.

common

law, judiciaries

cases before

desire

the

is

As with

it.

is

what

the interpretation of statutory law and
the application of

making sure

the law

is

reasonably applied to the individual

the first purpose underlying the separation
of powers, the

to protect the majority

from the minority but while the process resulting from

reason tends toward conflict and delay, the policy process
stemming from an

first

efficiency goal

this

Through

unifying

is

one of greater cooperation and

Policy questions arising under

action.

banner would also involve process, but they focus on the question of which types

of action are best handled by which branches of government. Once specific
constitutional limitations have been met, this set of questions

The

final

purpose for the separation of powers

rights" of individuals. In contrast to the first

this

one

is

comes

into play.

to protect the "unalienable

is

two purposes

for the separation of powers,

particularly concerned with protecting minorities

Questions regarding the distribution of power only require

from the majority.

that

each branch stay within

80

See Alexander Hamilton's argument for an energetic executive in Federalist #70, Federalist Papers,
423-43
Hamilton argues that unity in the executive is one of the necessary ingredients to efficient
,

1

.

government. Most

states,

Massachusetts included, do not meet

no elected executive-branch
elected executive officers

officers

who

this

requirement. "Only

beyond the governor, and many

states

undertake important administrative responsibilities and

share the governor's political affiliation." Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions,
the

Governor and Lieutenant Governor

New Jersey

has

have several independently

who need

17.

In

not

Massachusetts

are elected together, but there are four other independently

elected executives. These are the Attorney General, the Auditor, the Secretary of State and the Treasurer

and Receiver General.
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its

own realm

(i.e.,

for the separation

own domain,

its

it

the executive does not exercise
legislative powers). 81 Tins purpose

is

to

ensure that even

when

a branch of

government

is

does not infringe upon the fundamental
rights of individuals,

generally understood to be the rights
delineated in the federal and state

As

acting within

the framers noted, discarding the
hereditary

eliminate this problem.

"It is

monarchy

of great importance

society against the oppression of

its

rulers, but to

in a

for a republic

A system

of rights.

would not

republic not only to guard the

guard one part of the society against

the injustices of the other part....If a
majority be united by a

of a minority will be insecure." 82

bills

common

interest, the rights

of separated powers was intended

to

guard

against the tyranny of the majority, and the courts
were seen as particularly appropriate
for this role.

83

This, the libertarian purpose for separating powers,
provides the

justification for the greatest level of involvement

process.

From

this perspective the separation

by the judiciary

in the

of powers was intended

policymaking

to eliminate

violations of civil rights and civil liberties by any branch of government, even when,

procedurally,

it is

acting in

its

own

realm. In contradiction to the other two purposes

for separating powers, this purpose involves questions of substance.

public policy which

fall

under

this

category would include general

Those questions of

civil liberties issues,

policies regarding due process and criminal process, and those public questions which

touch on issues of civil

8l

rights.

Obviously, neither the federal or

state constitutions

"checks and balances" precludes such a
82

83

strict

provide for a complete separation. The concept of

application of this standard.

Federalist #51, Federalist Papers, 323.

"If, then, courts

of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against
argument for the permanent tenure of

legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong

judicial officersf.]" Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #78, Federalist Papers, 469.

some

difference between the federal and state governments in this regard.

lifetime tenure for their judicial offices. See following footnote.
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Most

Once again

states don't

there

have

is

!52J5S^M

™

These three purposes
politieal system, the

^MAKING .N

JUWCIAL

for separating

governmental powers

in the

American

Madisonian, efficiency, and libertarian
purposes, are each accepted

as legitimate arguments for the existence
of the institution which

called the

is

separation of powers and yet these three
purposes lead to potentially conflicting

expectations for government.

As

applied to the state high courts, they lead to
different

assumptions about the role a court should play

The Madisonian and
courts should not

the state's policy

making process.

efficiency arguments provide basic support for
the expectation that

"make

the most legitimate

in

policy."*

body

4

From

these two perspectives the legislature

(constitutionally) and the best equipped to

make

is

both

law. This

the default position on judicial policymaking in a
system of separated powers, and

the one followed in

many

many

cases in which the

instances by the

SJC has

Supreme

the opportunity to

is

is

Judicial Court in Massachusetts.

make

policy

it

In

defers to the

legislature or the executive or the local government. 85

The high

court of Massachusetts

is

involved in policymaking, however. While

the restraint on judicial policymaking imposed by the separation of powers

arc a variety of exceptions

84

Thc argument

that state

which

arise

supreme courts are

therefore should be least involved

in

from different perspectives on the purposes

"the least democratic branch" of state

making policy

is

not as clear for states as

their years

on the bench. While these selection

democratically accountable than systems of appointment (as followed
quarter of the states, including Massachusetts), the courts are

in the

policy

making process, or

at least

is

slill

there

for

governments and

on the national

in

in the federal

level.
al least

courts and one-

the least democratic of the stales' three

branches. (For an example of the exercise of democratic control over justices

involved

it

some form of election
methods may make justices more

Justices in over three-quarters of the slates must answer to the electorate

once during

is real,

who were

seen as too

on the wrong side of the policy, see John T. Wold, "The

Defeat of the California Justices," Judicature 70 119X7J: 348-355).
8S

There are
made, cases

policy.

really three types
in

which

it

of cases when

could be

made

but

These distinctions are discussed

in

it

comes

isn't,

more

to

policymaking potential: cases

in

which policy

and those cases which do not offer the chance
delail

33

below.

to

make

is

separating powers.
the justices in

They provide

making policy

legitimate arguments for a greater
role on the par. of

for the citizens

of the Commonwealth. Fu st,
different

views of the Madisonian and efficiency
arguments
to justify a

more

aetivc role for the ji.dieia.-y. There
are times

two other branches may

conflict, raising questions

system has the legitimate authority
questions would

tor separating

call

to act.

The

powers can combine

when

of which branch

the actions of the

in the constitutional

resolution of these "Madisonian"

upon the expertise of the courts

as bodies

whose primary

resolving conflicts as fairly as possible.
Such conflicts would not

pit

talent

is

the judiciary

against a "democratic" branch ofgovernment
but would require the judges to choose

between the actions of two, competing "democratic"
branches.
of Massachusetts judicial opinions there were
legislature

and the executive were

a

few cases

in conflict, arising

during the advisory process discussed

in

in

In the

which

the

following study

powers of the

most often over budget questions

Chapter Six.

Efficiency arguments can also justify the policymaking by the SJC
which

is

described in Chapter Four. This involves questions of common law development and
statutory interpretation.

cases, are best able to

"fit" specific cases.

The

make

courts, in applying the generalities of the

the policy adjustments

In addition,

which arc required

law
to

to specific

make

the law

while the majority of these adjustments are

incremental, the courts arc occasionally involved in cases which raise questions which,

to

be adequately resolved, require more substantial policymaking. While the Court

may develop

these policies on their

own

(as with the

development of right-to-die law

Chapter Four), the justices of the SJC also recognize the efficiency

discussed

in

argument

for separating powers.

As

the discussion of the

34

development of

governmental

tort

immunity

will

show, they have encouraged the leg
ls lature

responsibility for developing policy in
areas in
officials are best able to

how

to deal

which they

to take

feel the state's elected

determine the appropriate response

to a

problem,

in this

case

with the increasingly outmoded concept
of governmental immunity.

Judicial inv olvement in questions of
civil liberties and civil rights
has been the

source of many claims over the years that
the judiciary has usurped democratic
power.

These

actions, however, can be supported

separated powers.

results

rights

is

An

by the

libertarian goal

inherent conflict between democratic
processes and libertarian

recognized by most students of government.

and equality are

of the system of

to

have any

real

If the notions

of fundamental

meaning they require some safeguard from

momentary whims of the most democratic branches of government.
As

the high court

justices are the least directly accountable of all public
officials, and as even elected
justices are expected to

make judicial

and not on popular opinion,
fundamental rights and
to

be open

determinations based on the facts before them

their insulation
86

liberties.

makes them

potential guardians of

Alexander Hamilton described why

this role

needs

to the judiciary.

This independence of the judges

is

equally requisite to guard the

Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those

humors which

ill

the arts of designing

men, or the influence of particular
conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and
which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more
deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion

dangerous innovations

minor party
86
I

am

in the

in the government, and serious oppressions of the
87
community.

not arguing here that high courts are always guardians of

United States Supreme Court and

state

liberties.

Many

decisions by both the

high courts over the years can be found to prove that they can

disregard these liberties just as easily as a democratic body. However, conventional
past 50 years (borne out to

some degree by

be more adequately protected by the judicial branch than by either the
of the

state or national

wisdom over the

the facts) has generally found civil liberties

governments.
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and

civil rights to

legislative or executive branches

Cases discussed
questions.

The Court

in

Chapter Five will explore

how

the

SJC has

dealt with these

regularly confronted with civil
rights and civil liberties churns

is

in constitutional questions;
these queries generally pit the
individual against the

executive carrying out the will of the
legislature. This study shows that
the SJC has

never avoided these questions and has
declared actions of co-equal branches

be

to

unconstitutional in such important areas as
abortion funding, the death penalty, and
the

exclusionary rule.

The separation of powers
assumption that "we
institution

all

is

know what

an institution which

it

As

means."

these three justifications for the

each meaning carries different expectations for what

constitutes legitimate judicial activity. 88

The separation of powers can provide

justification for judicial involvement in policy

making

argument

for state

for severely limiting

Recognizing

some

often referred to with the

show, however, we could each be "meaning" something
different when we

make our assumption, and

in

is

this

may

any policy role

help to explain

why

in

some

instances and an

supreme courts

a single justice

may

a

in others.

be willing

to

be

activist

instances but restrained in others.

Federalist #78, Federalist Papers, 469. While Hamilton

people" using their power to tax the minority

whO were

was probably most concerned about

wealthy, the argument

is

"the

equally valid as regards

the protection of other minorities, whether they be racial or ethnic minorities, defendants fighting the

strength of the community's criminal justice forces, or an individual with unpopular ideas.
88

There

may

be some similarity here with the "multiple orders" approach to the study of institutions

presented by Stephen Skowronek

approach finds

which

in

"Order and Change," Polity 28 (1995/1996), 91-96. While his

political disorder arising

are present in the

same

polity,

I

from the conflicts between the meanings of different

am

institutions

arguing that in this instance the competing meanings are

inherent in one institution, separation of powers. While focusing on role theory, this position was voiced

by

J.

Woodford Howard.

Court

"Strain

among

expectations within a role perhaps characterizes their [Circuit

justices] situation better than does the concept of conflict

Federal Judicial System

,

between

roles."

Courts of Appeals

166. This strain stems from different theoretical justifications for the

institution.

36

in the

same

Role theory, with

its

basis in sociological stud.es,
helps explain

socialization, institutional arrangements,
small group

and differences

in state political cultures

may

how

pre-court

dynam.es on an appellate

court,

lead to different attitudes toward
judicial

policy-making by different high courts. 89
Focusing more specifically on the varying
roles required by the three justifications
for the institution of the
separation of powers

may

further explain differences in willingness
to be involved in policymaking
from one

case to another on the same court, and even
explicate some of the seeming
inconsistencies

in

the jurisprudence of individual justices.

Role theory, especially as

applied to state high courts, has always been
intricately connected to the separation of

powers.

It is

premised on the

the degree that

more

fact that the place

one understands

of the courts can be understood only

their relationship with the other branches.

to

By drawing

specifically on theoretical arguments for the justification
of the separation of

powers

to

explore the activities of the Massachusetts high court and the role which

justices see themselves as playing this study

implicit in role theory

Looking

--

that the

makes

explicit

its

what has always been

High Court docs not operate

in a

vacuum.

90

varying purposes for the separation of powers provides another

at the

benefit for studying the role of state high courts. While the textbook notion of

separated powers leads to assumptions of conflict, the recognition of other purposes,
especially the efficiency perspective, provides a reminder that policymaking by the

court does not necessarily result in conflict. Looking only

at

those cases in which the

89

For a work which combines these and other factors into a model to explain decision-making in stale
supreme courts see Susan P. Fino, The Role of State Supreme Courts in the New Judicial Federalism
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987).
90
I

should make clear that

I

use the separation of powers lens

in this

study as a heuristic device, not as a

predictive one. There arc no operationalized variables here or predictions of future judicial activities.

say this not as an apology but merely

to let the reader

37

know what

to

expect

in the

pages which follow.

I

Court

is

involved in a conflictual relation
with the legislature or the executive
would

result in an incomplete picture

policy.

process

part of an

is

neglect.

on the

would overlook

It

of the times when the Court

the various times

involved

is

in

when judicial involvement

ongoing dialogue with the other branches
or the

In either instance the Court

lives

is

making

in the policy

result

of benign

making decisions which have important

effects

of the residents of the State of Massachusetts.

THE SUPREME Ilin iCIAL COURT AND
MASSACH USETTS POT ITICS - AN OVER VIF
In

filed

1997 Representative Henry Hyde, Chair of the House
Judiciary Committee,

HR.1252 - The

Judicial

Reform Act of 1997. The

bill

was

filed, in the

words of

the Chair, to address "the infrequent but intolerable
breach of the separation of powers

by some members of the

federal judiciary."

he and co-sponsors of the legislation saw

91

Concerned with recent problems which

in issues

of judicial discipline and recusal

questions, the legislators responded by filing legislation to limit the authority of the
federal courts.

criticism

Similarly, in 1998 the

from the

overstepping

its

unconstitutional.

prided

itself

legislature

bounds

New

Hampshire Supreme Court came under

and the governor. The Court was accused by some of

in declaring the state

mechanism

The High Court's decision forced

on having no income

tax, to

for funding education to be

the state, a state

come up with

which has long

alternative taxing plans to

correct for educational funding inequities. "Critics say the courts have

become

too

powerful and judges too arrogant because they get lifetime appointments and aren't
accountable. They accuse the Supreme Court of failing to protect the public from bad

Quoted

in

Stephen B. Burbank, "Unwarranted Distrust of Federal Judges," Judicature 8 1 (1997),

38

7.

judges and lawyers, enaeting court
rules

that contradict state law,

rulings that tread on legislative
and executive
legislators filed

New

20 pieces of legislation

in

and making

power.- Concerned

about

'activist'

tins ruling

1998 which would Hunt the
authority of

Hampshire's Supreme Court.
Despite claims that the separation of
powers was developed to promote

efficiency and not just to hinder activity,
these and
lead to the assumption that conflict
legislatures

is

many

other examples could easily

the order of the day in the relationship
between

and high courts throughout the nation.

On

the other hand, an interested

observer of Massachusetts politics would see
no indication
conflict exists.

that this

kind of interbranch

Preliminary research into the state High Court led
to the same

conclusion. This seeming contradiction between
trends on the national level and
other states and the relationship between branches

question which motivated this research:

is

in

Massachusetts lead

there no conflict because the

in

to the original

SJC makes no

policy?

METHODOLOGY - FINDING POLICYMAKING ON THE SJC DOCKET
The question of how

often the

significant effect on public policy

SJC

92

activity,

Supreme

became

Judicial Court of Massachusetts has a

the focal point of this study. Fifteen years of

running from 1981 to 1995, were looked

Katharine Webster, "Judges Struggle

to

at in detail to

Keep Their Independence

in

address this

Face of Court Reform," 3/22/99.

<http://www.fosters.com/news99a/mareh/ww/hn0322b.htm> (March 21, 1999). In addition to (or some
might say because of) the school financing decision, in 2000 a variety of ethics concerns were raised
regarding the behavior of several of the justices of the

New

Hampshire Supreme Court

.

The

result

was

one resignation (Steven Thayer) and the impeachment of the Chief Justice. He was acquitted by the
2000 on all four charges, but the Judicial Conduct Committee admonished him
Senate on October
1

1

,

violating legal codes of ethics in April of 2001.
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for

question.

This fifteen year time span covers
an era

-

in

which

the

membership on

the

Court was almost constant. From the
end of 1981 through 1995 only eight
justices
served on the seven

member

different chief justices,

from 1989

to 1995.

court.

Edward

F.

94

They operated under

Hennessey from 1981

the leadership of

1989 and Paul

to

determining the extent of SJC involvement

two closely
data.

From

related problems:

the start

interpretation.

way

in

J.

Liacos

95

In looking at the activity of the
Court over these years
that

two

it

was

1)

it

soon became apparent

in significant policy decisions
involved

vagueness of the terms, and 2) difficulty

clear that the term "significance"

affects the

SJC and

gathering

was vague and open

Since the theoretical question which motivated

which the separation of powers

in

its

this

to

work concerned

justices,

it

the

was decided

to

use the justices' views of significance as determined
by the language of the opinions.

A

careful reading of the opinions provided the following
kinds of indicators as to the

significance of a case: phrases such as

comments

that the opinion will

"we consider

for the first time," specific

have a broad impact, dissenting opinions which take the

majority to task for intruding into the Legislature's realm by making law, or language

Some

cases from before and after this time period are also discussed as they relate to specific points or

areas of law being discussed in this 15 year period.
94

Since

much of

1982 so as

1981 was a year in transition an argument could be

to limit the research to "natural" courts.

funding of abortion services
is

in

1981 which

I

felt

made

for beginning this research in

However, the Court issued

was important

a decision regarding state

to include in the data

base so

all

of 1981

included. Three seats changed hands in this year with Justices Joseph Quiroco, Benjamin Kaplan, and

They were replaced by Justices Joseph R. Nolan, Neil L. Lynch, and Francis P
They joined Chief Justice Edward F. Hennessey and Associate Justices Herbert
P. Wilkins, Paul J. Liacos, and Ruth L Abrams. The only change to membership after this came in 1989
when Liacos replaced Hennessey as Chief Justice and John M. Greaney was appointed Associate Justice.
Robert Braucher

O'Connor

95

retiring.

respectively.

Hennessey

originally

became Chief Justice

in

1976 and Liacos served

40

until

October, 1996.

which indicates

a break

from previous

common

law or constitutional decisions. 96

A

reading of all 219 opinions issued
during the 1981 calendar year
found such references

approximately

in

30%

(64) of the cases, while another

65%

(143) could be categorized

as "routine" with a fair degree
of certainty. 97 Referring back to the image
of separation

of powers as three overlapping

circles, these 143 cases

would

tall

easily into the large

portion of the "judicial circle" which
stands alone, not overlapping with the
executive

or legislative circles. In most instances
these cases involved non-discretionary
matters

(most especially appeals

in first

degree murder cases, tax questions coming
from the

Appellate Tax Board, or unemployment questions
coming from the

district courts).

98

Also included as routine cases were those involving
the reading and application of a
specific

document

to the

case

at

hand (contract or

long-standing statutory interpretation or

While acknowledging

that this

careful reading of each opinion cut

however, led

96

Of course one

future.

to the

second problem

definition of guilt

A

1

somewhat

Such a method of analysis,

at the time an opinion is issued what impact it will have in the
hard to imagine that Lemuel Shaw, Chief Justice of the SJC from 1830-1860,
he wrote for the Court in Webster v. Commonwealth, 5 Cush. 386 (1850) that his

beyond

a reasonable doubt

would

still

be the standard almost 150 years

1

more thorough discussion of the SJC's

rather than

on the side of "routine." The

caseload, including questions of discretionary and non4.

is

take cases which, upon

full

in

some ways with

the

established to ensure that only the most "important" cases are

taken by the state's high court. (See Chapter 4.)

Some of the

difference could

come from

the fact that

consideration, turn out to be less important than originally

considered. The remainder are likely due to the fact that a case which

may

See 1996

certainty.

This codification of non-discretionary cases as "routine" admittedly conflicts

notion that the SJC's screening process

SJC may

later.

the District Court (Boston: Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education).

discretionary matters, will be found in Chapter

the

subjective, a

attempting to answer this question: time

Coding of cases tended to err on the side of "significant"
cases were impossible to categorize with any

remaining

99

the problem.

still

it is

Model Jury Instructions for

98

in

law standard was being applied."

coding of cases was

down on

which

can never be certain

For instance,

had any idea when

97

common

will) as well as those cases in

not be as evidently important for questions of public policy.
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is

significant for legal purposes

a

To

constraints.

carefully read fifteen years of

would have been

a nearly impossible task.

measure of "policymaking," and

was decided

to

to

make

To

SJC opinions

(at

an average of 244/year)

attempt to find a more quantifiable

the data gathering task

focus on the SJC's opinions

in

more manageable,

two types of cases: those which

it

ra.se

questions of judicial review and advisory
opinions issued by the Court under
constitutional authority.

100

The 178 questions involving judicial review,
and

which the Court were asked

three in

101

detail.

The

results

to issue advisory opinions

of this research are presented

in

the thirty-

were analyzed

in

Chapters Five and Six

respectively.

As

the 1981 data discussed above indicates,
however, presenting only this

information would leave a misleading impression of the
role which the SJC plays
this

system of separated powers, especially

many

times

when

the

SJC has

a voice in the policy process

cases.

The Court can be involved

conflict.

To

ignore these cases

with the Legislature (or

in relation to the Legislature.

is

at least

to

in

making policy

overlook

all

in

in

There are

beyond these obvious

cases which do not present

the times in

which

the Court

works

with their acquiescence) to develop public policy. The

100

The Massachusetts Constitution grants the SJC the authority to issue advisory opinions upon request
of either house of the Legislature, the Governor, or the Governor's Council. Massachusetts Constitution,
Part II, ch. 3, art. 2 as amended by art. 85 of the Articles of Amendment.
101

Cases were located as follows: The

easiest

were advisory opinions. Since 1982 they have been

volume of the Massachusetts Reports (beginning with page 20 ). Questions
review were found through a brief review of all 3660 cases, and were confirmed by

printed at the end of each
raising judicial

1

double-checking against those cases

Massachusetts Reports. While

would have discovered

listed

under "Constitutional"

a Lexis search

the materials regarding

in the

index of each volume of the

would undoubtedly provided

common

1

the

same

results,

I

never

law and statutory interpretation which are

essential to understanding the SJC's role in the policy process as discussed in Chapter 4.

1

An

interesting indication of the degree to

which cases which do not involve

advisory opinions are seen as important can be seen from the following.

When

cither judicial review or

the Massachusetts

of the most important SJC opinions over a 25 year period (1972-1997)
only three involved questions of judicial review and none were advisory opinions. "The Most Important

Lawyers Weekly published
'

its list

Opinions of the Past 25 Years," September 22, 1997, B5-6.
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problem was

to identify these eases

without expending an inordinate
amount of time

in

1

data gathering.

which

The

resulting solution

was

to gather general data

all

3,660 eases for

lw
opinions were issued from 1981 to
1995.
In addition, the headnotes of
all

full

cases were

skimmed

to find

was supplemented by

quick indicators of interesting and
important cases. This

a review of the Massachusetts

Law Review,

Lawyers Weekly, and major law reviews from
Massachusetts
specific cases

indicators

on

which had engendered

came from

interest in the legal

a review of the Boston

indication of important political opinions.

the Massachusetts

to find areas

community. Further

Globe index from 1982

From

of law or

these sources

come

to

1995 for an

the data

which was

analyzed for Chapter Four. The results of this process,
while probably underestimating
the policy impact of

SJC decisions over

these fifteen years, provides at least an

perspective on the degree to which the Court

is

welcomed and involved

initial

in the state's

policymaking process.
In addition to analyzing opinions of the Court, interviews

means of gathering
eight justices

who

data.

were conducted as a

These taped interviews were conducted with seven of the

served on the Court during these years. 104 All interviews lasted for

1

This information included the citation, a list of participating justices, the author of the opinion, authors
of dissenting and concurring opinions, information on amicus curiae briefs, the primary area of law
involved, the point of origin of the case, and trail it followed in getting to the SJC. This type of
information, while readily available on
I

some

courts,

had

to

be developed from scratch for

this project.

summary opinions issued
value). The Court issued 336

did not include rescript opinions in this study. Theses are shorter, more

by the Court

in less significant cases

(although they do have precedential

such opinions between 1981 and 1995, or just under 23 per year.
1(14

Interviews were conducted with Associate Justices Abrams, Nolan, Lynch, O'Connor, and Greaney

who was an Associate during the years
Only former Chief Justice Paul Liacos
was unable to be interviewed for this project. He was ill when I began the research and died in the spring
of 1999. Audiotapes were made of all interviews, seven of which were transcribed. Unfortunately, a
malfunction of the taping equipment resulted in a loss of information from the interview with Chief
Justice Hennessey. I became aware of this problem immediately after the interview ended and recreated
was also able to rely on two books which the Chief
the interview as best as possible from memory.
and with former Chief Justices Hennessey and Herbert

under study and who served as Chief Justice from 1996

I
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P.

Wilkins

to 1999.

at least

one hour with two

lasting

two hours or more. Questions were
aimed

at

gathering two general types of information.
First were questions focused
on developing
a

more thorough understanding of the

set

of questions attempted

Court

in a

to discern the justices'

system of separated powers. While a

free-flowing so that not

A

internal procedures of the Court.

second

who had worked
persons together

Henry Clay),

set

all

105

understanding of the place of the

script

questions were asked in

was

all

used, interviews were fairly

interviews.

of taped interviews were also conducted with
key

for the Court throughout the period
under study.
filled positions as the

The second

staff persons

These

five staff

Chief Legal Counsel (Daniel Johnedis and

the Administrative Assistant to the

SJC (John Burke),

the

Deputy

Administrative Assistant (Robert Bloom) and the Executive
Assistant to the Justices

(Maria Mossaides). These individuals had over seventy years experience
working
the SJC.

106

Questions presented to staff differed depending on their area of expertise.

Ms. Mossaides had been most involved

Bloom

for

in administrative matters,

Mr. Burke and Mr.

in administrative matters as well as legislative-judicial relations,

and Mr.

Johnedis and Mr. Clay had worked exclusively on matters involving cases which came
before the Court. Interviews lasted from one and one-half hours to three hours. In two

Justice has recently written which address

(Boston: Flaschner Judicial

Institute,

many of the

questions which

I

raised.

Judges Making

1994) and Excellent Judges (Boston: Flaschner Judicial

Law

Institute,

1997).
1

5

Unlike the United States Supreme Court,

described in writing.

procedures and

how

As

a result

I

spent

little

of this information regarding internal process

much time

the unique Single Justice session worked.

written for practicing attorneys and

is

is

learning about such things as case screening

often not presented in a

Even when information is available, it is
way which is most useful to the research of

a political scientist.
106

In addition to these staff interviews, preliminary

who had

the Massachusetts
in

meetings were held with Ms. Catherine Ledwidge

served as a clerk to Justice O'Connor and Mr.

Committee

for Public

Brownlow

Speer, Director of the Appeals Unit of

Counsel Services (the public defender agency

preparation for meetings with the justices and

staff.
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in

Massachusetts)

instances follow-up telephone interviews
were also conducted. The material from

all

interviews can be found interspersed
throughout the remainder of this work.

THE RESULTS - A PREVIEW
The

six chapters

which follow present an answer

to the

two

questions which motivated this research: does
the SJC play a role

process in Massachusetts and,

known

if so,

how

as the separation of powers?

The

do play a

role in policy making.

is it

shaped by the

interrelated

in the

institutional structure

short answer, not surprisingly,

The longer answer

is

yes, but not in

all

Separation of powers provides a helpful heuristic device
to understand

seem

justices

such activity

to feel

is

is

that

which operates on

must be understood
settings.

Even

in the

instances.

when

the

United States with which most people are

the national level.

if the

However, "separation of powers

general goals of avoiding tyranny and ensuring effective

to separation

systems, the meaning of these ends and

Two

yes, justices

as a contingent principle that has different applications in different

governance could be ascribed

Chapter

is

legitimate.

The system of separated powers
familiar

policymaking

of powers

how

in

both the state and federal

best to achieve

provides an explanation of the various ways

in

them

will vary widely."

107

which the theory of

separation of powers differs in operation between Massachusetts and the U.S.

government.
Continuing

to focus

on the place of the SJC

in the state's political system,

Chapter Three describes the interactions between the Supreme Judicial Court and the
Legislature "outside the courtroom," in struggles for control over the internal
107

Schapiro, "Contingency and Univcrsalism," 100.
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operations of the judicial branch through
rule-making authority.

Court has gained increasing power over
the judicial branch's
General Court

still

Over

the years the

internal operations but the

maintains substantial authority. While
most conflicts over these

issues have been resolved through
compromise, the potential for a
this areas is ever-present.

A

second area of analysis

in

power

struggle in

Chapter Three concerns the

legislative-judicial relationship regarding
administration over the lower courts.

Struggles by the Court to achieve the minimal
court reform legislation enacted
will be analyzed as representative of
this area of struggle. This chapter

while administration of the

state judicial

system

in its entirety

shows

in

1992

that

has been one of the most

contentious areas of interaction between the two branches,
these interactions have not

had the

effect of interfering with the SJC's ability to
operate as an independent, co-

equal branch of government.

Aside from these interactions over

activities outside the

courtroom, the SJC

operates in frequent isolation from the other two branches of government so that
the
relationship

is

predominantly one of "benign harmony." As Chapter Four shows,

can be attributed

to the fact that the majority

of cases which come

resolution do not require the that judgment be

government.

1

08

made upon

Court for

to the

the actions of

this

its

partners in

This chapter will provide a picture of the overall caseload which the

SJC handled from 1981

-

1995.

Two

points emerge from this picture. First, the

primary institutions with which the lower courts "interact" are really the lower courts

of the

state.

workload

108

is

In other words, the

emphasis one sees

in

on exactly what one would expect from

Since the SJC has almost

total discretion

over

its

process by which the justices choose to hear cases.

46

an analysis of the Court's

a court of last resort

-

the majority

caseload, this chapter begins with a review of the

of cases involve relatively
^controversial applications of state

law precepts

to controversies

the application of law

applying

it

to

new

by the lower courts or

fact patterns.

Secondly, however,
individually

from Massachusetts

this

more important,

policymaking process."

statutes

and

common

residents, either correcting errors
in

further refining the interpretation
of law,

109

Chapter will also discuss those

instances

where

the Court

is

less frequent, but

involved in "the

While discussion of the lawmaking power of our
nation's

courts frequently focuses on questions involving
judicial review, this represents an

incomplete understanding,
the

Commonwealth.

at least as to the

ways

in

which the SJC influences

Chapter Four focuses on a variety of cases

in

the law of

which the Court's

opinions have had influence well-beyond the individual
parties to a case.

Chapters Five and Six focus on the two types of cases which have
the greatest
potential to bring the

SJC

into potential conflict with the other, "political," branches of

government. Chapter Six
opinions, a

power which

power, one which

is

details the

is

SJC's activity

in the issuance

of advisory

granted to the Court in the state's constitution. Such a

not exercised by the U.S.

court in only nine other states,

is

Supreme Court and

particularly interesting since

it

is

is

given to the high

a constitutional

requirement which clearly draws the Court into conflict with principles underlying the
separation of powers. Recognizing

this, the

of this power, avoiding any question which
criteria they

have

set out

is

While

this

summary

is

moot

or otherwise does not

in its

use

meet the

over the years for meeting the "solemn occasion" requirement

set out in the Constitution.

109

Court has generally been cautious

Once

these requirements have been met, however, the Court

refers to these opinions as relatively routine,

not making incremental policy decisions in any case

it

hears.

I

am

I

do not mean

to

imply that the SJC

only stating that their decisions

these cases are treated as routine by other political actors, indicating that they are legitimate.

47

in

provides extensive and detailed answers
to requests about the
constitutionality of

proposed legislation or executive actions.
These opinions and the way
institutional

power has influenced

partners in government

the relationship between the

SJC and

which

its

this

co-equal

the focus of this chapter.

is

Chapter Five focuses on the other type of
case which tends
direct contact with the other branches,
those

which

judicial review over the acts of the
Legislature.

call

However,

two examples, when they

for abortion

SJC

into

to exercise

the advisory power, the

their caution

be confused with trepidation, since the Court has
never hesitated

most controversial of areas, public funding

to bring the

upon the Court

As with

justices have exercised judicial review
cautiously.

action.

in

to rule in

SJC

should not

even the

and the death penalty being but

feel that constitutional rights are

being usurped by legislative

110

Chapter Seven presents a summary of the role which the SJC plays

policymaking process

in

Massachusetts. Contrary to

democratic concerns regarding appointed

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

the

officials

common

in the

assumptions of

having authority to make law,

SJC not only plays

in the

a role in this process, but

it

often does so in cooperation with the other branches of government. Rather than

debate, which

is

assumed

to

be the primary

mode of discussion

in the

view of the

separation of powers as a struggle for power, the judiciary in Massachusetts

in a

engaged

dialogue with the General Court with their conversations resulting in public policy

for the citizens of the

110

is

See,

Moe

v.

Commonwealth.

Secretary ofAdministration and Finance, 382 Mass. 629 (1981) (public funding for
v. Watson, 38 1 Mass. 648 ( 1 980) and

abortion), and District Attorney for the Suffolk District

Commonwealth

v.

Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150 (1984) (the death penalty).
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CHAPTER

2

SEPARATION OF POWERS: MASSACHl ISFT TS AND US
There are many

similarities

between the Supreme

Compaq

Judicial Court of

Massachusetts (SJC) and the nation's highest
court, but there are also some
important
differences.

While

this is not a

comparative study per

judiciaries and the place each holds in
fuller

its

comparison of these two

se, a

respective political system

is

important to a

understanding of the SJC. Readers tend to be
more familiar with the relationship

between branches of government
capital."

features

1

To understand

the role

must be delineated

by recognizing what

Supreme Court

it

is

-

the

SJC plays

last resort

assumed

Boston or any other

Massachusetts

differences between the

way

SJC and
in

unique

it

the United States

Much

is

known about

tends to be our model for understanding the

within a system of separated powers.

similarity

its

state

which the separation of

role in each level of government.

Supreme Court, and

place of a court of

in

in

role can be defined not only in positive terms but
also

lead to different understandings of the

the United States

this

its

Washington, D.C. than

which

The

not.

powers shapes the judiciary's

however,

in

As

between the national court of last

supreme courts may not be accurate." 2 This chapter

will explore

will be

resort

shown,

and the

some of the

state

essential

differences between the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Judicial Court

of Massachusetts. These differences

1

may

explain, in part,

why

the high court of

In almost all states the three branches are located in the state's capital. California

this

with the legislature and the governor headquartered

in

is

an exception to

Sacramento while the California Supreme

Court operates out of San Francisco.
1

12

While he

is

speaking here of theories of constitutional law rather than theories regarding the

separation of powers, Alan Tarr's observation seems appropriate. "Legal scholars announce
constitutional theories that actually encompass only the federal Constitution -- the rough equivalent of

propounding a

literary theory that pertains to a single novel."

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998),

1.
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Understanding State Constitutions

Massachusetts appears

to

have a more cooperative relationship
with

its

state

counterparts than has been the case with
the United States Supreme Court
and

its

co-

equal branches on the federal level." 3

Some of the

differences between the

are obvious (the national impact of the
to

SJC and

the United States

Supreme Court

Supreme Court's decisions comes immediately

mind), while others are less well-known.
The similarities and differences between

the

two

will be assessed

historical

from two perspectives, the

first

being a description of the

development of the SJC. Predating the Supreme Court
and having

standing place

in the state's political

system which dates back

to colonial times, the

SJC's development over time has changed with the developing
needs of the
Contrasted with

this

is

is

state.

the relatively consistent place of the nation's high court
in the

American system of government. Secondly,
judiciaries

a long-

the difference

between these two

explored through the roles and responsibilities they are assigned by their

respective constitutions as well as their different places in the system of federalism.

These differing

institutional factors

between branches."

have the potential

to

promote varying relationships

4

113

Some comparative information will also be provided about the high courts of other states. Each state
may vary in the degree to which its role in the polity is more conflictual (as on the federal level) or is
more cooperative
114

(as in Massachusetts).

Federal-state differences are not the only

way

in

which judiciaries

differ.

State courts differ from each

other as well, not only in their history and their constitutional roles, but also because of that amorphous

but unavoidable concept called "political culture." See, Daniel Elazar, American Federalism:

from

the States, 3rd ed.

(New York: Harper and Row,
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1984).

A View

HISTORIE S COMPARED - A PRACTICAL DFVFI

AND A THEORETIC Al F\FRfK£

opm^ t

Historians and justices of the SJC often
point to the long, proud tradition
of
judicial activity on the part of the state's
highest court, a tradition

before that of the U.

between these two

S.

Supreme Court. From

this perspective,

and one whose

institutions,

effects

system of separated powers may be overlooked,
institutions.

While the United

is

one of the differences

on the place of the judiciary

the respective "age" of the

Supreme Court

States

which began long

clearly dates

two

beginning

its

in a

to the

implementation of the U.S. Constitution

in 1789, the

Supreme Court of Judicature which was

created under the charter which established the

Province of Massachusetts Bay

in 1692.

may seem

a

little

traces

It

proudly lays claim

far-fetched

On
--

how

shift

would be

be seen as new. At the very most,
115

It

its

being "the oldest

its

history to

seems

that this political

for all institutions operating after the Revolution to

it

would seem

that the

SJC could only

This Charter was granted by King William and Queen Mary on October

generally traces

to

can the same political body

under British rule and under American independence?

enough

roots to the

one hand, tracing

exist

substantial

its

115

court in continuous service in the hemisphere." 116
early colonial times

SJC

17,

1

69

1

,

lay claim to

SJC
November

but the

"birth date" to the act of the General Court (the colonial legislature) on

25,

1692 which created the Superior Court of Judicature. For a discussion of the early history of the
judiciary in Massachusetts, see the following articles in Russell K. Osgood, ed., The History of the Law
in Massachusetts: The Supreme Judicial Court, 1692 - 1992 (Boston, MA: Supreme Judicial Court
Historical Society, 1992): Barbara Aronstein Black, "The Concept of a Supreme Court: Massachusetts
Bay, 1630-1686" (43-80); David Thomas Konig, "The Virgin and the Virgin's Sister: Virginia,

Law" (81-116); and Russell K. Osgood, "The
Supreme Judicial Court, 1692-1992: An Overview" (9-42). Also see Edgar J. Bellefontaine, "The
Lawyers and the Judges in the Court's Earliest Years," Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly Special Edition,
October 19, 1992, 6-10, and Catherine S. Menand, "The Revolutionary Moment and the Supreme
Massachusetts, and the Contested Legacy of Colonial

Judicial Court," Massachusetts

Law Review

1 (March, 1992), 22-30.

116

Benjamin Kaplan, "Introduction: An Address," in Osgood, ed., The History of the Law in
Massachusetts, 4. Kaplan was an associate justice of the SJC from 1972 through 1981. The various
articles in this book form the core of much of the history in this chapter as this is the most detailed
history of the SJC available. It was compiled by the SJC Historical Society on the occasion of the
Court's tricentennial.
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being nine years older than the
United States Supreme Court,
noting

Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.
While

this political shift

the Court as an institution
remained relatively unchanged.
really only the Superior Court of
Judicature under a

creation in the

its

was happening, however,

From

tins

view the S.IC was

new name. The membership,

general rcspons.bilities, and law which
the justices applied remained largely
unchanged
in the transition

from colonial

"appear to have been deemed

status to independent statehood.

to

passage of enabling legislation

In fact, the justices

be justices of the new court [SJCj without
even the

to establish that Court." 117

Whether or not one accepts 1692

as the birth date of the SJC,

is

it

certainly the

case that Massachusetts (along with the other twelve
colonies) had extensive experience
operating with a judiciary as a separate institution within
their local political systems

long before the United States became an independent

political entity.

This allowed for

an evolving notion of the separation of powers, arising more out of
practical experience
than out of theories from the books of Locke and Montesquieu.

From

earliest colonial

times, the distinction between the executive, judicial, and legislative powers began to

develop. Before 1692 the colonial legislature

One

exercised a variety of judicial functions.

melding and dividing of judicial duties
Winthrop, the

It is

first

in

Massachusetts, the General Court,"

8

scholar presents an early view of the

in the early years

through the eyes of Governor

Governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.

clear to

me

that

Winthrop suffered no more from

this variety

of

confusion [regarding division of duties between legislature and
judiciary] than

we

do,

which

nature of things, which

117

Osgood, "The Supreme

is

is

to

say no more than

to say, rather a lot.

Judicial Court," in

Osgood

cd.,

inevitable in the

The History of the

118

This is still the formal name for the state's legislature, and will use
"Massachusetts Legislature" throughout the remainder of this work.
I
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is

Winthrop understood the

it

Law

in

Massachusetts,

interchangeably with

1

7.

distinction

between

and adjudication very well indeed
well
weaknesses, as well as its strengths
and his
approach to the General Court as an
adjudicative body brilliantly reflects
his understanding of both. 119

enough

to

In the years

authority and

its

between 1692 and the Revolutionary War,
concern with delineating

power between branches,

judicial branches, gave

independent

legislation

understand

way

entities as they

to a

especially between the legislative and
the

broader concern with maintaining the courts
as

came under

increasing pressure from the Crown. 120

Nonetheless, judicial "specialization" continued
throughout these years.

By

the time

the Massachusetts Constitution took
effect in 1780, the three branches, especially
the
legislature

and the judiciary which had operated

Crown, had

a

working relationship which

The importance

to the citizens

this written constitution

of the

equal branches of government can be seen

Declaration of Rights, the state's

bill

relatively independent

new

in

state

two

from the

only formalized.

of Massachusetts of having co-

articles

found in the Massachusetts

of rights. Article 29 declares,

in part, that "[i]t is

the right of every Citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial and independent
as the

Barbara Aronstein Black, "The Concept of a Supreme Court,"
in

Massachusetts, 79. This

article

in Osgood, ed., The History of the
provides an excellent discussion of the factors tending toward a

Law

separation of powers in the early years, as well as those factors which hindered a fuller development of
this

organizing principle. Overall, her view of the distinction between legislative and judicial powers as

being parts of a continuum as opposed

between the two powers
120

Some

is

one which

I

to the perspective

which

tries to

draw

a clear line of demarcation

share.

historians have argued that these battles for judicial independence

were as important

in the

broader revolutionary movement as the more well-known struggles over taxation, general searches, and
quartering troops. "The dispute over judicial independence was a major cause of opposition to the royal

government

in

Massachusetts, and the struggle to control the court and

its

judges was central to the

revolutionary crisis." (Menand, "The Revolutionary Moment," 22.)

This

is

an early example

in

American

politics

when

the centrifugal effect of

institutions within a local political system (colony or state)

were

power on those same

institutions.

country" was clearly greater than contemporary

states in the

conflict with an "outside"

government,

this offsetting influence, continues to

powers on the

federal and state levels.
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offset

by the

competing power

centripetal effects of a

While the sense of threat from "the Mother
feel from the federal

United States ever

be an important difference

in the

systems of separated

lot

of humanity will permit." 121 For

this reason, the

framers of the Massachusetts

Constitution avoided what one commentator
has called "some premature Jacksonian

preference" for elections of justices, mandating
that justices of the SJC be
appointed for
"as long as they behave themselves." 122
In addition to providing for the
independence

of the judiciary, the Constitution stated

that a clear separation

of powers should exist

between the judiciary and the other two branches.
government of this Commonwealth, the legislative
department
never exercise the executive and judicial powers,
or either of them:

In the
shall

The executive

never exercise the legislative and judicial powers,
or
The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and
executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may
be a government
of laws and not of men. 123
shall

either of them:

It

could be argued that the United States Supreme Court started
out

where the SJC had ended up
its

in

1780.

The

difference, of course,

is

that the

in

1789

SJC reached

position after a long period of growth and development within a political
system of

The

full text

individual, his

of article 29 reads as follows:

life, liberty,

"It is essential to the preservation of the rights of every
property and character, that there be an impartial interpretation of the laws,

and administration of justice.

It is the right of every Citizen to be tried by judges as free,
impartial and
of humanity will admit. It is, therefore, not only the best policy, but for the
security of the rights of the people, and of every citizen, that the judges of the supreme judicial Court

independent as the

lot

should hold their offices as long as they behave themselves well; and
salaries ascertained and established by standing laws."

According
criticized,

to

one scholar, the 1778

among

draft Constitution

a variety of reasons, for the fact that

See, Kinvin Wroth, "The

Maine Connection: 1620

-

it

that they

which was rejected

made

in

should have honorable

Massachusetts was

the judiciary subordinate to the legislature.

1820," in Osgood, ed., The History of the

Law

in

Massachusetts, 189.
122

Kaplan, "Introduction,"

in

Osgood,

ed.,

The History of the

Law

in

Massachusetts,

3.

123

Article 30, Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. While this language seems particularly clear and
unambiguous I would emphasize two points which are important in light of my project. First, the
language assumes an understanding of what the various powers (executive, judicial, and executive)
entail. As emphasized in Chapter
there may be times when an agreement on how each power is
1

defined

is,

in fact, the

,

source of much conflict. Secondly, despite such

strict limits, Part II

of the

Constitution which outlines the "Frame of Government" includes violations of this provision. Most
notably, these include the right to veto legislation which

power) and, most
legislature

interesting to

me, the power given

is

to the

and the Governor. This clearly allows the SJC

activities in a

way

not found on the national level.

given to the Governor (an obvious legislative

SJC
to

to

provide advisory opinions

be involved

in legislative

The Massachusetts Constitution

is

to

both the

and executive
not unique in this

declaration of separation. Forty other states have such declarations. (Tarr, Understanding State
Constitutions, 14.)
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separated powers. In contrast to this
history (which was shared to
some extent by most

of the other colonies 124 a national
judiciary did not even develop with
),
Independence;
it

was

not until the U.S. Constitution

created

-

and

tins creation

was

not

was

I7S7

ratified .n

wimout

conflict.

125

.Ik.,

a federal judiciary

According

to

its

was
one

detractors,

of the many problems which the government
had faced under the Articles of
Confederation was

and

that

it

a lack

of

a national judiciary to

was done uniformly across

the country.

ensure that federal law was applied

From

the perspective of those

who

favored retaining a confederation instead of adopting
the federal system of the new
Constitution, however, this was not a problem.

strong national government

state courts.

With

if

it

Convention of 17X7 who favored

ended up supporting
supremacy.

It

was

easier to avoid the tyranny of a

was men

is

ironic that

a

weaker national government

the creation of the

a case

was

the national law could only be applied and
interpreted

mind

this in

It

it

Supreme Court

of the lesser of two evils

-

at

in

the Constitutional

who

vis-a-vis the states

as a vehicle for ensuring federal

while not wanting

a federal

judiciary to enforce federal laws, they preferred this to the proposal of "nationalists" to

124

While

all

colonics had this depth of experience with a separate judiciary, the

branches developed

in

each

slale

was

different.

For a history of the

New York

way

in

which these

Court of Appeals,

that

bale's highest court, see, Francis Bergan, The History of the New York ( 'owt oj Appalls, 1847-1932
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), chapter 2. A brief history of the New Jersey Supreme

Court can be found
Nation

(New

I

in (i.

Alan

fair

and Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter, State Supreme

laven: Yale University Press, I98X), chapter

5.

In contrast to the

these high courts were created out of the hybrid system which had grown up

Independence. The

New York

Court which had been

in

Court of Appeals was created

in

(

'ourtS in State

years alter

in the

1847, replacing the

New

York Supreme

existence from 1791-1X46. According to one Student of that court,

"with judges elected statewide was

a reaction to the

and

Massachusetts history,

its

creation,

predominant sentiments of .lacksoiuan democracy."

Luke Bicrman, "Paths to the Bench: Judicial Selection on the New York Court of Appeals," paper
at the American Political Science Association Meeting, September 2-5, 1993, Washington,
D.C, The New Jersey Supreme Court was developed in 1947 to replace the outdated Court of Errors ami

presented

Appeals. While not an original colony, another interesting history of

a state

high court can be found

Charles Sheldon's A Century ofJudging: A Political History of the Washington Supreme
125

The majority of the information

Schmidhauser ami Larry

L,

1972), especially, Chapter 3

-

in

the rcmaimlci oi this paragraph

comes from

The Supreme ( 'ourt and ( 'ongress (New York:
"Legitimacy and Judicial Power."

Berg

in

55

the

(

m

'ourt,

work of John

flic f ree

Puss,

1,.

give the nation's legislative or
executive branch the power to override
unconstitutional
state laws.

had a

What

is

most

far greater bearing

interesting about this history

While

was

of federalism

the concept of

discussed, albeit inconclusively, during

126

impossible to assess with any certainty what
difference these

it is

respective histories

institutions

that «[t]he issue

upon the creation of a Supreme Court than
did

separation of powers, although the latter
the convention."

is

may have made

in

regard to the relationship between the

of government as they exist today, there

different roads of

development may have made. At

is

one potential impact these

least in the early years, the

legitimacy of the SJC vis-a-vis the legislature and
the governor would seem to have

been much more firmly established than

that

of the Supreme Court

in relation to the

Congress and the President. This legitimacy and acceptance was not just
the
constitutional mandates but of many years of experience

-

sometimes conflictual

which

occur post-Independence. This
than starting anew, only that

Perhaps
these

in part

due

laid the

is

it is

~

of

sometimes cooperative and

foundation for the interactions which were to

not to say that such a history

different.

is

necessarily better

127

to their different histories, the paths

two high courts have taken from

result

of development which

the end of the 18th century until today have

varied as well. There are two distinctions which seem to be of particular importance.

126

127

Schmidhauser and Berg,

An example

of the

arrangement of power

way
in

p.

in

24.

which pre-Revolutionary history helped

Massachusetts can be seen

in the

to

shape the institutional

hesitancy of the legislature to grant equity

to the courts of the Commonwealth. It was not until 1877 that the SJC was given plenary
chancery jurisdiction. (Osgood, "The Supreme Judicial Court," Osgood, ed., The History of the Law in
Massachusetts, 26). See, also, Konig, "The Virgin and the Virgin's Sister," in Osgood, ed., The History

power

Law in Massachusetts, 100-1 15, for a comparison of Massachusetts and Virginia in this regard,
with his explanation for the difference resting largely on cultural differences between the two colonies.
of the
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First is a difference within a
similarity.

From

their inception, both high
courts

were

expected to function both as courts of
original jurisdiction and as courts
of appeal. The
difference between the two, however,

Supreme Court was
consistency

in,

another. This

was

that the

predominant role of the U.S.

to hear appeals involving federal
questions so as to ensure

and compliance with, federal law from
one

was one of its primary reasons

part of the country to

for being created. In contrast, the

wasn't really "created" for any reason but simply
continued as
colonial period.

The General Court did enact

"new" SJC would have
would perform

legislation in

five justices (one chief justice

a variety of duties, formalizing

1

it

SJC

had during the

782 which stated

that this

and four associate justices) and

what had largely existed under

the

Superior Court of Judicature. 128 This statute also "defined the
jurisdiction of the Court
in the

broadest

common

law, but not equitable, terms,... provided for appellate review of

certain matters and for the Court to regulate admission to the bar and

respecting

Modes of Trial, and

however, the SJC continued

the

Conduct of Business'." 129 With

to operate

criminal and civil matters until 1859

statewide

128

St.

trial

predominantly as a

when

of these duties,

court for serious

the Massachusetts legislature established a

1782, c.9. Since 1873 the SJC has been composed of seven justices:

low of four

all

other Rules

court system with the creation of the Superior Court Department.

justices (St. 1873, c.40). Before that time the total

1

trial

'all

to a high

1

130

The

chief justice and 6 associate

number of justices required by

statute

ranged from a

of six.

Osgood, "The Supreme

Judicial Court," in

Osgood,

ed.,

The History of the

For further discussion of the Court's rule-making authority see Chapter

Law

in

Massachusetts, 18.

3.

130

An early history of this development can be found in William T. Davis, History of the Judiciary of
Massachusetts (Boston: Boston Book Co., 1900). For a more contemporary account see James B.
Muldoon, "Massachusetts Politics and the Founding of the Superior Court," Massachusetts Lawyers
Weekly Special Section, October

1

9,

1

992, 19-21. See also James B. Muldoon, You

Any Sure Rule of Law: The Saga of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
Lookout

Hill Press, 1992).
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Have No Courts

(Peterborough,

NH

with

SJC

retained

still

some

trial

jurisdiction after 1859 but the focus
of

with appellate work beginning

this point,

to

its

role

changed

at

predominate. As one observer has

commented,

«[t]

he process facilitated the transformation
of the Supreme Judicial Court

from a great

trial

court with ancillary appellate authority
to a great appellate court with

ancillary

trial

jurisdiction."

131

From

the mid-19th century on, the original
jurisdiction

of the Court was removed piece by piece, leaving
the SJC with only appellate
jurisdiction.

132

Ironically, while the U.S.

predominantly a court of appeal,
SJC, which

until the

any original

jurisdiction.

As with
change

in the

it

1860's had a

still

Supreme Court has always been

maintains some original jurisdiction today. The

much

heavier original caseload, no longer maintains

133

the change in the balance of original and appellate
jurisdiction, another

Court's workload also occurred more slowly

federal level. This

was

Supreme Court gained

the ability of a high court to control

a large measure of control over

enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1925. 134

131

Daniel

Osgood,
132

"The

Court's

The History of the

earliest
trial

change

in the

jurisdiction and

removed from

the

Supreme

Law

in

l33

There

under

ed.,

is

art.

was not

Its

its

Massachusetts than on the

its

own

until

own

docket.

The

docket with the

almost 50 years

later that the

Impact on the Supreme Judicial Court,"

in

Massachusetts, 445.

period from 1860 to the present was the gradual legislative denuding of the

its

conference on the Superior Court. For instance,

Judicial Court in 1880. Capital cases

Contract and replevin were finally transferred

Osgood,

It

Johnedis, "Creation of the Appeals Court and

J.

ed.,

in

The History of the

one small exception

Law

in

in

tort trial jurisdiction

were removed wholesale

in

was

1891.

1905." Osgood, "The Supreme Judicial Court," in

Massachusetts, 23 (citations omitted).

to this statement.

There

is

one grant of original jurisdiction

to the

SJC

101 of the Articles of Amendment in the Massachusetts Constitution regarding redisricting of

legislative districts for the Governor's Council

and the State Legislature. This power

is

rarely invoked,

Town of Brookline v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 406 (1994).
The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is outlined in U.S. Constitution, Article III, §1. The
number of cases of original jurisdiction which the Supreme Court hears are minimal; since its creation
but see

1

789 the Court has decided about

1

75 cases under

its

grant of original jurisdiction. (Henry Abraham,

The Judicial Process, 7th ed. [New York: Oxford University Press, 1998], 171.)
134
This was further supplemented by the 1988 Act to Improve the Administration of Justice which
eliminated all rights of appeal to the Supreme Court except in cases involving reapportionment, those
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in

SJC gained any

real control

over

its

own

docket when,

the Massachusetts Court of Appeals to
handle almost

non-discretionary appeal to the SJC which

still

in

all

1972, the Legislature created

mandatory appeals. The only

has any impact on the Court's workload

involves convictions from capital crimes. 135

Despite the different timelines which the United
States Supreme Court and the

SJC have followed
similarity

regard to both jurisdiction and docket-control,
there

in

which emerges from

this brief

look

at their

development. This

is

is

an obvious

the fact that

the legislatures, both the Massachusetts General
Court and the U.S. Congress, can

exercise a great degree of control over the judiciary by
controlling their workload. This
is

hardly an earth-shattering observation, but

their differences, both

of these

The other

that the degree

chosen

similarity

to exercise

legislation being

is

it is

important as a reminder that despite

institutions are constrained

by the separation of powers.

of control which the respective legislatures have

over the high courts has diminished over time, with the trend

toward greater freedom for

their respective courts

of last resort

in

in

controlling their workload.

The
affects the

differing paths

by which each

political

contemporary understanding of the

system developed

role of the

two high courts

respective political systems. There are two important things which

court of last resort

is

in this

given a great degree of discretion over

its

regard

in their

may happen when

docket, both tending

involving the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Voting Rights Act of 1965, Presidential Election Campaign Act
of 1974, or "actions challenging the constitutionality of any statewide legislative bodyf]" (Abraham,

The Judicial Process, 180.)
135

See GL c.278, §33E. There are a few other types of appeals over which the SJC has no discretion.
These include appeals from Single Justice sessions, certification of questions from the courts of other
jurisdictions, and requests for advisory opinions. For a more thorough discussion of the source of cases

on the SJC's docket and the process by which cases come

59

to the Court, see

Chapter

4.

a

toward the same

result.

The

first

effect

workload of the Court diminishes.
no justice wants

to rush

No

is

predominantly practical; the general

matter

how hard-working

justices need to establish a system for
determining

The second

on 'important" questions

to take

likely to overlap with the issues being
considered

government. Instead of having
the

Supreme Court has had

to hear

The

Court

now

result has

effect

is

that the

-

is

a judiciary that has the

questions which

may

be

by the other branches of

any appeal involving routine judicial matters,

authority and the time for over 70 years to confine

activities to those questions coining to their attention

important.

be,

which of those discretionary cases

they want to hear. The result which both
effects tend toward

more

may

through cases so quickly that she cannot
adequately consider

the issues being presented before reaching
a conclusion.

time and the inclination

the justices

which the justices

its

find to be

been described by David M. O'Brien as follows:

"[t]he

functions like a roving commission, or legislative body, in responding to

social forces."

discretion.

A

136
It

has not been until the

briefer experience with

last thirty

years that the

"freedom" could explain,

SJC has had

in part,

rarely described as being as "political" as the fairly typical description

why

the

this

SJC

is

which O'Brien

gives of the U.S. Supreme Court. There have been fewer years (ergo fewer
opportunities) in which the two institutions could

It is

interesting to note, however, that the

come

into conflict.

SJC has taken on an

increasingly

visible role in the last twenty years, less in relation to other branches of the

Commonwealth
court in the

136

than in relation to the federal government.

movement known

Storm Center, 2nd

ed.,

as the

new judicial

a prominent state high

federalism, the

(New York: Norton and Company,

60

As

1990), 194.

SJC has been more

willing than

many of its

counterparts throughout the country to
interpret the

Massachusetts Constitution

to

provide greater protection for individual

especially for criminal defendants, than are
provided by the
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. 137 So,
while the

civil liberties,

Supreme Court's

SJC has been

restrained in

interactions with the Legislature, they have not
hesitated to exercise their

breaking from the course

would be followed by

set

by the U.S. Supreme Court. Such

a timid court afraid to

move beyond

is

power

its

in

not the path which

the very traditional notions

of judicial power.

INSTITUTIONA L FEATURES - BROAD SIMILARITIES.
SUBTLE DIFFERENCES
While having taken

Supreme Court and

the

slightly different paths to get there, the

SJC share many

institutional traits today.

United States

They

are both the

final appellate authority for their respective political systems, exercising almost total

discretion over their caseload, and supervising a three-tiered judiciary. While the

Supreme Court has nine members and
chief justice and associate justices
•

behavior.

1

38

the

who

SJC only seven, they

are both

are appointed to serve for

life,

composed of a

assuming good

•

Broad

similarities,

however, mask three, specific differences between

these two high courts which are imposed upon them by constraints of their respective

See Barry Latzer, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991).
Latzer finds Massachusetts to be one of the four states with the highest rates of rejecting current Supreme

Court precedents when interpreting

its

own

constitution in regard to the rights of criminal defendants.

Michele DeMary, "Protecting the Individual: Search and Seizure and the Massachusetts
Constitution," paper presented at the New England Political Science Association Annual Meeting, April
22, 1994, Salem, Massachusetts; and "Banned in Boston? Free Speech Under the Massachusetts
Constitution," paper presented at the Northeastern Political Science Association Annual Meeting,
See

also,

November
138

As

11, 1994, Providence,

Rhode

Island.

This practice

will be noted below, "for life" in Massachusetts only

retirement from the bench

is

mandatory.

61

is

discussed in more detail in Chapter

means

until the

age of 70,

at

which point

5.

constitutions.

Again, these distinctions differentiate
the system of separated powers

on the federal level from
First,

authority for

that in Massachusetts.

and most evident,
its

system

political

the fact that the

is

if there is

a federal

law or the U.S. Constitution.

Clause dictates

word on whether

When

must follow

When

these state laws conflict with

140

fall.

that the statute, or the

This distinction has implications

of these two high courts and the role they play

of government.

The

result

of federal supremacy on the

the lead of the United States

a state statute

constrained in

its

in their

state

Supreme Court

respective systems

system

is

response. Federalism

'

There are also differences

cases and
rules

in

in the

way

in

becomes an intervening

which

and norms established by the Courts (and sometimes by

choosing cases will be discussed
will be included in
0

Chapter

The Supremacy Clause

Laws of the United

the

shall

two courts exercise

The

criteria

in

more

variable in the

How

their discretion in

this

played

choosing

legislative action)

and not of constitutional

and procedures which the SJC employs

in

in

more

detail in

found

in the

United States Constitution, Article VI. "This Constitution, and

Chapter

4.

Their role

in

supervising the lower courts

3.

is

States

which

shall

be made

in

Pursuance thereof; and

be made, under the Authority of the United Slates,

Judges

is

supervising their respective judicial branches. These differences, however, arc a result of

constraints and will be discussed elsewhere.

1

the

SJC

in settling federal questions.

relationship established through the system of separation of powers. 141

l3

that the

challenged on federal constitutional grounds, the SJC

is

the

such a question arises, the Supremacy

interpretation of the state's constitution, must
for the study

the

on the interpretation of stale law and

Supreme Court can determine

that the

only the ultimate appellate

is

no federal question involved. While

state's justices provide the final judicial
voice

state's constitution, they arc not the final

SJC

every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing

shall

be the supreme

in the

all

Treaties made, or which

Law

Constitution or

of the Land; and the

Laws of any

State to the

Contrary notwithstanding."
141
I

would add

national level,

that the organizational principle
in the

controversial decisions issued by the
legislation but arc
a result,

aimed

some of the

of federalism also has a powerful influence on the

relationship between Congress and the

Supreme Court

at state action:

Supreme Court. Many of the more
40 years have not overturned federal

in the last

abortion, due process rights, desegregation, school prayers.

tensions which have existed between these two

62

bl

As

anches on the federal level have

out in the fifteen years under analysis
in this study will be discussed
more thoroughly

Chapter

In general,

5.

it

in

should be noted that there are two,
contrasting results which

the pressure of federalism could have
on the system of separation of powers in
the

On

states.

the

one hand, the realization

could cause the three branches

that "the feds"

work more

to

may

be challenging the

state

closely together than might otherwise be

the case in the absence of this pressure.
This sort of threat from "outside"

may

introduce a motive for cooperation to counter
the traditional notions of separate

branches battling for their respective powers. 142
Conversely, the fact that the SJC

may

not operate as the final voice on the

constitutionality of a law could encourage division, allowing
the losing branch in the

challenge before the SJC to take
this

could happen

which

the

if

its

SJC were

claim to the United States Supreme Court. While

to interpret the

conflicts with the U.S. Constitution, the

Massachusetts Constitution

more

likely occurrence

do with a struggle

for

power between

the

two branches than with

a struggle

way

would be when

the SJC's decision rested on an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. 143

less to

in a

It is

between the

possible

states

and

the Court.
14

An example

of this "cooperation" can be found

391 Mass. 730 (1984)

in

which

in

Attorney General

v.

The Travelers Insurance Co.,
health coverage in health

minimum mental

state legislation requiring

insurance policies was challenged as conflicting with the federal Employment Retirement Security Act

(ERISA). Travelers Insurance had made a similar claim

in

1982 (385 Mass. 598) which the SJC had

denied. Travelers appealed to the Supreme Court which vacated the judgment and remanded
further consideration in light of a 1983 decision,

SJC continued
from

their

to

hold that the

1984 opinion

is

Supreme Court
143

v.

for
this,

the

The following language

"them" sense of which speak. "It may be argued, on
Supreme Court would reach a different result, but we decline to

indicative of the "us" v.

We think that

it

Delta Air Lines (463 U.S. 85). Despite

state statute did not violate federal legislation.

the basis of intimations in Shaw, that the
anticipate such a ruling.

Shaw

I

nothing in the congressional language or

language of the

in the

requires us to sacrifice our State policy" (733).

The obvious way

for the

Court

to

avoid

this

problem

is

ground. This depends, however, on the appellant raising a

to rest all decisions

on

state constitutional

state constitutional claim.

(For a discussion of

the intricacies of this practice, see Stanley Friedelbaum, "Independent State Grounds: Contemporary
Invitations to Judicial Activism," in

Mary Cornelia

Porter and G. Alan Tarr, eds., State

Supreme Courts:

Federal System [Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982].) This was the practice
followed by the SJC in cases like the following: District Attorney of Suffolk County v. Watson, 381 Mass.

Policymakers

in the

63

thai this

avenue

eyes of the

oilier

The

challenging the SJC could weaken

for

two branches (and of

its

perceived authority

in

the

144

the public).

differing place of each court within the

American system of federalism

is

not the only institutional distinction
within the seemingly similar structures
of the SJ(

and the United States Supreme Court. A second
difference
145

appointment.

is in

The justices of the Supreme Court, of course,

their

method of

are appointed by the

President with the advice and consent of the Senate.""
While the nation's chief

m

executive exercises sole authority

choosing

a potential

nominee, the 100 members of

the Senate, especially those of the majority parly on the
powerful Judiciary Committee,

exercise a palpable influence on the appointment process. This

nomination phase since the president,

if

she wishes

is

true

even

in

the

nominee confirmed, must

to see the

648 (1980) (provision in art. 26 of the Declaration of Rights which prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment prohibits the use of the death penalty); Moe v. Secretary ofAdministration andFinance,
Mass. 629

182

(due process of art, 10 ol the Declaration of Rights provides that legislation prohibiting
the USeoi slate medical assistance funds for abortion procedures is unconstitutional);
Commonwealth V
(

(

l

>XI

)

Upton, 394 Mass. 563 1985) (art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights provides greatei protection
to
individuals than does 4th Amendment); Opinion of the Justices, 406 Mass. 1201
(1989) (proposed law to
"shield" child witness from defendant in Child sexual abuse cases would violate the art. 2 guarantee ol
(

I

face-to-face confrontation.)

" While rare, this

'

is

these eases, however,

similar to what happened
it

was

Of government,

In the original cases, (he S.K

applying the 4th

Amendment

14

was

to a

Supreme Courl which reversed
Illinois v

in light

v,

Sheppard, 46X U.S. 9X1

and seizures, (Commonwealth
Mass. 363 [1985].)

(

)f

'ommonwealth

1983]),

|

of

state constitutional provision so as to be

,S

followed what

course the

fact that the S.K

'

[ampshire and Rhode Island) have

146

exington,

I9X4|.)
|

more

II,

in

In

co-equal branch

precedent

in

w>(>

Mass. 727

rehearing, the

9X2 and
1

1

in the

lo the

opinion of

1984] and

SJC continued

to interpret the

protective of the right to be free ol unreasonable searches

slates.

Of those who do
life

1
I

each case appealed

search and seizure law

Upton,

v.

Upon

19X5| aiul

Commonwealth

v,

§2.

64

Upton, 194

|

life,

differentiates

them from

use

the

some form of election
an appomlmenl process, only two others (New

Thirty-nine slates use

time appointments, See, The Hook oj the Stales

KY: The Council of State Governments,

U.S. Constitution, Article

a

late

Sheppard, 387 Mass. 4XX

V.

justices are appointed, especially for

(partisan, non-partisan, retention).

(I

thought was appropi

district attorney in

Sheppard, 394 Mass. 3X1

V,

it

new developments

majority of justices on the high COUrtS of other

I

The

Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). {Massachusetts

Massachusetts

1

((

Upton, 390 Mass. 562

V.

'

challenging the Court rather than

search and seizure claim, slating that the state guarantee under Article

similar lo this federal protection.

'ommonwealth

(

two 1984 eases involving search and seizure claims.

in

dislricl attorneys' offices

1998), chapter 4.

2000 2001

bear in mind the potential preferences of
the Senators. This

is

not to deny that the

president has the upper hand in this process,
but only to emphasize that the Senate
also

has a distinct and discernible influence on the
choice of justices
highest court.

who

sit

on the nation's

147

Contrasted with the federal process, the justices
of the SJC are

appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent
of the Governor's Council, a

governing body remaining from Massachusetts' colonial

involvement by either the House or the Senate
This variation

148

past.

in this process.

There

is

no

legislative

149

in the selection processes raises the
potential for

an interesting

difference between inter-branch relations in Massachusetts
and in Washington, D.C.

Assuming

the appointing authority can influence the judiciary by the
appointment

process, an assumption that

some U.S.

presidents

selection system provides the setting in

would deny, the Massachusetts

which a much stronger connection could

develop between the executive and the judiciary

in

Massachusetts than could

7

For a review of the appointment process for Supreme Court Justices, see: Stephen L. Carter, The
Confirmation Mess: Cleaning up the Federal Appointments Process (New York: Basic Books, 1994);
John Anthony Maltese, The Selling of Supreme Court Nominees (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

Mark Silverstein, Judicious Choices: The New Politics of Supreme Court Confirmation
(New York: W.W. Norton, 994), and David A. Yalof, Pursuit ofJustices: Presidential Politics and the
Press, 1995);

1

Selection of Supreme Court Nominees (Chicago: University of Chiacago Press, 1999). While the Senate

has some influence on Supreme Court appointees, that institution's influence increases as one

down

the judicial hierarchy.

On

Goldman, Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court

Selection from Roosevelt Through

Yale University Press, 1997). Also

J.

Constitutional
148

for

approving

warrants for

Michael

II,

Reagan (New Haven:
A

Gerhardt, The Federal Appointments Process:

c.2, §1, art. 9.

Press, 2000).

The Governor's Council

is

composed of eight

are elected biennially from districts throughout the state. In addition to their responsibility
all

all

judicial appointments, they

must approve

expenditures by the Governor's office.

(composed of five members)
149

see,

and Historical Analysis (Durham, NC: Duke University

Massachusetts Constitution, Part

members who

move

the U.S. Courts of Appeal and federal district courts see, Sheldon

to

all

New

pardons and commutations, and approve

Hampshire also uses a Governor's Council

approve judicial appointments. (Book of the States, 136.)

which other states choose their justices, see Philip L. Dubois,
and the Quest for Accountability (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1980); Charles H. Sheldon and Linda S. Maule, Choosing Justice: The Recruitment of State and
Federal Judges (Pullman, WA: Washington State University Press, 1997); and Lyle Warrick, Judicial
Selection in the United States: A Compendium of Provisions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: American Judicature
For a comparative view of the way

From

in

Ballot to Bench: Judicial Elections

Society, 1993).

65

necessarily be

assumed on the

federal level.

independent stance toward the legislature

There

is little

also presents the possibility of a

Massachusetts than

more

in the nation's capital.

indication that the appointment process
has this sort of influence,

however. In the
in

in

It

fifteen years

very few cases and,

when

under analysis the Governor's authority was
challenged

it

was, the judiciary generally dismissed the action
as

against the Governor. 150 Furthermore, the
judicial-legislative relationship which

emerges from these same years shows the SJC
legislature, despite the fact that there

is

to

be relatively deferential

no connection

in the

to the

appointment process.

Since the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 took effect,
141 justices have

been appointed
changed.

150

51

to the

Court and the formal process for these appointments has not

The process has changed

"The Governor and

in practice,

however, as Governors throughout

the Legislature should be dismissed as parlies, even though any

concerning them would be

in their favor.

Declaratory relief

is

judgment entered

not available against the Governor or the

Mandamus is available neither against the Governor nor against the Legislature. Judicial
unwillingness to order the Governor or the Legislature to act is founded on separation of powers
principles expressed in art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. In most (but not all) cases,
Legislature.

deserved, can be obtained against the

Commonwealth or some defendant other than the
(Town of Milton v. Commonwealth, 416 Mass. 47 [1993].) While not
researching this directly, I only came across two cases between 1981 and 1995 in which an action of the
Governor was found to be unconstitutional. The first was in 1981 when Governor Edward King, in
action reminiscent of President Harry Truman's seizure of the steel mills during the Korean War, issued
an executive order to take control of the MBTA during a fiscal emergency. Like the U.S Supreme Court
in 1952, the SJC declared this action to be beyond the powers of the Governor. Unlike its federal
counterpart, however, the Court was extremely deferential to the Governor. "On the other hand, we
recognize... that the Governor was confronted by the prospect of a public disaster.... In such

relief, if

Governor or

the Legislature."

1

circumstances, deferral of coercive judicial remedies to permit action by the appropriate branch of

government

is

a familiar expedient." {Massachusetts

Bay Transportation Authority Advisory Board

v.

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 382 Mass. 569 [1981], 578-9.) The Court authorized the
Governor's continued operation of the Authority until the Legislature could be called into session to deal
with the

fiscal

emergency. The second case concerned the action taken by Governor Weld to remove a
is interesting from a separation of powers perspective because

county sheriff from his position. This case

the Court found that if anyone should have this authority,
for certain elected county officials,

it

is

the

SJC

itself.

"We

note

that, additionally,

including sheriffs, the Legislature has provided a distinct procedure

removing such an individual crom office. GL c .21 1, §4, provides this court with broad authority
remove a sheriff[.]" (McGonigle v. The Governor, 418 Mass. 147 (1994), 149.)
for

151

to

In January. 2001, the newest justice, Robert J. Cordy was sworn in as the 141st justice of the SJC.
Five of the other six justices of the Court are also quite new to the bench of the high court: Chief Justice
Margaret Marshall, appointed - 1996, Justice Roderick Ireland - appointed 1997, Justices Francis X.

66

the recent past have brought additional
players into the process to screen judicial

nominees

for all courts in the

Commonwealth

Council for approval. Considering the low

before nominations are sent to the

visibility

of the Governor's Council,

152
an important check on the Governor's appointment
power.
Unlike the public

in the

appointment process which

President's appointees to the United States

Supreme Court,

Governor's Council generates

beyond

While not confirmed by any
Council

when

is

their

unknown

an

Councilor

study,

interest

it

since appointments to the

SJC tend

little

the approval process of the

the parties immediately involved.

fairly safe to

153

say that the Governor's

of Massachusetts

an individual without further

Council hearings generate relatively

Councilors.

seems

entity to the large majority

is

interest

generated by the Senate's approval of the

is

little

IS IS
this

citizens, especially

political aspirations

media coverage. This

is

and when

generally the case

to generate relatively little controversy

among

the

154

Spina and Judith A. Cowin - appointed 1999, and Justice Martha B. Sosman - appointed 2000. Justice
is the most veteran member of the current Court, having been appointed in 1989.

John M. Greaney
52

1

j

•

*

For a discussion of the relationship between justices' concerns with democratic accountability and the
number of participants involved in their selection process, see Charles H. Sheldon and Nicholas P.
Lovrich, "Democratic Theory and Judicial Selection," in John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson, eds.,
The American Courts: A Critical Perspective (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1991).
153

A

recent exception to this

was

the nomination for Associate Justice Margaret Marshall to replace

Justice Wilkins as the Chief Justice of the SJC.

From

the day before her nomination

by Governor

Cellucci on August 27, 1999 until her confirmation by the Governor's Council on October

vote of 6-3) the Boston Globe carried

of the

interest in Marshall's

woman

to

at least 15 stories

appointment was due

head the SJC. Further

interest

Bernard Law, Archbishop of Boston

on the nominee, 10

to the fact that if

articles

Roman

13,

1999 (by a

5 editorials.

confirmed, she would be the

was generated, however, over questions

for the

and

Part

first

raised by Cardinal

Catholic Church, about Marshall's potential bias

against Catholics due to certain actions which she took while serving as general counsel

at

Harvard

University.
154

In addition to the Council's 6-3 split in the approval of

above, the other exception
Fried

was

a Harvard

to this statement

was seen

Chief Justice Marshall which was discussed

in the

appointment of Justice Charles Fried

in 1995.

who had served as Solicitor General under President Reagan
appointment generated much controversy due to the conservative positions he

Law

School professor

from 1985 to 1989. His
pursued under Reagan's administration

in

cases involving abortion, civil rights, and organized labor. In a

67

The

editorial

board of the Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly
concurs

assessment of public knowledge of the Governor's
Council.

In a

in tins

1995 editorial which

appeared after there had been some criticism of
the Council's rejection of a Superior

Court nominee, the paper
arguably improved some

know who

said,

"Although the quality of the Governor's Council has

in the last

their representative

couple of years, few citizens

on the council

is,

lawyers

-

and when the council meets or what

the council does besides approving judgeships.
For a
is

- and few

body with

significant power, that

simply not appropriate." 155

The

invisibility

of this process makes the addition of more players

selection process important. Since 1972

all

to the

governors have brought more voices into

the nomination process by using a judicial nominating committee
(presently called the
Judicial

Nominating Council

appointees,

JNC

JNC). The

is

a volunteer

composed predominantly of attorneys, which

positions and

While there

-

is

recommends

body of gubernatorial

screens applicants for judicial

a pool of individuals (usually three to five) to the governor.

no constitutional or statutory requirement

that these bodies exist, both

Republican and Democratic governors have used JNC's since Governor Sargent

rare break with recent history, Fried's appointment

was approved by a vote of 5-4 with Lieutenant
Governor Paul Cellucci forced to vote to break the tie on behalf of Governor William Weld's appointee.
While Fried's nomination would probably have generated controversy anyway, he was also caught up in
a growing concern by activists that a justice of color had never served on the SJC. This concern
continued to be voiced when Margaret Marshall, a white woman born in South Africa, was appointed as
an Associate Justice in 1996, although her appointment was approved by a vote of 7-1. Those concerned
about the need for minority representation on the Court finally saw a victory in 1998 when Justice
Roderick Ireland, an African- American male, was appointed
155

May

8,

1995, 10. According to Professor

politically astute. "In

fact, the

Mark

SJC.

Miller, the Council

Governor's Council

the Massachusetts Political Almanac.'"

to the

is

("Lawmakers' Attitudes

is

even overlooked by the

members are not even
Toward Court Reform in

so obscure that

its

listed in

Massachusetts," Judicature 11 [1993], 37.) Reacting to a political squabble between Acting Governor
in the spring of 2001, an editorial in the Boston Globe proposed

Jane Swift and the Governor's Council

would entail a lengthy constitutional
go to useful state programs.
such action with shabby shenanigans." May 11, 2001, A30.

the elimination of the Council. "The abolition of the council

amendment

process, but

Councilors only invite

it

would save $400,000

a year that could

68

developed the praetiee

in

1972.

156

The use of the JNC

judicial appointments less "political,"
or at least to

the appointment

in

should be "as

Today

the

of these individuals who,

free, impartial

in the

clearly an attempt to

make

minimize the appearance Of politics

words of the

and independent as the

JNC's various committees

is

lot

state's Constitution,

of humanity

will admit."

157

(four regional committees and the executive

committee) are composed of gubernatorial^ appointed
members (predominantly of
attorneys) from throughout the state.

The Council

advertises vacancies and solicits

applications, reviews the extensive questionnaire
completed by applicants, and

conducts background checks and interviews

bench based on "the
is still

who

to find those

quality of their intellect,

most qualified

judgment and

integrity[.]

to serve

,,l5x

While there

opportunity for a governor to influence this process, and while there are

continue to believe that "a judge

development of JNC's over the

is

a lawyer

last thirty

who once knew

on the

many

a governor," the

years clearly represents an acknowledgment

of the importance of qualified, non-partisan appointments. 159 This was reinforced

972 Massachusetts voters enacted a constitutional amendment requiring all justices to retire
a result, 40 vacancies occurred on courts throughout the Commonwealth on the same day.
Governor Francis Sargent responded to this situation by creating "an ad hoc judicial nominating
In

70.

1

ai

in

age

As

committee, noteworthy for

its

broad citizen representation. ...Sargent publicly committed himself to

abiding by his nominating committee's recommendations."

egacy

Thomas

H. Martin, "Governor Sargent's

Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, November 23, 1998,
According to Martin,
Sargent's legacy was the establishment of "non-patronage judicial appointment which his successor
l

to the Judiciary,"

1

1

.

governors honored."
157

158

Art. 29, Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

Executive Order No. 420, April 26, 2000.

1S9

While an assessment of this appointment process is beyond the scope of this project, it seems as
is neither so "pure" as seen by some or as "political" as seen by others. On the one
hand, the Slate Justice Institute of the American Judicature Society lists the Massachusetts selection
system as being one which employs a "commission" plan in its appointments. They quote from the
though the process

Executive Order establishing the

JNC

to note that "[b]y executive order

of the governor appointments arc

made on a nonpartisan basis from names submitted by the judicial nominating commission." (Lylc
Warrick, Judicial Selection in the United States.) My reaction would be to say, "yes, but..." The reality
is

that the governor,

through her power over the membership of the Council, as well as through the

69

summer of 1999 by Governor

the

committee

to assist

him

Cellucci

in the task

when he developed

a special

of appointing four new justices

nominating

to the

SJC

retirement vacancies which were expected from
the

summer of 1999 through

Leonard Lewin, the governor's chief

announced

2000.

committee was created

that "[t]he

choosing four SJC justices

is

governor

legal counsel,

is

trying to

do the

for

the year

time the

at the

right thing since

a oncc-in-a-lifetime, significant task." 160

The other screening panel

that participates in the selection process

is

the Joint

Bar Committee on Judicial Appointments. Composed of
representatives of the Boston

Bar Association and the Massachusetts Bar Association,

comment

to the

Governor on the individual she intends

this

to

committee provides

nominate for consideration

by the Governor's Council. Since former Chief Justice Paul Liacos' appointment

is a
as

change the executive order which establishes the JNC, exercises more control than this
would indicate. If the process was so non-partisan, there would have been less concern voiced
by Republicans in the state when Justice Marshall, a recognized liberal (and likely a Democrat) was
appointed to the state's high court by Governor Weld, a Republican. (Sec Frank Phillips, "Harvard
Counsel Marshall is Weld's Nominee for SJC," Boston Globe, September 4, 996, A .) On the other

ability to

description

1

1

hand, while there arc complaints to be heard about the quality of the stale's judges, complaints made both
formally before the Judicial Conduct Commission and informally in the halls of courthouses throughout
the stale,

1

would note

that the

process probably weeds out the least qualified candidates. Justice Lynch

noted the increased quality of judges appointed

system
It is

is

so far superior today to what

to the

lower courts. "But, you

know

once was." (Interview by author, Boston,

the appointing

MA,

25,

May,

1999.)

interesting to note that complaints about this process emphasize problems with existing judges and

Rarely

justices.

is

lor consideration

do with

a

complaint heard that a qualified individual

was denied. This could mean

the appointment process than

in sitting

160

it

on the bench

Quoted

in

it

that the quality

who

submitted an application to the

of individuals being appointed has

docs with the pool of self-selected individuals

who

JNC

less to

are interested

in the first place.

Paul D. Boynton,

"SJC Search Committee: 'No Hidden Agendas'," Massachusetts Lawyers

and of the lead article on
emphasize the tension between the Governor and members of
the committee on the one hand who claim their only goal is to find the best candidates possible and
" 'The governor has pretty
critics of the governor on the other hand who are skeptical of this claim.
much made up his mind that he wants judges of a certain ideological stripe, and in picking a diverse
Weekly, June

14, 1999, 32.

this issue in the

It is

interesting to note that the tone of this article

Boston Globe continued

to

committee of lawyers to enlist applicants and to screen them, think he's trying to give himself political
cover,' said Boston Defense lawyer Harvey Silvcrglate." Tina Cassidy. "Cellucci Appoints Group to
Select SJC Candidates," Boston Globe, May 21, 1999, Bl
I

70

justice

by Governor Michael Dukakis

in 1976, all

candidates

recommended

Governor's Council have received the approval
of the Bar Committee.

The second

subtle distinction

and the U.S. Supreme Court
are appointed to serve for

162

While

this

was

are

which

1(11

arrangements of the SJC

justices serve.

While both

removable by impeachment, the

Supreme Court serve

for life with

no mandatory retirement

originally the case under the Massachusetts
Constitution, the

voters, at the urging of the

League of Women Voters and

Constitution in 1972 to require

161

institutional

the terms of office

good behavior and

justices of the United States

age.

is in

between the

to the

all

others,

amended

judicial officers to retire at age 70.

163

the

This difference

who was chosen by the judicial nominating committee, was rated "not qualified" by
Bar Committee. Governor Dukakis nominated him anyway and he was approved
by the Governor's
Council in April of 1976. Dukakis was highly critical of the Joint Bar Committee on Judicial
Justice Liacos,

the

Appointments who had given Liacos (and seven other Dukakis nominees) the "not qualified" rating.
See
Philip Brunelle, "BU Law Professor Chosen for Bench," The Springfield Union, March
18, 1976. At this
point in time the Bar Committee received the names and commented upon all five of the JNC selections.
Since the late 970's however, the process has changed so that the Bar Committee gets only the name of
the final nominee. (Some of this information comes from my Interview by Justice Lynch, Boston, MA,
1

May 1999. Justice Lynch had been the Chief Legal Counsel to Governor Edward King [1978-1982]
and was therefore very involved in the judicial nominating process at the time.) Considering the timing
of this change, it is possible that the conflict over the Liacos appointment led to this change.

25

162

In addition to impeachment in Massachusetts (Part II, Chapter 1, §2, art. 8 and
§ 3, art. 6), justices can
be removed by "the Governor, with consent of the Council... upon the address of both Houses of the

Legislature" (Part

II,

Chapter

3, §

1

),

or by the "governor, with the consent of the council. ..after due

notice and hearing retire them because of advance age or mental or physical impairment." (Art. 98 of the
Articles of

Amendment).

In his interesting anecdotal history of the SJC,

James Muldoon, who served as

Secretary of the Massachusetts Judicial Council from 1964 to 1991, explained the difference between

impeachment and address as follows. "A judge can be removed by the process of Address, which is not a
The result is nothing more than the loss of the office. If a judge is convicted of
impeachment, it is possible that he or she may be indicted and punished for the offense leading to the
impeachment, if indeed such offense is criminal. An impeachment also has the effect of disqualifying
the individual from any further public service. A judge removed by Address does not necessarily bear
any stigma as guilty of 'high crimes and misdemeanors'." You Have No Court, 90. This history presents
only one instance when a justice of the SJC was removed from office. One Theophilus Bradbury was
removed by Address in 1803, not for any wrong-doing but because he was physically incapacitated and
refused to resign (82). Two evidently political attempts to remove justices by Impeachment took place in

judicial proceeding.

1900 and 1921 but were rejected by the Legislature. (See pp. 165 and 200-212.)
163

Article 98 of the Articles of Amendment. While the merits of such a plan are obvious, I can't resist
the opportunity to point out that Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. left his position as Chief Justice of the SJC
to

assume a

seat

on the United States Supreme Court

at the

age of 72. His twenty-year tenure on the

nation's highest court was, by almost any measure, a very productive one.

71

has

little

effect

from a separation of powers perspective,
except

the appointment process. Since passage
of the

practice of most justices of the

SJC

Amendment,

as

it

indirectly affects

has generally been the

it

to serve until they reach the

age of 70 (or to

retire at

the end of a term or a calendar year preceding
their 70th birthday). This has had the
effect of

There

is

making

on the SJC more predictable than

rotation

frequent curiosity at the federal level

senior justices will

Massachusetts

retire,

at least in part,

judicial transitions.

An

-

when more

An

exception to

this practice

of retiring

at

from the very predictable nature of the Massachusetts

indication of how unusual an "early retirement"

from the following headline of a page

Lawyers Weekly

court-watchers about

especially near times of presidential elections. In

this is generally not the case.

age 70 resulted,

among

on the Supreme Court.

it is

3 article in a

is

can be seen

1996 edition of the Massachusetts

"Liacos Shocks Bar, Announces SJC Retirement." 164 What was

"shocking" was the decision of Paul Liacos, justice since 1976 and chief justice since
1989, to retire three years before he reached the mandatory retirement age of 70.

Reporting on the press conference

Lawyers Weekly noted
'

at

which Liacos announced

that Liacos said

he was stepping

his decision, the

down

for "personal

and

family reasons." In addition, however, he acknowledged that the fact he was one of
four justices

decision.

165

who would
By

stepping

turn 70 in the

down

in 1996, his

governor, and whoever was elected

lf>4

165

same twelve month period influenced

in

his

replacement would be chosen by the

1998 would appoint only the other

three.

sitting

The

June 24, 1996,

other three were Chief Justice Herbert P. Wilkins (who retired in August, 1999), and Associate
Justices Neil L. Lynch and Ruth 1. Abrams who retired upon turning seventy in 2000.

The

72

article further stated that

Liacos

governor select four justices

"felt

it

was very important not

to the SJC... whoever

it

may

be."

to

have a single

166

This comparison of the appointment and tenure
arrangements for the SJC and
the U.S.

Supreme Court show

there to be superficial similarities

which mask

subtle but

important differences in these two institutions. Even
more misleading would be an

assumed likeness between
last resort in

the federal and state courts because they are
both the court of

regard to their respective constitutions. The U.S.
Constitution and the

Massachusetts Constitution are obviously two different documents
and an analysis of
these differences, especially those which affect each court's
relationship with

equal partners in government,
fact that

is

one of these documents

is

"the

Supreme Law of the Land" puts

the

Ironically, the unusual decision

" Governor,

"new

on the bench,

Argeo Paul

rather than to retire

is

unique

by

own

Justice Charles Fried to step

in the

indicative.

fill

these commentators are

down from
Harvard

the Court in 1999, after

Law

School

still left

on the Court. Fried's decision

"Our Constitution precedes and was,

In light of this court's reaffirmation today of

examine more thoroughly

the

to resign

I

cannot but wonder

why

its

in large

measure, the

desire to develop

the court and the dissenting

the protections afforded by

art.

2 of the Declaration of

Paul Desilets, 418 Mass. 316 (1994), 335 (Liacos, concurring). "How
document? What superlatives will suffice?. ..Most of the states have drawn freely

Rights[.]" Attorney General
this

and

Court's recent history.

constitutional jurisprudence,

does one describe

The document of which

to return to a faculty position at the

Examples like the following are
model for the Federal Constitution.
further our

167

Cellucci, with four seats to

167

Justices decline to

in

rhetoric one finds written about the Massachusetts Constitution,

both by justices and commentators.

less than four years

two courts

two branches of government. The

supremacy of the U.S. Constitution, however, could sometimes be forgotten

166

co-

important to this project. As already mentioned, the

in potentially different places vis-a-vis the other

amongst some of the

its

v.

model for the Constitution of the United States several years later." Edward F.
Chief
Justice of the SJC), "The Extraordinary Massachusetts Constitution of 1780,"
Hennessey (former
Review,
Law
University
(1980), 873-885, at 873. "Permitting study of the U.S. constitutional law
Suffolk
from

it...

and

it

was

to eclipse study

a

of state constitutional law

in this fashion is particularly inappropriate in

Massachusetts.

constitution of Massachusetts.. .is at least the equal of the Constitution of the United States." Charles
H. Baron, "The Supreme Judicial Court in its Fourth Century," Massachusetts Law Review 77 (1992),

The

35-43

at 35.

73

so proud

was

ratified in 1780,

document (and

its

1

and the citizens of the

amendments) since

17

that time,

state

have lived under

making

this

same

the Massachusetts

Constitution "the oldest still-governing constitution
168
in the world."
The original

document was composed

largely

by one of the Revolutionary

era's great constitutional

minds, and one of Massachusetts' pre-eminent
public figures, John Adams,

claimed that the U.S. Constitution drew largely from

his

work.

who

169

Despite claims that the U.S. Constitution draws on the
Massachusetts
Constitution, there are

many

important differences between the two. The differences

which are immediately evident stem from
government which each

the different natures of the

established; the federal

two forms of

government was established as a

limited government with only specific powers while Massachusetts,
like

governments, was
In his recent

to

work on

all state

be a multi-purpose government with complete police powers. 170
state constitutions,

Alan Tarr presents an interesting comparison

l68

William Francis Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth, in The Constitution of the Commonwealth of
MA: Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1996), iii. If one tries to read the
Constitution, however, one could argue that the state would be well-served to allow for a rearrangement
of the document. While the state would give up its "claim," it might have a document which would be

Massachusetts (Boston,

more accessible

to its citizens.

169

The greatness of the Massachusetts Constitution, as well as Adams' role in its development can be
As one commentator notes, "Adams. ..might have overstated things a bit when he wrote, T
made a constitution for Massachusetts which finally made the Constitution of the United States.' Letter
from John Adams to Mercy Warren (July 28, 1807) in 4 MASS. HIST. SOC. 377 (5TH Ser. 1878)."
Aviam Soifer, "The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the 1780 Constitution," in Osgood,
exaggerated.

ed.,

The History of the Law, 209.

In addition to Soifer's article,

two excellent sources

for discussion

of

the creation of the Massachusetts Constitution are: Oscar Handlin, The Popular Sources of Political

Documents on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press,
1966); and Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 (Amherst, MA: University of

Authority:

Massachusetts Press, 1978).

A

political history

of the development of 18th century

state constitutions

more generally can be found in Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, chapter 2. See also the
Bibliography of that work (21 1-235) and Tarr's "Bibliographic Essay" in Constitutional Politics
States: Contemporary Controversies and Historical Patterns, ed. G. Alan Tarr (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1996), 203-209.
170

Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America
University of North Carolina, 1996) for an analysis of the states' police powers.

See William

(Chapel

Hill:

in the

J.

74

of federal and

"What
to

is

most

American

state constitutionalism in his

assessment of McCulloch

striking about Marshall's constitutional
analysis

state constitutions."

172

One

result

of this

duties and responsibilities of the three
branches
the Massachusetts Constitution than
instance, unlike the

is

which Congress may make laws,

there

in

how

is

Maryland.'

little

many

in Article

is

I,

71

of it applies

that the description

of the

instances, even vaguer in

the case with the U.S. Constitution.

of powers found

list

is,

is

v.

For

§8 which details the reasons for

a general statement in the Massachusetts

Constitution of the General Court's power to enact "all
manner of wholesome and
reasonable, Orders, laws, statutes and ordinances, directions
and instructions, either

with penalties or without; so as the same be not repugnant or contrary

to the

Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of this

Commonwealth[.]"
gives the

SJC one

173

The broad nature of the power granted

less tool in

its kit

when confronted with

constitutionality of an act of the Legislature.

act

of Congress

ground

to

171

172

it

for voiding an act of the state legislature

exceeds congressional authority,

is

have more limitations on

less available.

174

On

Understanding State Constitutions,

the other hand,

state legislatures in clauses other

Part

II,

Chapter

1,

§1,

art. 4.

Art.

7.

4 also gives the General Court the power

arrange for election and selection of public

to raise taxes

officials. Article 3 outlines the legislature's

and

power

to

to "erect

and constitute judicatories and courts of record...." This, of course, does not imply that the U.S.
Constitution is necessarily clear and detailed, only that the Massachusetts Constitution is even less
174

this

4 Wheaton 316 (1819).

I7
'

questions regarding the

While the Supreme Court can declare an

be unconstitutional because

state constitutions tend to

to the state's legislature

While

the

Supreme Court had been

reticent to use this basis for declaring an act

unconstitutional since the "Constitutional Revolution of 1937,"

challenge the authority of Congress, especially under the

Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Court declared the

Congress' power

to regulate

Gun

commerce).

75

it

has been

of Congress

much more

Commerce power.

to

so.

be

willing of late to

See, for instance, U.S.

Free School Act unconstitutional as beyond

v.

than the traditional protect.ons for
legislative action.

175

civil liberties

These can be found

amendments. Such clauses

in the

and

civil rights

in either the

which may

prohibit

body of the Constitution or

in

Massachusetts Constitution include the following;

176
prohibiting the Legislature from suspending
the laws,
requiring frequent meeting of

the Legislature,

177

requiring vote of two-thirds of both houses
for borrowing and

limiting the uses to

179

limiting legislative authority over local cities
and towns to only general

and requiring motor vehicle tax revenues

be used only for transportation

to

SO

I

purposes.

The
that

(effectively requiring a balanced

178

budget),

laws,

which borrowed money can be put

constitutional provisions for the executive

power

of the federal constitution since the executive power

varies in

in state

all states

governments

from

is

not

181

unified.

In contrast to the President of the United States

who

is

the constitutional

executive, the Massachusetts Constitution recognizes five, independent constitutional

These include not only express
constitutional interpretation,

limitations but also implied ones. "[I]n contrast with federal

which

historically has focused

fundamental interpretive issue under
legislative powers." Tarr,
176

177

1

179

Part the First,

art.

20.

Part the First,

art.

22.

Understanding State Constitutions,

Articles of Amendment,

art.

62.

Amendment,

art.

89.

Articles of Amendment,

art.

104.

Articles of

under the

state's police

be upheld

should be noted that

may

if

it

is

on

state

16.

all

to general restraints

legislative

powers, even when exercised

of being reasonable and enacted for the

act pursuant to a valid exercise of

public, even though contract previously entered into

may

its

be

police

power

affected....

An

for the general

impairment will

reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose." Nationwide Mutual

Insurance Company
181

It

powers, are subject

public good. "The Legislature

good of the

on the implied powers of Congress, the

state constitutions is the implied limitations (if any)

v.

The only exception

Commissioner of Insurance, 397 Mass. 416 (1986), 423.
to this is

New Jersey which

has a unified executive. See

2001.

76

Book of States: 2000-

which share executive

offices

Governor which

responsibilities.

will be discussed below.

183

182

The

best

known

The other four

is

the office of

offices include the Auditor,

the Attorney General, the Secretary of
State, and the Treasurer and Receiver
General.

All serve for four years and, except for
the Auditor and Treasurer, have
constitutional duties.

initiative petitions

meet formal

The Secretary keeps
results,

The Attorney General
criteria

and

While the division of executive

specified

assigned responsibility for ensuring that

that they

the official records of the

and performs a variety of duties

difficult, the

is

some

do not cover excluded

Commonwealth,

in the initiative

184

certifies election

and referendum process. 185

duties in the state

Governor does have many powers similar

topics.

makes an exact comparison

to the national executive but, as

with the description of the Legislature's power, the description of the
Governor's power
in the

Massachusetts Constitution

is

also quite vague. For the

most part

provides

it

greatest detail of her authority as commander-in-chief of the state militia. 186

Governor

I8

" It is

is

unclear

also granted certain

how

the average per state

powers which are similar

Massachusetts compares
is

to those

which

The

the U.S.

to other states in this regard.

10.2 independently elected executive officials.

It

According to a recent
would appear that

article,

Massachusetts

is well below this average unless they counted the members of the Governor's Council in
which case Massachusetts would have 13 independently elected executive officials. Thad Beyle,
"Governors: The Middlemen and Women in Our Political System," in Virginia Gray and Herbert Jacob,
eds., Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Congressional

Quarterly Press, 1996), 229.
1

Art.

86 of the Articles of Amendment of the Massachusetts Constitution (which took

effectively eliminated the Lieutenant Governor as an independent entity. This

effect in 1966)

Amendment

requires the

Governor and Lieutenant Governor to run for office as one. The only real duty which the Lieutenant
Governor has is to preside over the Governor's Council when the Governor does not, and to serve as a
member of the Council when the Governor does preside. (Massachusetts Constitution, Part the Second,
ch. 2, §2.)

184

Articles of Amendment,

duties.

185

186

I

am

art.

Part the Second, ch. 2, §4,

Part

II,

74.

It

should be noted that

all

officers

have other statutory and

speaking here only of their constitutional authority.

Chapter

art. 2;

Articles of Amendment,

2, §1, art. 7, 10, 12.

77

art.

101; and

art.

74 and 108.

traditional

Constitution grants to the President on
the federal level. These include
the power to

veto acts of the legislature, to pardon
those convicted of violating state
law,
all

judicial officers,

and

to adjourn the legislature.'* 7

"authority from time to time,

Counsellors of this

at his discretion, to

Commonwealth

Counsellors, or five of them

In addition, the

assemble and

for the time being,

at least, shall,

call

to

appoint

Governor has

the

together the

and the Governor with said

and may, from time

to time,

hold or keep a

Council, for the ordering and directing the affairs
of the Commonwealth, agreeably
the Constitution and the laws of the land." 188

of the

state's chief executive

It

would be easy

is

the General Court, the authority

stated in the broadest possible terms.

assume

to

As with

to

that a state-federal

comparison of constitutional

provisions regarding the high courts might be different.

A

quick look

at Article 111 in

the U.S. Constitution leads easily to a conclusion that the
Massachusetts Constitution

could not possibly say less about the SJC than
U.S. Supreme Court

in the section

--

court details not

its

189

arts. 5

The only

judicial

Powers of the Governor
-

federal counterpart says about the

would be wrong. None of the

five articles

of the Constitution entitled "The Judiciary" deals specifically with the

SJC's judicial power.

legislature

but such a conclusion

its

specific reference in this section to the state's high

power but

arc detailed in Part

and 6) except

for the veto

power

the granting of a quasi-legislative

II,

Chapter 2 (pardon

power which

is

found

-

art. X;

appointment

in Part II,

Chapter

I

,

art. 9;

-

§

to the

1

,

adjourn

art. 2.

These

constitutional powers, except the veto, require approval of the Governor's Council.
IXK

Part

II,

Chapter

2, §1, art. 4.

This

is

an interesting example of how the language of the Constitution

can remain the same while the practice of government changes.

It is

obvious from the language

framcrs expected the Governor to work closely with the Council, not unlike

in

that the

colonial times. Today,

except for gaining acceptance of the Council on specifically designated tasks (pardon, appointment,
expenditures), the Governor never works with the Council.
189

Part

II,

Chapter.!.

78

Court

-

of providing advisory opinions, upon
request,

that

to the

Governor, Council, or

either branch of the legislature. 190

A

fuller discussion

over time can be found

power

Chapter

However,

6.

it

should be noted that

this

this

unique

certainly can help to shape the relationship
between the Court and the state's

legislature

the

in

of the SJC's advisory power and how the
Court has used

and executive. This

lawmaking process than

is

institutional feature involves the

the case on the federal level and

Court more closely

marks an

in

essential

difference between the two courts. 191

The

Constitution's lack of specificity regarding the SJC's
judicial duties

directly related to the history of the Court

assumed

SJC would simply be

that the

Judicature, performing the

same

duties

which was discussed above. 192

new name

a

which

It

is

was

for the Superior Court of

predecessor had performed under

its

190

Part II, Ch. 3, art. 2, amended by art. 85 of the Articles of Amendment
to read as follows: "Each
branch of the legislature, as well as the governor or the council, shall have authority to
require the
opinions of the justices of the supreme judicial court, upon important questions of law, and
upon solemn

occasions."

The amendment only

and Council" meant
independently. The

that both
1

clarified the question

must agree

to

964 Amendment made

of whether the original wording of "Governor

send a request
it

to the

clear that either the

SJC or if each could make
Governor or the Council,

a request

independently, could request such an opinion.
191

This also puts the SJC in a different place than most of the other state high courts, although seven
other state constitutions authorize the high court to give advisory opinions. In Colorado, Maine,

Michigan,

New

Hampshire, and Rhode Island the

their legislature or their governor. In Florida

opinions. In addition,

state's high court can respond to requests by either
and South Dakota only the Governor may request such

Alabama and Delaware provide

Considering recent debates between the

NH

statutory authorization for advisory opinions.

Legislature and the state's high court, the existence of the

advisory power alone certainly does not appear to lower the conflict level between branches

See discussion
1

It

also

in

seems

Chapter

to differentiate

it

from some other

which the

states in

state constitutions

detailed provisions for the judiciary. While the Massachusetts Constitution does contain
for other sections of the judiciary,
states

have chosen

statute.

to set

The judicial

in a state.

7.

up

it

is

not as detailed as

their entire judicial

some which Alan Tarr

have very

some provisions

describes. "[S]everal

system by constitutional prescription rather than by
each court's jurisdiction,
and provide for the selection of

articles in these states establish all state courts, specify

delineate the boundaries of the

districts in

which the courts

shall operate,

judges to serve on them." Understanding State Constitutions, 18. While this isn't clear from Tarr's
discussion, it is likely that these states are operating under revised constitutions and not their original
charter.

In

Massachusetts these things have been more likely

leaving the discussion of the judiciary

in the

Constitution as

79

to

is.

be handled via statutory change while

colonial charter. This notion of
continuity which applied, to

branches of the new

"all courts

of law

departments."

shall

in Part 11,

Chapter

proceed

in the

all

was

federal level

Article 6 allowed for the continuati
lion

6.

changed by the General Court and

until

degree, to

government and which was absent on the

state

reinforced by two articles

of all former laws

some

article 9 stated, in part, that

execution of the business of their respective

193

This continuity

in

regard to the Courts meant that the SJC would,
and

did, continue as the judicatory for important
civil

the final appellate court in

some

and criminal cases, as well as being

instances.

In carrying out these judicial duties the

power of the SJC

is

protected by

art.

29

of the Declaration of Rights which guarantees lifetime
appointment of justices with
"honorable salaries."
protection to the

on

194

Amendments

SJC and

their authority

to the Constitution

the other courts of the

have provided additional

Commonwealth,

not only from attacks

from other branches of government but also from the

the initiative and referendum process

was added

citizens.

to the Constitution during the

1918 Constitutional Convention, there were a few matters excluded from

and referendum

Initiative

Art. 6 reads: 'All the laws

Colony or
and be

petitions cannot include consideration

to the rights

and

liberties

which have heretofore been adopted, used and approved

contained

9 71

this process.

of measures related

in the

State of Massachusetts Bay, and usually practiced on in the courts of law, shall

in full force until altered or

1

When

to

Province,

still

remain

repealed by the Legislature: such parts only excepted as arc repugnant
in this

Art. 9"s applicability to all branches

is

Constitution."

found

in the

following:

"To

the end that there

may

be no

of Justice, or danger arise to the Commonwealth from a change of the Form of Government - all
officers, civil and military, holding commissions under the Government and people of Massachusetts Bay
failure

in

New

England, and

all

other officers of the said government and people,

shall take effect, shall have, hold, use, exercise

committed,
l94

until other

and enjoy,

persons shall be appointed

Furthcr protection for salaries

is

found

all

the

in their stead...."

in Part II,

80

Ch.

at

the time this Constitution

powers and authority

2, §1, art. 13.

to

them granted

or

"the appointment, qualification, tenure,
removal, recall or compensation of
judges; or to
the reversal of a judicial decision; or
to the powers, creation or abolition
195
of courts."

While the SJC

is

protected

there are constitutional checks on

in

its

an effort

to

maintain a government of co-equals,

authority as well.

As

already mentioned, the

appointment process puts the governor and the
governor's council
will

sit

on the SJC as well as on the bench of the lower

courts.

in control

Once

of who

there, the

Constitution provides for removal of a judge or
justice through the previously discussed

methods of impeachment

(legislature alone), address (legislature

and governor

together) or "retirement" (governor alone). Another
potential check on the judiciary

(although more as a check on

trial

courts)

governor and the council. Finally, the

is

the pardoning

power

legislature's

judicatories and courts of record," combined with their

power which
to "erect

is

given to the

and constitute

power over meetings times and

places forjudges of probate and over determining jurisdiction regarding marriage,

divorce and alimony, combine to enable the legislature to establish a degree of
administrative control over the lower courts and to effect the workload of the state's

highest court.

The

196

final perspective

constitutional

which needs

to

be added

in a discussion

powers are divided between the three branches of government by the

Massachusetts Constitution regards the provisions which are made
maintain

195

Art.
196

its

of how the

power through checks on

to

enable the SJC to

the other branches. In the original Constitution,

48 of the Articles of Amendment.

Power

to establish Courts

and places

for probate issues

divorce, and alimony in

is
is

art. 5.

detailed in Part

found
It is

in Part

II,

II,

Chapter

Chapter

1,

§

3, art.

1, art. 3.

Power

4 and to

control cases of marriage,

to establish

interesting to note that this article originally placed the

determine "all causes of marriage, divorce, and alimony, and

all

power

to

appeals from the Judges of Probate" in

the hands of the Governor and the Council "until the Legislature shall,

8

meeting times

by law, make other provision."

the only partial check granted to
the
particularly

weak check, however, due

governor or the General Court

which
to

do

SJC

is

to its

that the

voluntary nature.

is

a

unlikely thai the

There

in nature.

opinion of the Court will be followed. While
in a

It

is

of the Court. Furthermore, even

opinions of the SJC are only advisory

Of all judicial power

weaker

Advisory power. 197 This

will request an opinion if they
are considering an action

will directly challenge the authority

so, these

the

this is the

is

if

they were

no guarantee

case with the exercise

system of separation of powers, enforcement
authority

is

even

regard to advisory opinions. 198

in

On

the other hand, the constitutional recognition
of the

provide advisory opinions

may have

SJCs

authority to

provided more constitutional support and

legitimacy to the Court's exercise of judicial review from
the

start.

This power, of a

court to declare acts of the other branches of government to
be unconstitutional,
clearly the

most potent weapon the judiciary has

attacks by the other branches on

its

authority.

at its

Like

its

is

disposal to protect itself from

counterpart on the federal level,

however, the SJC has no specific constitutional support

for the exercise of this power.

Constitutional support for the Court's participation in the legislative and executive

processes found

147

in the

Two amendments

91 of the Articles of

Massachusetts Constitution

have specifically added

Amendment,

to the authority

ratified in 1968, deals

can occur through notice of the governor personally

by notification

to the President

in the

form of the advisory opinion

of the SJC

with a vacancy

that s/he

is

unable

to

check the other branches.

in the office

to

Art.

of governor. This

perform the duties of office or

of the Senate and the Speaker of the House by "the chief justice and

a

majority of the associate justices of the supreme judicial court. ..[by] their written declaration that the

governor

is

unable

to

discharge the powers and duties of his office[.]" This power has never been

exercised. Art. 101 of the Articles of

Amendment,

ratified in 1974,

Massachusetts House of Representatives and the Senate, requiring
Section 3 gives the

SJC "[or iginal jurisdiction. ..upon

Commonwealth. ..for judicial
and senatorial
198

As

I

changed

the size of the

that a redislricting plan

be developed.

the petition of any voter of the

relief relative to the establishment

of House of Representative, councillor

districts."

discuss in Chapter 6, however, the House and the Senate have generally followed the direction

outlined by the

SJC

in

advisory opinions.

82

may

process

1805

War.

help to explain

why

to the present, while the

SJC has more

the

Supreme Court used

consistently used tins

power from

sparingly until after the Civil

it

199

This potential effect on the recognized
legitimacy of the respective courts'
exercise of judicial review

of course, time-bound, judicial review has
long been

is,

recognized as a legitimate use of judicial power
on both the

The continuing debates about

this

power today tend

state

to concentrate

should interpret their respective constitutions
when exercising

many of the

and national

this

on

how

power.

the courts

200

Since

cases in which the high courts are asked to use
this power involve

guarantees of individual

liberties, a

comparison should be made between the U.S. and

Massachusetts Constitutions concerning their respective
degree the history of their development

is

similar.

The

bills

of rights.

201

inclusion of a

bill

of rights, are a

common theme

in

To some

stories regarding the battles for

of the U.S. Constitution, with the Anti-Federalists holding out

ratification

levels.

American

for

an

history classes, as

is

the

recognition that the passage of the Bill of Rights only two years after ratification of the

document

original

199

largely the result of these battles. Similarly, the original attempt at

of judicial review by the Supreme Court to declare an act of Congress to be unconstitutional
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137. The first recognition of this power in the Massachusetts
found in 1805, Mountfort v. Hall, Mass. 443. A more thorough discussion of the SJC and

First use

was

in 1803,

reports

is

1

judicial review
200

is

is

found

in

Chapter

5.

New Hampshire debate over school financing provisions is an example of this. See
So too was the controversy in California over the death penalty which resulted in the defeat
of Rose Bird and two colleagues in a retention election for their seats on that state's Supreme Court. See,
"Rose Bird and the Politics of Judicial Accountability in California," Judicature 70 ( 986); Betty
Medsgcr, Framed: The New Right Attack on Chief Justice Rose Bird and the Courts (New York: Pilgrim
The

recent

Chapter

7.

1

Press, 1983);
2(ll

This

shift,

and Preble Stolz, Judging Judges (New York: Free Press, 1981).

from judicial review

to protect the judicial

parallels the discussion in Chapter

separation of powers.
to the protection

1

Of course some justices

of individual

rights,

domain

to

its

use to protect individual

liberties,

of the Madisonian and libertarian purposes served by a system of

is

argue that upholding the constitution, especially

also part of the "judicial domain," an area

the experts.

83

in

in

regard

which justices are

writing a constitution in Massachusetts
was rejected in 1778, in part because
202
failed to include a guarantee of
rights.
This response

the proposed 1778

document represents

view

this

from voters

it,

too,

Essex County

in

to

well.

We think a bill of rights ascertaining and clearly describing

the rights of
conscience, and that security of person
and property, the supreme power
ot the state is bound to afford to all
the members thereof, ought to be
fully ratified before, or at the same
time with, the establishment of any

constitution.

As

a result of this and similar concerns
from other towns in Massachusetts, the

Constitution of 1780 opens with a Preamble,
followed by "Part the

First,

A

Declaration

of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts." 204 The
articles

of the Massachusetts Declaration contain almost

found in the

Bill

to the U.S. Constitution

most glaring of these, and the one which has
over the years,

the guarantees

which are

of Rights and many more. Missing, however, are two rights
found

Amendment

the 1st

all

thirty

is

and two

in the Fifth

attracted the

most

in

Amendment. The

attention

from historians

the essential requirement of a state religion found in article

3.

This

is

obviously different than the guarantee of religious freedom and protection from
establishment of religion which are found in the First

While one could have been persuaded

was not

in

Amendment

to the U.S.

1787 by the argument of the Federalists

essential for the protection of individual rights against the

power of a

that a bill

of rights

limited government which

the U.S. Constitution established on the national level, the lack of such protections in a state constitution

against a government
203

From

This

to exercise general police

the Essex Result, quoted in

Community,"
204

empowered

is

in

powers

Henry Clay, "The Supreme

is

a

more

Judicial Court: Liberty

Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly Special Section, October

the pattern in

most

states.

appending the declaration of rights

"[F]ew

to the

state constitutions

glaring oversight.

19, 1992,

1

and

1.

have followed the federal practice of

end of the constitution." Tarr, Understanding State

Constitutions, 12.

84

Constitution.

205

This requirement for public support
of churches was eliminated with

passage of article

1
1

of the Articles of Amendment

(and seemingly unstudied) difference
a statement guaranteeing

speech. This

that

is

while

freedom of the press,

was not added

it

1833* The

in

article 16

other interesting

of the Declaration contains

contains no similar guarantee for

207
to the state's constitution until
1948.

The Massachusetts Declaration

also lacks specific language concerning

the criminal due process guarantees found
in the Fifth

Amendment

two of

to the U.S.

Constitution. These are guarantees of indictment
by grand jury as well as protection

against double jeopardy. These have never been
added through the constitutional

amendment

process. However, beginning in 1854 the

SJC recognized grand jury

indictment for offenses imposing a state prison sentence to be
a part of the

guarantee of due process.

By

the 1930's the Court recognized a

protection of individuals from double jeopardy. 208

As

common

a result of these

article 12

law

amendments and

judicial determination of rights, the Massachusetts Declaration today contains

guarantees found

in the

all

U.S. Bill of Rights.

In addition to these the Declaration of Rights contains additional protections

which

205

are not found in

its

federal counterpart. This gives the

Article 2 does provide for protection of the "right and duty of all

manner and season most agreeable

the

to the Dictates

of his

own

men

SJC

a potentially broader

in society. ...to

worship

God

in

conscience, or for his religious

profession or sentiments...." (Emphasis added.)
6

For an interesting discussion of this

and
207

the First

Amendment (Chapel

Art. 77 of the Articles of

following

freedom

is

adopted

in a state:

it

in

Hill:

history, see

Leonard Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion

University of North Carolina Press, 1994), especially chapter

Amendment.

"Article

XVI

of Part the

First

is

2.

hereby annulled and the

The Liberty of the press is essential to the security of
be restrained in this commonwealth. The right office

place thereof: Article XVI.

ought not, therefore,

to

speech shall not be abridged."
2<)8

For grand jury indictment for crimes involving

329

(

1

854). For double jeopardy see,

state prison sentences see,

Commonwealth

85

v.

James

McCan, 277 Mass. 1 99

(

1

v.

93

Robbins, 74 Mass.
1

).

array of limitations on which to
draw in addressing the constitutionality
of legislative

and executive

actions.

209

In addition, as

interpret similar provisions in

its

mentioned previously, the

constitution differently than the

interpreted the U.S. Constitution, a
practice in which the
albeit with

some

One

dissent.

SJC has

state

high court can

Supreme Court has
willingly engaged,

210

final difference

between the Massachusetts and U.S. Constitutions

is

the

ease of amending the state's document and
the concomitant frequency with which the

Massachusetts document has been amended

The cumbersome process

amendments being added

for

amending

in

comparison

to the federal constitution. 21

the U.S. Constitution has resulted in only 17

since the Bill of Rights in 1791. While the
Massachusetts

Constitution does require the action of two consecutive
sessions of the state legislature
as well as a vote of the citizenry to amend, this
process

is

easier to see to completion

than either of the processes established for proposal and ratification
of amendments to

Protections found in the Massachusetts Declaration which are not specifically provided in the U.S.

Constitution include:
right

of people

art.

5

- all

change" the government;

regular rotation in office by elected officials;

be elected;

may

art.

1

1

-

right to

must be accountable

officers in the state

to "reform, alter, or totally

art.

9

-

art.

at all

8

-

right to free elections

remedy "by having recourse

receive in person, property, or character.";

art.

22

-

times to the people;

rights

and

art.

7

-

of people to ensure

to all eligible citizens to

to the laws, for all injuries or

wrongs which he

provision that the legislature will meet

frequently for "redress of grievances, correcting, strengthening and confirming the laws, and for making
laws, as the common good may require."; art. 23 - guarantee of no taxation without consent; as well

new

art. 29 guarantee of an independent judiciary and the art. 30 provisions for a government of
separated powers which have already been discussed in this chapter. For a discussion of the wide array

as the

of protections found

Harvard

Williams, "State Constitutional
210

The

participation of the

Court sees

itself as

SJC

Again,

Civil Rights-Civil Liberties

Law
in

Processes,"

new judicial

this is similar to

in the state.

most

states.

equal to the average of amendments to
in Tarr, ed.,

Law Review 8 (1973), 271-350 and Robert
Mary Law Review 24 (1983), 169-228.

federalism provides

some

insight into the role

In fact, the 117

1

86

in

Chapter

other

5.

amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution is
See Donald Lutz, "Amendment Patterns,"

constitutions.

Constitutional Politics in the States, 3

which the

in relationship to the

This will be discussed more thoroughly

all state

F.

William and

playing not only vis-a-vis the federal government, but also

two branches of government
211

of other states see, "Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for

in the constitutions

State Bills of Rights,"

the U.S. Constitution required
by Article V. 212

Massachusetts Constitution has been amended

not surprising, therefore, that
the

It is

1

17 times since 1780. 213

This difference has two potential
effects on the contrasting place
of the United

Supreme Court and

States

the

SJC

in their

respective political systems.

The

similar to one mentioned above in regard
to the Declaration of Rights.

requirements and limitations there are
justices of the

SJC can justify

more thoroughly

in

Chapter

5,

in the written

their exercise

the

to the

prohibiting progressive taxation has engendered
as

is

The more

document, the more easily the

of judicial review. 2

amendment

fust

'

4

As

will be discussed

Massachusetts Constitution

many

claims that statutes are

unconstitutional as has any of the civil liberties
protections of the Declaration aside

from the broad due process and equal protection guarantees. 215
Secondly,

the general

ease with which the constitution can be amended, and the
relative acceptance of this
process, puts the

SJC and

the General Court in a

somewhat

different relationship than

The

constitutional amendment process is detailed in art. 48 of the Articles of Amendment
as amended
74 and 81. The process allows for either citizens (with signatures of 3% of those voting for
governor in the last election) or legislators to submit an amendment for consideration. The legislature

by

art.

must meet

in joint session to

amendment proposed by
happen

in

consider such proposals, and only 1/4 of the

citizens (a majority

two consecutive

must vote

members must support an

for legislator initiated

legislative sessions before the

amendment can be

amendments). This must
put on the ballot at the next

general election for approval by a majority vote by the citizens. In addition to the relative case of
winning passage of such amendments, it should be noted that the state process also differs from the
federal process

by the greater

role allowed for citizen involvement and for the absence of requirements

for supcrmajorities as arc required in the federal process.
213
It

should be noted, however, that only fifty-one of these passed as a result of the process described

note 102 above. The

first

nine were a result of the Constitutional Convention of 1821

.

at

The next 35 were

passed following an earlier amendment procedure

(art. 9 of the Articles of Amendment) between 1821
and 1918. (A Constitutional Convention of 1853 resulted in no changes to the Constitution.) The
remaining 22 amendments came out of the Constitutional Convention of 9 7- 9 8. For a comparison
1

of
14

this

process to that followed by other

According

to the research

215

and

Art.

local debt.

Lutz,

1

in the national constitution.

"Amendment

Process," 36.

44 of the Articles of Amendment.

87

1

1

Understanding State Constitutions.

of Donald Lutz, 63 percent of all amendments to

with matters which have no place
state

states, see Tarr,

state constitutions deal

These topics include

local

government and

between the Supreme Court and Congress.
While amendments

exists

to the U.S.

Constitution can, and have, been enacted
to counter a Supreme Court
interpretation of
the Constitution, such corrections
of

SJC

"errors" are easier to make. 216 This
could

give the justices of the SJC a greater sense
of freedom

and exercising judicial review, knowing
decision can be overturned through the

that

in interpreting the constitution

major public dissatisfaction with

Amendment

process.

their

217

THE STRUC TURAL FRAMEWORK - DIVISION OF
POWERS v. SHARING OF POWERS
should be clear by

It

last resort in a

States

that

any understanding about the place of a court of

system of separation of powers which comes from studying the
United

Supreme Court

filled

is

relationship in the states.

many

now

with potential pitfalls for understanding such a

Even

a state like Massachusetts,

whose high

general characteristics with the U.S. Supreme Court, has

many

differences. In general, the history and the constitutional structure

court shares

important

which

the U.S.

Constitution establishes for the U.S. Supreme Court puts the Court in a position of
tension vis-a-vis the Congress while the judicial-legislative relationship in

Massachusetts tends

to represent a

continuum. The U.S. Supreme Court began

its life

216

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution which are seen as overturning Supreme Court decisions include:
Amendment (in response to Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 [1793]); 14th Amendment (in
response, in part, to Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 [1857]); 16th Amendment (in response to
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 158 U.S. 601 [1895]); 26th Amendment (responding to
1

1th

Oregon

v.

400 U.S. 12 [1970]). The most recent case in Massachusetts in which a
amendment was passed in response to the decision of the SJC was in 1982 when
of Amendment was enacted. This article states, in part, that "[n]o provision of the

Mitchell,

1

constitutional

the Articles

art.

116 of

Constitution, however, shall be construed as prohibiting the imposition of the punishment of death."

This amendment was

in direct

response to the SJC's decision

in District

Attorney for Suffolk County

Watson, 381 Mass. 648 (1980).
217

As

will be seen in Chapter 5, this theoretical

review

to overturn actions

by the

freedom has not led

state legislature.

88

to frequent practice

of judicial

v.

in controversy, in contrast to
the

existing, accepted institution.

SJC whose existence was simply

From

the beginning the U.S.

a continuation of an

Supreme Court was

clearly

given "the judicial power" as something
distinct from legislative and
executive powers.

The Massachusetts

Constitution, however, continued
the development of "the judicial

power" which had been occurring before
and Council continued

the Revolution.

The

fact that the

maintain authority over issues of
marriage and divorce

to

representative of this. 21 * In sum, the origin
of the U.S.

Supreme Court and

of separated powers was more contrived,
while the SJC was allowed
naturally, both as an independent
institution

government.

The

result

Governor

was

and

to

in relation to the other

a greater sense of tension

is

the system

develop more
branches of

between the branches on the

federal level than existed in Massachusetts
where distinctions between powers of

government were based more on practice than on any

clear theory of separated powers.

This difference continued as the two institutions
developed within their
respective political systems.

From

its

inception, the U.S.

opportunity to be more "political" than did the SJC.
appellate cases from the

of original jurisdiction

more

discretion over

Both of these
take on

new and

comiposed

218

factors

start, in

till

its

contrast to the

It

Supreme Court had

could devote

SJC which

the 1860's. In addition, the U.S.

workload

made

it

at a

much

earlier date

easier for the U.S.

difficult issues than

of much routine judicial

its

the

time to

retained a substantial degree

Supreme Court exercised

(1925 as opposed to 1972).

Supreme Court, should

it

so desire, to

could the SJC whose workload would be

fare,

those duties which

all

This development could be seen as a continuation of the process begun

recognize as being

in early colonial

times (pre-

1690) as described by Barbara Aronstein Black, "The Concept of a Supreme Court," in which she
describes the legislative-adjudicative distinction as a continuum rather than a clear separation.

89

"judicial" in nature.

institution taking

are generally

institution

on

more

Again

difficult issues

from the

which "grows

into"

its

On

start since appeals,

hotly contested than cases at

granted discretion over
its

this paints a contrasting
picture.

On

trial.

the one side

by

an

is

their very nature,

the other side

is

the SJC, an

appellate authority and which, by the
time

it

is

workload, has developed a solid institutional
acceptance of

its

place in a system of separated powers.

This contrast between the role of the
courts of last resort

systems

is

presented to highlight the need to look

in state

and federal

both systems to see that the

at

separation of powers does not lead to only one
kind of interbranch relationship

between the judiciary and

its

co-equal branches. In addition,

toward explaining the findings of this study,

and

legislative branches in Massachusetts

be the case on the federal

is

it

may go

that the relationship

part of the

way

between the judicial

more cooperative than

is

often

assumed

to

level.

However, the reader should not think

that there

is

no tension between branches

Massachusetts. While the more natural development of the Massachusetts
system

in

may

provide a path for smoother relations between branches than did the more contrived
birth

and development of the federal system, there

various

power sources within one

seen in the next chapter, as

political system.

we move

To what degree

to a look at the

between the SJC and the General Court
budgetary control over the

will naturally be a tension

in the

this is true

can be

sometimes contentious relationship

attempt to exercise administrative and

state's judicial system.

90

between

CHAPTER

?

JUDICIAL ADMINSITRA TION - SOURCES OFl
NTERBRANCH rnvr,
There

is,

,r r

no doubt, a connection between "how
government operates" and "what

government does." While not denying

this link, the goal

predominantly on interbranch relations

in

the majority of this

work

regard to the second question.

reports findings from research

legislative interaction in policymaking.

judicial branches from that perspective

of this project was

The

relation

was found

to

As

to focus

a result,

which assessed judicial-

between the

legislative

and

be one of greater cooperation

in

the years under study than had been
expected. Throughout the course of the research,

however,

it

became apparent

that interactions

between the SJC and the General Court

were not always harmonious. More

conflict

seemed

government operates." Therefore,

seemed

as

it

occur

to

though

this

in

questions of "how

study would be incomplete

without a discussion of some of the conflicts between the judicial
and legislative

branches which have taken place

Such

powers

is

working

moves

in

regard to judicial administration in the recent past.

conflicts are to be expected, especially since the concept of separation of

intricately

connected to that of checks and balances. While each branch

to fulfill its duties as

outside

into the sphere

its

it

sees

fit,

the others are

on guard

realm of authority, or more importantly,

to

make

to

make

of power of another branch. In judicial-legislative

sure

is

sure no branch

it

doesn't step

relations, the

Legislature can check the High Court through control of the budget as well as through

legislation

aimed

at administrative duties affecting the

in administrative supervision

development of court

rules

of lower courts,

in

work of the Court, most notably

control over court structure, and in

and procedures. The theory

91

is

that if the

SJC

interferes in

the legislative sphere while

it

is

exercising us recognized powers
of common law

development, statutory interpretation, or
judicial review, then the
Legislature can
Court via these legislative or budgetary
mechanisms.

in the

would argue
or not)

in a

that the judiciary has inherent

system of separated powers

essential to maintaining independence.

mentioned above

On

the other hand,

rein

some

powers (whether constitutionally
recognized

to control those facets

of its operation which are

Not surprisingly, these include the same
factors

control of fiscal affairs and of judicial
219
administration.

Conflict has occurred as a result of attempts by
both the Legislature and the SJ(
to exercise authority in these

realms

in

the last thirty years.

I

lowever, these conflicts

actually lend support to the overall picture
of cooperation which

Court and the Legislature
these disagreements had

more

in

the

little to

development of law

in

is

seen between the

Massachusetts since most of

do with substantive poliey matters. 220 Rather, they

often concerned battles lor control of "who runs
government."

degree

that the justices

of the SJC seemed

to

have

a

In

addition, to the

strong position on administrative

matters, resolution of the conflict eventually resulted

in

change the

the

justices desired

most instances.

in

For

a

general discussion of this concept, sec (ail Baar, "Judicial Activism

Inherent Powers Doctrine,"

in

Porter and Tarr, State

inherent powers as applied Injudicial reform

Inherent

Power

to

Reform:

An

in

Supreme Courts. For

a

in

State Courts:

The

review of the theory of

Massachusetts, sec William Burnett Harvey, "The

Essay on the Massachusetts Judiciary," Massachusetts

Law Review

11

(1992), 8-20.
220

While

I

recognize that decisions about administrative matters like personnel, the structure of the

and the development of rules of COUrt are policy questions of a
different from questions of the substance of the law.
judiciary,

221

i
I

.

-

would note

chapters

in (his

,

that (he

in

I

would argue

result

this chapter, unlike the findings in the other

of systematic research. Rather

it

developed out of side

several interviews with court personnel, as well as from anecdotes

secondary materials on the

thai (hey arc

(

information presented throughout

work, was not the

comments made

sort,

(

'ourt.

While

I

in a

variety of

did not search out this information, the cumulative effect of

these miscellaneous pieces of information was impossible to overlook.

92

While future research

will

JUDICIA L ORGANIZATION - CONFLICTS OVFR

POLICY OR PATRONAGE?

The
into

two

story of judicial administration in
Massachusetts from the 1970s on tails

different phases.

With respect

most of the major administrative changes

to

which occurred through the 1980s, one sees
eventual cooperation between
and the

legislative branch, as

more tension before consensus
on these matters

Many

seen

is

is

in

the judiciary

questions of "the law," although with a

As

reached.

be noted, there was

will

less

little

consensus

in the early 1990s.

of these changes took place

Massachusetts judiciary began

in the

to enter the

1970s, the decade

modern

era.

when

Some of the

the

least controversial

reforms during these years included an increased
professionalization of both the bar and
the bench under the control of the

High Court. 222

1972 the SJC adopted the Rules of

In

Professional Responsibility which were modeled on the

ABA's model

code, and

1974 the Board of Bar Overseers and Clients' Security Board was created

and ensure compliance with the new code by the
Justice Wilkins, this action

was done,

state's attorneys.

to

in

oversee

According

to

Chief

appropriately, by the judiciary alone.

appropriate that the Supreme Judicial Court established the new
process wholly within the judicial branch of government. Any attempt
It is

such a system by legislation would undoubtedly have generated
greater controversy than existed in the debate before the court and would
to create

have created substantial separation of powers questions.

I have never
heard a serious question raised as to the constitutionality of the court's
action in creating the board and in establishing a system of annual

assessments to finance the board and the clients' security fund.
2

According

to Professor Harvey, the

judicial system

is

perhaps the

power

to "supervis[e]

least controversial"

223

and discipline] personnel within the

of the Court's inherent powers. ("The Inherent Power

Reform," 16.) Judicial control of the bench was solidified in 1978 with the creation of the Judicial
Conduct Commission. Statutes 1978, c.478, §14, inserting c.2 C into the Massachusetts General Laws.
to

1

223

Herbert

P.

Wilkins,

"A

Justice's Perspective of the First

Law Review

1

Twenty Years of the Board of Bar

79 (1994), 136. The results of these efforts can be seen
Rule 3:07 - Canons of Ethics and Rule 4 - Bar Discipline and Clients' Security Protection.

Overseers," Massachusetts

93

in

SJC

The

The

first

structure of the judiciary in Massachusetts

changed

in the

1970s as well.

of these developments, while requiring
legislative action, occurred largely
due

to the efforts

of Chief Justice G. Joseph Tauro: the
establishment of the Massachusetts

Court of Appeals as an intermediate appellate
court

in 1972.

224

According

former

to a

Legal Counsel to the SJC, and a leading
scholar on the development of the Appeals
Court, while the workload of the

SJC made

the creation of such an institution

important, and while other states were adopting
a three-tiered judicial system,

appeared doubtful

would succeed

in the

when Tauro was
in the fall

[at the

end of the 1969-1970 term] the movement

Massachusetts

foreseeable future[.]" 225 These prospects changed,
however,

offered the position of Chief Justice of the

of 970. Tauro accepted

this

1

from the Governor

in

"it

that

SJC by Governor Sargent

nomination, but not before getting a guarantee

he would put his political power and will behind the creation of

an intermediate court of appeals. 226 This promise was combined with
Tauro's ability

draw together diverse members of the judicial and

legal

to

community from which most

objections to this measure originated. 227 Within two years of Tauro's appointment, and

"4

While debates may occur over the proper role for legislative and judicial activity in questions of
power to create new courts clearly falls under the constitutional authority of
the Legislature as Part II, c.
art. 3 gives the General Court the "full power and authority to erect and
§
constitute judicatories and courts of record."

judicial administration, the

1

,

1

,

225

Daniel J. Johnedis, "Creation of the Appeals Court," in Osgood, ed., History of the Law in
Massachusetts, 463. See also transcripts of interviews with Johnedis and John L. Burke, former
Executive Secretary to the SJC, on file with the author for more of this history.
226

Johnedis, "Creation of the Appeals Court," in Osgood, ed., History of the Law in Massachusetts, 465.
Tauro was Chief Justice from 1970 to 1976. The Justice Tauro with which many Massachusetts residents
are familiar, Joseph L. Tauro of the Federal District Court of Massachusetts, is the son of the former
Chief Justice. Such family ties aren't unique in Massachusetts. Chief
Justice

Tauro was appointed

Wilkins, father of Herbert

P.

to the position

Wilkins

and as Chief Justice from 1996

who

on the SJC upon the retirement of Chief Justice Raymond

served as an Associate Justice of the

to 1999.

94

SJC from 1972

to

1996

with the Governor's support, the
Legislature passed legislation which
created the

Appeals Court. 228

Most

interesting for purposes of

Legislature and the

development,

developed
little

1

97

At

is

that

while there was some conflict related

centered mostly upon

institution.

legislative
229

1

it

SJC

examining the relations between the

According

who would

control positions in the newly

to Johnedis' history

of this development, there was

concern with the creation of an Appeals Court

that point Senate President

to this

until the final

push

in

Kevin B. Harrington and Senate Chair of the

Judiciary, William Bulger, indicated that they
were less than pleased with the degree of
judicial involvement in

what was predominantly a

however, these concerns gave way and the
the Senate leadership on this matter

in the legislation that the clerk

and the clerk

for the

Whether or not

this

statute

seemed

legislative responsibility.

was enacted. The acquiescence of

to coincide

with the decision to guarantee

of the SJC for Suffolk County (the single justice session)

newly developed Appeals Court would be the same person. 230

move (which gave

a powerful

Boston area

political figure,

Powers, control over both clerks' offices and therefore control over

Concerns from the

In 1972,

legal

all

John

of the positions

community seemed to center on two issues. First, there were concerns that
would result in the SJC eventually becoming too involved

the creation of an intermediate appellate court

injudicial administration at the apex of a growing judicial system while being less involved in the
development of the law. Secondly, there was a feeling among some that all appeals deserved to be heard
by the state's highest court, and that to create a system which prohibited this would be to deny justice.
228

229

230

Statutes 1972, c.740, inserting

GL

c.

21

1

A.

Johnedis, "Creation and Impact of the Appeals Court," 472-473.

The Single

Justice session of the

SJC

will

be discussed

95

in

more

detail in

Chapter

4.

within both offices) had anything to do
with the final passage of this

an

bill is

interesting question. 231

The second major
Massachusetts
Trial Court

in the

change within the judiciary

structural

1970s was the quasi-unification of the

Department

in 1978.

that occurred in

trial

court system under the

232

Previous to

thus time, the trial courts

were

locally

controlled and local in character.
In the late '70s, the "extremely

fragmented" courts were administered by
counties rather than the state and six of those
counties boasted the
highest court delays in the country. Judges
and lawyers say that "local
ficfdoms" controlled judicial budgets, personnel
and courtroom
procedures, creating confusion and inefficiency
among

The

counties.

1978 Act reduced the number of budgets from more than
300 to one, and
the allocation of resources went from a
"free for all," to an objective,
need-based system.

The

fact that six

delays were

in

of the twelve counties

in the

Massachusetts was closely connected to

administration. These problems were so bad that

come from
formed

a variety of sources.

at the

country with the longest

this

confusing method of

momentum

Most notable was

the

trial

for

change seemed

Cox Commission,

a

to

committee

request of Governor Michael Dukakis in 1975 and chaired by Archibald

The timing of these events was confirmed by John Burke, interview by

author, Boston,

MA,

5

May

1999.
232

Statutes 1978, chapter 478.

I

use the term "quasi-unification" because while

were combined under the umbrella of the
identity.

Trial

all

seven

Court Department, they each maintained

trial

courts

their separate

The reorganization did, however, move the control over the state's courts from the individual
state. The seven trial court divisions are: Boston Municipal, District, housing, Juvenile,

counties to the

Land, Probate, and Superior. For a

full

description of the organization of the Massachusetts judiciary,

Michele DeMary, "The Court System in Massachusetts," Unpublished paper, 1995. For a broader
view of 1970s court unification efforts, sec Larry Berkson and Susan Carbon, Court Unification: History,
see,

Politics

and Implementation (Washington,

D.C.: National Institute for

Law Enforcement and

Criminal

Justice, 1978).

lh

Meghan S. Laska, "The 20 Anniversary of Court Reform," Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly,
November 16, 1998,
The descriptive terms in this quote come from Henry L. Barr, the first
professional trial court administrator. Unless otherwise indicated, this article is the source of much of the
1

information

in the

.

paragraph which follows.

96

Cox. The Commission issued

some

a report in

1976 calling for a variety of reforms,
drawing

ideas from previous findings of an
earlier Massachusetts Bar Association

committee. While Chief Justice Tauro (then

retired)

Chief Justice Hennessey, the SJC did not
appear

was on

the

Committee, as was

to take the lead in this

Despite these problems with judicial
management,

it

reform

effort.

234

took another two years

235
before the Court Reform Act was signed
into law.
While the history of this

development
raised in

is

news

well beyond the scope of this paper, the
interesting point which was

articles

of the time and

in

interviews with

SJC

which delayed these obviously much-needed reforms
came

On

the one hand,

some

local legal

could use

control,

this

and attorneys

knowledge

largely

that the

is

from two sources. 236

who knew

to their advantage.

that

it

way. Judges had a great degree of

the "ins" and "outs" of their local court

Parochialism was

at the root

source of resistance to change as well. This came from those legislators

thought to have a certain degree of control over the

many patronage jobs

courthouse, including court officers, clerks, and probation officers.

Change nonetheless occurred,

called for a unified

separate identities of the seven

234

235

236

albeit involving

trial

of the second

who were
in a

As one of the

bastions of patronage in Massachusetts, these legislators were loath to

Cox Commission had

concerns

communities, courts and attorneys, benefited from

the decentralized system and wanted to keep

freedom and

staff

last

make changes.

some compromise. While

the

court department, the 1978 act kept the

trial

courts (Boston Municipal, District, Housing,

John Burke, Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

5

May

1999.

Statute 1978, c.478.

This information comes largely from Laska, "The 20

th

Anniversary of Court Reform," as well as from
by author, Boston, MA, 5 May 1999; Robert Bloom,
1999; Maria Mossaidcs, interview by author, Boston, MA, 26

the following interviews: John Burke, interview

interview by author, Boston,
April 1999;

Edward

F.

MA,

6

May

Hennessey, Interview by author, Boston,

97

MA,

4

May

1999.

Juvenile, Land, Probate and Superior)
within a general Trial Court
Department headed

by a Chief Administrative Justice
Department. This

was

way each

trial

to operate as the

court maintained

its

own

particularly important to the Superior
Court) while

benefits of unification. According to
Hennessey
at

primary manager of the new

the time this reform occurred, «[t]his

single

trial

court,

which was

at first

dictated by function [anyway], and

As

was an

who

institutional identity

still

allowing for some of the

served as Chief Justice of the SJC

excellent compromise, because the

proposed, would have required subdivisions

would require sub-chief justices of some kind." 237

will be seen in the following chapters,
there appeared to be

regard to changes

policymaking

in

efforts

administrative matters than had occurred

of the SJC

(which

As with

in the recent past.

in

more

conflict in

regard to any of the

the creation of the Appeals

Court, these conflicts centered less on policy concerns and more
on concerns over
controlling jobs and other local advantages in court

management which could be

with unification. While

is

this

makes

perfect sense,

it

unlikely that

it

is

lost

necessarily the

kind of thing that Madison was concerned about when he discussed "ambition
countering ambition." Even more interesting

along a legislative-judicial divide. Rather,

it

is

that the conflicts didn't divide cleanly

was much more of a

division within the

judicial branch, with parochial concerns of local courts (closely mirroring concerns of

local legislators) challenging the statewide perspective of the state's leaders of the bar

and bench, including justices of the SJC.

237

Laska, "The 20

,h

Anniversary of Courl Reform." Not everyone agreed that

necessarily for the best. See Maria Mossaidcs, Interview by author, Boston,

98

this

MA,

compromise was
26 April 1999.

CONFLICT IN R1TI.F-MAKING - A n.AKSir
MASSACHUSETTS RFSOT ITTIOM
While

the

SJC was involved

in

reform efforts regarding the structure of
the

judiciary, the constitutional authority
for such changes clearly rested
with the

Legislature. There has also been conflict
between legislators and justices in a different

kind of administrative matter, rule-making.
In

change

is

less clearly delineated so, not
surprisingly, there has

between the branches
branch

this realm, the authority for

in these matters.

There

is

really

been greater tension

no constitutional basis

to control these questions, although as
previously noted

would say

that high courts

have inherent authority

making

for either

some commentators

to control those administrative

matters which are essential to their operation. 238 Chief
Justice Wilkins described the
tensions over this authority in his interview.

There has always been an uncertainty as to the extent to which we may
and the Legislature may. .enact laws which govern the way
in which courts operate. And there can be a tension
between what the
issue rules

.

Legislature says should happen in a court, or how a particular kind of
case should be handled[.]...We regard... there being a core area of
judicial control over

which the Legislature may have nothing to say and
we, therefore, would hold unconstitutional any intrusion which
interfered with the significant operations of the court[.]. .Now, when we
.

adopted the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, the Massachusetts
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate
Procedure,

it

was

a coordinated effort with the Legislature.

suggested what the rules would be.

General laws

We

A group combed through the

There was a bill prepared
which the Legislature considered and it, I would say, graciously said
'OK, now these are the matters that are going to be governed by
whatever the relevant rule of the Supreme Judicial Court is,' and we
really got into no confrontation at all, and that has proceeded pretty

According

to

to identify inconsistencies.

one commentator, the Court

should have been

in

in

Massachusetts has been more hesitant than he feels

it

using this power. "Such reluctance as the courts have shown, in Massachusetts and

other states, to assert their inherent power directly against the legislature rests,

I

prudence rather than constitutional limitation." Harvey, "The Inherent Power

to

99

suggest, on political

Reform,"

16.

much along
iive... years.

those lines ever since and that's
been about twenty3

There are two important points which can
be drawn from the Chief Justice's

comments.

First,

he indicates that the legislative-judicial
interaction over these

questions has, for the past twenty-five years,
been relatively cooperative. The
implication

is

that this is distinguishable

from the period which preceded the adoption

of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 240 This point
the adoption of these

The

same

is

reinforced in an interesting history of

rules.

legislature did give the

Supreme Judicial Court supervisory
authority over the lower courts in 1956 and
created the office of
Executive Secretary to assist the Court in carrying
out its

new

responsibilities.

This legislation, however, did not confer broad

rulemaking authority, a point made clear by the defeat of a
court
rulemaking bill that same year. The legislature also refused to

authorize

pre-trial oral depositions in spite

of considerable bar support for the
measure and longstanding Judicial Council approval. 241
After the Legislature turned
pre-trial oral depositions, the

down

the above-mentioned legislation regarding

SJC, upon petition of the Boston and Massachusetts Bar

Associations, promulgated a rule on

its

own

to address this

problem. Thus, despite a

contrary decision by the Legislature, and despite the concerns of some in the legal

239

240

by

MA, 26 April 1999. The Rules of Civil Procedure and of Appellate
1974 while the Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted in 1979.

Interview by author, Boston,

Procedure were adopted

in

This statement, like so
his

justice

own

many

others of the Chief Justice during his interview,

tenure on the bench, but also by what he

from 1956

to 1970.

As

knew of activities during

a result, the historical perspective of Wilkins

II

was informed not only

his father's tenure as chief

spans more than just his

tenure as a justice.

The

fact that relations in administrative matters

that the cooperation

which

this

may have been

better in the 1970s

and 80s means

study found in the policymaking realm in the 1980s and 1990s

may

be

time-bound.
241

Robert G. Bone, "Procedural Reform

Massachusetts, 42

1

.

in a

Local Context,"

This lack of trust between the branches

in

Osgood, ed., The History of the Law in
950s is recognized as well in John

in the

1

Burke's comments regarding the creation of the Executive Secretary position. "[T]hey referred

Executive Secretary. Originally the

bill

was opposition in the
Interview by author, Boston, MA,

to the

talked about a Director and there

Legislature and of course a Director sounded too forceful[.]"

1999.

100

5

May

community,

the

SJC enacted

the rule.

242

This 1965 aet,on was called a
"virtually

unprecedented dynamic exercise of the
Supreme Judicial Court's rule-making

power."

243

While there was

a legislative attempt to override
this action in 1966,

failed (despite the fact that the
Legislature

The path was opened

What remained

to

for a

had originally been

more pro-active high

it

set against this change).

court in the area of rule-making. 244

be seen was whether the Legislature would
become more accepting

of this exercise of power on the part of the
justices.

The adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure

in

1974 seems

to

mark

a turning

point in this relationship. While the details
of this reform effort are interesting, the

portion of the story most relevant to this study
concerns the
potential tensions

that

manner

in

which the

between the Legislature and the judiciary were resolved

while tensions between branches

exist,

for

it

shows

they are not primarily policy oriented. In

the above-cited quote from Chief Justice Wilkins, he
noted that the Legislature

reviewed

a bill

which detailed the necessary

newly developed

rules

and "graciously"

The rule was referred to as Rule 3:15. Today
Rules of Civil Procedure. The opposition which

statutory changes for enactment of the

said,

it is

is

filed a petition against the

encouraging the Legislature

to overrule the rule.

Larkin

&

what happened, but the story

came from

the Massachusetts Trial

adoption of the rule and which was active

in

Smith, "Rule 15: Pretrial Oral Discovery

Law 13, §24.1 (1966), 347,
the
Law
in Massachusetts, 432.
of

Massachusetts
History

is

incorporated into Rule 30 of the Massachusetts

referred to

Lawyers Association which

243

OK. This

statutory authority for the

SJC

in Massachusetts," in Annual Survey of
Bone, "Procedural Rules Reform," in Osgood, ed.,
According to Bone there was not then, nor is there now, any

quoted

in

to take this action.

244

It should be noted that the justices may have paid a price for this independence at the time. According
John Burke, Massachusetts Representative Conrad Kieman, House Chair of the Judiciary Committee,
made the following comment to Mr. Burke upon hearing that the SJC had adopted the rule despite
negative action on this same matter during the last legislative session. "Go back and tell your friends [the

to

justices] that they've got their rule

now, so they can take

getting their pay raise." Interview by author, Boston,

it

MA,

to the
5

search, the statute establishing the salaries for the justices of the

not 1965, the year in which Rule 3:15 was enacted.

101

bank and cash

May

it

because they're not

1999. According to a Lexis-Nexis

SJC was amended

in

1963 and 1966, but

of why the Legislature said

"OK"

is

a

little

more

colorful than this description might

have one believe. After the Committee which
the SJC had formed
rules

any

had completed

statutes

its

job,, t

was

still

to the

develop the new

necessary for the Legislature to act to
eliminate

which were inconsistent with

former Administrative Assistant

to

the rules.

As

the story

SJC, individuals had as

is

told

much

by John Burke,

influence on the

process as any overriding concerns regarding
the influence of institutions. 245
1 was called over to see Kiernan [House
Chair of the Judiciary
Committee] because the courts had submitted a bill
which was about
that thick [holding fingers approximately
two inches apart] which
contained all the amendments that would be necessary
to make the rules
come into play. And Kiernan told me that he wasn't going to
go through
all that stuff. He said what I want
you to do is get a letter from Judge
Moynihan, who was Chairman of the Committee. And he

said, if

Moynihan will write me a letter saying that the intent of all these
amendments is merely to make the statutes conform to the rules, and
there's no gimmicks here. .he said I trust Moynihan.
.I'll let the bill go
.

through, report

it

.

favorably out of Committee. So

Moynihan. Moynihan wrote him the

I

went and talked

to

246

letter.

Judge Moynihan was a well-respected member of the Massachusetts

community.
first at

He had

served as a Superior Court justice as well as a faculty member,

Boston College

Law

70, at Suffolk University

School and then, when required

Law

School.

As Bone

development of the Rules of Civil Procedure,

to retire

between the Advisory Committee and the
legislative acceptance

"[a]

legislature

connection that Judge Moynihan shared with alumni

The position of Administrative Assistant
Reform Act of 1978.
Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

5

May

to the

SJC replaced

1999.

102

BC

number of people whom

at

age

I

in bridging the

and smoothing the way

of the Rules.... And several also pointed

45

from

notes in a footnote to his history of the

interviewed stressed the key role that Judge Moynihan played

246

legal

who were

that

to the

gap
for

Boston College

serving in the

of Executive Secretary

in the

Court

legislature."

247

While each

may have had concern

institution

for

its

own

authority, the

personal connections between certain
248
individuals were enough to ease such
concerns.

The broader

man"

"great

story of this

development makes clear

theory of history.

Moynihan could make

A

that this

a difference.

However,

move

One more example of relations
system

may

more than

not always

the

which

community, which crosses over

and executive branches, especially

separated powers in Massachusetts

that the

little

this story points to the possibility
that

as connected through the alumni

network of Boston area law schools, may be the
grease

show

a

variety of broader factors led to a
situation in

the relatively small nature of the
Massachusetts legal
into the legislative

is

that

makes

the system of

smoothly.

in administrative matters

work

from the 1990s

will

so smoothly. This time, though, the source

of conflict comes not only from concerns over patronage but also
from personality
conflicts.

LEGISLATIVE TOOLS TO CHECK THE JUDICIARY?
As noted above,

the stereotypical view of checks and balances within an

American system of governance,
check the others

if the others

federal or state,

is

overstep their bounds.

of each branch having powers to

To

that end,

one could see the

Legislature's control of the purse strings as a potential check on the justices of the SJC.

To be

effective,

however, a check must be perceived as such. By

this standard, there is

no check. To an individual, when asked whether or not they were concerned

47

24x

that the

"Procedural Rules Reform," 438.

This leads to an interesting theory of change

barriers,

once broken, never seemed

opened up by the respect

for

to

in

intergovernmental relations, especially since the

have been raised quite so high again. The new relationship,

one individual, seems

to

103

become an

institutional

norm.

legislators

may

try to trim the sails

majority of the Legislature
that they weren't very

may

of the justices

that's

concerned with

one reason

Justice

this possibility.

that they don't

Nolan presented

only was

that not

adamant but just
I

all

gave answers which indicated

Presenting a humorous response

this, Justice

O'Connor

pay us very much.

We

said, "I don't....

don't have that

much

to

249

lose."

and

they issued opinions with which
the

disagree, the justices

when asked whether he was concerned about

Maybe

if

suppose

[it]

never discussed, but

as skeptical

that,

I

a direct response. "No. I'm bold

was

don't think

I

it

Justice Lynch. «[Y]ou

wouldn't want

to say that

I've never been particularly concerned about

enough

to say that

was ever considered." 250 Less

how that it's conceivable,

such a thing could never happen, but
251

it."

As

Justice

Abrams

noted, "[t]hey

don't have a vindictive policy." 252
Overall, interviews with both justices and judicial staff
of the
the Legislature generally funded the

SJC

as

was needed,

SJC indicated

that

treating their budgetary

253
requests with the degree of respect that a co-equal branch of government
deserved.

As Chief Justice Wilkins

we

noted, "they take

decide maters they care about." 254 The only limit

Interview by author, Shrewsbury,
50

25

252

253

I

254

MA,

May

21

Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

Interview by author, Boston,

MA 25

May

1999.

Interview by author, Boston,

MA 25 May

1999.

This

am

good care of us because, probably because

is

3

May

may be

the overall economic

1999.

1999.

not to say that funding for overall operation of the state's judiciary has always been adequate.

referring here only to the funding for the

Interview by author, Boston,

MA 23 April

SJC

specifically.

1999.

104

climate.

the

As

economy
This

Abrams

Justice

economy

is

good our budget

is

good.

If

doesn't interfere with the SJC's budget.
The Trial Court

it

Department, with local courts

in legislator's local districts, is

So, to the degree that the

management and
however,

the

not to say that the Legislature does not
take interest in the judiciary's

budget, only that

legislators.

"when

bad, then [our budget isn't as good]." 255

is

is

noted,

SJC's intrusion into the

"[W]c now have

its

in reaction to a policy position

legislative sphere, but

civil service,

and we

to

some

responsibility to include

oversight of the lower courts, the Legislature

done not

this is

SJC understands

of more interest

may

interfere.

256

Again,

of the SJC, or because of the

comes from

a desire to control jobs.

[courts] arc about the only remaining part of

government where you can put people. And some of the jobs... don't require
an awful
of credentials, so one can find constituents

lot

propose them.

It's

In addition, there are

facilities in

critical

I

this is not true for everyone.

week

to craft a final version.

justices of the state

bill

reduce case backlog and to improve court

to

see these issues as distinct from the judicial decision-making portion

of the Legislature's actions on a

until this

and

1999.

ongoing struggles over funding

pending before the SJC. "The
wasn't

MA 25 May

Massachusetts. While

of the SJC's duties,

was

that standard very easily

a constant struggle, relating to the Legislature in terms of jobs. ,,257

Interview by author, Boston,
256

who meet

In a

bill for

was passed by

1997

editorial,

upgrading court

the

Dan Ring of Ottaway News
facilities in light

House and Senate more than

a

month ago,

that the Legislature finally took a procedural step to create a conference
Is

it

just a coincidence that the biggest boosters of the courthouse bill

Supreme

Judicial Court

-

Service

of a certain case
but

it

committee

-

the

are set to rule in June on the legality of term limits for state

lawmakers and other officeholders? Probably not." "Almost two years away, 1998 elections
New Bedford Standard Times, March 15, 1997.

cast a

spell,"
257

Herbert

P.

Wilkins, interview by author, Boston,

the trial courts

is

MA,

23 April 1999. The problems with patronage

in

not a hidden issue. Paul O'Neill, the plaintiff in a 1999 discrimination lawsuit heard by

the Massachusetts

Commission Against Discrimination, was

a transfer to a court nearer his

home because of a medical

a court officer

who had

attempted to obtain

condition. In a Boston Globe article, Mr.

O'Neill criticized the court personnel system. "They're allowing people with political connections to
transfer to courts closer to their

homes

transfer are told they aren't allowed."

for

whatever reason, but court officers with seniority

He

further noted, "I

did." Sacha Pfeiffer, "Court Officer Sues

have no one

Over Transfer," September

105

9,

at the State

1999,

B

1

who wish

House and

I

wish

1

to

Probably the greatest checks which have
been employed against the SJC
directly in the past twenty-live years
occurred in the early 1990s

when

the Court

was

operating under the leadership of Chief
Justice Liacos. The relationship between
the

Chief Justice and the Legislature was often
retaliatory action

on the

and

down due

Peabody

in the

SJC's offices

in

in state

amendment

government."

indicate that the real reason

The obvious

that the

retaliation

which denied Liacos the use of

Court (near his home) when he wasn't working

Boston. The proponent of

said he "pressed for the

duplication

District

one clear

some suppositions

to this conflict.

the insertion in the 1995 state budget
of language

an office

this resulted in

part of the Legislature, as well as

1992 Court Reform Aet was watered

was

strained,

258

this

measure, Representative Brian Lees,

as part of an

ongoing

Comments made by

may have more

to

at the

effort to cut

waste and

other legislators, however,

do with ongoing tensions between

Liacos and legislators. Interestingly, the fact that Justice Liacos
was an outspoken

proponent of civil rights seems

to

have had

little to

do with

this.

It

wasn't the Chief

Justice's efforts to independently interpret the state's constitution in a
substantially

more

liberal direction than the federal courts

were moving, nor his opinion overturning

the death penalty which motivated legislators. 259 Rather, press stories said that Liacos'

personality

has

won

was

the overriding impetus.

condescending toward them."

"

s

259

Frank

Hill sources said Lee's

bipartisan support from top legislative leaders, reflects

desire to tweak the chief justice,

2

"Beacon

Phillips,

260

who

they feel

is

action speaks for

"Judge Might Defy Law," Boston Globe, June 24, 1995,

106

in

many lawmakers'

often rude, arrogant and

The childishness of this

Liacos' positions on these issues will be presented

move, which

more

detail in

I

itself.

7.

Chapters 4 and 5 below.

More

serious,

and more clearly connected

Court overall, were changes made

Nineteen ninety-one marked the

to the

first

to the administrative activities

SJC's proposal for court reform

of the

in 1992.

time that the seven justices of the SJC
joined

together in filing a court reorganization
plan with the Legislature. In 1992 a
court

reform proposal was passed, and

it

was signed by

the

Governor

January of the

in

following year. 261 There were major
differences between the two plans, however.

of the differences between the two versions,
both of which were aimed
unifying the

trial

One

at further

court system, lay at the apex of the reformed
administrative structure.

While the SJC version would have given

the

SJC more

control over administrative

matters, the final legislation replaced the existing
administrative officer, the Chief

Administrative Judge, with that of the Chief Justice of
Administration and Management

(CJAM). This was more than just
almost

total control

titles,

as the

removed only

As Chief Justice Wilkins

a lot stronger."

is

§3, the

noted, "[I]t's a very strongly protected position.

to get rid

In addition, this reform bill

added conditions

law which gives the SJC superintendence power over lower

Frank

chosen by the

of a

262

law and administration.

260

is

for misfeasance, malfeasance, or

The Chief Justice of Administration and Management's power
chief

CJAM would have

new

over the Trial Court Department. While she

justices of the SJC, she can be

nonfeasance.

a change in

263

While not making any change

Phillips, "Office Politics

Heats

Up

to the

to

trial

court

MGL c.21

1,

courts, both as to

SJC's authority of

as Liacos Defies Bid to Vacate," Boston Globe, June 30,

1995, 25.
261

Statutes 1992, c.379.
262

Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

23 April 1999.

263

Before the 1992 amendment, the second paragraph of §3 read in part as follows. "[T]he justices of the
supreme judicial court shall also have general superintendence of the administration of all courts of

107

superintendence "to correct and prevent
errors and abuses..
expressly provided" (generally considered

its

.if

no other remedy

is

authority over superintendence of the

law), the 1992 legislation put relatively
severe limitation on the Court's exercise
of

general superintendence in the "administration
of
outlined in the second paragraph of GL
c.21

1,

all

courts of inferior jurisdiction" as

§3.

.provided, however, that general superintendence
shall not incudc the
authority to supersede any general or
special law unless the supreme
judicial court, acting under its original or
appellate jurisdiction finds
such law to be unconstitutional in a case or
controversy; and
.

.

provided

further that general superintendence also
shall not include the authority
or power to exercise or supersede any of the
powers, duties and
responsibilities of the chief justice for administration
and

management.

.in any general or special law except
under extraordinary
circumstances leading to a severe, adverse impact on the
administration
.

of justice; provided,

that the majority of the supreme judicial
court shall
issue a written order that sets forth the basis for
a finding that, absent
such action, there would be a severe and adverse impact on
the

administration of justice in the commonwealth.

This legislation clearly placed greater limitations on the authority
of the justices of the

SJC

to oversee administrative matters in the

addition,

justices

§227 A of the 1992

were

to strike

down

legislation

lower courts than had existed before.

added a non-severability clause so

that if the

the changes to §3 as an unconstitutional violation of the

principle of separation of powers, the entire bill

Research into the reasons for

beyond

In

the scope of this study.

would

this reaction

However,

at least

fall.

on the part of the Legislature

is

two individuals who were

interviewed for this project commented on the fact that the portions of the 1992 court

reform legislation which were discussed above could be viewed as "Liacos

it may issue such writs, summonses and other processes and
may be necessary or desirable for the furtherance of justice, the

retaliatory'

inferior jurisdiction... and

such orders,

directions and rules as

regular execution

of the laws, the improvement of the administration of such courts, and the securing of their proper and
efficient administration." This paragraph,

expanding on the superintendence power of the SJC over the

administration of the courts, was added to the laws in 1956.

108

measures.

solely from

is

more

Giving the Legislature

'

what some may have viewed

likely that

over the

due,

its

trial

it

was an attempt

to

is

it

unlikely that this reaction

stemmed

as Liacos' arrogant treatment
of legislators.

It

be sure that the Legislature maintained
control

courts, especially as Liacos

had been making

full

use of the powers

at his

disposal since his appointment as Chief
justice in 1989 to modernize the
administration

of justice

in

Massachusetts and centralize

in the

it

hands of the SJC. 265

Much

of this

work was done by committees whose membership
was drawn from justices and
courts throughout the state.

The following

list

staff in

of reports of committees issued during

Liacos' tenure as Chief arc indicative of the level
of activity. They include:

"Reinventing Justice 2022" (Chief Justice's Commission
on the Future of the Courts,
1992), "Five Years

Committee

for

Toward Gender Equality" (The Supreme

Gender Equality,

1994),

"Supreme

Juvenile Justice Final Report and Executive
Justice, 1994),

Commission

to

"Equal

Judicial Court's

Judicial Court's

Commission on

Summary" (The Commission on

Justice: Eliminating the Barriers"

Study Racial and Ethnic Bias

(Supreme

in the Courts, 1994),

Juvenile

Judicial Court's

"A Matter of Just

Treatment: Substance Abuse and the Courts" (The Supreme Judicial Court's Substance

Abuse

Project Task Force, 1995), and

Judicial Court's Franklin

264

Upon

"Moving

to a Preferred Future"

(The Supreme

County Futures Lab Task Force, 1995). 266

request of the interviewees,

I

will refrain

from naming the individuals who made such

comments.
265

However, if these same actions had been taken by his predecessor or his successor, both of whom had
more cordial relations with the Legislature, one can't help but wonder if the reaction of the Legislature
would have been different.
6

The number of committees has not diminished

Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly

lists

since Liacos' tenure, however.

of the non-judge membership on these committees, see

Committees," March

8,

A

1999

article in the

23 such committees, 14 of them standing committees. For a critique

1999, Bl.

109

this article

by Eric T. Berkman. "Inside SJC

When

asked upon his retirement

Justice, Liacos said, as

one

who

how

he would like to be remembered as
Chief

"fought for an independent judiciary." 267

interview conducted just before he

left

[

n an

the bench, Chief Justice Liacos reflected
on the

tensions he had experienced over the years
with the Legislature. The following excerpt

from an

article

developed from

this interview explains

why

he

felt this

tension existed.

system was going down the tubes and I had to change
it," he
had to change attitudes. I had to make it a unified
system."
Members of the bench and bar have said that Liacos got off
to a bad start
with the Legislature - due in part to his personality and never
recovered. But Liacos says legislative leaders were
merely being
territorial - accusing him of being an
"emperor" for advocating more
independence for the judicial branch. "When I becamse chief
had a lot
of trouble with the Legislature because they were used
"I felt the

says. "I

I

to controlling the

judicial branch," he says. "It wasn't that 1
the king or all that other kind of nonsense.

independent judiciary

them

still

don't like

While there

is

in reality.

And

wanted
I

be the emperor or
was fighting for an
to

they didn't like

that.

...Some of

268
it."

no doubt

that Liacos' style

was

different than that of his

predecessor, Chief Justice Hennessey, or of his successor, Chief Justice Wilkins,

it is

unlikely that this alone would have caused the tension between branches. 269 However,

Liacos' efforts to further control the administration of the lower courts did anger the

Of most

legislators.

interest for this study, though,

desire to "check" the judiciary for abusing

Paul

J.

is

that the anger did not stem

power by entering

from

the policy-making

Martinck, "Preserving an Independent Judiciary," Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, September

23, 1996, Bl.

28

269

Martinek, "Preserving an Independent Judiciary," B6.
If the tone

of the following Annual Message of the Chief Justice

is

any indication, however, Liacos'

confrontational style probably didn't help matters. For instance, his discussion of actions of both the

Executive and the Legislature
published

in the

in the

Massachusetts

"Annual Report on the State of the Massachusetts Judiciary"
in March, 1992, were quite critical. Liacos referred to

Law Review

"Draconian underfunding by the executive and
such as these, unwarranted

restraints

unacceptable and must be dissolved."

Too much

is at

legislative branches."

on the judiciary's

And

He noted

ability to operate

more

that "[I]n

economic times

efficiently are

wholly

he warned the readers of his report that "we shall not yield.

stake to allow the temporary setbacks of the past year to frustrate our goal" (5

110

1

-

53).

a

domain

in a

way which was

inappropriate. Rather,

it

seemed

to

come from

a desire to

continue to control the operation of local courts,
including the question of who
non-judicial positions. Patronage

was

fills

the

crux of conflict between the Legislature

at the

and the SJC.
There
Efforts

by

is little

a source of power for elected politicians.

is

local legislators to control such positions
should

anyone schooled
is

doubt that patronage

in practical politics.

that the legislature's use

What

is

most

come

as

no surprise

interesting to this study, however,

of checks over judicial administration seems

largely a tool to control jobs and not to rein in an
overactive judiciary.
this

could be that the SJC was so restrained

making matters

that

Four, however, the

no checks were seen

SJC has played

in its

to

involvement

as necessary.

As

a substantial role in the

to

have been

One reason

for

in potential policy-

will be seen in Chapter

development of law

in

Massachusetts. This fact leaves open the possibility that the Legislature does not

attempt to check the judiciary because
possibility

which

it

is

accepting of the SJC's role in lawmaking, a

will be explored in the following chapter.

1

1

CHAPTER

4

THE SJC AND THE LEGISLATURE^ COOPERATION
OVER CONFLIC T*
DIALOGUE OY ER DEBATE
The American system of separated powers can be
the judicial and legislative branches of
government.
this

system

is

that the

One of the assumptions

branches will often compete for the

struggling to enact their view into policy.

operates in Massachusetts has not been

a source of conflict between

final

word, each branch

The system of separated powers

immune from

underlying

conflict.

As seen

in

as

it

Chapter

Three, there have been tensions between the Court and
the Legislature over questions

concerning administrative control of the lower courts and over
the rules of procedure
affecting these

same

These

courts.

conflicts,

however, stem not from a desire

to control

judicial decisions and legal interpretations of the Court, but from
a concern for local
affairs affecting individual legislators.

As one of the

last

bastions of patronage in the

Massachusetts political system, legislators have jealously guarded
trial

courts.

of local

Similarly, concerns about rules changes have been generated by local

lawyers (who

may

approve a change
change.

their control

What

also be political supporters), and legislators have been hesitant to

in rules until

enough of their constituents are willing

these battles did not indicate, however,

use their powers to

make

sure the

SJC did not abuse

was

its

to accept the

a desire of the Legislature to

authority as the final arbiter of

legal conflicts in Massachusetts.

This becomes even more evident
portrayed in Chapter Three

~

we

consider the justices' perspectives as

the justices of the

as the final arbiter in conflicts

check the high court through

if

SJC

feel

autonomous

which come before them. While

legislation, through control

112

in their authority

the Legislature can

of the budget, and through

removal from

office, justices

of the SJC don't

feel these

powers have ever been used

to

influence (of if they were, they have not had
the intended effect of influencing) the

independent authority of the Court

which come before

it.

The

hear and decide questions of law in the
cases

interesting question

why: why haven't the checks

Has

to

built into this

which emerges from

this finding is

system of separated powers been activated?

the Court never given the Legislature cause to
feel

was overstepping judicial

it

boundaries, venturing into the legislative realm of lawmaking?
This question provides
the focus of this chapter and the

look

at the

way

in

two which follow. Chapters Five and Six respectively

which the SJC has used

its

power of judicial review and

issue advisory opinions to discover the degree to

authority of the Legislature. These chapters

its

power

which the Court has challenged

show

to

the

the comparatively restrained role

which the justices of the Massachusetts high court have adopted which gives some
credence to the view that the Legislature has not had

to

check the Court as

it

has rarely

acted in ways which threaten the legislative authority of the state's elected
representatives.

This view

is

accurate as far as

it

goes, but

it is

incomplete.

presented in the remainder of this chapter will attempt to
relationship between the

question

is

SJC and

of the

the Massachusetts Legislature. Here the

same

addressed but from a different perspective

the brief answer to this question

answer more

fully,

-

fill

do the SJC's opinions tread on

to the Legislature in cases

questions of judicial review or which aren't advisory

I,

material

in the picture

ground which could be seen as belonging

Chapter

The

is

in

nature?

As mentioned

raise

in

"yes." This chapter will explore this

explaining the role the Court has played

113

which do not

it

in

cases involving

common

law development and statutory

interpretation.

It is

a role involving the

SJC

in

policymaking, yet one which the Legislature has
generally accepted without challenge.
In contrast to traditional understandings

the relationship

of the operation of the separation of powers,

between the two branches which emerges from

this analysis is

one of

cooperation rather than confrontation. Instead of
clashing with and challenging the
Legislature, the

two branches have often worked together

in the

development of

important public policies. Furthermore, the Legislature
has been more likely to use the

system of separated powers

to

avoid responsibility and

policy than to challenge the judiciary's authority.

As

to

allow the Court to

make

a result, the role of the Court has

often been one of "encouraging" the Legislature to act rather
than prohibiting them

from acting as

is

the case with judicial review. Just as the Legislature will
fight to

maintain friends in their
enemies.

districts,

they will avoid acting in ways which could

make

270

Before presenting these findings, however,
degree to which the SJC

it

is

important to understand the

A proclivity

free to establish

its

own

of the state's justices to involve themselves

in

shaping public policy and an acceptance

is

of this action by the Legislature would have no
the time to act.

exercises this

The

control

on the part

effect if the justices did not also

which the Court has over

power provides perspective on

itself in policy questions

workload.

its

docket and

the degree to

and of the role which the justices

way

in

have

which

which the Court can involve
feel

they should play within

the state's political system.

70

Legislatures are not alone in avoiding issues which could be politically harmful.

political question doctrine

by judiciaries

is

proof of this.

114

it

The use of the

APPEALS BF.FORF TH F S|C - CAN PO LITIC A
QIJESIIQNS
BECOME LFC4 L QUESTIONS?
I

"There

hardly a political question

is

or later turn into a judicial one." 271

in the

United States which does not sooner

This frequently cited quote from the 19th
century

French observer of American society, Alexis
de Tocqueville, has been debated
frequently.

most

While debates over

political questions

the substance of the statement

become

When

asked

be interesting (Do

legal questions?), they often overlook
the procedural

puzzle which the quote contains. That
"judicial" one?

may

just as

is,

how

does a "political" question turn into a

to distinguish the judicial

branch from the

state's other

two branches of government, Chief Justice Wilkins pointed
out one of the problems
which

is

inherent in Tocqueville 's observation, the reactive
nature of the judiciary.

Let

me

off by saying our function normally is to deal simply with
a
case that comes before us. We do not have the broad license that
the
start

Legislature has to announce what the answer

problems.
gets here
is

We only get involved... with

we

is

on a whole variety of
and if the issue never

real cases,

never are going to deal with that particular subject. So that

the major restraint on the courts. 272

No

political question will

become

a judicial one unless

someone brings

the

question to the Court. The second procedural hurdle which needs to be jumped

* 71

Alexis dc Tocqueville, Democracy

in

America,

ed.

J. P.

Mayer (New York: Harper and Row,

in

1969),

270.
272

Interview by author, Boston,

passive

which

make

in this matter.

conflicts will and
it

MA,

23 April 1999. This

Jurisdictional boundaries,

which

will not

make

it

is

not to say that the courts are necessarily

some of which

are set by court rule, help to determine

High

into the judicial system.

courts, in particular, can

clear that they are interested in hearing certain cases and the justices of the

thought regarding

still

unanswered questions

in footnotes

found

in

SJC may convey

their

opinions like the following: 'The

case does not raise the issue of the constitutionality of standards for approving private schools,

curriculum requirements, or the qualifications of private school teachers.
issues,

and we intimate no view on them. The defendants do not argue

provides greater protection than the United States Constitution. Thus,

is

our State Constitution

we do

not consider any issues of

386 Mass. 367 (1982), 368. Whether or not these
dependent on whether a party to an appeal raises the question.

State constitutional law." Attorney General

questions will arise in a future case

We do not consider these

that

v.

Bailey,

1

15

movint
ig a question from the

political

realm

to the judicial

comes from

the Court itself

since the SJC, like most courts of last
resort, has almost complete
discretion over

caseload. Therefore, few questions will
court so desire.

Whether or not an

become judicial ones

appellate court

its

unless the justices of that

involved in deciding questions of

is

policy depends on the right question
being asked and on the justices of the court
being
interested in providing an answer to that
question.
barriers are crossed

justices

is

Most research on

resort should play within

to take appeals

the case selection process

which are brought

state courts

which

is

of last

H.W.

Perry,

While some research focuses on the question of which
trial

court level.

to their attention.

resort,

274

the

employed by the United

Studies by Doris Marie Provine and

centers on the

its

political system.

appellate courts has focused on the second
condition

of these studies have involved

273

and why these procedural

important to understanding the broader
question of what role the

and the public think a court of last

do justices choose

How

Some of the

Jr.

273

- when

While some

most well-known are of

States

Supreme Court.

have greatly increased our

conflicts enter the judicial arena,

studies in this regard

come from

much of this

the extensive data gathered

through the Civil Litigation Research Project. See, Joel B. Grossman, et. al., "Dimensions
of
Institutional Participation: Who Uses the Courts, and How?" Journal
of Politics 44 (1982), 86-1
Other research focuses on the role of interest groups in bringing such litigation, both to the trial

14.

court and

to the appellate level.

See, for example, Lee Epstein, "Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist
Court Era," Journal of Law and Politics 9 (1993), 639-717; Kevin T. McGuire and Gregory A. Caldeira,
"Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of Obscenity: Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court,"

American Political Science Review 87 (1993), 717-726; and Karen O'Connor, Women 's Organizations'
Use of the Courts (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1980). Studies of when losing parties to a suit
choose

to appeal tend to

emphasize either the general role of interest groups (see previous

part of the "story" of how an important case finally reaches the

Supreme Court. See,

for

cites) or to

be

example,

Edward Geary, Beyond the Burning Cross (New York: Vintage Books,
Justice

(New York: Vintage

Books, 1964).

An

1994); Richard Kluger, Simple
and Anthony Lewis, Gideon 's Trumpet (New York: Vintage
Gregory J. Rathjen's "Lawyers and the Appellate Choice: An

Press, 1975);

exception to

this is

Analysis of Factors Affecting Decision
74

See, Lawrence

Baum, "Decisions

to

to

Appeal," American Politics Quarterly 6 (1978), 387-405.

Grant and Deny Hearings

Patterns in Court and Individual Behavior," Santa Clara

in the

Law Review

California

Supreme Court:

16 (1976), 730-740; Robert L.

Dudley, "Coalition Building on the California Supreme Court: Votes on Access and the Merits,"

Sheldon Goldman and Charles M. Lamb,

ed., Judicial Conflict

University of Kentucky Press, 1986), 254-274; and Victor E. Flango, "Case Selection
Illinois

Supreme Courts,"

Justice System Journal 12 (1987), 398-401.

116

in

and Consensus (Lexington, KY:
in the

Georgia and

understanding of which cases justices
of the U.S. Supreme Court find

to

be certworthy

and how they make these determinations. 275
From these studies we have learned
the U.S.

Supreme Court

is

more

likely to grant certiorari to a
case in

of the following are present: United
States as a petitioner,

that

which one or more

inter-circuit conflict, conflict

with Supreme Court precedent, a certain
ideological position of lower court rulings,
and
the presence of amicus curiae briefs.
These indicators

which

tell

us something about the role

the justices of the nation's highest
court feel they should play in the nation's

political system.

At the very

least they indicate that the justices
feel they

should

provide a consistent body of law throughout the
nation and that they should pay
attention to the cues of others (the executive
branch or interest groups)

who

feel a case

raises a significant question of law.

While the research conducted
direct

answer

to the question

for this project

of what cases the SJC

was not developed

is

provides a view of some important facets of this step

most

to

provide a

likely to hear, the data

in the judicial

process in

Massachusetts. Insight can be gained from the following information which
was
gathered in the course of this project: the process by which cases reach the SJC
(both

what the

rules say

and what the justices say) and the kinds of cases which the SJC

chooses to hear.

275

This research is necessitated by the fact that Rule 10, the Supreme Court Rule which outlines the type
of cases to which the Court will grant certiorari, is written in general terms and subject to interpretation.
While it provides a preliminary indication of when a case will be heard, justices obviously do further
sifting to

develop their docket. Doris Marie Provine, Case Selection

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) and H.W. Perry,

in the

United States Supreme Court

to Decide: Agenda Setting
Supreme Court (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991). It would seem remiss
not to mention as well the seminal work on agenda-setting on the U.S. Supreme Court upon which all
later studies built. See Joseph Tanenhaus, Marvin Schick, Matthew Muraskin and Daniel Rosen, "The
Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory," in Glendon Schubert, ed., Judicial Decision
Making (New York: Free Press, 1963),
1-132.

the United States

1

1
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Jr.,

Deciding

in

HOW TO GET TO THE SJC - THE MANY AVENUES
Cases come
far the largest

to the highest court in

Massachusetts from one of five sources. By

percentage of cases which appeared on the
SJC's docket between 1981

and 1995 came directly from one of the seven
the

3660 cases came from

this source.

trial

court departments

(See Table

the Appeals Court has heard and decided

percentage of the Court's docket, only

avenue of appeal

4.

1

for a

upon the

9%

it,

which

is

277

may

arrive at the

SJC

This makes up a smaller

which

unique

is

derived from us."

278

to

former Chief Justice Wilkins,

to the

"We

This session

Court from a Single Justice session.

draws almost

all

of its cases and

choosing which cases

it

will hear.

components

to

Court plays

in the state's

276

in the

It is

is

used

to

perform a variety of

In addition, all three

them which makes them

SJC
in

of these procedures have unique

interesting in assessing the role

system of government. Before looking

which

at these

the

procedures

in

1

These included the Appellate Tax Board,
Labor Relations Commission.

278

that the

majority of instances, the Court has discretion

tribunals.

c.

from these three sources

to the

Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 1 1 (application for direct appellate review). See
GL c. 21 A, §10. This also includes cases which came directly from one of several administrative

also

277

have

Commonwealth, even Maine doesn't

gatekeeping functions for the Court. From 1981 - 1995, 429 cases
(12%) came
full

after

(343) in the fifteen years under study. The

procedure for handling appeals. According

have

case.

summary of the numbers

from the Single Justice Session of the SJC, an unusual

is

a Single Justice Session

(2793) of

276

referenced throughout the next few pages.)
Secondly, cases

third

- 76%

the Industrial Accident

Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 27.

211A, §11.
Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

23 April 1999.
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1

Reviewing Board, and the

(application for further review). See also

GL

more

detail,

however, there are two other sources for
appeals which are not

discretionary.

While almost

all

cases on the SJC's docket

the Single Justice session or the
Appeals Court, a few

jurisdiction or

come from

come from

the

trial

courts,

a court of another

from another branch of Massachusetts
government. The

first

of these

is

similar to the practice in most other
jurisdictions. In these cases questions
of law can

be certified

to the

SJC from

federal courts of other states to clarify
a point of

TABLE 4.1

- SJC:1981-1Q 95 - Sources of Ap pp.k

Source: Data Compiled by Author from Massachusetts Reports, Volumes 382-421.
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Law

Massachusetts

with which they

absolutely requ.red.

law certified

to

it...

Court could refuse

SJC Rule

when

to

1

may

be eoneerned. Accepting such requests

:03 says only that «[t]his court

questions of

requested by the certifying court[.]" 279
While in theory the

answer the question, there

which may be connected

to

is

no indication

what the justices see as an

court in a federal system of separated
powers.
that in a federal

may answer

not

is

The

that this ever occurs

essential role for the state's high

certification process

is

a reminder

system of government questions which require
the interpretation of a

state's constitution, statutes, regulations,
or

common

law, are to be answered by the

high court of that state (and not the U.S. courts or
the court of another
has the authority to

make

the definitive statement of what

its

state).

Each

state

own law means. The

interesting point concerning the role of the judiciary,
however,

that questions

is

regarding administrative regulations are not certified to the Governor
and questions

regarding statutes are not certified to the Legislature. Rather,
the Court,

go

to the

all

questions, by rule of

SJC, a persistent reminder of the role of the High Court

in a

system

of separated powers. 280

The second source
to the

for non-discretionary questions involves cases

which come

Court for an Advisory Opinion from either house of the General Court, from the

Governor, or from the Governor's Council. 281 The importance of this process
understanding of the Supreme Judicial Court

279

in the state's

to

system of government

Emphasis added. There is no statutory basis for this procedure. As seen
to the SJC from this source between 1981 and 1995.

in

Table

4.1,

an

is

only 30 cases

came
280

For

a discussion

of one justice's view of the certification process, see Herbert

"Certification of Questions of Law:

P.

Wilkins,

The Massachusetts Experience," Massachusetts Law Review 74

(1989), 256-258.
81

1

,

Advisory Questions come
c. Ill, art. 2,

as

to the

amended by

art.

Court under constitutional authority, Massachusetts Constitution,

pt.

85 of the Articles of Amendment. See Chapter 6 for a more thorough

discussion of this process.

120

analyzed

more

in

(less than

1%

detail in

of the

Chapter

total) arrived

6.

As

regards workload, however, only 33
cases

on the Court's docket as requests

for

Advisory

Opinions.

In addition to certification

discretionary cases

came

directly

and advisory questions,
from the

trial

large majority of them being appeals
involving
statute, all individuals

courts in the years under analysis, the
first

degree murder convictions. 282

By

found guilty of such charges must be granted,
upon request, a

review of "the whole case for

its

consideration of the law and the evidence." 283
During

the 15 years under analysis non-discretionary
cases from

17% of the

a variety of other non-

Court's caseload.

of these sources made up

284

DISCRETIONARY REVIEW - THE
The mandatory

all

portion of the

HOW AND THE WHY

SJC docket represents

less than one-fifth

caseload in the 15 years under analysis. This means that the other
those years consisted of discretionary cases and

it

is

to these

83%

of the

of the cases

which we return

in

to attempt

There are a few miscellaneous categories of cases which also fit in this category during the years
under analysis. While very small in number, non-discretionary matters filed directly with the SJC include
disciplinary matters involving judges and clerks of court, although most of these come through
the Single
first. In addition, through 1986 the SJC was the first court of appeal
for cases coming

Justice session

from the

Court and Boston Municipal Court Appellate Divisions, from the Appellate Tax Board,
Court decisions in unemployment cases. This was due largely to an oversight when
the legislation was written to create the Appeals Court. Legislation enacted in 1985 (at the urging of the
Court) changed this, making the Appeals Court the first line of appeal for these cases. Massachusetts
District

and from the

District

Statutes 1985,
3

GL

c.

c.

314. Daniel Johnedis, Interview by author, Boston,

278, §33E. This

does, of course, give

play

—

a final

check

some
to

is

a

holdover from the days

indication of the role

be certain that the conviction

possible in a case where the ultimate punishment
284

when

which the

is

is

the

MA,

14 April 1999.

Commonwealth had

a death penalty.

It

legislators feel the state's high court should

as accurate

and the process as

fair as

humanly

being imposed.

more recent years, the percentage of non-discretionary cases to the overall caseload of the SJC is
coming close to one-half. This seems to be due largely to the increase in first degree murder
appeals. See Annual Report on the State of the Massachusetts Court System, Fiscal Year 1998, 16-17.
Henry Clay, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 5 May 1999. Mr. Clay is the Chief Staff Counsel of the
In

rising,

SJC.
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to

answer the question of why

What might

this tell us

the Court chooses to hear

about the role which the justices

Massachusetts political system? To answer

this

some

eases and not others.

feel they

we come back

should play

in the

to the sources

of the

Court's discretionary workload, the
Single Justice Session, the Trial
Courts, and the

Appeals Court.

The Single

Justice Session, formally

known

as the

Supreme

Judicial Court for

Suffolk County, appears to be a holdover
from the early years of statehood. 285 In

its

unique, gatekeeping role, the Single Justice
hears appeals authorized under numerous
statutes, but the

most

which the SJC has

common

basis for appeal

is

the general superintendence

the authority to exercise over inferior
courts under

Petitions for such actions

are rarely allowed."

287

"abound

almost every single justice hearing

at

While these

GL

petitions are

power

c.21

286
1,

§3.

[yet] ....they

most often denied, the Single

Justice

can grant the petition and decide the appeal on the merits, or
grant the petition and
reserve and report the case to the
that the ability

of a single justice

Court for consideration.

full

to reserve

one justice's views of what cases the
caseload for the entire Court.

288

full

This

is

and report a case

Court should hear

It is

interesting to note

to the full

to

bench allows

determine part of the

an interesting power, although not used often.

285

1 have been unable to find any history on this unique institution except for a brief reference to its
existence in the late 1700's in William T. Davis, History of the Judiciary of Massachusetts (Boston, MA:
Boston Book Company, 1900), 177. As noted in Chapter 2, many practices from colonial times were

simply incorporated into the practice of the

adopted
286

in

state judiciary after the

1780 so the practice of using such an

See discussion of this power

in

Chapter

3.

appeals to the Single Justice session appears

Fiscal Year 1998, 18-19. According to

SJC
287

this

institution

One of the

Massachusetts Constitution was

could predate statehood.

best basic discussions of the statutory bases for

Annual Report of the Massachusetts Court System,
source, there are 24 statutes which authorize an appeal to the
in the

for Suffolk County.

Joseph Nolan, Massachusetts Practice: Appellate Procedure, Vol. 41

1991), 58.
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(St. Paul,

MN: West

Publishing,

coming

SJC between

to the

cases heard

these years

in

of this unique
(

institution

was developed

lounty

L981 and L995.

came

known,

not

is

on report from

to

role

.is

while also having the time

The
to

trad

which

995 was from

I

the

is

Single Justice. 289 Since the history

a

hard to determine

why

the SJC

as a separate vehicle for
handling appeals.

speeial session since the end of
the

capacity for fulfilling

h

me case is Only 308

In either instance

to

1

700's, however, provides the

of superintending the judiciary

for Suffolk

The existence of this
(

!oun with a greater

more routine matters

in

290
decide importanl questions of law and public
policy.

the large majority of discretionary appeals
followed from 198]

conn

trial

directly to the stale's highest court. Tins
can

happen

either through an application for direct review filed
by the parly taking the appeal

;kh...

rhere

may

be

a similarity

here with the actions of Justices of the

emergency appeals upon assignment
rarely,

it

to a circuit, refer an

I

(22%

is Supreme Court win,, hearing

appeal to the

lull

(

!ourt,

Tins happens more

however,

any "wayward" justices would be "checked" by her colleagues on the bench, Should
many cases, or report cases loo frequently which Ihe justices led do not merit their

likely thai

is

one justice

report too

would probably make this known through internal communications, As much of the
contemporary research on the strategic actions of judges reminds us, appellate justices operate in a small
group selling which conditions their range of actions. Sec Lee Epstein and Jack Knight,
The 'hoU es
Justices Make (Washington, D.C.: CQ Pr ess, 1998).
attention, they

<

is

li

interesting to note thai these cases increased from an average of24/year from

35/year between
decisions.

appeals)

li

'

is

I

wo and

Perhaps an increase

may

The increase appears

1995.
in

the

to

murder caseload (with

explain this Subtle but consistent

that the siaie's

>.x

I

to

1989

to

conconulant increase

the

in

inlerloculory

shift,

also possible thai the long term existence of this institution

understanding

(
I

be largely from appeals from Single Justice

may

reinforce a seemingly ongoing

high courl has importanl business to conducl as

a

co equal branch

oi

government.

The Single
unique
lull

lo

seven.

Justice session of the

Massachusetts. This

is

SJC seems

to

have engendered another process which

m

the practice of the Court regularly sitting

During the years under sludy

in this

work, panels

ol five justices

decided over

appeals before the SJC. (This practice was largely abandoned when Wilkins became

1996 SO

thai all

this live-justice

panels as follows: "Bui because one of Ihe justices was busy on thai

one day of ihe

al least

relatively

(

70%

a

ol Ihe

lucf Justice

in

seven justices hear and decide most cases today.) Wilkins explained Ihe development of

session

|

is

panels of five rather than

Single Justice
|

may have been that inaudible didn't sit the whole crowd,
more practical. fntil we had an Appeals 'our! there were an awful lol

sitting

week,

il

There is another reason which is
of junky cases." Interview by author, Boston,

|

|

(

I

MA,

23 April

123

(
I

(

'

>

(

>.

of these appeals)

or,

more

29
frequently, by an order of the
SJC.

'

Tins occurred

1432

in

cases (39%) not heard unless two
justices of the SJC feel they should
hear the appeal
directly rather than allowing the

the Court can choose

Appeals Court

which cases

to resolve the conflict.

appeals directly (also called sua sponte

According

to

both cases

to hear, leaving the others to
the intermediate court o

The second of these procedures, by which

appeals.

In

-

on

its

the

own

SJC "reaches down" and

initiative), is relatively

former SJC Legal Counsel Daniel
Johnedis,

it

was

takes

unique.

292

also unique to

Massachusetts.

The impetus

for this historic change in the
outlook of the Court came
from the Associate Justice Edward F. Hennessey,
who was the junior

justice at the time the

new [Appeals] court appeared and later became
chief justice of the Court....Justice Hennessey
designed a simple system

enabled the Court to regulate its appellate caseload
and,
contemporaneously, to help retain the Court's national
that

reputation as a

leading state appellate court. His proposal was
challenging and
unorthodox: the Court would review every case entered in
the Appeals
Court before it was argued and transfer cases deemed
particularly

important (as measured by the statutory

criteria).

293

Procedurally, all discretionary appeals must first be filed with the
Appeals Court with an additional
application filed for direct review with the SJC. Court orders in
response to applications for direct
appellate review, unlike those concerning further appellate review,
are not printed in the Massachusetts
Reports so it is not possible to develop a chart similar to Table 4-2 below which
details what percentage
of applications for review are accepted. However, in Annual Reports of the
State of the Massachusetts

Court System beginning in 1994, such data was included. From FY91 to FY98 the number
of
applications for direct review remained fairly steady (annual average of
96.5), while the percentage of
applications granted dropped steadily from approximately 65% in the early years to under

50%

latter years.

This

is

directly connected to the decreasing

available for discretionary cases as the
292

i

number of direct

number of spaces on
entries

is

by the

the docket which are

climbing.

•

According

to Harry Stumpf and John Culver, a similar practice occurs in five states whereby all
appeals are filed with the state supreme court and then the state supreme court distributes appeals
between the high court and the intermediate court of appeals. While the procedure is different (in

Massachusetts, except for the exceptions regarding direct appeal,

Court

first

and the SJC reviews on

its

own

Interestingly, though, the Massachusetts

Courts
293

(New York: Longman,

initiative

example

is

from those

all

appeals are filed with the Appeals

filings) the result is similar.

not discussed in

Stumpf s book. The

Daniel Johnedis, "Creation and Impact of the Appeals Court," 479

Law

in

Politics

of State

1992), 25.

Massachusetts.

124

in

Osgood,

ed.,

The History of the

This procedure, which

represents an attempt to
w.ll be heard

by the

operates as originally established

still

make wise

use of judicial resources. The
most important eases

state's high court

two courts of appeal was

state's

in the early I970's,

while avoiding duplication of
efforts by the

a primary concern in the creation

of the

state's two-tier

appellate system. 294

The question
criteria

does

still

remains, however: which cases are
most important?

do the justices use

this tell us

governance?
from the

trial

Procedure

to

determine when

a case

under study,

61%

courts by discretion of the justices.

list

should be heard directly and what

about their perspective on the role of
the Court

In the fifteen years

three criteria

which

the

SJC

What

in the state's

of all cases came

Rule

will use to

I

1

to the

system of

SJC

directly

of the Rules of Appellate

determine

if

it

should hear an

2"5

appeal directly.

will hear

It

such cases

if

they raise:

1

)

novel questions or questions

of lust impression; 2) constitutional questions
concerning the Massachusetts or U.S.

Constitutions; or 3) "questions of such public interest that justice
requires a final

determination by the

full

Supreme

Judicial Court."

Not unlike Rule 10 of the United States Supreme Court which provides
criteria for granting cert, the

the questions which
294

For a

list

SJC's

was presented

of studies which laud

this

criteria are

broad and open

to the justices

and

to interpretation.

the

One of

staff in interviewing for this

unique process see Johnedis, "Creation ami Impact of the Appeals
is done by a committee of three justices (often the most junior

Court," 4X9-490. The actual screening

justices on the Court) who meet once a month with the Chief Staff Counsel and the SJC Clerk to screen
applications for direct review and the recommendation of the Staff Counsel's office about which cases
from the Appeals Court docket should be taken sua spontc. (Daniel Johnedis, Interview by author,

Boston,

MA.

14 April 1999

and Henry Clary, Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

5

May

contrast, applications for further appellate review (discussed below) are distributed to

and votes are taken

1999.

all

In

seven justices

in conference to determine if the application should be allowed. Information on the
process for screening further appellate review applications comes from Daniel Johnedis, telephone

Interview by author, 27 April 1999.
2 ' ,?

See also

MGL,

c.211, 10.

125

project focused on this process in
hopes of developing a clearer sense
of these
criteria.

296

Their answers provide

should play

insight into the role the justices
feel the

little

in the state's political system.

justices tended to paraphrase one or

Rather than refining the terms of Rule

more of the

criteria set forth in the Rules. 297

asked what factors determined when they
thought the SJC should take a case
instance, answers tended toward the
following. "Well, clearly on direct

something of first impression." 298
state or federal, then

which appeared

significance?

Does

it

we

should take

299
it."

When

in the first

should hear

The only other

answers of more than one justice was similar

Justice Lynch: "[Y]ou look at

we

11,

"Ifit's a serious question of constitutional
law, either

almost by definition

in the

SJC

how

important

have significance

to

is

the issue.

more than just

Does

it

to that

criteria

expressed by

have system-wide

the litigants?"

300

Overall, the formal criteria for case selection, as well
as the justices' responses,
are consistent in what they don't contain: there

is little

concern with ensuring justice

in

296

While not a part of the present project, it would be interesting to conduct an in-depth
study by
comparing potential appeals which were not chosen with those the Court chose to

hear over a period of

Such research would be different than studies of most other appellate systems because of the
unique screening process which the SJC uses. For instance, unlike research on the
U.S. Supreme Court
which focuses on which cases are chosen out of all applications for a writ of certiorari which are filed,
the universe of potential appeals for the SJC would be comprised of all appeals filed
with the Appeals'
Court. This would be a not insubstantial task as the number of such appeals topped the 1000 mark
time.

throughout the 1980's and numbered more than 2000

While providing me with no clearer sense of what these broad criteria mean to the Justices, the degree
which the responses of the justices and staff mirrored the language of the rules is interesting. Whether

to
it

in the 1990's.

means

they're only repeating the language of the rule to give the "expected" answer or that they've

internalized the criteria
298

299

is

impossible to

tell.

by author, Boston,

MA,

3

Justice Lynch, Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

25 April 1999. While

Justice Nolan, Interview

May

1999.

this is a close paraphrase,

should be noted that he distinguishes serious constitutional questions from more routine matters.

SJC were

to

choose

to hear

every constitutional question they would take almost

appeal.
300

Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

25

May

1999.
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all

it

If the

criminal matters on

individual cases.

Rather, they

whose impact extends beyond
courts

much

in a

show

a

predominant concern with deciding
questions

the part.es to the appeal, a
Stance similar to most high

system with an intermediate court
of appeal. 301 While

light

tins

doesn't shed

on specific instances when
policy-making mighl be an acceptable

the justices to play,

it

does show

that the court's rules

(recognized

role for

in legislative statute)

reinforce an acceptance of the SJC's
authority to take actions which will have
broad

public ramifications.

The second source
Appeals Conrt.

lor discretionary appeals

The losing party to an appeal

which come

in the

to the

SJC

Appeals Court has the

is

the

right to

apply lor further appellate review (FAR) by
the SJC. Nine percent (343 eases) came
the

SJC

via this route from 1981 to 1995.

Such applications

"shall be

to

founded upon

substantial reasons affecting the public interest or
the interests of justice." 302 Three of
the seven justices

of the SJC must

feel that

these criteria have been met before a case

taken for further review. As with the criteria for direct review,

this

standard

is

very

broad. Also similar were the responses of the justices as to

when

met, often paraphrasing the appropriate Rule.

however, the justices

Beyond

presented two general guidelines for determining
for further appellate review.

might not have gotten

U

"

"By

quite right."

it

we

saw,

this

was

of these

303

is if

they will consider taking a case

they feel the "that the

App eals Court

This could apply to their interpretation of the

the primary... purpose lor

devices so that the stale courts of
Slump!', The Politics

,IH

first

when

might be

definition, the vast majority of cases heard on appeal in the Males are disposed of by the stale

lAC's. As

102

The

this,

this criterion

is

last resort

of State Courts,

which they were created

--

to act as

screening

could concentrate on the important policy issues

in the

law."

145.

Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 27.1. Sec
Justice Lynch, Interview by author, Moston,

also,

MA,

25

MGL C.
May

2

I

I

A, §

I

I

1999. Speaking

somewhat more

bluntly,

but with no clearer definition of the criteria. Justice Nolan presented his view as follows: "Or vou might

127

law or the- decision as

It

affects the individual part.es.

the relevance of the legal
question
part.es to the appeal? 304

when

which the appeal

The only concrete

raises.

out of the Appeals Court.

Does

reach beyond the

it

indication that most justices gave as
to

case would be accepted lor
further review was

a

The second guideline involves

when

there

was

a dissenl

This information, while limited, reinforces
the general sense found
cases accepted on direct review of the
role

should perform

in a

-

- which justices

or roles

to

have two roles

FAR

to play in

cases.

in

concerns regarding direct review.

applying the law
resolved. This

interests

of

to all individuals fairly

is

is

justice,

and

1

in justices

may

considering whether

concerns

of these

is

not

that conflicts are equitably

MA

be unjustly imprisoned. Unlike

to take the conflict

3

Appeals Court

May

in

just didn't get

cases

in

which

it

the

on direct review, the High Court here

making questions of justice

say, this

is

wrong. That's

all

in

(here

is

individual

is

to it."

1999.

Lynch noted an important distinction between criminal and civil appeals. "And. ..of course, if
and somebody's in jail that shouldn't be, we ought lo take the case. Il'it's a civil case,
may have lo be something more than maybe they didn't gel right." Interview by author, Boston, MA,

25
305

a criminal case

il

May

1999.

The Appeals Court

hears appeals

in

panels of three; the justices say they arc more likely to consider

an application for further appellate review
to

fu st

Justice

it's
il

that the

unanimous opinion from them [Appeals Court] but

Interview by author, Boston,
04

The

in

which the Court has of

and of guaranteeing

the final avenue of appeal for most litigants,

gel a

the role

SJC

direct review,

While the two are not inherently

is

at

reflected in the second criteria found in Rule 27.1, to serve the

right or that an individual

SJC

It

looking

procedure show the

this

conflict, tune constraints will force the
justices to juggle them.

found

in

believe the

system of separated powers. As
distinguished from

however, both the justices' comments and the
rules guiding
Court

coming

305

in a 2-1

opinion from the Appeals Court. Unfortunately, data

confirm these statements was not gathered during the course of this

128

project.

more

cases

pressing.

community beyond

The second

role concerns the Court's
responsibility to the

who and how many

the parties to the case: to serve
the public interest. Concerns o\
or
are affected

by the decision of the Appeals Court
indicate a

recognition that the SJC's role extends
beyond the traditional concept of judicial
power,

of applying the law
in

fairly to the conflict at hand.

Perhaps most interesting

cases of serious injustice affecting
individuals, the SJC

is

generally

is

that except

more concerned

with addressing broader policy questions. 306

A

comparison of the number of applications

number granted
would be

for further appellate review

and the

indicate that these criteria for further
review are rarely met. This

a comfort to original opponents of creating
an intermediate court of appeals in

Massachusetts whose predominant concern was that
valuable judicial time and energy

would be wasted on many cases

SJC has developed
entitled to

a

getting

two appeals. Largely

307

one appeal, but only one appeal, so

A

problem, the

review philosophy with an "underlying theory that everybody

review that's sort of an acknowledgment
case."

to avoid this

quick look

at the

that

that the

numbers proves

when

Nve grant further appellate

system didn't work

that the

is

in this particular

system does work most of the

time.

()h
I

realize that this

this as

some

sort

is similar to most other high courts in the United States. The point is not to
present
of neNv and unusual support for judicial lawmaking. Rather, the point here, as

throughout the Chapter,
justices

combine

to

is

to

show how

promote a

institutional supports (rules

role for the

of court and legislation) and views of

SJC which extends beyond

the traditional judicial role of

adjudicating individual cases.
307

Justice Lynch, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May 1999. This could mean the system failed in
one of two ways, each relating to one of the two roles of the Court mentioned above. On the one hand
the failure (in the eyes of the SJC) could have been on the part of the Appeals Court in that it did not

"serve the interests of justice" in making
taking the case

in the first place,

of law which the

its

decision.

On

the other hand, the

SJC could have

erred in not

not recognizing that the case presented a unique and important question

state's highest court

should decide

in the first instance.

A

1984 study of FAR

in civil

cases lends credibility to the position that in civil cases (as distinguished from an improper imprisonment
as Justice

Lynch

noted), justices

were concerned predominantly with "maintaining

129

a

uniform body of law

Table 4.2

- SJC:

Calendar
Year

1981

1982
1983

1984

308

1985

1986
1987
1988
1989

1990
1991

1981-1995

- F ather AnnHl.to Rovio,

Application for

Number of

Further

Application

of

Appellate

s

Applications

Review
252
276
319
274
339
299
230
263
243
238
295
344
440
431

Granted
1

5

12.3%
9.4%
9.7%

l

1
1

15%

1T
51
in

9.4%

17

J.J/O

22
11

8.4%
4.5%

19

8%

10%

27

9.2%
26
4.6%
30
6.8%
29
6.7%
541
39
7.2%
4784
411
8.6%
by author from Massachusetts Reports, Volumes 382-421.

1992
1993

1994
1995
Total

As Table

4.2 shows, of the

granted which means that

4784 applications

than

in less

losing party that another appeal

9%

the unique system

filed in these years, only 41

was necessary. For

which the SJC has developed

the

most

have

Credit for this

lies largely

with

for taking cases directly for review.
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Commonwealth." (Byrgen Pickering Finkelman, "Further Appellate Review in Civil Cases: How
What Cases to Take," Massachusetts Law Review 79 994], 116.) As a matter of

Finkelman found only one case

[ 1

in

10 years (out of 127 cases) which the Court appeared to take

"solely because further appellate review
08

part, the justices

309

the Court Decides
fact,

were

1

of the cases did three justices agree with the

limited parties to one appeal in the state's judiciary.

in the

.

Granted

1

lb
J
A

Percentage

was

in the interest

Since volume 393 of the Massachusetts Reports

is

of justice

in the particular

case" (120).

missing a page (1101) there are no entries for

7/27/84-1 1/2/84. Therefore, the numbers for 1984 (as well as the totals for the 15 years) are not a perfect
reflection of

SJC

activity in this regard.
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These are the

five paths

by which eases reach the SJC.

study the Court had no discretion
over

appeals from
polity's

view

first

and determined by the

some cases which

state's highest court.

involving an individual

who

The other

discretionary matters. This

is

1

5 years

under

of its easeload. Composed primarily
of

degree murder convictions,

that there are

criminal charge.

1/3

In the

this portion

of the easeload represents the

are so important that they must be
heard

This applies

in particular to

cases

paying a penalty under conviction of the
most serious

2/3 of the SJC's caseload however,

means

that

is

composed of

an average of 161 cases per year provide
the

potential for the Court to have an impact
on major questions affecting public policy

On

concerns.

the most basic level this

shows

that the justices

have the necessary

control over their docket to take only those
cases which they feci arc most important.

The justices have

the opportunity to turn these political questions
into legal one

if

they

are raised.

WHICH QUESTIONS ARE ANSWERED?
The cases which
study,

did

make

SJC

CASELOAD ANALYSIS

onto the Court's docket

it

combining discretionary cases with those which were

The Table

also

shows

part of a larger trend in the SJC's workload.

applieations arc being filed, the
fairly consistent, discretionary

SJC accepted

FAR

SJC

is

in the 15

years under

directly entered onto the

While increasing numbers of

granting fewer requests. In an attempt to keep their workload

appeals will diminish as mandatory appeals increase. Finkelman found

13% of the requests between 1973 and 1982. This further
confirms the existence of this trend (with 1982 marking a shifting point). It should be noted, however,
that Finkelman's study covered only civil cases and not criminal.
that the

310

The term

in

approximately

"credit" does not imply that there

necessarily good.

It

clearly

Appeals Court as they
by SJC justices

makes

for

more

unanimous agreement

is

efficient use

affect parties to the appeal

that an injustice

may

had been perpetrated.
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that limits to

one appeal are

of judicial resources. However, errors by the

not be corrected, even if there

is

some agreement

SJC's docket, had the following
opinions from 1981 to 1995.
years

shows

that

An

The Ugh
I

analysis of the category

30% covered

indicates, there are

1

3"

C ourt issued 360(1 full

of cases considered

an average of 30% dealt with
private law, almost

criminal matters, and another

Figure 4.

characteristics.

no

4.1

40% concerned

2
a variety of other public law
matters."

real trends that

numbers within each category from one
year

Figure

in these

emerge

As

front the subtle shift in

to the next.

SJC Caselo ad hv General

Calegnries. 198I-I99S

-— Private Law
-— Criminal
Public

Law

S

^

tff
Year

Unless indicated otherwise,

all

data on cases

was developed by

the author

from analysis of opinions as

reported in the Massachusetts Reports.
312
"

n

Private law cases were those concerned with the following issues: business, private employment,

probate and family, real property and

budget and expenditures,

tort.

civil liberties

Public law cases included the following issues: governmental

and

civil rights, court oversight, democratic process, public
government, social services and education, state regulations, taxation, and torts
involving public entities. For a comparison of this caseload with a historical look at the activities of state
high courts throughout the nation, see Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, Lawrence M. Friedman, and

employment,

local

Stanton Wheeler, "The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870 - 1970," Stanford Law Review 30
977), 121-156. While a direct comparison is impossible due to differences in categorizing cases,

(

1

appears as though the SJC caseload from 1981

Kagan,

10%

to

the 1940-1970 era with more criminal and public law cases in Massachusetts (almost
each category) and a correspondingly lower percentage of private law cases.

ct. al. in

higher

in

it

1995 differed from the average caseload described by

132

While these general categories
remained

was one

there

trend.

specific category of cases

7%

which did change

in

over the years of study,

ways which

Tort cases (combining both
private and public appeals)
averaged

easeload from 1981

1

fairly steady

-

From 1985

1984.

10% of the

1995, however, tort claims comprised
almost

-

of the decisions which the SJC issued.
As indicated

Massachusetts Tort Claims Act

indicate a

later in this chapter, these

in the

discussion of the

numbers are confirmed by

interview data and other research on
the SJC. The Court, often working
with the
Legislature,

was

essential to several important

The Supreme
system,

is

Judicial Court, like

limited in what

are brought to

its

all

can do by the

it

judiciaries in the

fact that

Once questions

attention.

developments

it

in tort

law

American

in the 1980's.

political

can only answer questions which

are raised however, the Court has both the

authority and the opportunity to take appeals
and issue opinions which have a broad

impact on the

polity.

deferential manner,

follow.

The

is

The

fact that they take

which

a fact

will

advantage of this, albeit

become more apparent

in the

and judgments by which the importance of cases

rules

however, support a conclusion

that the justices recognize they

of the SJC

is

to resolve

the state. However,

to a

and

pages which
determined,

have a more involved

role to play in the political system than merely adjudicating cases.
role

is

in a restrained

They understand

the

broader questions of law, thereby making public policy for

when asked what

the state's high court should definitely

person the justices said the SJC should not

legislate. Is this

NOT do,

only a matter of

semantics or does the separation of powers make judicial policy-making more
legitimate in

313

some

instances than in others?

This research assumes that the difference

noted, "[t]he great

power of judges

in

313

Chief Justice Wilkins made some

is more than just semantics. As Chief Justice Hennessey has
making law, and in reviewing the act of the other branches for

133

distinction

between

appropriate to

roles

make

when asked

were times when

if there

it

may be more

policy.

Well, certainly,

if the

Legislature has spoken, we've got to
recognize it
them to have spoken. There are some
areas where we may feel it helpful
not simply to decide the given case
and discuss policy considerations
applicable to it, but to go on and talk
about related matters that are likely to
come up in subsequent cases
which will follow whatever we've done.
That's known as [inaudiblel

assuming

it's

constitutional for

dicta. Sometimes it's very
helpful to lay out a road
things can be handled. 314

Discussing the role of the Court

map

as to

how

'

these

in relation to the Legislature,
Justice

Lynch

described the problem of differentiating
responsibilities as follows. "There's always...a
dividing

All law, and

line.

one stop and the other one

between making law and

all

judicial functions involving line drawing.

start?"

315

For Justice Nolan,

legislating.

"After

all, it's

this line

was

be more accurate about the thing,

legislate

-- in

we

be drawn

inaccurate to say that the Court

should not be making laws because the Court makes law
any time
to

to

Where does

it

decides a case. So,

should have to say the Court has no right to

other words, to enact law by legislation." 316

chapter will provide a more detailed look

at

The remainder of this

what the justices of the SJC choose

with those cases which they decide. This will

fill

in the picture a little so that

to

we

do

can

understand the difference the justices see between "making law" and "legislating."
constitutionality, lends extraordinary importance to the judicial selection process.

judicial opinions cannot obscure the great

Flaschner Judicial

power of the

courts."

Judges Making

Rhetorical devices in

Law

(Boston,

MA:

Institute, 1994), 64.

314

Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999. In a later interview, Justice O'Connor was critical
of this technique of influencing policy. "Or they're talking about something that really isn't this case, it's

another case.

And

bring that issue to
21
315

1,6

May

supposed

to talk about some other case....[I]f you want to deliver a
two lawyers, both capable, have different views and they
you instead of.. .predicting what ought to be." Interview by author, Shrewsbury, MA,

I'd say, you're not

message about something

else then wait until

1999.

Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

25

Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

3

May

May

1999.

1999.
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Perhaps

is

it

similar to that centaies old practice
in American politics of
turning

political questions into legal ones.

THE

S I) PR F, IMF,

117

JUDICIAL QO^fRT AS

In its simplest form, the theory

make

the law, executives

and balances complicate

winch overlap

to

this a little

into the circles

theory assumes that

power

implement

all

I

,A\viyi a

of separation of powers means

the law,

thai legislatures

and courts adjudicate disputes. Checks

of power of another branch. Tins simple
version of the

powers, whether part of a branch's original
powers or part of its

check, are clearly delineated. The practice
of separating powers of

would acknowledge

make law when

Making Law,
a fiction."

that simple.

Even

that all judges, especially those

interpreting statutes, and

constitutional law.

in

the

who

the

sit

most restrained justice

on courts of

last resort,

development of common law and

As Chief Justice Hennessey reminds

us

in his treatise

"[t]he proposition that judges merely find the law that

Judges

was always

there

318

The most obvious instance of justices affecting public policy

of judicial review. While there may be debate over
in a

democracy or

is in

the exercise

the appropriateness of such an

the constitutional legitimacy of such power, there

question that the power to stop actions of an elected legislature

"

k»

by granting each branch certain
defined powers

government, however, has never been

action

k~

is

no

(or, less frequently,

an

7

it

Following Justice Nolan's
is

argued

that the

and policymaking

which

are

Court

is

lead,

1

will continue to use the term "legislating" to refer to instances

overstepping

its

authority.

As discussed

will be used interchangeably to refer to actions

more arguably

legitimate.

llh

Hennessey, Judges Making Law,l,
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in

Chapter

I,

the terms

when

lawmaking

which have system-wide impact

but

is

executive) has an effeet on public
policy. This power to check
the Massachusetts

in

SJC has used

Chapter Five. To focus on

this

that

power sparingly over

power

alone, however,

is

a powerful one, but

the years as will be d.scusscd

would be misleading

for the

High Court of Massachusetts also exercises
influence over the making of public
policy
in

more

subtle and less confrontational ways.

The justices

(although sometimes grudgingly) that they
have a role

making law through

the

to

clearly see and accept

play with the Legislature

development of common law, through statutory

in

interpretation

and through constitutional law.^ Perhaps
the cooperative nature of these endeavors

opposed

to the confrontational

justices to distinguish

between

as

assumptions of a system of separated powers helps
the
setting policy

and

legislating.

THE SJC AND THE COMMON LAW - A TRADITION OF LAWMAKING
Common
fact that

courts,

law

is

often referred to as

judge-made law, a

judges have made law for hundreds of years.

common

law

is still

No

clear recognition of the

longer pertinent

important to the body of law which governs

in the federal

320

The

states.

long history of common law authority which the U.S. courts inherited
from their British
forebears adds a veneer of tradition which legitimizes the practice of judge
319

The

role

of the Court

in

developing constitutional law will be analyzed

in

made

Chapter 5 with the

discussion of judicial review.
320

in

Federal courts stopped developing federal

Erie Railroad

Company

v.

common law after the United States Supreme Court ruling
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Former Chief Justice Hennessey presents a

view of this matter. "The Erie principle has not prevented the creation of a large area of
which can only be called common law. The Congress, like state Legislatures, has used
generality oflanguage in a number of statutes with the clearly implied intention that judge-made law
slightly different

federal law

should be a supplement. ...From the federal and
large areas of law

While

made by

state constitutions, directly or indirectly,

the courts in giving substance to general terms." Judges

have also come

Making Law,

6.

would not disagree with Hennessey on the fact that judges have great leeway in applying broad
principles to specific cases, follow the more traditional avenue of handling such policy-making cases
I

I

under the rubric of statutory interpretation and constitutional law respectively. For an argument that
federal courts have been developing a new strain of federal common law, see Wayne M. Scrra, "New
Criticisms of the Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine," Cleveland State
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Law Review 46

(1999),

1.

law.

The continuous use of this power by

-

may make

it

more acceptable

the federal level.

from colonial days

states

to the present

for state courts to be involved
in policy-making than

Not only does

common

the existence of

law provide greater

opportunity for judicial involvement but
the ongoing nature of this power
judicial policy-making in general

more

"[m]uch of our law
tort

is

common

is still

it

O'Connor's recognition

How
their

does

very

much

that they

is

from

to

O'Connor

You know

develop and enforce the

which

legislating,

job? The most important distinction seems

the Court stand as the law of the

all.

Justice

in state

a lot

noted,

of our

not legislative at all." 322 All justices shared

have a duty

this differ, in their eyes,

As

alive.

law, not legislative law at

and contract law and our others

may make

palatable.

Increasing "statutification" has reduced
the role of common law

jurisprudence over the years, but

on

to

Commonwealth

be that

all

justices noted

common

law.

was not

law decisions of

for only as long as the Legislature

allows them to stand. While the SJC can speak, they are not
the
matter and the justices are well aware of this

common

fact.

sure they [the Legislature] are unhappy with.. .and

"We
if

final

voice on the

have taken some positions I'm

they don't like something they can

An example of this tradition in Massachusetts can be seen in the common law right to forcibly resist
an unlawful arrest which the Court has traced to a 1709 English decision which was adopted by the SJC
1

for Massachusetts in

Commonwealth

modified the rule established

v.

in Crotty,

Crotty in 1865 (10 Allen 403).

It

was not

until

1983 that the SJC

noting that "[s]ince 1709 society has changed. In this era of

constantly expanding legal protection of the rights of the accused in criminal proceedings, an arrestee
may be reasonably required to submit to a possibly unlawful arrest and to take recourse in the legal

processes available to restore his liberty." Commonwealth
is

322

also an

Interview by author, Shrewsbury,

jurisprudence from
(Ithaca,

v.

example of the slow, incremental nature of change

NY:

common

law

MA,

21

May

Moreira, 388 Mass. 596 (1983), 599. This
in the

common

law.

1999. For a discussion of the shift in U.S.

to statutory law, see Willard Hurst,

Law and Social Order in

the U.S.

Cornell University Press, 1977). Even in criminal law, the most "statutificd" area of law,

the previously mentioned crime of resisting arrest

was not made criminal by

c.268, §32B, inserted by Statutes 1995, §276.
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statute until 1995.

GL

control by statute they go ahead
and pass a statute." 323 This awareness
that the

Legislature holds the final authority
the

common

A

one factor

"legislating" stems

in

which policy development via

from the motivational source

for

differentiates

this perspective, the

in the

the

common

in

which

a

via

324

law differs from

changing the law.
interests while

In general,

change

context of an individual conflict.

development of common law by judges

primary example of the way

lawmaking

strive to avoid.

changes come about by pressure from
various

emanating from the judicial branch develops

From

wh 1C h

law from the legislating which the
justices

second way

legislative

is

in

Massachusetts

is

a

system of separation of powers encourages a

division of labor between branches of
government according to task and expertise, with
the courts

making law when

the Legislature

is

not.

While the Legislature

confronted

is

with a variety of new issues each legislative term,
there will always be public policy
questions which do not
individuals

so as to be

who

to their attention,

sometimes because there are too few

are immediately concerned with the issue. Legislatures
are established

more responsive

are organized in

323

come

ways

to

to

make

concerns of larger numbers of people, often people
their voices

more

Chief Justice Wilkins, Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

effective.

who

325

23 April 1999.

3 '4

This is a point of which the justices are reminded when they are confronted with the question of
whether a specific statute overrules a common law precedent. See, Commonwealth v. Jones, 382 Mass.

387 (1981)

(statute regarding

involuntary manslaughter);

homicide by motor vehicle does not impliedly repeal

Commonwealth

v.

common

law crime of

Chretien, 383 Mass. 123 (1981) (rape statute overrules

common

law exemption of husband from prosecution for raping wife); Commonwealth v. Wilkinson, 415
Mass. 402 (1993) (common law right of out-of-state bail bondsman to capture bonded fugitive
superseded by Uniform Criminal Extradition Act); PACE v. Signal Technology Corporation, 417 Mass.
154 (1994)

(common law

regarding misrepresentation as regards hiring benefits

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
325

is

superseded by the

1974).

n

See Steven B. Kramer, "Case Comment ~ Prospective-Retroactive Overruling: Remanding Cases
Pending Legislative Determination of Law," Boston University Law Review, 58 (1 978), 8 8-840 for an
1

interesting claim that in the question of governmental tort

immunity (to be discussed
below) the SJC wrote an opinion with these broader communities in mind, assuming
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in

more

detail

that the Court's

Courts, on the other hand, handle
concerns on a case by case basis.

many

issues are likely to arise in a case
confronted

anyone has thought of it
time

in

as an 'issue."

by the

As

a result,

state's judiciary before

For example, the SJC considered for the

1983 whether or not a child can be compelled

first

to testify against a parent in a

grand jury proceeding regarding a crime
allegedly committed against a non-family

member.

326

Such a question would probably never

arise in a legislative context, but the

concrete process of adjudicating a criminal
complaint brought the question to the

While the decision was only immediately applicable
ramifications extended far beyond this since

it

to the case at hand, the

involved a question of balancing the

needs of the criminal justice system with the needs of
327
individual families.
In
instance, the Court refused to use

common

its

fore.

law powers

to

this

develop such a privilege,

recognizing that the Legislature has developed some privileges
over time but has not
created such privileges within families other than for spouses.
The message of the

opinion in this case was,

While following
instance if

it

if

the Legislature wants

a line of restraint, the

it,

SJC made

it

the Legislature should develop

clear

it

was

32 ^
it.

entitled to act in this

so chose.

opinion would mobilize various interests (most notably local municipalities) so that the Legislature

would
326

act.

Three Juveniles

v.

Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357

(1983).

327

The dissenters in this case presented the importance of this policy question most strongly. "The court
should recognize a public policy against imposing on the conscience of a child responsibility for
incriminating his or her parent. Society's interest in its children should be recognized as sufficiently
important to outweigh the need for probative evidence

only does society have an interest

in children

in the

administration of criminal justice. ...Not

being free from unreasonable public demands, but society

also has an interest in fostering the unity of the family." Three Juveniles,
328

In contrast, the

SJC has used

its

common

law authority

to establish

O'Connor

dissenting, 366.

and maintain a privilege between

attorneys and their clients. This most likely represents the special relationship which the Court exercises

over the bar and the bench. See, Foster

v.

Hall, 12 Pick. 89 (1832).

139

Many

cases

m which the

interpretation of specific

SJC's

common

law authority

documents such as contracts or

wills.

is

invoked involve the

For instance,

interpreting the provisions of a will
in 1987 the Court overruled
previous

in

common

law,

declaring that the definition of "issue"
will no longer be limited to
children born in

wedlock unless

329
specifically provided for in the
document.
Recognizing the need for

public policy to keep up with contemporary
practices, the Court

was probably accepted by other policy-makers
and by
without a sponsor

have been made

who was

-

it

made

a change that

the citizenry at large. Yet

particularly interested in the subject,
this change

would never have survived

in the legislative

would not

maze, not because of

opposition, but because of apathy. 330

This
in the

not to say that the

is

common

incremental.

Powers

law.

331

This

On
is

SJC

is

prone

the contrary, the

a third

way

in

to

making broad and sweeping changes

development of common law

which lawmaking through

is

common

slow and
law powers

Wilkinson, 399 Mass. 650 (1987).

v.

330

The SJC has been increasingly active in recent years in the definition of family.
This is represented
by two 1999 cases regarding visitation rights. In Youmans v. Ramos
(429 Mass. 774) the Court upheld
Probate Court decision granting visitation rights to an aunt who had been
intimately involved

a

in a raising

a child.

More

controversially, the Court in E.N.O.

partner of a child's biological mother

As

v.

who had been

L.M.M. (429 Mass. 824) found

that the lesbian

a "de facto" parent could be granted visitation rights.

distinguished from most

SJC cases, these two decisions were relatively widely reported upon. See,
"Rulings Broaden View of Family," Boston Globe, August 8, 1999, Bl; Irene Sege,
"When
and
Split", Boston Globe, November 23, 1999, CI; and Meghan Laska, "The Future
of Visitation Rights," Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, October 4, 1999, Bl. There was some conflict,
Sacha

Pfeiffer,

Mom

Mom

especially over the second decision, as seen in the dissent of Justice Charles Fried and in quoted
the Catholic Action League of Massachusetts. Despite these concerns at the time, there
is no indication yet that the Legislature intends to react to "correct" these
decisions.

comments from

331

While the following case may be more accurately categorized

Amendment
in

or Article 12 guarantees of a fair

which the Court developed

the law

trial)

rather than

as a constitutional law decision (6th

common

on admission of polygraph

law, the language in an opinion

tests in criminal trials is representative

of the careful, case-by-case approach the justices of the SJC take to development of the law absent
legislative direction. "The question of the admissibility in this Commonwealth of such evidence to
corroborate (or impeach) the testimony of a witness, other than a defendant, was an open one

of the

trial. ...To this

point,

we have

carefully

left

at the

undecided the question of the admissibility of the

140

time

can often be differentiated from
the Court did not use

new

its

legislating.

common

Except

law authority

in

in the area

of right-to-die policy,

any one case

to declare a dramatic

direction in the law during the fifteen
years under study. 3 " While the

substantial changes over time in the law
regarding torts and in

SJC

directed

employment law,

these

changes came about slowly, with overarching
principles of law emerging out of the
individual opinions for specific cases. 333

The slow development of the law provides

further legitimization of judge-made
law in a system of separated powers since
legislators to take the necessary action to

law before any drastic

The

makes

it

which come

to the judicial branch.

with

Its

new

issues arising out of

role as the arbiter in these

the ideal branch to refine policy through the

in these cases (as

common

334

situations confront old tenets of law.

powers

in the

common

While the SJC may refuse

law as new

to use its

common

with the question discussed above of developing a

It is

law

new

privilege against testimony for a child against her parent), the justices
accept this
as an appropriate part of their job.

allows

felt.

state's highest court is regularly confronted

specific conflicts

disputes

effects are

modify or overturn changes

it

power

legitimate as distinguishable from "legislating"

of a polygraph examination given to a witness other than a defendant.. ..[However], [t]he
issue
cannot reasonably be avoided in this case." Commonwealth v. Dilego, 387 Mass. 394
(1982), 396-397.
results

332

333

Right-to-die cases will be discussed below.

For a discussion of the development of the law regarding termination of employees

cause, see Hennessey, Judges

Making Law,

9-10.

In addition to cites in discussion

at will

without

below regarding the

Massachusetts Torts Claims Act, review of some of the
Johnedis, "
81.

The Supreme

William

J.

tort law changes can be seen in Daniel J.
and Tort Immunity," Massachusetts Law Review 63 (1978), 75Interspousal Immunity," Massachusetts Law Review 66 (1981), 105-

Judicial Court

Brisk, "Tort

Law

--

106.
334

The incremental nature of common law development connects back to the history of judicial
lawmaking in the English/colonial/American system of law. Even before judicial power under common

law could ever have been considered as a challenge
a tradition of being incremental
traditions

to the authority

of other governmental bodies,

and conservative with the judiciary being bound

and previous decisions.

141

to the past

by

its

it

had

aeons

since then-

never

come

decisions

arc no, final, since they
often handle

to the Legislature's attention,

and since (he

specie questions which would
effeel

of their individual

often minimal (although the
cumulative effeel of these decisions can he

is

major). These restraints on the

common

law legitimate judicial policymaking
and

reinforce the fact that dividing
responsibilities between branches leads to

dcvelopmcnl of law, one which brings law

efficient

life

close, to .he concrete realities

STATUT ORY INTI RI>K1 ATION
gPEAKg OK Hi; LKXiISI

[f this

were

\\i

I

common

law

is

involved.

In

Of a

common

go uninterrupted

statute

does

is

lo

I

ligh Court's

law ends once

policymaking
as

in a series

appear

lo

in

role in

more and more

phenomena which continues

change the way

law the Court speaks

for so long dial they

monologue ends when

of the

Of Massachusetts would dimmish over lime

replaced by statutory law, a

the enactment

common

Passage of legislation, however, doesn'1
eliminate the Court's

the case, the importance

the lives of the citizens

What

All

[

responsibility of the judiciary for the development
of the

legislature has acted.

voice,

of

THE COIIUT

[

I

(lie

more

by the residents of Massachusetts.

as lived

The

a

to this day.

which the Court

is

of long statements which often

be monologues.

In

most instances the

the Legislature enters the conversation by passing a law.

here that a dialogue begins. The players

in

335

each branch

may change

develops, but the dialogue will go on. There will be instances

in

Il

is

as the conversation

which the Court's

us
in

advising legal practitioners of the importance of learning more about statutory construction, one

commentator has described
shrinks and the reality
I

1

awrence
14.

l).

Shubow

ol'

the increase in statute law as follows.

legislative

enactments shaping. ..almost

Shubow, "Statutory Construction
is

a retired District

in

"[T]he terrain of the
all

human

Massachusetts," Massachusetts

Court justice.

142

common

law

interrelationships expands|

Law Review

79

1

|"
.

1994),

discret,onary role in this process
will be limited by the fact
that the legislation

concrete and specific, but this
all

words have

is

is

not often the case. Certainty
in legal language, "where

a fixed, precisely ascertained
meaning;

purposes, not only with accuracy, but
with fullness"

where men may express

is,

in the

their

words of James Bradley

Thayer, a "lawyer's Paradise." 336
Separation of powers grants to each
branch of government a distinct, primary
responsibility.

For the judiciary

statute, to a specific situation.

all

language,

policy.

337

is

it

the

is

power

apply the law, often

to interpret the

law

become an

and the degree

to

ambiguous or concrete

which

in this

process provides the justices with a

a judicial determination

the legislation in question

which gives the judiciary

little

form of a

active partner in developing

second potential avenue for judicial policy-making.
The degree
exists,

in the

Necessitated by the reality that statutory
language, like

often vague, the Court will

The need

to

room

is.

is

to

the potential

accepted, depends on

An example

for interpretation

which

how

of a concrete statute

was presented by

Justice Lynch.

for example, the Legislature should pass a law
that says the speed
limit on the Massachusetts Turnpike is 65 miles an
If,

protests that and

we

say, well they didn't really

they meant 60 miles an hour, that to

Lynch continued, however, by noting
precise as

we would

like

it

to be.

drafted as

we would

like

it

to be."

me

clearly

hour and somebody
mean 65 miles and hour,
is

that "[t]he English

And sometimes
It is,

of course,

legislating.

language

338

isn't

always as

the legislation isn't as carefully

in these instances that the courts

must determine exactly what the Legislature meant.

336

337

A Preliminary

Of course

Treatise on Evidence at the

statutory language

may

Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

(Boston: Little Brown, 1899), 428-429.

be even more vague than other language

from compromises which would make
338

Common Law

if

the legislation resulted

clear definitions of legislative intent problematic.

25

May

1999.
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1

.

According

to

one commentator, approximately

20%

of appellate court cases

involve issues of statutory construction. 339
In reviewing 15 years of SJC
decisions, few
controversial cases involving statutory
construction were evident. 340 This of
course

does not mean that the Court wasn't
involved
policy which they
a flare gun

is

made was

not a

in

making

generally uncontested. 341

weapon under

the terms of

GL

c.

policy,

When

only means that the

it

the justices determine that

269, § 10, the position

controversial and

it

is

law which makes

it

a crime in Massachusetts to carry a
dangerous

•

1

license.

342
-

probably

in tune

was

with the intent of the Legislature in passing
this

the decision, however, doesn't

the decision in

more

O'Donnell

Massachusetts Civil Rights Act

weapon without

v.

Chasdi

a

art.

1

is

who

are speaking

m Shubow, "Statutory Construction
because Shubow presents only

this

in

an

in

any case

are guaranteed

of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 343
are representative of the

generally involved in policymaking through the

They

less

by the presence of a

be brought

at individuals

These cases, neither of which was widely controversial,

which the SJC

any

this

which the SJC interpreted the

in

to allow for civil action to

equal protection of the laws under

make

controversial, as indicated

charging intimidation, threats, or coercion aimed

construction.

hardly

»

Agreement with

exercise in policymaking. Slightly
dissent,

is

on behalf of the Legislature

Massachusetts," 123.

1

quote

in a

this figure

way

power of statutory

way which
with

some

the elected

trepidation

statement with no citations or clarifications.

340

While I cannot guarantee that there weren't more, there were no indicators, either in headnotes to the
cases or in journal articles, that there were more. See methodology discussion in Chapter 1
34

For a

list

of cases from the early years of this study (through 1984) which involved an exercise of
Making Law, 35-39.

statutory construction, see Hennessey, Judges
142

343

Commonwealth

v.

Sampson, 383 Mass. 750 (1981).

400 Mass. 686 (1987).

court by

its

In dissent, Justice

Lynch described

this decision as follows: "I believe the

decision today so broadly construes the Massachusetts Constitution that

boundless right of one citizen

to

sue another which

is

144

in

it

has created a

both unprecedented and unwarranted." (695)

officials

and others who

may

challenge then view find acceptable.
Furthermore,

most cases the Legislature does not

"The number of statutes

in this

try to control this

commonwealth

restricting the role of courts in
this area

interpretation has developed as a

is

power of statutory

in

construction.

generally defining statutory meanings
or

very small....[T]he law of statutory

common

law subject,

its

controlling principles found

in court decisions." 344

There was, however, one particularly
interesting and potentially controversial
interpretation of a statute

to

many of the

which occurred during

the years under analysis. 345 In contrast

cases discussed in this chapter in which
the emphasis has been on the

incremental, cooperative and often uncontested
use of judicial power, this decision,

both

in its effect

the bench.

and

its

language, shows a Court seemingly intent on legislating
from

The case of Commonwealth

"question whether a viable fetus
statute."

Cass presented the justices with the

a 'person' for purposes of our vehicular homicide

is

346

In a decision

347
it is.

v.

which the majority

itself calls

"unforseeable," they decide that

perhaps most unforseeable because they recognize that

It is

this is a

question of

legislative intent but they give only circumstantial evidence that
the Legislature ever

344

Shubow, "Statutory Construction," 115-116.

regarding murder which

is

A

good example of this can be found

in the

law

discussed below.

345

1 say potentially because there didn't seem to be much attention paid to the decision. The 1984
Annual Index to the Boston Globe (281) lists only one article on this decision. This is contrasted with
nine articles which appeared in the same year regarding the more controversial issue of the SJC's

the

decision on the death penalty. (The SJC's activity on the death penalty will be discussed in Chapter 5
below.) In addition, while the Legislature has amended GL c. 90, §24G since 1984, the word "person"
still

346

347

appears as before with no further clarification or definition. (Statute 1986, c.620, §§15,

3 92

Mass. 799 (1984), 799. The vehicular homicide

Cass, 807. Justice Wilkins, writing

comments on

this fact.

"The court

in dissent for

rightly says that

court further characterizes the conclusion
court

is

right.

I

it

never would have guessed

statute

is

found

in

GL

c.90,

§24G.

himself, and Justices Liacos and

its

'decision. ..may

Abrams,

(809, citations omitted).
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satirically

have been unforseeable. '...The

reaches as '[a]n unpredictable judicial decision.'

it"

16.)

I

think the

intended to depart so drastically from
past statutory and

homicide law

Commonwealth when

in the

it

enacted

the majority, Chief justice Hennessey
shows

embedded

how

common

law practice regarding

this statute in 1976.

Writing for

deeply the contrary practice was

in the state.

We turn now to the common

law definition of homicide. Since at least
the fourteenth century, the common
law has been that the destruction of
a fetus in utero is not a homicide.
Although this court has never had a
case that directly presented the question,
we have assumed that the
stated rule is a part of our common law,
and we have restated it as a part
of our common law, and we have restated
it as recently as 1976
The
rule has been accepted as the established
common law in every

American jurisdiction
of a law

is

The decision

SJC generally view

in

Cass

that the Legislature

is

is

not representative of the

their position in state's

and the dissenters recognize

process. This

that has considered the question.

But the antiquity

no measure of its soundness. 348

that the

make such

one case

in

way

in

which the justices of the

policymaking network. 349 Both the majority

normal practice of the Court has been

to suggest

sharp and sweeping changes through the legislative

which the majority does not seem

to

have differentiated

well between legislating and lawmaking by the judiciary and conveys an important

reminder. While the justices of the SJC seem to be more restrained and deferential than
their federal counterparts,

justices of the

when confronted with

SJC may be just

as

potentially "hot button" issues, the

swayed by personal preferences

as the next judge.

how to treat a viable fetus was then expanded in
Lawrence, 404 Mass. 378 (1989). Here the principle was applied not only to the
interpretation of a specific statute but to the common law crime of murder in general. By this time the
Court felt the decision should have been anticipated; they applied the definition to the case at hand rather
Cass, 805. Citations omitted. This perspective on

Commonwealth

v.

than prospectively as they had done
349

Justice

Nolan presented

in

Cass.

a forthright perspective

abused the power of statutory construction.
in effect

is

legislating...I

don't say

we do

it

on the extent

"Now we've
often,

I

mean

to

which the SJC

I

don't want to exaggerate, but that clearly

impropriety in terms of separation of powers." Interview by author, Boston,

146

has, in his eyes,

taken statutes, turned them on their head, which

MA,

3

May

1999.

is

an

These kind of questions, which make
up
docket, are determined, as Justice
in.

You know

a lot

a relatively small percentage

O'Connor

says,

of the Court's

by "whose kitehen...you gr[e]>
up

of them [Supreme Court justices]
grow up with

a certain

amount of

value judgment....They're the kind of
questions you can't say, 'Oh well, what
the
then; if three of

you think

good.

that,

Most Questions of statutory

sign'."

I'll

350

interpretation

which the SJC confronts, however,

involve less volatile issues like the
interpretation of a clause
a conflict of interest statute. Justice

hell

Lynch described what

in a tax

law or a phrase

the justices

do

in

in

interpreting such statutes.

I

don't think

policy.

I

we

mean

favorable,

ought

to

make

if there is

we ought

number of statutes

to

public policy as

something

recognize

it..

much

as discern public

that is universally recognized as

..The Legislature has enacted a

that in essence say that

minor children should be
adequately supported by their parents. That is well
recognized and not
contested by anyone that I know -- a public policy.
So when we're
interpreting some of those statutes, we have to keep
in mind what's the
paramount interest here? Paramount interest is to see that these kids
are
supported, that they're properly taken care

The power of statutory
be differentiated from

interpretation, like the

As with

legislating.

interpret statutes in specific cases

Court

the legislation

become

It is

From

MA,

law, can

development of common law, justices

it

limits the

also provides a check on the

in generalities

but the law

MA,

21

May

1999.

He voieed

is

applied by the

25

May

1999.
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of powers often

a similar opinion in

Consensus and Coping with Dissent," Massachusetts

Interview by author, Boston,

common

this perspective, the separation

96.
351

the

not until this occurs that potential shortfalls or gaps in

apparent.

Interview by author, Shrewsbury,

Collcgiality: Creating

power over

which come before them. This not only

The Legislature speaks

courts to individual cases.

350

the

to a reactive position in policymaking, but

legislative process.

351

of.

Law Review

"The Art of
83 (1998), 93-

acts

more

to

ensure efficiency than to provide
checks against abuses of power.

Secondly, statutory construction

is

similar to

common

law development

interpretation of statutes generally
proceeds incrementally. 352

common
Court

SJC

law, the

in a

finally, as

with the

not the final voice. This slow
development of the law by the

is

system of separated powers means

overturn the interpretation
fact.

And

in that the

Whether or not they

when
will,

it

is

that legislators can act to

modify or

contrary to their intent. That they can
do so

however,

is

is

a

another question.

THE COURT SPEAKS - IS THE LEGISLATURE LISTENING?
The judiciary has
it

authority to develop

common

law and

to interpret statutes, but

operates in a system in which someone else has
the final voice. The Legislature has

the ultimate

power over

these questions and can enact legislation to overturn
most

decisions of the SJC. The belief that they will do so

if

they feel

ensuring democratic accountability) rests on two assumptions:

it

necessary (thereby

1) that

each branch pays

attention to the activity of the others, and 2) that each
branch wants to take

responsibility for

all

policy matters. Both of these stem from the view that a system of

separated powers will lead to conflicts between branches over
in the polity,

with each branch jealously guarding

encroachment by others and fighting
the

first

assumption

to this question,

to

have

their

its

power

The case of Cass

is

make

the laws

territory against

own views made

its

will

into law.

Applying

that the Legislature

opinions to be certain that

it

pays

is

not

or acting contrary to the Legislature's desire. In their interviews,

most justices were able

352

own

one would hypothesize

attention to the activities of the SJC, monitoring

abusing

its

who

to recall

some evidence of this

an obvious exception to

this statement.

148

occurring, with the General

Court enacting legislation

one of their opinions. 353 These
examples were

in reaction to

only anecdotal, however, and no
justice mentioned more than one
case

had occurred.

In contrast to these specific

that the Legislature

would be most

move

theory.

1

the Legislature to act/' 355

affect a vested interest.

Legislature

this

may

of the Court would affect

think any vested interest in whatever

However, not

These limited observations

we

did might

such decisions of the Court will

all

raise the possibility that the

not always be the "watchdogs" envisioned
under separation of powers

356

A
that they

look

may

at the

views of legislators

Massachusetts lends support

in

to the thesis

not always be concerned with the output of
the state's highest court. In

research conducted in 1991 to determine

lawyer legislators and non-lawyer

Not

which

examples were the justices' general views

likely to act if the decision

an organized constituency: "[A]nd
well

in

354

surprisingly, justices

were most

if

was

there

a difference in the reactions of

legislators in regard to court

remember

likely to

reform proposals

in

instances in which the Legislature reacted to

an opinion they had authored, although Justice Lynch cited the
passage of the "Castle Defense" (law
allowing the use of deadly force in one's home, with no need to retreat)
as a reaction to an opinion

authored by former Chief Justice Hennessey. "He [Hennessey] maintained that
they didn't understand
the opinion but, nevertheless, clearly that statute was passed because at least
of a legislative

perception of

something we had done." (Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May 1999.) Chief Justice Wilkins
remembered well the actions of the Legislature in "stretch[ing]" the statute of limitations in certain tort
actions. "1 wrote an opinion that said that it really was outrageous, or at least not
permissible, when a
suit is brought against A on theory Y, after the statute of limitations has run in any claim
against B on
theory Z, that

it

would be

therefore the addition

theory but

when you

is

OK to add

timely.

did both,

It's

we

B

to the case

one thing

wrote,

I

to

and hook up

add an

wrote, that

a very short period of time, passed an act which said

Boston,
354

This

MA,
is

being timely,

add a party on the same

seemed outrageous. And the Legislature, within
was perfectly all right." (Interview by author,

not to say that the justices' responses represent an accurate accounting of all instances

SJC opinion,

Chief Justice Wilkins, Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

I

am

when

implying only that the times when

in the justices'

memories.

23 April 1999.

Justice Nolan to describe how the Legislature interacted with the
He felt that the Legislature did keep an eye on the SJC. "Oh boy, they're watchdogs. They
they may not agree with us." (Interview by author, Boston, MA, 3 May 1999.)

The term watchdogs was used by

judiciary.

watch,

to

it

it

such actions occurred did not stand out as particularly relevant

35

one thing

23 April 1999.)

the Legislature enacted legislation in response to an

355

to the original action,

issue, it's
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.

Massachusetts, Mark Miller asked
. randomly selected
questions, one of which

how much

particularly pertinenl

is

sc.

of 64

legislators a variety of

,s/
.

Responding

to a question regarding

attention they pay to decisions of the
SJC, over 1/3 of all legislators

survey responded with "none" or
"not much." The responses of non-lawyer

who made up 72% of the
Showing
pay

General Court

or no interesl

little

to

SJC

indicates that attention

rely

on outside sources

say they

42%

that

of all

legislators polled

claimed

to

pay

decisions, but a second question asked of the respondents

is

drawn

As was assumed by

media.

22%

45%

such decisions.

Tins research does show
"sonic" attention

legislators,

1991, were ev en more surprising with

decisions of the SJC. Conversely, only

in the

a great deal ol" attention to

in

the

in

to

such opinions only

if the

case

is

covered

in the

several justices in their interviews, the legislators lend
to

review the work of the suite's high court. This means

to

that

those cases which arc "sexiest," or those affecting an
organized constituency, arc most
likely to

come

the Louise

to the attention

Woodward

trial

of the majority

159

And while some of the

findings from this research are presented

The Following

table

legislators' sources

Table

is

recent activities ovet

in

Judicature 77

(

J.

do with

Court's policy-making

1993), 34 4

1

taken from page 38 of Miller's study and gives complete information on the

Legislators' sources

of information aboul SJC decisions

Memb/

From

ases

Constituent

Staff

Judges

73%

67%

28%

11%

17%

6%

85%

4%

39%

33%

22%

7%

Media

to

of information,

lobby/

Read
Lawyers

As

show, the sexiest cases may often have nothing

broader public policy questions.

" The

ol" legislators.

(

Other

IX)

(n

NonLawyers
(n=46)

(Individual legislators
,s
'

Woodward was

child

in

her care

in

may have

the English

given up to three responses, so percentages will not add

to

100 percent,

nanny who was found guilty of second degree murder in the death of a
The s.k heard the ease on appeal lo determine a variety of

the Boston aiea.

'
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decisions will be highlighted by
pressure groups, no,
affect an organized constituency 360

An example

all

such decisis necessarily

.

of such low salience policy decisions
can be found

in a series

of

cases decided between 1982 and
1990 dealing with questions of paternity
and
illegitimacy.

No one

of these cases had a strong constituency,
nor did they necessarily

have immediate policy implications which
were broad enough
attention.

However, when looked

at all

to attract

media

together these cases present a very different

state-sanctioned view of family and familial
obligations than had existed only a decade
before. For instance, in a 1982 case,
the
rule

of law (adapted from an English

which would prohibit

a

SJC overturned

common

man from making

a 19th century Massachusetts

law rule dating from the early 1700's)

a claim for

annulment of a marriage on

claim that the child born to his wife was sired by another
"criminal intercourse" with the wife before marriage 361
for the Court, "[w]e

today

we

would no longer follow

that rule.

.

man

if the

a

husband had had

As Chief Justice Wilkins noted

Its

harshness

is

apparent, and

see no salutary quality in such a rule." Concerned again with
questions of

paternity, the Court in C.C.

"no longer any need

v.

A.B. determined that as a matter of common law there

for a presumption of legitimacy" in cases

where a child

married couple, increasing the opportunity for a putative unwed father

is

is

born to a

to claim

questions, the primary one concerning the authority of the trial court judge to reduce the verdict of the
jury to involuntary manslaughter. There was more media coverage of the Court's decision on this matter
than on all other cases which it decided in 1998.
360
It is

possible that the leadership of the

respond

to a decision

when

they feel

it is

House and

the Senate watch the

SJC more

carefully and only

worthwhile. If this were the case the role of the High Court

in

the policy-making process could be seen largely as a consensus of elites, with legislative controversy

becoming apparent only when the elites disagree. Considering the close working relationship which
seems to exist within the legal community (and associated with Boston's law schools), this may not be as
far-fetched as it sounds. For discussion of elite theory, see the classic, C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).
361

Symonds

v.

Symonds, 385 Mass. 540, (1982).
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when

paternity

in the

the

common

SJC's decision
a will or trust

mother

is

married to another man. 3 "

law which present a challenge
in

One

example of changes

final

to traditional notions

of family was the

1987 that the traditional definition of the
term 'issue" when found

would be changed so

as to

in

no longer exclude children born out of

363

wedlock.

No one

of these decisions alone presented a
dramatic challenge

order of events. Even combined they only
seem to parallel changes

and support

for these

in state statutes.

changes can be found

in the

common

However, these and similar cases show

authority over the

common

law, does

make

in

that the

policy which

the Legislature. Attracting the attention of
neither the

law

may

to the existing

in society at large,

other states as well as

SJC,

easily

in exercising its

go undetected by

media nor any advocacy

organization, such policies are judge-made law created
without the assumed oversight

of

legislators.

364

The development of law by justices through

common

statutory interpretation or the

law can be limited by the Legislature but the Legislature

of what the SJC

is

doing.

Even when they

is

not always aware

are paying attention, however, the

406 Mass. 679 (1990), 686. The importance of this decision as a public policy statement was
recognized by Justice O'Connor in dissent. "I would strongly disagree with the policy declared by the
Court because it is antithetical to the Commonwealth's legitimate interest in promoting family harmony
for the care

and protection of children and affording legitimacy to children whenever possible. I would
it is sound public policy to recognize a man's interest in maintaining a

not accept the proposition that

relationship with the child that he claims to have fathered by an adulterous, and therefore criminal, see

G.L. c.272, §14 (1988
illegitimate
363

364

Powers
This

is

ed.), relationship

and disrupting

v.

with the child's mother

at the

expense of making the child

a 'unitary family'." (697.)

Wilkinson, 399 Mass. 650 (1987).

not an argument for or against this exercise of

policies being discussed).

should be the institution

It is

power by

the Court (nor for or against the

simply intended to describe the Court's

to act is a separate question.

regard continue apace.
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As previously

activities.

Whether or not

the

SJC

noted, the Court's activities in this

Legislature

may choose

not to act for a variety of reasons
which counters a second

assumption underlying a separation of
powers theory which emphasizes
conflict

Adopting such an approach one can tend
conflict does not necessarily

Legislature

the Court to

may

overlook times when an absence
of visible

mean agreement.

Instead,

could

it

not necessarily agree with the law
being made,

go unchallenged because

position established by the

changed.

to

it

SJC would be

while the

that

allows lawmaking by

the perceived costs of working to

change

a policy

greater than their desire to see the
policy

1"5

In these cases, the

communication between

the

accepted monologue- the SJC speaks
while the Legislature

of such cases would be those winch

in

relative apathy.

is

a great deal

of

This lack of action

inertia in

central areas, that

cases

mean

is,

in this state."

two branches would be an
listens.

One

winch the Legislature's inaction

results

from

explained by one legislator as follows. "There

response to the [Supreme Judicial Court], except

the

sub-category

most important issues

most

There aren't many of those

politically.

In these instances the costs

in the

is

of acting wouldn't necessarily offend

anyone, they would simply be opportunity costs, taking time away from
more pressing
matters.

There are times when the Legislature chooses not
encouraging them

See,

to

engage

in a

dialogue.

Mark A. Graber, "The Nonmajoritiarian

7 (1993), 35-73.

Graber's thesis

is

that not all

Difficulty," Studies in

policymaking on the

countermajoritiarian. While he

ties this specifically to the

presents to

policy

in a

system of separated powers

is

common

American

part

Political

of high courts

is

United Slates Supreme Court

Development

necessarily
in its

notions of struggles over the power to

encourage or

tacitly

exercise of

make

public

in this

regard, Graber recognizes that "[e]lcctcd

support judicial policymaking both as a means of

avoiding political responsibility for making tough decisions and as

a

means of pursuing

controversial

policy goals that they cannot publicly advance through open legislative and electoral politics." (37)
6

Miller,

"Lawmaker

is

applicable as well to other high courts exercising a wider array

of activities. Instead of the assumption of conflict
officials in the United Stales

even when the Court

Included here would be instances where the

judicial review, the challenge

it

to act

Attitudes Toward Court Reform," 39.
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SJC has recognized

that the

common

law

is

not adequately addressing a
problem or that

the statute(s) affecting an area
of law need clarification. Justices
will

make

reference in

opinions regarding the need for the
Legislature to enact comprehensive
legislation

to

replace the case-by-case law which
the Court has developed. While
the Legislature

may

agree, in theory, that the problem
should be addressed, the time and effort
required

would not be worthwhile, or worse, could be
former can be seen

in the

politically

damaging.

development of the murder law

1980 appeal of a murder charge

in

in the

An example

of the

Commonwealth.

which a primary challenge was

In the

to the jury

instructions concerning the expression
"malice aforethought," Justice Kaplan wrote in

concurrence

As

to

emphasize the problem with

this expression.

367

the court indicates, instructions on this matter,
even

carefully devised,

must remain obscure

when more

to the ordinary juror as

long as
they derive from the text of the present statute. It is
a serious reproach
to the administration of criminal justice in
this Commonwealth
that in

of a grievous offense with high penalty a jury may have to
proceed under so feeble a light. The beginning of a remedy
would be to
revise the statute.. ..Without this help the system will continue
to turn up
instructions for which this court will be making rueful apology. 368
the

trial

No change was made

to the statute regarding

Court again encouraged the Legislature

murder law more broadly, concerned
murder developing piecemeal

as a

to act.

murder and

ten years later the

This time the Court criticized the

that legislative inaction

had

mix of statutory and common

led to the

law of

law, resulting in a

367

GL c.265, § 1 defines murder and reads as follows. "Murder committed with deliberately
premeditated malice aforethought, or with extreme atrocity or cruelty, or in the commission of attempted
commission of a crime punishable with death or imprisonment for life, is murder in the
Murder which docs not appear to be in the first degree is murder in the second degree."
ib%

first

degree.

Commonwealth v. Starling, 382 Mass. 423 (1980), 430-431. Justice Braucher's majority opinion
made the same point, although in less forceful language. "We have long recognized that

for

the Court

'malice aforethought'

is a...

'very technical and

somewhat misleading expression of the

terms probably convey the intended meaning imperfectly
is

to the ordinary juror,

law. '...Those

and drastic simplification

doubtless desirable. ...Modernization of jury instructions on the subject, however desirable, would

savor of statutory revision, a Legislative prerogative" (428-429).
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body of law which was confusing and
needed
desirability

clarification.

"There

is

no doubt of the

of legislative consideration of the
homicide law with a view toward

simplification and modernization.
However, in the absence of definitive action
by the
Legislature,

decision[.]"

we must
369

The

bring our involuntary manslaughter
law in line with the Matchett

lack of action by the Legislature in
such matters

of the issue's relative unimportance
legislators

on a regular

basis.

in the overall

When

"messages" which the SJC sends

asked

if

this is sort

of tough

to

largely a factor

universe of problems confronting the

he thought legislators were aware of such

in its opinions, Justice

action as follows. "I think they're aware
of

is

it.

Lynch explained

But, again, whether or not,

probably they'd straighten

set

when we

understand and some clarifying language would be
helpful,

don't suppose that necessarily goes to the top of
their legislative priorities

When

their lack

all

those things out

[if

they had time]."

list.

I

of
say

I

think

370

the Legislature does not have time to develop a
comprehensive, coherent

of statutes regarding the law of homicide (or

to address

any other policy question

confronted by the Court), the system of separation of powers results

in the judiciary

enacting public policy by default. The Courts are not necessarily chomping

at the bit to

take on additional authority. However, since their primary responsibility as a branch of

government
answered

is

to adjudicate individual disputes,

to properly adjudicate, the

and since such questions must be

SJC must make

a stand.

The SJC speaks,

trying to

Commonwealth v. Catalina, 407 Mass. 779 (1990). In this case the Court redefined the law of
manslaughter based on the specifics of the case which only added one more piece on to an already
complicated puzzle of law. As of 2001, the Legislature has taken no action in this regard.
370

Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

25

May

1999.
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engage the elected
Legislature.

officials in a conversation, but
they are not

answered by the

371

THE RIGHT TO DIE - LET THE COURT DECIDE
Silence on the part of the Legislature
in the face of policymaking
by the

Supreme

Judicial Court could also stem not

from apathy but from

cither a desire to

avoid taking a stand on a particularly
controversial issue or an inability

working majority which could get
court

is

legislation passed.

particularly anxious to take on

decision

when

justices of the

a case

some of these

comes before them. 372 One

SJC with such challenges

is

Whether or not

develop a

to

the state's highest

difficult issues, they

must make a

area of law which has presented the

the right-to-die.

373

Throughout the I970's

and 1980's the Commonwealth's highest court was faced
with making decisions

in a

variety of cases involving the right to die with no
374
legislative direction.
In his

interview, Justice

in this field

Lynch presented

his perspective

on why the Legislature had not acted

of law.

371

While the justices clearly feel this is a duty which would be better managed by the
Legislature, this is
a concern motivated by questions of effectiveness and efficiency, not
of democratic accountability. If the
Court began to adjust the definitions associated with the law of homicide in a way which
the citizenry

would

find unacceptable, the Legislature

would most

certainly act.

While unlikely

in this instance, lack

of action by the Legislature could also indicate

that they find the Court to be the best institution for
refining definitions as they are faced with the specifics of the cases which come before
them.
372

Unless, of course, they too can avoid this issue with a doctrinal construct such as the doctrines for
mootness, or ripeness, among others.

political questions, standing,

See Henry R. Glick, The Right
of policy innovation
undertaken

in this area

in three states:

to

Die (New York: Columbia University

Press, 1992). Click's study

of law includes case studies of the legislative and judicial

California, Florida,

and Massachusetts. See 121-132

activities

for a specific discussion

of Massachusetts.

m According to Glick, the SJC would have had difficulty avoiding these questions.

"[TJhc right to die
has remained on the [state's political] agenda partly because of a steady stream of appellate cases (their

number is equaled only in a few other states." (120.) This is not surprising since the avenue by which
SJC chose to develop their right to die policies required the involvement of the judiciary in each case.

the

Sec discussion below.
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think that

one of those areas where the
Legislature is very happy to
eave the ultimate decision in our
laps. I think we'd be just as
happy to

leave

it

s

in the Legislature's.

Unfortunately, if there's somebody in
a
a feeding tube stuck in them,
somebody has got
to leave it in or take it out. 375

coma somewhere with
to

decide whether

In

1976 the

New

Jersey

Supreme Court issued

Matter of Karen Quinlan which established
the
determine whether or not

to partake

this question.

Court.

In

doing

so,

Rather than leaving

determined

that

Thus,

their family to

of life-prolonging medical treatment. 376
The
state

high court to issue an opinion

broke with the path begun by the

this decision to the

New

Jersey

Supreme

family and the doctor, the SJC

such decisions could be made only with judicial
intervention.

we

continue

it

landmark opinion of In the

of an individual or

right

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was the
next

on

its

reject the approach.. .of entrusting the
decision
artificial life

whether

to

support to the patient's guardian, family, attending

doctors, and hospital "ethics committee." For

its

part, the

New

Jersey

Supreme Court concluded that "a practice of applying to a court
to
confirm such decisions would generally be inappropriate,
not only
because that would be a gratuitous encroachment upon the
medical
profession's field of competence, but because

cumbersome."
difficult

We do

and awesome

it would be impossibly
not view the judicial resolution of this most
question -- whether potentially life-prolonging

treatment should be withheld from a person incapable of making his
own
decision - as constituting a "gratuitous encroachment" on the domain of

medical expertise. Rather, such questions of life and death seem to us to
require the process of detached but passionate investigation and decision
that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of government was
created. Achieving this ideal

is our responsibility and that of the lower
not to be entrusted to any other group purporting to
represent the "morality and conscience of our society," no matter how

court,

and

is

highly motivated or impressively constituted. 377

Interview by author, Boston,
376

377

3 5 5 A.

MA,

25

May

1999.

2d 647 (1976).

Superintendent of Belchertown Hospital

footnotes omitted). While this quote

between the Massachusetts and

New

is

v.

long,

Saikewicz 373 Mass. 728 (1977), 758-759 (citations and
it

was included

Jersey opinions.
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to give a full flavor

of the difference

The SJC acted because
year old

man who was

it

had

-

to

the family of Mr. Saikewicz,
a sixty-seven

mentally retarded and

cancer, wanting to save

him from

who had

the pain and

petitioned the Probate Court to use

recently been diagnosed with

agony of chemotherapy treatment, had

equity powers to intervene and
stop treatment.

its

This was undoubtedly a case of such
importance that the state's highest court
would

have

to hear the appeal.

And

then,

no matter what the Court had decided

they would have been "making law"
since they were breaking

allowed the chemotherapy treatments
a policy

to

new

ground.

Had

they

go forward, they would have been establishing

which recognized the importance of promoting

state interests (preserving the

sanctity of life) over the wishes of the
individual (or her surrogate). 378

the treatment, the Court recognized, in

in this matter,

some form,

By

prohibiting

a right to die in Massachusetts. Ever

mindful of their power, however, the justices were
careful
followed in each case rather than to establish a broad

set

to set out

procedures to be

of guidelines.

"We

decline

the invitation... to formulate a comprehensive set
of guidelines applicable generally to

emergency medical

situations involving incompetent persons.

effort is better left to the legislative

Such a wide-ranging

branch after appropriate study." 379

The SJC has
right to die.

actually recognized four state interests which must be considered in cases involving the
" (1) the preservation of life;
(2) the protection of interests of innocent third parties; (3) the

prevention of suicide; and (4) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession."
Superintendent v. Saikewicz 373 Mass. 728 (1977), 741.
379

Saikewicz, 755. Glick distinguishes the decision of the SJC in this regard from those of the high
courts of California and Florida. While

all three courts made innovative decisions in this realm, the SJC
"ha[s] not called for legislation.. ..they have allowed judicial and legislative agendas and policy to remain

separate."

Why Glick does

present their "call" in

more

not consider this to be a call for action

is

While the Florida court did
was the same. (110.)

unclear.

forceful (confrontational?) language, the intent

California falls in a different category because the high court of that state did not decide any cases until
after the Legislature

making

this a case

had already taken preliminary action

of legislative-judicial dialogue

in

case of common law development. (100).
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in

passing the Natural Death Act in 1976,

regard to statutory interpretation rather than a clear

Despite

Court

until the

According

later

of health care proxy legislation

combined

)the influence

(

to

1990.

in

in

the church on

many

two

Massachusetts, despite the

in

Massachusetts, exercised through (2)

Senate President William Bulger, the church's
"key spokesman

While there were proponents of

that

each legislative session since 1975. These
factors

of the Catholic Church

power of the Senate

380

other states throughout the country.
(Forty-two

in

keep such a law from passing

had been introduced

1

the

in

had enacted some form of such legislation
by 1990.) However, he finds

fact that bills

the

gu.de the

to

expected action of the Legislature
would be to enact a living

had been happening

related factors

were:

General Court did not enaet legislation

passage thirteen years

to Click, the

will statute as

states

this invitation, the

in the state senate."

381

living will legislation, they weren't
able to battle cither

President (which

was renowned) or

the pervasive influence of

individuals and organizations throughout the state. 382
Third, since

SJC was dealing with

the issue,

noted that "he opposed living will

many

bills

legislators

probably agreed with one

and preferred, instead,

to

who

have the courts make

decisions on a case-by-case basis." 383

It is

interesting to note that while the

SJC recognized

the ultimate authority of

the Legislature to determine overall policy guidelines in this matter, the justices
did not
hesitate to use their

power

to establish policy as cases arose.

The requirement

for

MGL Chapter 20 ID, added by St.

1990, c. 332. Health care proxies are seen as less protective of the
of the patient since they simply allow the individual to appoint another as the person to make
health care decisions on their behalf should they become incapacitated. Unlike living wiils, they do not
rights

allow the individual

to spell out their wishes regarding specific kinds of medical treatment.
individual must rely on the representative's ability to adequately express their wishes.

381

382

Glick, Right to Die, 120.

Glick makes special mention of Representative Richard Vokc (D

this legislation

3X3

The

Quote

-

Chelsea) as an active proponent of

from within the General Court.

in Glick,

Right to Die, 122-123. This was a

Globe, September 23, 1986, 25.
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summary of a statement found

in

The Boston

judical involvement was inherent

m

lime an individual or family wanted

which was established
continue to

make law on

begin and end

felt

its

to terminate

an individual's medical treatment

Saikewicz, This position placed the
Court squarely
a

ease-by-ease basis

in the trial courts,

continue to refine

In

in

then requirement of judicial
involvement every

policy.

19X6, the Court

in tins Held.

some would

in line to

While many eases would

inevitably be appealed and the

SJC would

384

was again asked

to assert its authority,

and again the justices

they had to aet since the Legislature
had not. This time the ease was more complex,

involving not the refusal of medical treatment
but the question of whether a feeding
tube can be removed from a non-terminal
patient

in a persistent

vegetative state. 385

Sensitive to the significance and complexity
of our decision,
shirk our responsibility, for we are aware that
the

we do not
advances of medical
science and technology are "compelling the public,
through the courts,
not the Legislatures, to formulate

new

The Court decided

of Paul Brophy

if

standards and procedures for
measuring the conduct of persons involved in the health care of
persons
with irreversible brain damage."'^

that the rights

to stop the feeding, as

presented through the substituted judgment of his family, dictated
facility in

which

his feeding tube

would be removed. 387 While

that

he be

clearly a

moved

more

to a

difficult

384

Sec, Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255 (1979)
(Commonwealth's interest in
upholding orderly prison administration decisive against prisoner's assertion of privacy rights); Harnish
v. Children's Hospital Medical Center, 387 Mass. 152
19X2) (individual's right to he free of
nonconsensual invasion of his bodily integrity and the burden of proving privilege to override this right
(

with physieian); Rogers

v.

1983) (substituted judgment

in

rests
(

™ Brophy

v.

New England Sinai

mBrophy, 419, quoting Sevems
387n

Mr. Brophy needed

to

be

Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 4X9
non-emergency setting).
Hospital. Inc., 398 Mass.

v.

moved

417 (19X6).

Wilmington Medical Center,
as

New

England Sinai

Inc.,

421 A. 2s 1334, 1344 (Del. 1980).

their assistance in

felt that

feeding lube would violate their ethical obligations as medical providers. The
difficult decision

can be seen

in

the voice

of dissenters

Superintendent ofBelchertown State School

v.

to

Brophy

.

removing

fact that this

his

was

a

more

"Unlike other eases, typified by

Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728 (1977), and Matter of Conroy,

160

case, the Court did not
hesitate to aet, this time following

Re Conroy decided

in 19 8 5.

The Legislature
it

New

Jersey's lead taken

388

finally accepted the Court's
invitation to join the dialogue

when

passed the Health Care Proxy Act.
This established a procedure by which
an

individual could appoint a proxy

who

is

empowered

to

make medical

decisions on

behalf of the individual should she
become incapacitated. In instances

proxy arrangements

exist unchallenged, the Court

about which few justices would complain
is

in ft

any indication. For the most

developed by the SJC. There
Saikewicz and

its

is

is

if Justice

removed from

when such

the process, a result

Lynch's previously quoted reaction

part, the statute mirrors the

law as

it

have been

only one possible inconsistency between the
law of

progeny and the Health Care Proxy Act.

The

statute states that the

attending physician shall not be prohibited from
providing "comfort care or pain
alleviation" as she feels necessary. 3 ' 9 Glick points
out that in living will legislation in

other states such provisions have been seen as requiring that
food and water be
artificially administered.

Proxy Act,

it

would

390

If this

were the interpretation applied

conflict with policy as established

to the Health

by the Court

in

Care

Brophy. Since

the passage of the Health Care Proxy Act the Court has decided no cases involving

98 N.J. 321 (1985), this case does not involve an individual's substituted choice to live for as long as
possible without seriously burdensome treatment rather than to undergo such treatment in order
to
prolong life for a brief and uncertain time. Instead, this case raises for the first time in this
Commonwealth the question whether an individual has a legal right to choose to die, and to enlist the
assistance of others to effectuate that choice on the ground that, irrespective of the nature of available life
prolonging treatment, life in any event is not worth living and its continuation is intolerable." Brophy,

O'Connor
388

dissenting, 449.

/\

98 N.J. 321, 344 (1985).

away from

of the courts
389

In his analysis, Glick indicates that

in this opinion,

I

see no clear indication that

like Conroy, also marks a turn
While there is less emphasis on the role
the Court had retreated in this matter.

Act 332 of 990. Language regarding comfort care can be found
1

390

Brophy,

the requirement of judicial involvement in each case.

Glick, 128.
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in §

1

3.

interpretation of this provision,interpret such a question

We ean

get

some

indication of how the Court might

from those cases the Court has decided
since 1990

die" cases in which no health care
proxy arrangement existed.

One of these

in "right to

cases dealt

specifically with the question of
removing a nasoduodenal tube inserted for
the purpose

of artificial hydration and feeding and
the court, applying the principle
of substituted

judgment

for a

baby

in state

custody

authorized removal of the tube. 392

apply the same principles

in

who was

If this is

of public policy of a
the

SJC was

in

state in

vegetative state,

any indication, the Court

will continue to

cases involving conflicts over health care
proxies.

The Massachusetts experience with
good example of the way

in a persistent

which the

the question of the right to die provides
a

state's highest court influences the

cooperation with the state's Legislature.

setting policy in this field of law through

its

common

First,

the justices, these debates

stemmed from

we

see that

law and equity

powers long before the Legislature spoke. While there was debate
over

among

development

this issue

ideological differences and were not

about the legitimacy of the SJC's actions. 393 Second,

we

the Legislature finally handled this subject followed the

see that the

manner

in

which

more conservative approach of

391

While the justices could do something different when confronted with a specific statute, it is likely,
absent a strong legislative indication of an alternative intent, that they would interpret the
statute in a way
which is consistent with their previous jurisprudence.
392

Guardianship ofJane Doe, 41

1

Mass. 512 (1991). The other three cases involved authorization of a
in state custody (Care and Protection of Beth, 412 Mass 188

DNR (do not resuscitate order) for a child

who is competent to refuse a blood transfusion (Norwood
Munoz, 409 Mass. 16 [1990]), and questions in a case involving the liability of a physician
who administered emergency medical treatment against wishes of patient as made known by her family
(Shine v. Vega, 429 Mass. 456 [1999]).
[1991]), recognition of a Jehovah's Witness

Hospital

393

v.

See dissents

1

in

at 442; Lynch at 443; and O'Connor at 448. This is another example of
which O'Connor mentioned (see above). He, Nolan and Lynch, generally the three

Brophy, Nolan

the hot-button issues

more conservative voices on

may have
may have been more

the Court during the 1980's,

"kitchen table" around which they were raised

dissented in this case because the

conservative than that of Liacos,

Wilkins, Abrams, and Grcancy. These three justices, joined by Chief Justice Hennessey, also

made up

the majority in Cass (statutory interpretation regarding death of a fetus and vehicular homicide).
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the SJC.

The Legislature enacted

health care proxy legislation
instead of a living will

law while the Court adopted a
court-centered approach

opposed

to the family/hospital

represent a

common

approach

to

deciding each question as

approach of Quinlan. This shared conservatism
to

law-making

easier for the Court and the Legislature
to

in the

work

may

Commonwealth which makes

cooperatively.

It

certainly leaves

it

open

the door for future court activity
as the openness of both of these
approaches allows the

law

to

develop incrementally when the courts
of the Commonwealth apply the Health

Care Proxy Act and make other determinations

who have

those individuals
action which

was

in

cases involving medical decisions for

not designated a health care proxy. Last,
but not

finally taken

least, the

by the Legislature matched the policy which the

judiciary had already developed through a long
process of common law

development.

394

The

pattern of communication in this case

monologue followed by

a brief response

was one of a long

and then another decade or more of legislative

silence as the legislators have taken no further action on
this matter since 1990.

The separation of powers

in a

governmental system allows for a variety of

responses to public policy concerns. The discussion of the three policy areas above

provide three different examples of how the legislative and judicial branches can work
together.

The

first

instance, definition of familial relationships, represents the kind of

policy in which the Court

is

best situated to adjust the law over time.

statement or statutory change

may be

No

necessary but as society changes,

broad policy

new

situations

3,4

In Volume 22 of the Massachusetts Practice Series concerning Probate Law and Practice, Sean
Dunphy (an Associate Justice of the Probate and Family Court Department in Massachusetts), notes

the specific legislation adopted in Massachusetts

enacted

in the state

of New York." (183). While

not have adopted the language of the

New York

is

a "cutting

this

may

statute if

in the state.
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be
it

that

and pasting of legislation previously
true,

it

is

likely that

Massachusetts would

had not comported with the previous practice

will arise

new

which

the old law (statutory or

common) may

not have considered.

As each

question arises the Court responds,
adjusting the law on a case-by-case
basis. The

second example, the definition of
homicide law
the type of policy

and comprehensive and not amenable

to the

so).

may have been

case-by-case basis

a policy

an example of

if the

change which

to die, represents a hybrid.

best for the law in this

When

in the first instance.

It is

is

is

broad

piecemeal approach of judicial

policymaking. The third policy area, the
right
it

Commonwealth,

which would be best made by the
Legislature (even

Massachusetts Legislature does not yet think

category,

in the

the

newly emerging

members of the

field to

Like the

first

develop on a

polity arc prepared to

deal with the issue collectively through
their elected representatives, there will
develop
in the

Legislature a sufficient

movement

to enact legislation to address the topic.

With

the right to die, the agreement reached on
the Health Care Proxy Act could only deal

with part of the issue.

It still

leaves

much ambiguity

with

many

questions which are

still,

perhaps, best addressed through the cumulative process
of judicial lawmaking.

This

still

leaves one

powers could create
branches.

The

more kind of division of responsibility which

-

closest

a

the separation of

more equal sharing of policymaking powers between

example

to

such a dialogue

in the last twenty-five years

Massachusetts history involves the question of governmental

tort

the

two

of

immunity.

TORT LAW AND GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY - AN ONGOING
DIALOGUE
The Supreme
law during the

Judicial Court

last thirty years.

was

particularly active in the

From 1981

to

both private parties and governmental entities

164

development of tort

1995 cases involving

tort

claims against

made up over 5% of the Supreme
1

Judicial Court's caseload.

Looking

at

these years in two distinct eras

we

find that tort

claims have increased as a
percentage of the Court's activity
over time. From 19811986, cases involving such claims
composed

percentage jumping

18.2% during the

to

at least in part, to the fact
that the

remedies

in the 1970's.

As one

1

latter

1.5% of the SJC's caseload, with

the

years of this study. This increase

is

Court began to chip away

the tort

immunity

barriers."

the last twenty-five years or so

Commonwealth, opening up
permissible under the

395

traditions

parental,

had outlived

causes of action and knocking

Chief Justice Wilkins confirmed
changes

this

in the tort

view. "Over

law of this

of recovery against defendants which were not

law prior

Court modified or recommended the

whose

new

we have made major

rights

common

old barriers to tort

staff person noted, «] think
probably within the period

you're talking about. .the SJC was
creating these

down

at

due,

to that."

total

396

Beginning

in the 1970's,

the

elimination of several sorts of immunity

their usefulness.

This included doctrines of interspousal,

and charitable immunity. 397

These changes coincided with increasing codification of tort law.
The law of
torts

had

historically

been controlled by

common

law and

the hands of the courts in the United States. While

common

95

its

development had rested

much of this law

in the states is still

law, by the latter half of the 20th century state legislatures began to codify tort

Daniel Johnedis, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 14 April 1999. As the discussion which follows
show, many of these activities began in the decade before my case analysis begins.

will
396

Chief Justice Wilkins, Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999. This view is found in
opinions of the Court as well. "In recent years, particularly, '[t]his court has frequently had occasion to
effect through its decisions not insignificant changes in the field of tort law'." McStowe v. Bornstein,

111 Mass 804 (1979), 808,
7

Lewis

Mass. 23
(parental

v.
1

in

citing

Lewis

v.

Lewis, 370 Mass. 619 (1976), 628.

Lewis, 370 Mass. 6! 9 (1976) (spousal immunity for auto accidents);

(1980) (spousal immunity for non-auto

immunity

for auto torts);

and Colby

v.

torts);

Sorensen

v.

Brown

Carney Hospital, 356 Mass. 527 (1969)

immunity).
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v.

Brown, 381

Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350 (1975)
(charitable

A description of changes in the doctrine

law,

Massachusetts shows that

this

was not always done

gave the Legislature an ultimatum
governmental

tort liability

of governmental immunity

that a

willingly.

-

was developed. The Court had

to the question

demand

to

not until the

SJC
of

that the

become involved

in the

an interesting example of how
the separation of powers can
force a

governmental department

By

was

comprehensive approach

Legislature speak, but the
representatives did finally

conversation

It

in

to act,

the early 1970's the

even when other factors

may

be inhibiting

SJC was showing impatience with

it.

the concept of the

doctrine of governmental immunity,
a doctrine which the Court
called 'logically
indefensible."

3

-

While hesitating

piecemeal approach inherent

to abrogate this doctrine
judicially

in judicial

because of the

policymaking, the SJC was clear that sovereign

immunity should be abolished.

We have no doubt as to the advisability of abolishing the rule

of

government immunity as applied to the Commonwealth
and its
subdivisions, and we have no doubt as to
our power to abolish

We refrain at this time,

doctrine.

the doctrine for

many

The

that

not merely because

years, but because the

available to the Legislature

is

we have

accepted

comprehensive approach

the preferable course. 400

Legislature, however, chose not to take this
"comprehensive approach."

matter of

fact,

they did nothing

at all.

Becoming even more

an uncharacteristically forceful ultimatum
Worcester.

398

political

a

impatient, the Court issued

to the Legislature in

1977

in

Whitney

v.

401

An example

2680) enacted

of this on the federal

level

is

the Federal Tort

Claims Act (28 U.S.C., Sections 2671-

in 1979.

mMorash and Sons

v.

Morash and Sons,
which did

As

Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612 (1973), 619.

624. This approach

is

less activist than that

of the four high courts cited

judicially abrogate this doctrine, Arizona, California, Idaho, and Illinois (619).
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in this

case

—ZtZ
m

Q

immunity

the

mtemi0n t0 abr ° gate the doctrine
of municipal
«
first appropriate case
decided by this

?

court after the

^

doctrnS.^
In

ltSdf 3Cted definiti ^ly as to
the

Whitney neither party had raised
the question of the

of sovereign immunity but the
Court ehose
years since

Morash and

the justices

to consider

it

anyway. 403

in the

of the doctrine

had been four

It

would wait no longer.- The degree

stance represented a departure
from the traditional deference

can be seen

viability

shown

to

winch

tins

to the Legislature

words of Daniel Johnedis. "One area
was governmental immunity.

And...what really shocked me,
^...Whitney

v.

the City or Worcester. ...And that

was

about as close as you get to a confrontation." 405

This stance was perhaps uncharacteristic
but

SineTul^

TTt

it

was not unique.
'

-

—

"

1969 the SJC has taken a similar
d
tha h
Carney Hospital (356 Mass. 527 [1969]) that

immUmty HaV ng

C°

In

m P lained »

doctrine should h
be abolished, the SJC warned in Colby v.
the next tune we are squarely confronted
by a legal question respecting the charitable
immunity doctrine
1Sh ll " iCamey 528
} The reSult in this case was Cresting as well. Chief
,
ur
,
t°'
ust.ce Wilkins described it as follows.
"For example, we decided to toss out charitable immunity
in
ort actions, and said, 'well we're going
to do this but we'll give you, the
Legislature, time to do it'"
We re not going to sort of plow into this because we think you ought to
make your judgment on this
They made a judgment and they limited the liability to
$20,000....[T]here's an example where we gave
them discretion to move into an area and then they came
up with, 'yes, we will have some liability here
but it s going to be very limited'." Interview by author,
Boston, MA, 23 April 1999. The moral of the
story is, the Legislature may have the authority to act
but the justices may not always like what they do
This is a lesson which will become important again in 1995.
(See discussion below regarding the 1993
Amendments to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.)

5

-

'

'

'

402

Whitney

v.

City of Worcester, 373 Mass. 208 (1977), 210.

403

Steven B. Kramer, "Case Comment -- Prospective-Retroactive Overruling: Remanding
Cases
Pending Legislative Determinations of Law " Boston University Law Review 85
(1978), 821.

404

An indication of the importance of this case is that all seven justices participated in this opinion and
agreed unanimously on the conclusion. As previously noted, most decisions (over 70%) in this era were
decided by panels of five justices.

405

MA, 14 April 1999. Also see, Daniel J. Johnedis, "The Supreme
and Tort Immunity," Massachusetts Law Review 63 (1978), pp. 75-8 1 On the other
hand, the language used by the Court continues to be deferential and non-confrontational. Before
Interview by author, Boston,

Judicial Court

.

declaring

its intent to act if the Legislature does not, the Court softens the blow. "We recognize the
delicacy of the tasks with which the Legislature has been confronted, and we now conclude that the
Legislature and the public are entitled to a more specific statement as to this court's intentions."

Whitney, 210.
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The Court

did

more than demand

that the

General Court

Hennessey's opinion for the eourt
led the Legislature
felt that

governmental immunity should

we

principles

the

SJC took

law

if the

at the

in the

mark

of course,

deliberations."

how

which the Court

«

that the

Furthermore,

they planned to change the

Legislature chose not to act but
also of announcing their
intention to

of immunity retroactive

to

Morash, effectively putting

state's tort lawyers)

make

the state

and

on notice. 407

Before describing the Legislature's
reaction

SJC

its

the unusual stance of not
only explaining

governments (and the

look

Chief Justice

in the direction

take, noting « [w]e hope,

stress here will aid the
Legislature in

their abrogation

local

aet;

Court's decision in Whitney to see
what

to the

it

ultimatum,

it is

important to

has to say about the role of the

policymaking process. In the eyes of one
commentator,

this action

seems

to

the outermost reach of the Court into
the legislative sphere.

Rarely

if ever,

has the court participated in the legislating
process to the
it did in the Whitney
opinion. Skillfully, the court has used
power of persuasion, its drafting skills, and its authority to
change

degree that
its

the

rules of

which,

406

4 7

common

law

in the court's

to help effect a

major revision

in an old doctrine
view, unnecessarily infringes on the right of an

Whitney, 211.

"While there was

widespread and justifiable reliance on the immunity doctrine prior to our decision
Morash... we think that subsequent to that opinion further reliance was
misplaced. Accordingly, if the
doctrine is to be changed by future action of this court, it is our intention
to abrogate the principle as to
injuries

111
i

which

occurred since the publication of Morash on May 14, 1973." {Whitney, 225.) For a
criticism of this action see Steven Kramer, "Prospective-Retroactive Overruling."
"The Court in Whitney
proposed to change the law, yet did not decide the case. Impatient with legislative inertia, the court
assumed the role of an interest group advocate, petitioning the Legislature for statutory reform on behalf
all

of politically underrepresented

was presented by

tort plaintiffs." (838.)

A

more sympathetic perspective on

Johnedis. "Unfortunately, during the time

it

this

problem

takes for the law of governmental liability

and immunity

to be settled (whether by the court or by the legislature) all claims by injured persons
against public officers and governmental entities, including the claims in the Whitney case, will remain
frozen in a state of animated suspension. This period of uncertainty in this important area of the law

seems

to

be part of the price

that

must be paid

to bring

about the modernization of an old outmoded

doctrine complicated by years of piecemeal modification by the legislature and the Supreme Judicial
Court." "The Supreme Judicial Court and Tort Immunity," 81.
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.

injured person to recover
from the one

More

departing from

way

that

wrongfully caused his

in his

BU Law Review article.

"In

role of deciding cases,
the court has entered the
political process in a

its

exceeds

of the court/'

of the Court was Kramer

critical

who

its

traditional

lawmaking function and undermines

the symbolic role

409

There

no doubt

is

that this

move may have

taken place

at the

boundaries of the realm of judicial
power as traditionally envisioned by
the justices of
the SJC.

In addition,

it

is

possible that there

was

a strategic element in their
use of the

prospective-retroactive plan of action,
one which was meant to add
their

words of encouragement. However,
when viewed

justices in this case do not

seem

movements

in the

not advocating the adoption of an unusual
position.

was decided, most
immunity.

states

in context, the action

quite as dramatic as these

Part of the context involves broader

had enacted some

sort

law

As of

of law

some weight

to

of the

commentators have found.
at this time.

The Court was

1978, the year after Whitney

to limit

governmental

410

The second

contextual factor which needs to be considered in
this scenario

is

the ongoing relationship which had existed over the
years between the Legislature and
the

SJC

in

regard to the law of torts. Tort law had been

common

law and both the

Legislature and the justices accepted that the Court could change, amend,
and adapt the

Johnedis, "The Supreme Judicial Court and Tort Immunity/\8

1

09

"Prospective-Retroactive Overruling," 837.
410

"Forty-five States have modified and at least partly eliminated the defense of immunity in tort actions
against municipal corporations. All except thirteen States have abolished or limited the defense in suits
against the State." Whitney, 212, citations omitted. By 1995, only Maryland and Mississippi still

maintained the doctrine of sovereign immunity. (Mark L. Van Valkcnburgh, "Massachusetts General
Laws Chapter 258, §10: Slouching Toward Sovereign Immunity," New England Law Review 29 (1995),
1092.
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.

common

law

until

such time as the Legislature
dictated otherw.se. In a 1975
case

involving claims of governmental
immunity the Court described the
breadth of

common

law powers. Citing Article
30 of the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights

Separate of Powers

article), the

Court notes that «[b]y

role of the Massachusetts
courts in the operation of the

without regard

to the origin

of that law before or

after

tins

common
1

common

its

fact that the

law powers

amend

Court was not doing so

such a major change
abilities

to

in the

is

guaranteed,

in

which the Court had

Commonwealth. 4 " The

stemmed from

their recognition that

law would benefit from the fact-finding
and deliberative

of the Legislature, as well as from

comprehensive approach

law

780." In a footnote to this

the law of torts in the

in this instance

(the

language the traditional

statement the Court cites ten cases
from the 1970-1974 dockets

used

its

to the law.

their greater capability to take a

Further, mindful of the fact that the
Legislature

is

the final legislative voice, the Court wanted
to avoid the legislative backlash which
can

occur

if the Legislature is

displeased with the action of the Court. Such a
legislative

reaction leads to inconsistency and uncertainty
in the law for a period of time, a

scenario which the Court claimed to want to avoid. 412

There
Whitney

in

one

is

less

final set

of contextual variables which make the actions of the SJC

anomalous. This

is

the fact that

from Morash on both the Court and the

Legislature had been actively engaged in "conversation" regarding the issue of

411

Hannigan

See

also,

v.

Caine

New Gamma-Delta Chapter of Kappa Sigma Fraternity, 367 Mass. 658 (1 975), 661
Commonwealth, 368 Mass. 815 (1975) and Piotti v. Commonwealth, 370 Mass. 386

The
v.

(1976).
412

However, as Kramer rightly notes, the Court was itself a source of uncertainty. Threatening to
eliminate governmental immunity retroactively to Morash, potential plaintiffs and defendants from
actions which occurred between 1973 and 1978 were left in limbo until the Legislature did act.
"Prospective-Retroactive Overruling," 833-836.
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changing the doctrine of
governmental immunity
to the

Court

in the

years between

governmental immunity.

on the matter, deferring
case of Hmnigan v
first

.

In

in

Massachusetts. Several cases

Morash and Whitney which

raised questions of

each case, the Court avotded
making

to the Legislature.

Kappa Sigma

Most

telling

was

came

a final

determinate

their opinion in the

1975

Fraternity in which the Court repeats
the position

it

presented in Morash.

Although we reaffirm our authority
accede

to the

to abolish sovereign

Commonwealth's argument

that

retrain, at least for the present,

immunity we

we

should continue to
Only about twenty-three

from doing so.
months have passed since the Morash
decision. In the meantime
legislation to the same end has been
filed and has been
Judical Council. For

Morash

opinion,

it

is

referred to the

all

of the compelling reasons

we

offered in the
preferable that the Legislature should
act to

accomplish

this necessary change. We shall
continue to refrain until the
Legislature acts or until events demonstrate
that it does not intend
to

act.

In addition to the continuing patience of
the Court over these four years

the fact that the Legislature

Judicial Council, a statutory

was considering
body created

to advise the Legislature

the judiciary, had considered the matter and
Fiftieth

filed

all

on

legislation regarding this matter.

matter

in

1974 and a

bill

each

made formal recommendations

in the

House and

five

skills to

come up with

in the

House

bills

the Senate in 1977. With

of this activity there had been ample opportunity for the Legislature

gathering and deliberative

The

on matters affecting

Report of the Judicial Council. 414 In addition, there had been
this

we have

to use its fact-

a comprehensive plan of action (or

413

367 Mass. 658, 662 (emphasis added). The Court
Commonwealth, 368 Mass. 815 (1975).
14

Document No. 144. Per Hannigan, this report was
DYS, 388 Mass. 810 (1983), it was issued in 1975.

Public

Irwin

v.

also refrained

171

from taking

this action in

Caine

v.

issued in 1974. According to the opinion in

inaoon)

to

address the matter.

By

this point the

Court obv.ously

or cut bait.

The

exceptions.

declared

416

The

first

was

its

intention of making

Legislature refuse to act, the

The bottom

line,

parameters within which
Additionally,

proposed

was toe

to fish

-

good" with

it

it

in

Whitney with two

the establishment of a
$100,000 limit on individual

The second involved

decided.

i,

Legislature finally responded
in 1978 with the
Massachusetts Tort Claims

Act (MTCA), a law which closely
followed the principles found

recovery.

felt

415

the question of retroactivity.

its

new

rule of

While the Court had

law retroactive

to

Morash should

MTCA was retroactive only to the date that

however, was

may be

Whitney was

that the Legislature finally acted
to set the

sued for actions taken by

adopted the major changes

in this area

its

organs and

officials.

of law which the Court had

replacing the immunity for acts which
occur "in pursuance of the
a discretionary-ministerial distinction
in determining liability

widely accepted by other jurisdictions. Additionally,

malfeasance as a basis for

the

it

which was

added nonfeasance

suits against individual public officials.

common

to

In both instances,

A

history of the development of the law regarding
governmental immunity can be see in Irwin v DYS
written in response to a question certified to the Court
by the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts as to whether the
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act represented an

The opinion was
agreement

to

waive immunity from

suit in

To answer the question Justice Lynch, writing
most recent actions of the Court and the Legislature in

Federal court.

for the Court, presents a history not only of the

realm but also of the origins of the elimination of some sovereign immunity a
century earlier. What
interesting for purposes of this research is that the description of this
history in Irwin shows that
the development of this law in this field has been the result of legislative-judicial
interaction from the
beginning. "Following close on our decisions rejecting a contract claim not founded
on the payment of
money...(1887), and hold that the statute did not permit recovery to reimburse a town for
certain
this
is

most

expenditures...(1887), the Legislature

amendment

amended Pub Sts. c.195, Section 1 (1882).. ..We construed this
as demonstrating a legislative intent 'to extend the jurisdiction of the courts to claims which

had not been included [per our
416

interpretation] in the previous statute...." (814.)

MGL

1978 Massachusetts Acts, ch. 512, amending
c. 258. The formal name of the act was "An Act
Establishing a Claims and Indemnity Procedure for the Commonwealth, its Municipalities, Counties and
Districts,

and the Officers and Employees Thereof." According

the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sections 1346 (b), 2771

Metropolitan District Commission, 387 Mass. 51 (1982).
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to the
et.

SJC, the law was also modeled on

seq. (1976).

See, Vasys

v.

the Court had been trying
to find a system which
balanced the right of individuals
to

pursue remed.es when wronged
with the need

to

ensure continuing fiscal viability
of

the state and the Legislature
accepted these principles in
there

"

obviously a strong correlation
between the their opimon

is

MTCA as evidenced by the following statement:
GL c.

4
full.

258, § 10

our guide."

(b),

we have

"To determine

stated that the language in
Whitney

In the Court's

in

eyes

Whitney and the

the intended scope of

v.

Worcester should be

418

The Whitney-MTCA exchange did

not end the judicial-legislative
dialogue

about the development of the law of
governmental immunity.
parameters of the discussion as

it

moved from

It

only changed the

the realm of common law to that of

statutory interpretation. In a law
review article written several years after
passage of

the legislation, Suffolk

Law

School Professor Joseph Glannon identified
no

seven major points which the law covers
for future interpretation. 419

these questions in the

It is,

which leave a variety of questions

of course, the courts which will be forced

instance.

first

in part but

less than

Glannon describes

this

to

answer

process as an "enigmatic

task of applying this language to claims arising out
of a wide variety of public
functions[.]"

420

As

distinguished from the right-to-die legislation, however, the Court

For a more thorough discussion of these points see Joseph W. Glannon, "Governmental
Tort Liability
the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act of 1978," Massachusetts Law Review
63 (1978), 7-22. It is

Under

interesting to note that the ease with

which the Legislature adopted the court's proposal undercuts
which requires the comprehensive attention that only the
Legislature can give. This argument assumes that the procedure of a Legislature, with committees to
consider legislation and the input of various individuals at the hearing stage, is better able to develop
comprehensive public policy. In this case, however, the General Court simply accepted the standards
arguments

that this

is

the kind of policy reform

which the Court had developed.
418

419

Irwin

v.

Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745

Glannon, "Governmental Tort

(1985), 753 citing Irwin

Liability."
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v.

DYS, 388 Mass. 810 (1983).

has been interpreting the
statute

in the

midst of an ongoing eonversation
since the

Legislature has rematned acttve
in this discussion,
enacfing 22
stnee

its

passage

Most of these amendments have
been

,n 1978.

non-controversial.

amendments

Twelve

deal, with further defining

public employee for purposes
of the

«.«

who

is

to the

Ae,

relatively simple

and

a public

Another seven involved

employer and a

clarifications

regarding jurisdiction and
presentment procedures" 2 and
another three involved

providing legal counsel or
indemnification to public employees

who

are subject to

actions under this Act. 423

While the Legislature was fine-tuning
the application of the law and

the legislation, courts

amendments.

its

In approximately

instances between 1981 and 1995
these questions

moved up

docket of the SJC, giving the Court ample
opportunity

to

were dealing with

one hundrerd of these

the ladder to appear on the

continue to participate

development of the law. As with most of the
amendments enacted by

many of the

in the

the Legislature,

Court's decisions dealt with minor questions
regarding proper presentment

procedures and of defining

who

is

a public

employee.

424

Beginning

1982, however,

in

the Court began to interpret the law so as to limit
the liability of governmental units

through the public duty

deny a claim

in

rule.

First

used

Dinsky

in

v.

Framingham,

it

allows the Court to

cases where the public official has a duty to the public in general
but

420

Joseph W. Glannon, "The Scope of Public Liability under
Duty Rule," Massachusetts Law Review 67 (1982), 159.

421

See

1983,

St.

c.

1980,

537;

St.

c.

151; St. 1980,

1991,

c.

412;

St.

c.

315;

1992,

St.

c.

1981,

343;

St.

c.

the Tort Claims Act:

179; St. 1981,

1993,

c.

c.

403;

110; St. 1993,

St.

c.

Beyond

1983,

467;

St.

c.

the Public

345;

1998,

St.

c.

459.

422

St.

1989,

1979,
c.

c.

1; St.

1982,

c.

176; St. 1983,

c.

343;

St.

1984,

c.

279;

St.

1987,

c.

343;

St.

1988,

c.

217;

St.

161.

423

St.

1979,

c.

396;

St.

1980,

c.

261;

St.

1983,

c.

345.

424

It is likely that some of these SJC decisions were the impetus for legislation as the Legislature acted
codify a Court decision or to clarify what the Court had decided wrongly in regard to these issues.

174

to

not to the individual

pontiff-

In

holding that the eity was not
liable

damage due

Dinsly the Court applied the
public duty
to the

to building improprieties

owners of a single-family home

rule in

for water

which the Dinskys allege should
have been

discovered during an inspection
required by the Board of Health. 426

Once
power

again, this presents the Court
as a policymaker, but one

As with

cautiously.

exercises

its

the Court's role in encouraging
the abrogation of immunity,

the public duty rule enjoyed
widespread national support as a

some

who

method

for providing

protection to local and state government
coffers from overly litigious
citizens. In

addition, the Court

governmental

was not

liability.

first in

the conversation to establish
an exception to

Section 10 of the

liability exclusions, the

MTCA as originally written established four

most notable being the discretionary action
exception which has

been recognized by almost

The

the

all

provisions...shall not apply

performance or the

who have

jurisdictions

to..

abolished immunity. 427

.any claim based upon the exercise or

failure to exercise or

perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a public employer
or public employee,
acting within the scope of this office or
employment whether or not the
discretion involved is abuse. 428

4

- 386 Mass. 801 (1982).

426

For an analysis of Dinsky see Glannon, "Beyond the Public Duty Rule."
Glannon asserts that this
application of the public duty rule did not mark any wholesale move away
from governmental immunity.
Further support for Glannon 's thesis can be found in the fact that only four
of the seven justices of the
SJC participated in the decision. During the years when the Court hear cases in
panels, the full bench

often heard important questions.
7

Kevin

J.

O'Malley, "Governmental Tort

Massachusetts? Irwin
4

Section 10

discretionary.

(b).

Town of Ware"

v.

This

still

The other

Liability:

A New

Suffolk University

Limitation on the Public Duty Rule in

Law Review,

19 (1985), 668

leaves the question for the courts, however, as to

three exceptions involve any public

employee who

when an

is

action

is

exercising "due care" in

the performance of a statutorily or regulatorily defined action; any intentional tort of a public employee;

and lawful collection of any tax or property by a law enforcement official. According to Professor
Glannon, these exclusions are similar to ones found in the Federal Tort Claims Act. ("Governmental
Tort Liability,"

1

1.)
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In addition, the cautious
approach to policymaking can
be seen ,n that the Court

chose

adopt the public duty rule

to

The Court applied

most sympathetic type of case"
possible.-

in "the

this principle to a
situation in

which the damage involved only

property interests, the harm was
not caused directly by the
town
plaintiffs

were

in a position to
protect

themselves from

this

itself,

and the

problem with

their

own

inspection of the property prior to
purchase.

The adoption of the
the

SJC

showed

to limit

that

it

public duty rule in Dinsky
indicates a

governmental

was only

a

liability.

minor

430

The majority of the justices on

limitation,

however, when

public duty rule only two years later
in the case of Irwin

decided not to apply the rule

remove

in the

move on

v.

case of a police officer

it

chose not

Ware

431

to

the part of

the Court

apply the

Here the Court

who had chosen

not to

a potentially drunk driver from the
road, leaving the town open to liability

claims by plaintiffs

who were

injured in an accident with the driver. In
his opinion for

the Court Chief Justice Hennessey noted
that the Dinsky ruling
In

Dinsky

was

to

be read narrowly.

we

relied in part on the principle that the
negligence of a
public employee occurring within the scope of
his employment will not
support a private action against the public employer

where the

employee's duty of care was owed

to the general public only.

Arguably,
seed which could reintroduce a broad-based
municipal tort immunity.. ..Clearly, such a broad reading of our
Dinsky
opinion runs directly contrary to the spirit of GL c. 258 and
our decision
this principle contains a

in

Whitney

be so read.

v.

Worcester.

We did not intend our language

432

in

Dinsky

to

Glannon, "Beyond the Public Duty Rule," 160.
430

One commentator has viewed the Dinsky decision as follows. "It seems ironic that the same court
which actively advocated the abrogation of sovereign immunity would later adopt the public duty rule

in

Van Valkenburgh, "Slouching Toward Sovereign Immunity," 1093. It wasn't exactly
"the same court." Three of the justices who participated in the Whitney decision were no longer on the
Court when Dinsky was decided.
Massachusetts."

431

392 Mass. 745 (1984).
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Interestingly the opinion in
Irwin, one

MTCA and the Court's previous ^Dinsky
the

opimon

in

which

which seems

to

rulings, created

fit

the intent of both the

more controversy than did

the Court adopted the
public duty rule to limit
liability. This

indicated by the existence of
two relatively

uncommon

occurrences. First there were

four amicus curiae briefs filed
in this case, two
promoting a limited view of

and two promoting an expanded
view.- Secondly, while occurring
of the cases, a dissent was
Justice

O'Connor,

Justice

filed in this

case.- Writing

Nolan shows how quickly

a

is

new

than

in less

for himself, Justice

.0%

Lynch and

become

rule can

liability

the

accepted norm. 'The court has essentially
abandoned the public duty rule and has

imposed

a

new 'common law

duty' upon police officers while

the public duty rulc....lf the court
thought

should have

summoned

it

wise

had already become an accepted

on governmental

interesting

Legislature seemed to

from

let this

limit

4 2

Irwin

v.

it

suggest that

earlier, the public

of powers perspective

debate play

itself out in the courts.

rule in

is

1982

Mad
or,

the Legislature

conversely, of

435

its

could have enacted legislation to change the policy set by the SJC.

Ware, 155. (Citations omitted.)

curiae briefs were filed in only 435 (12%) of the cases between 1981 and 1995. In this case
were submitted by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, the Massachusetts Municipal

Association, the City of Boston, and the Mothers Against Drunk Drivers. (Irwin
434

duty

the fact that the

Amicus
briefs

it

liability.

a separation

been displeased with the adoption of the public duty
limitation in 1984,

I

the courage to abolish explicitly the
generally accepted rule in

SJC only two years

Most

using the rubric of

to follow this path,

public service cases." 435 Adopted by the
rule

still

i-x*

•

v.

•

Dissenting opinions were written

in

318 cases (8.8%) between 1981 and 1995.

776-777.

177

Ware, 746.)

>hcy were paying attention
to this Held of law.

-ttgation of the SJC,

I,

wasn't

un.il 1993,

tha, the Legislature
entered this conversation in

way, and when they did

i,

was with

a

hang, moving the

again

at

the

any meaningful

Commonwealth

as eU.se as h

has been to governmental
immunity since 1978. This
most recent conversation

between the Court and the
Legislature highlights another
way
the Legislature differ

in their

policymaking

in

which the Court and

roles: the Legislature is

responsive to local concerns, and
no concern

is

more

local than the

much more
budgets of cities

and towns.
This most recent interchange
between the two branches began

Court issued

its

Opinion

in

Jean

IV.

v,

Commonwealth.™ The

in

1992 when the

decision, issued "by (he

Court," was accompanied by lour
concurring opinions, a very unusual
occurrence for
the SJC.

At the heart of the debate was the
question of whether the Commonwealth

should maintain the public duty rule as an
exception
justices opting for

its

to

governmental

liability,

437
elimination and three arguing to maintain the
rule.

with four

As with

previous debates, however, the question was not
over whether the Court had the
authority to be involved

The only way

in

in this

policy but over the substance of the policy question.

which the Court's

role

was debated was

in

regard to

how

the public

duty rule should be abrogated. Justices Liacos and Grcaney opted
for an approach
similar to that used by the Court in Whitney, announcing their intention
to eliminate the

36

414 Mass. 496 (1992). The case involved claims against the Commonwealth by a mother and her
who were involved in an attack by a man who was mistakenly paroled from a Massachusetts

children
prison.
437

r.

Concurring opinions by Liacos (497), Wilkins, joined by Abrams (514), and Greaney (523) argue lor
elimination of the rule. A concurrence by O'Connor, with Nolan and Lynch joining
(515) promote the
continued application of the public duty rule.

17S

}

rule at a

felt

tor

date so that the Legislature

was necessary

to

prepare for

this.

would have

"The

afforded an opportunity to
consider whether

change by passing additional
limitations on

the time to take any
action they

Legislature, nevertheless,
should be

wishes

it

liability.

intention to abolish the public duty
rule at the

first

to

respond

to this anticipated

We therefore

announce our

available opportunity after the

conclusion of the 1993 session of the
Legislature .»™ Wilkins, with
Abrams, would

have eliminated the rule effective
immediately. Lacking
action,

competing

interests at the heart

of this debate.

in

On

1982 the Court had grappled with
the one side

underlying the intent of both the Court and
the Legislature

immunity: one
others.

who

In the case

policy, with the

is

which enabled

common

whole governmental

liability, this

in the

which governments play
439

operates

the government's negligence.

maxim

that "the king

extensive claims against a governmental

community.

the principle

eliminating governmental

(i.e.,

somewhat

like

an insurance

unit bearing the cost rather than the
individual(s)

the doctrine of governmental tort

law origins

in

is

negligent should bear the cost which
that negligence imposes on

of governmental

who were harmed by

On

the other

immunity

hand

is

the concern

to outlive its ancient

can do no wrong"

unit, especially in light

- numerous

or

of the unique roles

police and fire protection) could quickly bankrupt a

The adoption of the public duty

relationship exception of Irwin

438

of that

however, they concurred with Liacos
and Greaney.
Since their adoption of the public
duty rule

the

a majority in favor

v.

Ware, show

rule in Dinsky, followed

how

by the special

the Court attempted to balance these

Liacos concurring, 499.

43

The Legislature obviously recognized this interest as well when they incorporated exceptions,
including the discretionary function exception, into the original MTCA.
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two

interests.

By

the time the ease

ofJean W. had reaehed

confusing line of eases whieh,
aeeording

draw an

intellectually defensible

negligence."aet.

In the eyes

Cannon, had

Hue between immune

of the Court,

While they were willing

to Professor

it

was time

to eliminate the publie

the Court there

"not

'public' dut.es

was

a

managed

to

and actionable

for the Legislature to step
in

and

duty rule on their own, they
once

again gave the Legislature the
opportunity to take whatever
action they thought

necessary to protect the

fiscal interests

of the

state

and

local

governments.

The period given

to the Legislature to appraise
the scope of GL c. 258 in
decision will permit governmental
entities to be heard
and public policy to be evaluated.
Additionally, our past decisions which
disclose the expansive, and at times
unusual, nature of claims that
light

of today

s

can be

brought under the present statute provide
a basis for legislative
consideration of the scope of the statute....
[T]he

opportunity for

legislative reflection

problems of judicial

on a

which has up to now posed difficult
interpretation and application persuades
me to join
statute

in

[this] resultf.j"

The Legislature acted with
added

six

more

the passage of legislation in January of
1994

statutory exceptions to the

public duty exception.

442

MTCA,

This result should

governments, especially local

cities

duty rule caused the legislators

to

come

and towns,

effectively writing into law the

as

no

voice

.

that while they

The pressure from

respond accordingly. This was clearly not the

have a voice

They can only encourage

surprise.

to the proposal to eliminate the public

position the majority of the Court would have wanted.

aware

in the

The justices, however,

making of public

the Legislature to

Jean W.

v.

Commonwealth, Greaney concurring, 525.

12

St.

1993,

c.

495, §57.
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are

policy, they are not the final

do what they think

"The Mass Tort Claims Act: Analysis and Update," Massachusetts Law Review 75
11

which

is

(

1

in the best

990), 64.

interest

does

of the

As

state.

the Court noted in the
following exceipt,

Here the Court was responding

is final.

Legislature had only

ma de

governmental

Whitney, the Court should aet
on
the

Commonwealth

to

its

to a claim that despite
the faet that the

liability

original plan

under the

MTCA retroactive to

and allow for

extend back to the Morash
decision

2^

what the Legislature

liability

claims against

in 1973.

plaintlff s line of ar ument in
this
^
that this court in Whitney
stated that

Zltt^lT}on°T
*e Premise

wouM

it

act if the Legislature
failed to abolish governmental
immunity
WhUney permits no such reading. It
stated only our intention to
act If the
Legislature failed to act definitively.
Even a statutory affirmation of
e
immUnity ° Uld Clearl have been
de finhive action
y
w,!
When
Whitney is read correctly, it becomes
even more clear that we
should not modify the law not
443
established by a comprehensive
statute.

em

Twenty years
that, at least

W

l

later the

SJC

is

according to one

no

less likely to

critic,

modify

the 1994 legislative

"reinstitute[d] the public duty rule, distancing
the

the taxpayers for

whom

supposed

it is

this

amended law

amendments have

government

to operate by, in

despite the fact

many

in

Massachusetts from

cases, precluding inquiry

into the possible negligence of governmental
444
employees."

This story of the development of governmental
immunity

shows
both

that the

common

Supreme

law development and statutory

the appropriate

body

They have encouraged, and

to

interpretation.

In

at

444

Vaughan

v.

fact that the Legislature

in a field.

times even demanded, this involvement, but they have
their will

on the Legislature.

Commonwealth, 371 Mass. 914 (1979), 915.

Van Valkenburgh,

making these common

develop a more comprehensive body of law

always stopped short of imposing

443

Massachusetts

Judicial Court has a legitimate policymaking role
to play in

law decisions, however, the Court has been ever mindful of the

may be

in

1108.
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It is

perhaps because of

this general respect

and deference

wh 1C h

the Court has

shown

to the Legislature o\ cr

the years that the
Legislature responds reasonably
to judical ultimatums
(both in

Whitney and

in

Jean W.) As the 1994 legislate
amendments

however, the Legislature
is

most favorable

some

(including

will

always be more

to the

MTCA

likely to p lc k the course

to local, parochial
interests In the case

some SJC justices) would say

this

of action which

of governmental immunity,

come

has

indicate,

at

the expense of

what

is

best for the individual citizens
of the state and for governmental
accountability overall.

Regardless of the position one takes
on the policy question, however, the
interaction

between

common

law and statutory law

allows for policy to be set by that
institution which
at

in a

is

system of separated powers

most effectively structured

various points in the policy-making
process. In this light

powers rather than
developed

a conflict over

in a field the

common

by-case basis. Once the need for

more comprehensive

lawmaking

authority.

law allows the courts

When

leads to a sharing of

Before statutory law has

to

make law

fuller legislative action is

action can be taken.

it

to act

the statute

slowly, on a case-

seen by the Legislature then

is

enacted the Court again

takes over by interpreting the statute in specific
applications until such time as the need
for legislative revisions

becomes necessary.

The examples presented above show

the system to be neither one of conflict,

with each side striving for power, nor necessarily of regular interaction. Rather,
these

examples show the Supreme
relationship

Judicial Court

and the Massachusetts Legislature

to

which has more often been marked by avoidance and deference than

conflict or cooperation. For reasons of apathy, political cover, or inability to

internal divisiveness, the

have a
either

overcome

examples above show a Legislature which avoided action for

182

as long as possib.e and a
Court which acted, bu, only
ou, of necessity.

confron.at.on in .h.s area of law

themselves bu. from the

came no. from branches smuggling

The one

to take

power

to

state's high court forcing
the Leg.sla.urc to take
responsibility

for abolishing governmental

immunity

in tor, actions.

"Ambition must be made

counteract ambition" should
perhaps be rephrased as
"necessity must be

made

to

to

counteract avoidance." 445

The Supreme
policy

in a variety

judicial Court has been involved
with the Legislature in

of areas through

their

power over

the

mterpretation. In both of these
instances, however, the

Legislature having the final say. In the
next Chapter
the Court has the final say

-

common

power

we

is

making

law and over statutory

clearly shared, with the

turn to shared

powers

in

which

tne field of constitutional
interpretation.

The original quote comes from Madison's Federalist #51. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and
John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: Mentor, 1961), 322.
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CHAPTER

The Supreme

Judicial Court and the
General Court of Massachusetts
have

worked together over

the years to

make

Intimately affect the citizens of
the

of an individual's right

to die

policy in important areas of
law which

Commonwealth. The

when faced with

issues of public responsibility
to individuals
in its duties

have

all

5

definition

of family, questions

catastrophic medical conditions, and

when

the

government has been negligent

been strongly influenced by
decisions of the SJC. Despite the

Court's involvement, however,
the final authority in the
development of policy in these

cases

was

ultimately in the hands of the
legislature.

The

interaction

between the two

branches generally has been cooperative,
with the SJC often leading the way.
The
Legislature has not tended to "pull rank,"
but the reality of a legislative check
on
judicial activity shapes not only the
debates surrounding the legitimacy of
judicial

policymaking

in these

cases but also influences judicial activity.
Justices feel freer to

decide policy questions knowing that
it

can be changed.

The same

if the legislators

do not agree with

their position,

446

is

not true of questions of constitutional interpretation,
especially

questions of judicial review. These questions are different than
those involving other

avenues of judicial policymaking

in a

system of separated powers. This difference

largely a matter of degree, with statutory and

6

As

Justice

Lynch

noted,

"when we're

(Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

25

common

is

law cases lying more clearly

interpreting a statute, the Legislature has the last word."

May

1999.) Conversely, Chief Justice Wilkins noted the caution
with which the SJC generally approaches constitutional questions. "It's [judicial review] an effort that
has to be undertaken with substantial restraint and most of the standards that apply to deciding the

constitutional issue are very favorable to the Legislature. That

instances than do something that at least has

Boston,

MA,

some

we

don't expect

them do more

in

most

reasonable, rational basis. (Interview by author,

23 April 1999.)
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Within the Ju d lcl al "circle
of authority," leaving

more democratically accountable
branches.
review go

to the heart

final policy decisions
in

On

hands of the

the other hand, questions
of judicial

of the debate over the
appropriate role which the
judiciary should

Play in a democratic system of
government, with the judical circle
lapping over into
the legislative and executive
realms of authority.

The separation of powers framework
on judicial policymaking which
provided
judiciary.

in

Chapter

The

1

provides some perspective on
judicial review and the role of
the

efficiency theory of separated
powers

may

provide a particular

justification for this exercise of
judicial authority if one accepts
the
is

is

a special relationship

between

and

a court

assumed by Chief Justice John Marshall

in

its

constitution.

Marbury

v.

argument

that there

447

This relationship was

Madison™

Invested with the

special duty of interpreting a constitution,
a high court which did not declare
a statute in
conflict with the constitution to be void

can be seen

in the decisions

would be

derelict in

of the SJC over time. "[W]hen

it

A

duties.

its

is

similar stance

clear that the statute

transgresses the authority vested in the Legislature
by the Constitution,

it

is

the duty of

the court, a duty from which they cannot
shrink without profaning their oaths of office,
to see

447

and

to declare the invalidity

of the

statute."

449

Of course

not everyone accepts

The Madisonian theory of separation of powers, one which sees this structure as
a way of balancing
when applied to judicial review than in application to

three co-equal branches, appears to be no different
other forms of judicial policymaking.
448

Cr. 137 (1 803). Marbury was the
be unconstitutional.
1

to
4

Salisbury

first

case in which the

Supreme Court declared an

act

of Congress

Land and Improvement Company

v. Commonwealth, 215 Mass. 371 (1913), 373.
Chief
same view in the earliest years of the Court's history. "[WJhenevcr it
manifestly appears to the judiciary power that an act, complained of, does in fact violate the Constitution,
or affect the rights of individuals in a manner which is repugnant to its character and principles, there is
no doubt that such act must be declared void and inoperative." Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 25

Justice John Parker presented the

(1815), 253. In a recent interview, Justice Lynch voiced the same opinion.

power of the SJC

is

to interpret the state Constitution.

185

Now,

"I

suppose the ultimate

the executive's got to

do

that

and the

that this specia. connection
exist,

been debate on
1825,

this point.

Just.ce

From

the early years of the 19*
century there has

Gibson of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court

said ,n

»
[i]t

will not be pretended,
that the legislature has
not, at least, an equal
right with

the judiciary to put a
construction on the constitution
nor that ether of
infallible."

them

is

450

The

libertarian theory

of separating powers also has
a close connection

role of the judiciary in
constitutional policymaking.

It

to the

provides the justification for this

judicial responsibility in that
protecting minont.es can often
best be done by the least

democratic branch, and the principles
underlying

this protection are

most clearly

delineated in the United States in
written constitutions. 451 If
protecting these principles
essential to America's system of
government, then the judiciary

is

this

power

to

check the

legislature.

power of judicial review, however,

452

No

it is

more problematic than other forms of judicial
is

thought to be more definitive

questions of constitutional interpretation.
Before
in

regard to the SJC,

it is

justified in using

matter which theory one uses to justify
the

policymaking because the voice of the courts

claim

,s

we

in

turn to look at the truth of this

important to step back from this specific arena to look

general criticisms of judicial review in general.

Eakln v. Raub, 12 Sargeant & Rawle 330. From Gibson's
perspective, one which has been advocated
over the years by those who encourage judicial restraint, the
ultimate responsibility for keeping elected
legislators from overextending their authority lies with
the voters, not the judiciary. For a recent appraisal
of the involvement of the president and the congress in constitutional
interpretation on the federal level,
see Keith Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided
Powers and Constitutional Meaning
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
51

The judiciaries are the least democratic branch in the one-quarter of the political systems in which the
justices are appointed to office. This includes both Massachusetts and the federal
system. Even in those
states with elected judiciaries there is generally less attention paid to judicial
elections than to other state
electoral races. See Philip L. Dubois, From Ballot to Bench (Austin, TX: University of
Texas Press
1980).
452

Rarely do challenges to the authority of the president or a governor
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

see,
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entail libertarian questions.

But

at
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Judicial policymaking in
non-constitutional realms can
be overturned by acts of
a legislature.

Whether

the elected officials are
acting to correct

erroneous interpretation of a
statute or developing new
statutes
questions previously
legislative voice

is

left to

the

the final determinant of
public policy. In interpreting

-

of judicial review focus on the
process by which policy

power

rests

virtually

To
is

the

its

a large extent the criticisms

made while

the defense of

on the substance of judicial
policymaking.

The most obvious
do so

to take the lead in

domain of the courts through common
law,

constitution, however, a high
court has the final say

this

what they see as an

critique of this process

unchecked by the

citizenry.

is

that

many justices who make

policy

While courts may not always make

decisions which are antithetical to
majority concerns, the possibility always
exists for
these institutions to develop as oligarchic
entities within a democratic system of

government. Specific examples from the Supreme
Court's past which are often used

to

highlight this problem include various decisions
of the conservative Court of the 1930s

which struck down popularly enacted

legislation

of the

New

Deal, criminal justice

decisions of the liberal Warren Court which were widely
attacked by politicians of the
day, and the

453

As

still

controversial

Roe

v.

Wade.

454

Justice Jackson said regarding the role of the United States Supreme Court,
"We are not final
we are infallible, but we are infallible because we are final." (Brown v Allen 344

because

U

S 443

[(1953].)
454

Cases of the 1930s include: A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(
935) (declaring the National Industrial Recovery Act to be unconstitutional); United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1 (1936) (declaring the Agricultural Adjustment Act to be unconstitutional); Carter v. Carter
1

Coal Company, 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
unconstitutional); and

(declaring the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act to be

Morehead v. New York ex

York minimum wage law

to

rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (declaring a New
be unconstitutional). Cases from the 1960s which angered political

conservatives included those affecting criminal due process rights. They included:

187

Mapp

v.

Ohio, 367

A

second

line

of criticism of judicial review
deals

potent,, abuse of power by
the judiciary than

democrat, power by

the citizens.

From

it

less

does with encouraging the
use of

this perspective the

process of democracy

important but this process
involves more than just
elections.

which works best when

It is

is

also a political system

there are a variety of
avenues for public involvement,
and

incentives for such activity.

it is

with checking the

The

larger the area for public
participation, the

that individuals will enter
the arena

and participate

in the process.

more

likely

This

participation takes forms as
varied as dinner table debates
and public protests. All

avenues wh,ch encourages citizens

to think

about the principles of democratic

government and the kind of policies they
want
open and welcoming.

When

the

government

tne justices of the courts

make

forum

in

which fewer

citizens participate. This

should be wide

policy decisions they

the question under consideration
from the public realm to the
a

to enact

more remote

argument was prominent

move

legal arena,

in the

opinions of Justice Felix Frankfurter, one
of the foremost proponents of limiting
judicial

power out of deference

to the

democratic process. 455 The following

is

an

example of this view.

U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the
states); Gideon

(1963) (applying Sixth

Amendment

Mass. 436 (1966) (requiring
to criminal suspects).

v.

Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335

right to counsel for indigents to states);

that certain rights regarding self-incrimination

Also of concern

and Miranda
and

v.

Arizona, 384

right to counsel

be read

to conservatives

were the opinions prohibiting prayer in school as
an infringement of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. See
School District ofAbington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). In all of these cases, as well as in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S.
13 (1973) (protecting a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy in the first two trimesters),
many claimed that the Court was enacting policy contrary to what "the public" wanted.
1

455

There are some who will say that Frankfurter's restraint was a sham, and that he was no less willing to
impose his ideology on the Court than other justices. For this position, sec Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold
Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
For a view which is more sympathetic to Frankfurter's stated judicial philosophy see, Micheie DeMary,
"Judicial Decision Making:

England

A Democratic

Political Science Association,

View," paper presented

at the

May, 1996, Northampton, MA.
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A

final criticism

branch of government

is

of judicial review which
focuses on process
the leas, qualified to

make

policy.

is

that the

judical

The judiciary operates

under an adversarial process with
a narrow spectrum of
participants. This, combined
with the relatively closed nature
of the judiciary,
legislatures are structured.

Whether

i,

is

contrasted with the

be Congress or the

way

in

which

state legislatures, they arc

able to gather the kind of information
and bring together the type of
expertise that

necessary to decide

how

best to develop the kind of laws

which

is

legislators feci their

constituents want. 457

While the criticisms of judicial review
take a procedural approach, most
defenses of that power are substantive

in nature.

an inherently non-democratic process,

is

however, two procedural responses

This

is

partly because judicial review,

difficult to justify in a

to critics.

One

democracy. There

says, "they all

do

it,"

arc,

while the other

responds, "but we're really just like them." While both
arguments focus on the
similarities

seeing

all

between the three branches, they do so from opposite perspectives,
one

branches as somewhat non-democratic, the other seeing

democratic by varying degrees. The

of the government

456

457

Dennis

v.

is

first

all

three as being

argument correctly recognizes

that

purely democratic. There are non-democratic elements

U.S., 341 U.S.

494 (1951), 555.

This argument parallels "efficiency" arguments under separation of powers theory.

189

no branch
in the

operate of the

other two branehes as well,
even if representation

demoeratie. For example, on
the federal level
filibuster in the U.S. Senate,
the use

we

of executive agreements by

There are also ongoing questions
about the degree

who

opposed

judicial policy-making are

From

this perspective, the

proponents see the appointed judiciaries
as

by the executive of the country or

body acting

in

state,

officials represent

namely those with money

non-democratic elements of
in other

also sees similarities with the
other

While appointment of judges may not
make them

elected

which elected

no worse than those elements

The second argument
this case

to

the president, or the

the state and national
levels.

to representing only
certain people,

contribute to campaigns.

aceepted as

find accepted procedures
like the

development of law by administrative
agencies on both

"the people" as

is

branches.

458

two branches, only

at least indirectly

in

democratic.

directly accountable, their selection

often with secondary approval by
another

an executive capacity,

is

good enough. This

is

usually paired

with the argument which James Madison
put forth so well over 200 years ago.

"[peculiar qualifications being essential
consideration ought to be to select that
qualifications."

expertise

in the

members

[of the judiciary], the primary

mode of choice which

best secures these

459

which

Selecting justices by an appointment process allows
for the legal
is

generally accepted as necessary for adequate performance
of one's

While only anecdotal, the following quote from an article on the Speaker of the
Massachusetts House
of Representatives, Thomas Finneran, provides an example that even the elected
branches aren't
necessarily representative of the views of the citizens. "Last year, Finneran stymied
overwhelmingly
popular measures to raise the minimum wage in Massachusetts, ban ATM surcharges
and reform

HMOs."
4,

Leslie Miller, "Finneran Takes on All;

1999, A3.

The degree of power held by

No

Exceptions,"

New Bedford Standard

Times, February

the leadership in both houses of the Massachusetts legislature

has often been criticized by political opponents.
459

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers,
York: Mentor Books, 1961), 321.
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ed. Clinton Rossiter

(New

duties as

ajudge while

removal by elected

The

still

ensuring indirect accountability
through appointment and

officials.

strongest arguments for
juchcial rev le w, however,
focus not on the process

by which decisions

are

made

but on the outcome of the
process.

less than purely democratic,
the dec, S1 ons

more

in

indicate.

One of the most well-known of these

at the

its

powers

to support the

power of judicial review
diminished. Analyzing
legislation, he

that the

law-making majority
to strike

all

down

found

in

The Supreme Court

as

theoretical support

appointment process, Dahl hypothesized

cases in which the

found substantial support for

in the nation

is

Robert

from the judicial
often use

and would only use

its

law-making majority had

Supreme Court overturned congressional

his hypothesis.

its

is

Supreme Court would most

legislation after this

democratic appearance of judicial review,

the process

process alone would

substantive responses

Dahl's seminal work, "Decision-Making
in a Democracy:

its

if

winch the judicial branch reach often
are

tune with democratic
government than a look

National Policy Maker." 460 Drawing

Even

Despite the non-

outcomes rarely challenged

a

contemporary congressional majority. 461
Dahl's research has been criticized over the years on a wide
variety of grounds:
for inconsistencies in

its

support the conclusions

460

theoretical assumptions, for selectivity in the data used to

(e.g.,

excluding judicial review over the

states),

and

for

Journal of Public Law, 6 (1957), 279-295.

An interesting twist on this argument is found in Mark Graber's "The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty:
Legislative Deference to the Judiciary," Studies in American Political Development, 7
(1993), 35-73. He
does not argue that the Court's decisions are majoritarian but that the Court is most often forced to make
decisions

when

the majoritarian institutions won't act. "Historically, the justices have

exercised their power to declare state and federal practices unconstitutional only
national coalition is unable or unwilling to settle some dispute." (36)

191

when

most often
the dominant

deriving conflicting conclusions
from the findings.these eritieisms

is

that they tend to rest

Challenging the notion
since the

outcome

is

specifically

for the existence of such a

of judicial revtcw

power

in a

sometimes challenge contemporary
lawmaking

why judicial
democracy

some

necessary. This argument

is

on the assumption

things which are intended to
be

From

this perspective

it is

countcrmajoritarian position

when

it

is

bill

beyond

A

that the

written

the reach of the

of rights of the federal and

state

the job of the justices of the nation's
courts to

uphold the constitutions despite popular
sentiment

to the contrary.

They should take

a

necessary to protect minority rights and

463

Leading

to a similar conclusion

be defined as more than majority
for instance,

exist.

review

rests

majority, including the liberties
guaranteed by the

liberties.

not particularly dangerous

is

not just a democracy but a
constitutional democracy.

constitution establishes

constitutions.

most interesting about

rarely poses a threat to
contemporary democratic policies,
these

majorities and that this

is

is

on an alternative justification
of judicial review.

that the exere.se

critiques find that judical
review does

United States

What

many would

The justices

rule.

is

the theoretical argument that

If the

democracy must

majority decides to eliminate free speech,

argue that democracy

in that political

are justified in their use of power to strike

system could no longer

down such

legislation, not

only because the Constitution says so but also because the elimination
of free speech

means

the end of democracy. Again, the judiciary

is

seen as the protector of essential

462

See, for instance, Jonathan Caspar, "The
Political Science

Supreme Court and National Policy Making," American
Review 70 (1976), 50-63 and David Adamany, "Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and

the Supreme Court," Wisconsin Law Review, (1973) 790-846. I know of no
comparable studies of
appointed state supreme courts. This could be because of the criticisms of Dahl's work, or it could be
one of the many areas on state court life which have yet to be studied.
463

This

is

very similar

to the libertarian theory

of separation of powers as

192

it

is

applied to the judiciary.

components of democracy through
Without

this

power

there

majority as represented

non-democratic power of judicial
review.

its

would be no

in the actions

entity

which could stand up

of the executive or the

to the

legislature.

power of the
Again,

it

is

the

substance of the judiciary's
decision which justifies their use
of power. 464
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of the concerns regarding
judicial review are the same
whether one

speaks of an appointed judiciary on
the federal or

who

individuals

The

state level.

fact

is

that

are only indirectly accountable
to the populace have the
most

definitive voice in interpreting and
applying the polity's fundamental
political charter,
setting important directions for the
state or federal government. 466
There
essential difference, however,

the

SJC may be

review than

is

which provides

less constrained

the United States

is

one

a theoretical basis for the
hypothesis that

by democratic concerns

Supreme Court. This

is

in

the exercise of judicial

the relative difference

between

tuTins
argument docs raise an tnteresting question. When the Court is
confronted with a challenge
lundamcntal democratic liberty and does not strike it down,
are they then acting illegitimately?

464

i

465
It

should be noted

strike

"'"
1

down

that the judicial

review

in this

to a

chapter focuses on the SJC's use of this power to

acts of the stale legislature, not local ordinances.

use the term definitive to

mean two

(barring constitutional amendments).

things, that

First, the

it

is

the most prominent

voice of the high court

is

and

that

it

is

generally final

usually the loudest.

The

expectation on the part of both the justices and other actors in the political
system is that justices arc the
experts on their own constitution and what they say should be given special deference.
This is not to
deny that there are ongoing debates in legal and academic circles regarding the degree
to which justices'

views should control constitutional discourse. However, even (hose who would promote a broader base
of citizen involvement in constitutional discourse begin with the justices' point of view as the starting
point. For instance, in the introduction to his treatise An Introduction to (
'onstitutional Interpretation,
Lief Carter posits the following question as central to the purpose of
the Court interprets the Constitution well or whether

Longman,
courts.

the

This expectation appears to be the same whether talking aboul State or federal
1.
second componcnl of defmitiveness, of course, the slates differ if interpreting the U.S.

1991),

In the

"How can we tell whether
document?" (New York:

his text.

we should amend

Constitution as their voice

in that

regard

is

not final,

193

the processes

errors

on the

* Massachusetts and on the national
part

level for "correcting"
constitutiona,

of the respective high courts.

THE SJC - LESS FINALITY?
Concerns of the

common

citizens that a high court
has erred in delineating statutory
or

law can be remedied through
the

interpretations can be overturned
by

legislative process.

amendments,

this

While constitutional

process

more cumbersome and

is

therefore less likely to be followed
than the procedure of making
changes via the

normal

legislative

process.- While

this is not a

accomplish than amending a constitution.
This

simple task,

is

it

is

clearly the case

certainly easier to

on the federal

where the two-step process ana the
requirement of superiorities

amending
fact that

is

level

both steps

make

the United States Constitution
an almost insurmountable undertaking.

The

only twenty-seven amendments have
been added to

this

at

document since 1789

representative, at least in part, of the
intentionally challenging nature of the

amendment

An

process.

argument could be made

that state justices

need be

less constrained in

exercising authority in the realm of constitutional
interpretation since the constitutional

amending process
difficult than the

467

This

is,

to

some

varies between the

normal

two

levels

legislative process,

of government. While

still

more

and while the process varies from

state to

degree, truer in theory than in practice.

As noted in Chapter 4, legislatures may not
This could be due to lack of awareness, time constraints,
legislative roadblocks, or other political factors. As Ellen A. Peters,
Chief Justice of the Connecticut
Supreme Court has noted, "the sobering reality [is] that, despite recurrent grumbling by legislators, the
always make statutory corrections

either.

legislature rarely overturns the judicial construction of a state statute." (Intergovernmental
Perspective
Fall,

1991,22

should be noted that the decision of a high court can also be overturned by a later court. This may
happen more frequently, but the process for this change is no more democratic than with the original
It

opinion.
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7

amending

state,

a state constitution

is

document. The frequency with
which
proof for

this.

invariably easier ,o

do than amending

state constitutions are

the federal

amended provides some

State constitutional scholar
Alan Tarr has described the
contrast as

follows.

Moreover, the most dramatic
constitutional developments
[on the federal
largdy
h0Ut formal
amendnt
enCa Stat6S haVe r6gUlarly reV1Sed
and amended their
constitutions. Only nineteen
!
states still retain their original
constitutions
and a majority of states have
established three or more As
of 1996 9 500
Pr ° P ° Sed t0
institutions and
overt
over
t
5,900 adopted
- an average of almost 120 amendments
468
per state.

2;:r
l2^
Eft

Massachusetts

is

^

*"*

one of the nineteen

number of times

in the

"tional

t

has

it

states with

amended

this

added since 1780. 469 This averages out
hardly a breakneck pace,

it

is

a

to

its

m

original constitution but

document:

1

17

it

is

average

amendments have been

one amendment every two years. While

more common occurrence than

the once every twelve

year pace of amending the U.S. Constitution
which has been the case on the federal
level since the addition of the Bill of Rights
in 1791.

JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MASSACHUSETTS - A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
Debates over the exercise of judicial review have gone on
centuries.

The Supreme

Judicial Court of Massachusetts has

debate from the earliest years. 470 The justices

468

first

for over

two

been involved

in this

recognized their authority

to

G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1998)

22-23.
469

th

The
Amendment was added in
amendment process in Massachusetts.
1

470

1

1990. See Chapter 2 for a description of the constitutional

While there is little indication that this authority is suspect in the Massachusetts political system
was more heated debate about this question in the Constitutional Convention of 1917/1918

today, there

195

°

exercise judicial review in
1805 in the ease of Montfort v
statute

under ehallenge, none of the
three justices

hesitant ,o decide whether
the statute ,n

guaranteed by

art.

1

5

queshon violated

several decades before the

in

Supreme

Court's

SJC declared another

^

Massachusetts.

SJC

Without

in

in

legislative act to

^

unconstitut.onal

references

*"

f

Holder, ,

i,

v.

lis

be unconstitutional

e^to

to

fairly

members of the

;r

Supreme COurt had declared

Madison,

1

Cr. 137 (1803).

It is

Marbury

any way trying

James.™

wh,

^^

m Marbury

shall not

first

was another

2"
—
* «* we

by jury

The Court

1849 and running through 1936
the justices were

—

Judiciary Act of 1789
ludicmwAet
r78Q 71
to be

,814

*

power of jud.cial rev.ew,

representative to the Convention from
Haverhill. "I hope that

note, however, that the

the right to trial

in

the

op.nions seriatim were

of the Massachusetts
Declarator, of Rights

the United States

However, beginning

While upholding

.

who wrote

declared an ac, of the Legislature
to be unconstitutional

As with

*

3

§

1

of the

interesting
" to

in discussing the history of judicial
review in
invade the rightful province of the Legislature to
conduct

its own business, we have the
duty certainly since Marbury v. Madison, to
adjudicate a claim that
and the actions undertaken pursuant to that law
conflict with the requirements of the Constitution
v. Ireasurer and Receiver
General, 378 Mass. 550

a

law

"

Colo

(1979), 553.

472

Justices Thacher, Sewall, and Sedgwick participated
in this case which is similar to the decision
of the
United States Supreme Court in Hylton v. United States,
3 Dall. 171 (1796) in which the justices upheld

the carriage tax in question but did not hesitate to
make this determination, implying that they had the
right to find the tax to be unconstitutional as well.

The

pertinent portion of art. 15 reads as follows: "In all
controversies concerning property, and in all
between two or more persons, except in cases in which it has heretofore
been otherways used and
practiced, the parties have a right to a trial by jury; and this
method of procedure shall be held
suits

sacredf.]"

473

The SJC found that "a resolve of the legislature. .suspending in favor of a particular
1 1 Mass. 396.
creditor against a particular estate the statute of limitations protecting
administrators,
was... unconstitutional as not being 'according to standing laws' as provided
by Article 10 of the
Declaration of Rights." James M. Rosenthal, "Massachusetts Acts and Resolves
Declared
.

Unconstitutional by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,"

1

Massachusetts

Law

Quarterly 301

(1916), 301.
474

Sohier

The Massachusetts General Hospital, 3 Cush. 483 ( 1 849) (taking property for private
the federal level, the Supreme Court first used its power of judicial review in 1803 in
Marbury, and then not again until 857 in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 9 How. 393.
purposes).

v.

On

1

1
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consent

in exercising judicial
review, striking

of approximately one
the United States

statute every

down

two years.- This

Supreme Court overturned

sixty-nine statutes for an average
is

about the same level

to

study the SJC would continue
to employ

numbers shows

this to

of the Le gl slature
activity

be

true.

for an average

on the federal

level,

5.1

™

1940

power of jud 1C1 al review. 4 - Reviewing

to

the

1995 the SJC overturned thirty-one
aets

of two statutes per year. This
increase again parallels

with fifty-one statutes being struek

from 1969-1998. (See Table

to

an assumption that during
the years under

its

From 1981

which

actions of the Congress in
these years,

with seventy-three statutes
overturned during the 139 year
period from 1801
This historical data adds
support

at

below

down

in the

29 years

for a comparison.)

The historical information on judicial review comes from
Rosenthal, "Massachusetts Acts and
Resolves Declared Unconstitutional by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts," [containing data
covering the years from 1804 to 1916] and James M.
Rosenthal, "Massachusetts Acts Declared
Unconstitutional by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, 1916-1936," 20 Massachusetts Law
Quarterly (1936), 44-49.
476

Supreme Court data in this paragraph comes from David M. O'Brien,
th
Storm Center, 5 ed. (New
York: Norton, 2000), 30. The pace of Supreme Court activity, however,
has been less'consistent While
overturning only 2 statutes from 1801 to 1865, 71 were overturned
from 1865 to 1940. While I know of
no general source of information on this question from other state high courts,
Harry Stumpf and John
Culver provide a somewhat contradictory view in The Politics
of State Courts (New York: Longman,
1992). "The conception of judicial review in this early period [19 th century] was what
legal historian'
Kermit Hall called 'departmental,' the power being used primarily as a protective measure
against
legislative and executive encroachments on the province of the judicial
department. Thus, although
legislative supremacy was generally honored, state supreme courts tended to
focus on issues of
separation of powers in which judicial territory was being threatened (135)."

declared unconstitutional in Massachusetts during

this

time period

show

A review of statutes

frequent use of the

power of

judicial review in other than a 'departmental' way.
477

The

available historical data ends in 1938. However, there

suddenly stop

this activity after

125 years.
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is

no reason

to think the

Court would

TABLE

5.1

-

A Comparison of | e?MMw Artlm , „„„,
by the Sunr.n,. ....hl..., < n „ r , nf

and the Unit ed States

">-Mrt« t .nn

,1

"uniui;
Supreme Court

AVERAGE NUMBER

COURT AND YEARS

NO. OF STATUTES

OVERTURNED

OF STATUTES

DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
PER YEAR

Supreme

Judicial Court

1805-1936

69

statutes

.56 statutes/year

United States

Supreme Court
73 statutes

1801-1940

Supreme

.52 statutes/year

Judicial Court

1981-1995

31 statutes

2 statutes/year

United States

Supreme Court
51 statutes

1969-1998

The numbers above show
levels of both high courts.

from particular

years.

review over time.

A

1

a close quantitative parallel

slight difference

The SJC has been

a

.7

between the

emerges, however,

little

more

statutes/year

if

consistent in

we

its

look

at

numbers

use of judicial

This can be seen by comparing data from different eras.

198

activity

Per Year. IXni.lonn
1921- 1930

™

1

1910- 1921

1889- 1910
73

1874- 1888
1865- 1873
1836- 1864
1801- 1835

0-4

0.6

0.8

No. of Cases/Year

The general

picture of the

which consistently uses

its

SJC which emerges from
power of judicial review

check while never averaging more than

1

this historical data is

to

of a court

keep the legislative branch

in

statute declared unconstitutional per year, a

relatively restrained approach.

The
basis on

historical data also provides

which the SJC declared these

some

interesting information regarding the

statutes to be unconstitutional.

statutes discussed in the Rosenthal articles, thirty-nine or

57% were

Of the

sixty-nine

declared

unconstitutional based on the Massachusetts Constitution alone. 479 This should

come

478

Data on the United States Supreme Court comes from David O'Brien, Storm Center. Massachusetts
information comes from Rosenthal's two articles on Massachusetts Laws declared unconstitutional

between 1804 and 1936.
479

Another
(16%) were overturned on federal constitutional grounds; 3 (4%) were struck down on
both state and federal grounds; and the specific constitutional basis for the SJC's actions were
undeterminable in 17 cases or approximately 25%. It is interesting to note that 12 of these 17 were
1

1

statutes declared void as unconstitutional takings, but Mr. Rosenthal never lists article 10 of the

199

as

no surprise

limitation

document

on

if

one looks

at the history

state activities, the

until 1868.

of the U.S. Constitution
since the primary

14* Amendment, was
not added

th
In addition, the use of
the 14

Rights to the states did not become
prominent

However, recent scholarship on
1970s often makes

late

their

own

it

constitutions.

precedents which exist

feel as

Amendment

until well into the

apply the

to

20

Bill

of

lh

century.

the "discovery" of state
constitutions beginning in the

though

state

high courts had never before
interpreted

These data are a reminder
in the

to the federal

that there

a large

is

body of

jurisprudence of most states on which
justices can draw

in

rediscovering their state constitutions. 480
While the specific findings from the
data

analyzed for
that

this project will

approximately

50%

be discussed

in

more

detail

below,

it

can be noted here

of those statutes which were overturned
as unconstitutional

during these years were also based on the
Massachusetts Constitution. In comparison
to the

1

800s the contemporary court has overturned a

slightly higher percentage of laws

with a slightly lower percentage of the cases relying
on the

There
Court

in the

is

one way

1800s

to

in

which the available

state's constitution

historical data

vary from that of the Court

in the 1980s.

shows
This

481

the activity of the

in the

type of

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights as the basis for striking down the
law. Article 10 reads,

in part, as

follows.

is

"And whenever

the public exigencies require, that the property of any individual
should be'
appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation
therefor." As the
just

compensation clause of the 5 th Amendment was not applied to the states until 1897
(Chicago, Burlington,
and Quincy Railroad Company v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226), the four takings cases decided
before then
must also have been decided on state constitutional grounds -- this would mean that 62% were
decided
without consideration of the U.S. Constitution.
480

Justice Brennan reminisced about this change in his seminal article on state constitutions written
almost 35 years ago. "In those days of innocence [when he served in the New Jersey courts], the

preoccupation of the profession, bench and bar, was with questions usually answered by application of
state common law principles or state statutes. Any need to consult federal law was at best episodic."
"State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,"
at

481

Harvard Law Review 90 (1977), 489-502,

489.

See, Donald Lutz, "The Purposes of American State Constitutions," Publius 12 (1982), 27-44.
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laws being overturned. Using
a similar method of
categorization

for the

two time

periods, the types of laws
declared unconstitutional
can be categorized as follows. 482

FIGURE

5.2

-

Categories

Two

Of

i

Different

, ns

Overturned

Tim P

^

the S

"

Periurh

70.00%-rf

60.00%
50.00%

40.00% +
30.00%
1804-1936

20.00%

E 1981-1995

10.00%

0.00%
Criminal

Private

Public

Types of Cases

One of the
were found

to

biggest differences can be seen in
Figure 5.2. Six criminal statutes

be unconstitutional

of judicial review; only
contrast,

35%

with criminal

(1

1

9%

statutes)

132 years that the SJC was using

its

power

of all statutes overturned during that period of time.
In
of the laws which the Court voided from 1981-1995 dealt

This matches broader national trends in the business of
state

statutes.

supreme courts as presented
and Wheeler.

in the first

in the longitudinal study

of Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman,

483

In their analysis of 100 years of state

authors found that the

last

supreme court

years of their study (1940-1970)

showed

activity, the

a substantial

increase in criminal matters coming before the state high courts, especially during the

1960s. "Criminal
482

i

Law

Cases were 9-10 percent of SSC

[state

supreme

court] business

•

Analysis of the categorization of cases involved in constitutional challenges from 1981-1995 will be
presented in more detail in the section which follows. The information here is presented only for a
~

historical comparison.

Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, Lawrence M. Friedman, Stanton Wheeler, "The Business of State
Supreme Courts, 1870-1970," Stanford Law Review 30 (1977), 121-156.
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in the 1930s, ,4-,
7 percent in ,he

and 1970."

1945-1960 period, and a

starting percent „

l96S

484

WithiD thC Categ01

^

prominently those relating
praetiees, tort elaims,

0f "Private law" are found
a variety of eases, most

to business transaetions

and contracts, employment

and probate and family law.
The most interesting differences

the type of laws being
challenged in these

two time periods deal with

in

the

business/contract category and
probate and family law. In the
latter category the
difference

is

more of a

"curiosity," as several

of the laws be,ng challenged

in the early

years dealt with certain acts
concerning specific marriage and
divorce situations over

which the General Court
jurisdiction in

had some authority, with the SJC
having original

still

some of these

cases.

485

of the private law statutes struck down
latter years.

The business/contract category made up
over
in the

These cases represent challenges

concerning public contracts

(i.e.,

1800s but none of those voided during the
to the constitutionality

of legislative acts

bridge operations) as well as special acts
affecting the

distribution of property between individuals.

It is

hard to imagine such statutes being

enacted today. The following two descriptions
are representative.
C. 57, Statutes of 1847

and gives

it

to B,

-

"Takes property without compensation from
under guise of confirming defective deeds."

C. 315, Statutes of 1853

abutting lot

--

"Grading private way and imposing

lien

A

on

owner

for costs thereof in invitum" found to be a taking of
private property for public use without compensation. 486

484

Kagan, et. al., 146. It is difficult to compare the other categories because the types
of categories
which I used and those used by Kagan were too different to do an accurate comparison.

485

For instance c.377 of the Acts of 1869 was described by Rosenthal (1916) as follows. "Special
act
A and B husband and wife void when, at time of act, A had been divorced by X, and hadn't
secured permission of Supreme Judicial Court to remarry as provided by General Statutes"
(305).
declaring

486

2/3

Rosenthal (1916), 303-304.
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Perhaps most ,n,eres,ing
these two time periods

is

in

the comparison of the
kind of laws strnck

the similarity in the
types of oases

whieh make up

down

in

the public

law category. Two-thirds of
the pnblic laws overturned
during both time periods
concern taxat.on or

two categories

state regulation.

Whi.e the ground

vartcd, the willmgness of
the

SJC

for overturning statutes
in these

to overturn statutes
essential to the

operation of government has
remained consistent, indicating a
steady view of the Court,

under the Icadcrsh.p of various
justices over time,

even

in situations

use

to

its

power of judicial review,

which challenge the power of its
counterpart, maintaining

its

equal

status with the state legislature.

JUDICIAL RFVlF.w v MASSACHUSETTS.
198M995 - FINDINGS
i

A

variety of factors led to the original
hypothesis with

began, that the SJC of Massachusetts
would freely exercise
to strike

down

legislation during the fifteen years under
study.

about the democratic process

and therefore lead

more

easily

its

may

constrain justices

who

which

power of judicial review
First,

while concerns

are appointed to their position

justices to limit their activism, the fact that state
constitutions can be

amended may

free the justices

of the SJC from

this constraint.

hypothesis was supported by more specific information on the
SJC
it

this research

has consistently used

this

power

since

1

805 and

in recent

years

it

itself.

487

This

Historically,

has been

known

to

Studies have actually provided mixed results on the effect of judicial selection on the
activism of state
court justices. See, Staci L. Beavers and Craig F. Emmert, "Explaining State High
Courts' Selective Use
of State Constitutions," Publius 30 (2000), 1; Staci L. Beavers and Jeffrey S. Walz, "Modeling Judicial

Federalism: Predictors of State Court Protections of Defendants' Rights Under State Constitutions, 19691989," Publius 28 (1998), 43; Ronald K. L. Collins, Peter J. Galie, and John Kincaid, "State High

Courts,

State Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980:

A

Judicial Survey," Publius 16 (1986),

Emmert, "An Integrated Case-Related Model of Judicial Decision Making: Explaining
Supreme Court Decisions in Judicial Review Cases," Journal of Politics 54 (1992), 543; and James
Wenzel, Shaun Bowler, and David J. Lanoue, "Legislating from the State Bench: A Comparative

141; Craig F.
State
P.

Analysis of Judicial Activism," American Politics Quarterly 25 (1997), 363.
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exercise this

power

challenge the legislature

to

abortron and the death

penalty-

have shown a wiUingness during
in «hc interpretation

Further, as

this

to be

No

wrong.

activist, there is little

legislation

from

1

policy areas as controversial
as

was shown

,„

Chapter Four, the justices

tune period to play a co-equal
policymaking role

of statutes and the development
of common law. All of these

factors led to an expectation
that the

proved

in

98

SJC would be

matter what cu, off point one
chooses for defining a court as

doubt that the thtrty-one cases
to

1

Th,s hypothesis, however,

activist.

1

in

which the SJC struck down

995 do not qualify the Court for criticism
from advocates of

judicial restraint.

The SJC decided 3,660 cases from 1981
year.

to 1995, an

average of 244 cases per

4* 9

In only thirty-one

General Court

to

of these cases did the SJC declare
a

be unconstitutional. 490 This represents

less

statute enacted

than

caseload during these years. For a fuller
understanding of what

about the role of the SJC

1%

(.85)

of the

this finding

can

system of separated powers, two questions need

in a

by the

tell

to

responded

more

detail.

What

to this activity will give a better sense

on public policy concerns. Before looking

488

Both cases were widely reported

public.

SJC

the Court did and

at the

how

the legislature

however, the "why" deserves some

time and are generally well-known
in

at

of the true impact of judicial review

at this,

decisions in these cases will be discussed

us

be

answered: why, and so what. The "so what"
question can be assessed by looking
these thirty-one cases in

total

more

detail

among

the interested

below.

489

As noted in the discussion of methodology in Chapter 1, analysis for this study was done on only full
opinions by the Court. The 336 rescript opinions issued by the SJC were not included in the analysis.
It
is highly unlikely that the Court would choose to strike down
a statute as unconstitutional in a rescript

opinion.
490

The Court

units

also struck

down

local ordinances during this period.

of local governance are creatures of the

state

and not co-equal

were not considered.

204

However,

as cities,

towns and other

political partners, these opinions

attention.

This question can be answered

in part

by looking

at the first step

winch

is

necessary for a statute to be challenged:
someone must raise the question.

WHY SO FEW?

CONSTITUTION.!

n.i EST

m NSMni rilTTftTMr|r
,

Citizens challenged the constitutionality
of a state statute in less than

cases heard by the
part,

why

SJC

the

SJC between 1981 and 1995.- This
struck

down

raise

such questions on appeal but

The SJC has

this

some of these

seems highly

unlikely.

cases.

When

492

its

-

the justices are

possible, of course, that plaintiffs

that these cases are

a great degree of discretion over

refuse to hear

It is

of the

fact helps to explain, at least
in

so few state statutes in this time
period

rarely presented with the opportunity
to do so.

5%

decided by the Appeals Court.

caseload and the justices could simply

Based on interviews with

the justices, however,

asked whether the Court would be likely

to take

cases raising questions of constitutionality, former
Chief Justice Wilkins said, "[y]es,
unless

it's

we would

a really far-fetched item,

take

493
it."

we would normally

deal with something like that;

This sentiment was echoed by Daniel Johnedis who, as
chief staff

counsel for the SJC from 1972

to

1990 worked closely with the justices

to coordinate

Such claims were raised in 1 78 of the 3660 cases decided by the SJC. Since the number of cases
involving the challenge to a statute was developed by reviewing the 3660 opinions
of the Court, it is
possible that questions of constitutionality were raised by the parties but the SJC chose
not to discuss
them. After reviewing
claim, even if
492

it

all

cases, however, the practice of the Court

only deserves cursory attention

seems

to

be

to

acknowledge such a

in the final opinion.

See Chapter 4 for a more thorough discussion of the case selection process.

493

Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999. In my review of cases I found that the SJC will
even entertain somewhat offbeat constitutional claims. My favorite argument is found in Commonwealth
v. Rodney M. Taylor, 413 Mass. 243 (1992) in which a challenge to the criminal law which more harshly
penalizes certain narcotics offenses

Amendment

when

they occur within 1,000 feet of a school was raised on 14

lh

equal protection grounds, claiming the law discriminates against inner-city drug dealers

where schools are closer

together. This claim

was denied by

205

the SJC.

case selection.
statute[.]"

», thl „ k

we wouid general,*

take .hose,

if

.here

was an

attack on a

494

Assuming, then,

that the

SJC did ehoose

to

hear most eases raising a
question of

judtcial review of a legislative
aet, eitizens of
Massachusetts only rarely challenged the

constitutionality of legislation.
This fact gives

some indicate

that the actions

of the

state legislature are generally
accepted as legitimate unless citizens
are prohibited

from

raising their concerns in a
court of law because of access
barriers, especially a lack of
financial resources. 495

It

can be assumed that individuals
and organizations with

substantial resources will pursue
their claims, but that

many

potential constitutional

violations will affect those least
able to afford to bring a case to
court in the

much

less to

pay

for an appeal.

While not denying the

difficulty

first

place,

of pursuing an appeal,

the activity of amicus curiae participants
in a substantial portion of the cases
which are

decided by the SJC proves

that there are organizations available
to help in the pursuit

a viable constitutional claim.

the fifteen years surveyed.

Amicus

briefs

Even more

were

filed in

12% of the

were over two times as

which no challenge

494

It

should be noted

be participants

to a legislative statute

Interview by author, Boston,

4 5

likely to

MA,

cases decided in

indicative of the fact that outside organizations

are interested in participating in cases raising
constitutional claims
parties

of

in these

is

the fact that

cases as in cases in

was involved. (See Table

5.2 below.)

14 April 1999.

that accepting an action as legitimate

206

is

not the

same

as agreeing with the

oucome.

TABLE

5.2

- Amicus

Total

r,.ri a e Particip ation

Nn

r>f

Cases

All Cases

The amicus
organizations.

The

were

likely to take

981-1 995

No. of
Cases w/

Cases

Amicus

w/Amicus

Briefs

Briefs

Percentage of

435

12%

178

51

28%

briefs filed in these cases

were from over 350

large majority participated in
only one or

the seventeen participants

1

3660

Cases Raising a
Challenge to
Legislation

on the S.1C,

who

filed

more than

two

different

cases.

However, of

five briefs over these fifteen years, five

on challenges on behalf of those without the
financial resources

to

pursue an appeal. These include the Civil
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, the

Committee

for Public

Counsel Services (the

state's

public defender agency), the

Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
the Massachusetts Tenants
Organization, and the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee,
a mental health

advocacy organization.

It is

legislatively enacted statute

Court.

likely that a valid constitutional

concern over a

would eventually be brought before the Supreme

Judicial

496

Other parties who

filed more than five briefs during this period were: the Attorney General's office,
Foundation of New England, Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys,
Massachusetts Association of School Committees, Massachusetts Association of School Superintendents,
Massachusetts Bar Association, Massachusetts Medical Society, Massachusetts Municipal Association,
Massachusetts Newspaper Publishers Association, Massachusetts Teachers Association, New England

Conservation

Law

Legal Foundation, and the Women's Bar Association.
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The

fact that

few cases

raise constitutional
challenges to legislative authority

does not mean that once the
legislature has acted,
very well continue

political controversy ceases.

another venue, even moving to
the judicial realm. 497 This
does

in

not mean, however, that

will rise to the level

it

of a constitutional challenge.
With

apologies to Tocqueville, while
political questions

become
reality

that

most

legislation,

even

if

Perhaps their

criticized

by the

legislation

own

state's

which

becomes

it

involve constitutional questions.
After
limits.

in the

United States

may

often

legal questions, not all legal
questions raise constitutional
498
challenges.

is

may

It

all,

a part of a legal controversy,
will not

the Legislature

integrity, reinforced

by

The

is

aware of constitutional

the possibility of being reviewed
and

high court, means that state legislators
will rarely enact

clearly violates the constitution.

Data from the SJC's caseload
types of cases which

come

questions than are others.

to the

in the

1980s and 1990s, however, indicate that some

Court are

As Figure

5.3

much more

below

likely to raise constitutional

indicates, cases involving public

law

questions are more likely to raise questions of judicial
review before the SJC than are
private law questions.

499

Interestingly, criminal matters

make up approximately

the

interesting to note that as questions

move from one venue to another there is a transition in the
from the language of substance to that of process. Examples of
this include the almost annual challenge by the automotive
insurance industry to the rates set by the
Commissioner of Insurance. While there is no doubt that what the insurance industry is looking
for is a
It is

conflict.

To some degree

the transition

is

different substantive outcome (higher rates), the opinion of the SJC reads
like a primer in administrative
procedure. Another example can be seen in questions involving ballot initiatives.
Some of the most
heated political debates in Massachusetts between 1981 and 1995 centered around ballot questions
such

as the Bottle Bill, the

All of these questions

wisdom, but

Term Limits Initiative, the Prevailing Wage Law and the Stop Nuclear Waste Act.
came to the SJC before they were voted upon by the public, not to determine their

to determine if the required procedures for placing a question

delineated in article 48 of the
498

"There

is

Amendments

on the

ballot

which

is

Massachusetts Constitution were met.

hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a

judicial one." Alexis deTocqueville,

Row,

to the

Democracy

in

America,

1969), 270.
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ed. J.P.

Mayer (New York: Harper and

same percentage whether analyztng

the

full

caseload of the Court or only those
cases

ratsing questions of the
constitutionality ofstatu.es."
Since the private law category

deals with

many

areas in which

common

interpretation of a specific
document,

fewer constitutional claim

Fj GURE 5.3

i(

law

is still

prevalent, or

which concern the

should no, be surprising that these
cases raise

s.

- Type s

cas^ercentaee

of

of S.IC ca ses

comp arpH

-

c,^ 55555 statute
overturned

-

1981-1995

Percentage of total

jEj^Steg
% caseload
% cases challenged
% overturned

Private

Public

Criminal

Types of Cases

A

further analysis of the categorization of the

indicates that there are three types of cases which

SJC caseload

in these

make up almost

years

sixty percent of all

cases containing constitutional challenges: cases involving
criminal law (32%), cases

concerning

state regulatory legislation (15.7%),

General headings used

to categorize cases

were

and

state tax

laws

(1

1.2%).

and criminal. Twenty cases fell into a
private and public law categories
were further divided into subcategories. Categories making up private law cases include: business,
contract private employment, insurance, probate and family, real property, and private tort claims. Public
law cases include cases involving the state budget, civil liberties claims (non-criminal), civil rights, court
miscellaneous category, but

all

others

fell into

private, public,

one of these

three.

The

supervision, democratic process, education eminent domain, public employment, executive authority,
local issues, social services, state regulation, taxation,

and

torts

involving public entities.

500

Note that most criminal cases raise constitutional questions, but many of these involve the application
of the law by law enforcement officers or lower courts. Whether the 4 th Amendment required a warrant
in a specific

circumstance

is

not a question of judicial review as

project.
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it

has been defined for purposes of this

Before moving on

to a look at

how

SJC decided

the

questions of judicial review and
what this

tells

these cases involving

us about the

SJC

in a

system of

separated powers, there are two
pi eces of particularly
interesting information which can

be gleaned from a review of the
kinds of arguments raised by
appellants

in their

challenge to legislate actions,
both of wh.ch indicate that the
practice of law does not
necessarily follow the academic

supreme courts have written
rely

more and more on

their

commentary on

treatises

own

the same. First, while scholars
of state

on the increasing tendency of some

state constitutions in setting
the

legitimate authority of governmental
actors,

it is

state courts to

parameters of

interesting to note that practicing

501
attorneys are not always reading the
treatises.
Even in a state like Massachusetts

which

is

considered to be one of the leaders

in the

development of an independent body

of constitutional protections, 502 laws challenged
before the SJC were
likely to be challenged

when

state claims

on federal than

slightly

state constitutional grounds. 503

more

Further, even

were made, they were most often paired with federal
claims

following: "These claims are

that,

as in the

under State and Federal constitutional provisions

concerning due process of law and equal protection of the laws,
This provides a reminder that what justices do

is

it

is

a violation..."

504

only a part of the picture: they cannot

This author is not immune from this comment, having contributed her own treatises, as will
be seen in
the discussion at the end of this chapter on the SJC's participation in the new judicial federalism.
502

See Barry M. Latzer, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press

1991).
503

For every claim raised under the

Data for

this

arguments
504

state constitution,

comes from reading of SJC opinions

in

1 claims were raised under the federal charter.
which the justices present their perspective of the
1

.

raised.

News Group

Boston, Inc.

v.

Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 627 (1991), 632.
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work

develop an independent body
of state constitutional law
unless an appropriate

,o

argument

made on

is

appeal.

505

There were two exceptions

to this general trend.

arguments were made when dealing
with provisions
found

m

the federal charter.

for

First,

independent

which no counterpart can be

Most frequently challenged under
separate

claims were laws which deal with
limits on the

state's

taxing

is

found

in the

appeals brought by certain

members of the

who

Committee

Counsel Services (CPCS). This agency has
been

are associated with the state's
public defender agency, the

of encouraging Massachusetts attorneys
using provisions
facing

for,

CPCS,

to

make

clear,

in the forefront

independent arguments for

Massachusetts Constitution to protect rights of
defendants

on criminal charges.

trial

worked

in the

The second

criminal defense

bar, particularly those

for Public

constitutional

power and those which

affect the delegation of powers,
particularly to the legislative branch. 5 '*

exception

state

the Court

is

In cases

where defense attorneys have trained with,

much more

Some would argue that the justices of the states'
One of the foremost proponents of this perspective

or

likely to note that the constitutional

high courts should be more proactive in this regard
Hans Linde, former Justice of the Oregon Supreme

is

"Every state supreme court, I suppose, has declared that it will
not needlessly decide a case on a
constitutional ground if other legal issues can dispose of the
case. The identical principle applies when
examining that part of the state's law which is in its own constitution.
In my view, a state court should
always consider its state constitution before the Federal Constitution. It
owes its state the respect to
Court.

consider the state constitutional question even

when counsel does not raise it, which is most of the time.
would not let itself be pushed into striking down a state law before considering
that law's proper interpretation. The principle is the same."
"First Things First: Rediscovering the States'
Bills of Rights," University of Baltimore Law Review 9
(1980), 383. Linde's view is still a minority view
The same

among

court probably

state high court justices.

506

Part

II,

4 requires that taxes be "proportional and reasonable" and Article 44 of the
(enacted in 1919) prohibits progressive taxation. Questions regarding the general

c.l, §1, art.

Amendments

authority of the legislature are challenged under Article 30 of the Declaration of Rights (requiring a
separation of powers) or Part II, c.l, §1, art. 4 which authorizes the legislative power in the following

words. "And further,

from time

to time, to

full power and authority are hereby given and granted to the said General Court,
make, ordain, and establish, all manner of wholesome and reasonable Orders, laws,

statutes, and ordinances, directions and instructions... as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare
of this Commonwealth." This language granting legislative authority is obviously much broader for a
general purpose government than in the case of the more specific grants of authority granted to the U.S.

Congress, a government of limited powers,

in Article

211

I,

§8 of the U.S. Constitution.

argument was made

either solely

made, one federal and one

The second

on

state

grounds or

that

two separate arguments were

that the state constitution
provides greater protection. 507

interesting difference

between general academic discourse
and

the

practice of law deals with question
of due process. In any text on
constitutional law

one

will read

in the

of the demise of the doctrine of
economic substantive due process

famous case of West Coast Hotel Company

v.

in

1937

Parish. Here the U.S. Supreme

Court, reversing years of conservative
economic rulings, upheld the constitutionality
of
a

Washington State minimum wage law against

a charge that

contract as protected by the due process
clause of the 14 th

may

be true

in state constitutional

law as well, not

all

violated liberty of

it

Amendment. 508 While

this

attorneys are aware of this. Well

over 100 claims were made during the 15 years
under analysis

that the

law under

challenge violated either the federal or state due
process guarantees. 509 While
these dealt with procedural questions, numerous
claims were also

made

many of

that certain

In a treatise developed for a seminar at the annual
Massachusetts Bar Association meeting in 1987
William Leahy, then Deputy Legal Counsel for CPCS, made it
clear how important this is. "The debate
is most interesting for any number of
perspectives; for Massachusetts

criminal law practitioners,

however,

import

crystal clear.

you represent a defendant asserting a constitutional argument, you
must cite and argue separately the pertinent provision of the Declaration
of Rights. If you are a
prosecutor, you must be prepared to respond with more than simple
reliance on federal precedent." "The
State Constitution: A Sleeping Giant Awakens," paper presented
at the MBA Annual Meeting
its

Sturbridge,

is

MA, May

If

30, 1987.

508

300 U.S. 379. Most texts follow this up with a discussion of the cursory attention given to any such
claims in the years post 1937, using Williamson v. Lee Optical, 384 U.S. 483 (1955) as an example
of the
fact that almost any economic regulation is acceptable under the due process clause.
In this case the state
of Oklahoma passed a law (much to the pleasure of ophthalmologists)
ophthalmologist could fit an individual for glasses.

The

that only a licensed

lh

Amendment protected previous to 1937 was also the source of
declaring several Massachusetts statutes to be unconstitutional in the early 1900s by the SJC.
509

liberty

of contract which the 14

th

The 14 Amendment of the U.S.

liberty, or property

Constitution reads, in part

"No

deny to any person.
no one portion of the

state shall

without due process of law." In Massachusetts there

is

.

.life,

Constitution which contains a due process clause. Rather, the Court has located these rights as follows.

"We
are

have historically taken the view

embodied

Constitution."

in articles

1,

Mary Moe

10,
v.

and

1

that the principles

of due process of law

in

12 of the Declaration of Rights and in Part

our State Constitution

II,

c.l

of the

Secretary of Administration and Finance, 382 Mass. 629 (1981), 33.

212

statutes, particularly state
regulatory statutes, should

be struek

down under due

process

guarantees beeause the law was
arbitrary or failed to serve a
public purpose. While

none of these claims were successful,
made.

interesting to see that the

is

argument

is still

510

Looking
is

it

at this first step

which

is

necessary before a question of
judicial review

brought to the SJC provides a
reminder of the one way

different

in

from the other two branches of state
government

which the judiciary

in the

legislature

on a constitutional

in

quite

realm of policy-

making. Unlike the Governor or the
General Court, the SJC must wait
be raised, and only rarely do citizens

is

for a question to

Massachusetts challenge the authority of
the

basis.

JUDICIAL REVIEW - THE COURT'S RESPONSE
The justices of the SJC have
before them.

handle

Once questions

this ultimate judicial

little

control over what questions are brought

are raised, however, the

power

tells

manner

us something about

role of the Court in the state's system of separated
powers.

common

how

which the justices
the justices view the

As with

their activities in

law development and statutory interpretation, the justices
approach

responsibility firmly but with restraint.

frequently, the instances

they feel

in

it is

when

While they may not exercise

this

their

power

they do so indicate that they will not hesitate to act

when

necessary.

A similar observation was made by Hans A. Linde when he was surveying arguments made before
Oregon Supreme Court in the 1960s. "Nevertheless, attacks on regulations under claims that may be
conveniently lumped as 'substantive due process' continue to be pressed." "Without 'Due Process':
Unconstitutional

Law

in

Oregon," Oregon

Law Review 49

213

(

1

970), 2.

the

1

The

overall impact

of the SJC on public policy
questions

can be measured boih qualitatively
and quantitatively.
the

numbers

in

two

different ways.

On one

constitutional legitimacy of a statute

the time.

comparison

In

to other state

hand, of the cases

supreme

SJC

in

which the

struck

to

look

at

these numbers, one which also

within the mainstream in

its

use of judicial review,

found an average of two statutes a year
this

same time period

Table

5.1

the U.S.

to

the

to

be average,

of the time. 51

SJC appear well

recognize that the justices

be unconstitutional. During
approximately

to

Supreme Court

the other hand, of the

1995, only .85% resulted

in the

wondering how much impact
through an analysis of
indicate that

it

is

its

struck

down

3660 opinions which

at the thirty-one

the state's high court has

1

.7 statutes

per year (sec

all

SJC issued from 1981

to

be null and void.

If

to

one

is

on public policy questions

use of the power of judicial review, the numbers would
this evaluation

cases in which a statute

we were

would be borne out by

was struck down by

effect of the justices' actions

O'Connor described some of these
were cases where

the

Court declaring a statute

minimal. In some ways

of these cases, the overall

511

makes

80%

17% of

the law

above).

On

look

is

down

SJC appears

courts, the

with most state high courts upholding
challenged legislation over

Another way

Commonwealth

Quantitatively, one can present

questioned, the

is

in the

the Court for in

was minimal. Former

instances as follows.

"I

a closer

remember very

many

Justice

well there

saying to the Legislature... [was] you can't put the

comma

Craig T. Emmert, "An Integrated Model of Judicial Decision-Making: Explaining State Supreme
in Judicial Review Cases," Journal of Politics 54 ( 992), 551. Emmert lists eight state

Court Decisions

supreme courts
are:

as the

1

most

activist,

30% of the time. These states
Oregon, South Carolina, Washington, and West

overturning challenged laws

Alaska, Kentucky, Montana, Oklahoma

(civil),

Virginia.

214

at least

there.

.remove the

comma

.

exaggerate

and you're

three of the cases in

overturned came close

all

set.- While

In all three instances the
challenged statute

due process guarantees. These are
problems which the

noted,

of life,

"[i]t is

This

is

was found

provisos which

violated

legislature could (and did)

not to deny the importance of
this problem.

a fundamental tenet of due
process that '[n]o one

liberty, or

legislative action.

may

property to speculate as to the meaning
of penal
this role,

However,

more and more

often,

the Court

be required

statutes'."

whether intentionally or

at peril

515

If the

directly at the substance of legislation

by

from more routine uses of this power

21

aimed more

is

dramatic cases of judicial review by the SJC
to take a

when reviewing

MA,

is

may.

One way of distinguishing more

Interview by author, Shrewsbury,

not,

the effect of this action does not really
pose a threat to the

democratic system of government as judicial
review which

discussed in Chapter Four

As

even with seemingly minor corrections,
the rights of

individuals could be violated

512

were

514

Court did not play

state's

statutes

In all three the Court struck
sections of

unconstitutionally vague because
of conflicts in sentencing

correct easily.

was obviously

which portions of recently enacted
drug

to this description.

newly enacted drug laws.-

the Justice

May

cue from the justices themselves. As

the unique Single Justice session, justices of

1999.
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Commonwealth v.Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567 (1982); Commonwealth
Commonwealth v. Bongarzone, 390 Mass. 326 (1983).

v.

Marrone, 387 Mass. 712 (1982);

514

SJC found declaring a statute to be unconstitutional to be the more
"To permit these defendants to be resentenced under the main paragraph would require
us to resolve a fundamental ambiguity in the statute against these defendants and to engage injudicial
lawmaking. That course is not open to us.... Consequently, the statute is void for vagueness."
It is

interesting to note that the

restrained option.

Bongarzone, 336.
515

Gagnon, 569 quoting United States

v.

Batchelder, 442 U.S.

215

1

14 (1979).

the

SJC usually

sat in panels

instances, however, in

reason for which

all

opinions, there were

winch

516
of five during these fifteen
years.
There were

all

seven justices would participate

sat

many

times in which the decision
was less routine. The

was not always

9%

readily apparent from a review
of the

of the cases from 1981

to 1995.

cases in which a statute was declared
unconstitutional, over

Further indication of potential
importance of an opinion

a statute

statute

in

9%

void,

19% of such

cases.

Of the

20%

of these cases.

the existence of a dissent.

is

in cases in

thirty-one cases in

means

that in almost three-quarters

which the justices of the Court overturned
viewed the question as

a legislative act

,

which

which a

struck down, approximately one-quarter
attracted the attention of the

court, a dissenter, or both. This

court

full

Seven of these were

of all cases during these years. Six
of these were

was declared

was

While the

seven

issued opinions in less than

This occurred

in a case.

of the cases

full

in

the justices themselves

relatively routine, having limited impact

and

falling easily

within the recognized realm of judicial authority.
In addition to these drug cases, the

twenty cases described below merited

little

extra attention

from the justices and could,

therefore, be labeled as routine. 517

In addition to the drug sentencing cases noted
above, five

more

statutes

were

declared unconstitutional because of violations of due process. This
included statutes

which deprived individuals of property without

the protection of a jury

518
trial,

a statute

516

Over seventy percent of the decisions of the SJC between 1981 and 1995 were issued by panels
which only five of the seven justices participated.

in

517

recognize that using these cues from the justices as a method of separating important from less
is somewhat arbitrary. Several of these "routine" cases had a significant impact on the
state's systems of taxation and criminal justice, and on the fiscal condition of the Commonwealth.
1

important cases

518

Commonwealth v. One 1972 Chevrolet Van, 385 Mass. 198 (1982) (trial under forfeiture statute for
drug offenses must take place with a jury - art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights) and Waltham Tele-

216

which allowed

for videotaped testimony

put the burden of proof on the
parents
rights,

520

of certain child witnesses,™
a

,n certain

Equal protection violations were
found

procedure of determining whether
an mdtvidual

which

procedures terminating parental

and a legislate amendment
which imposed rctroac.tvc

injuries

statute

is

in the state's

liability for certain

law regarding the

a "sexually dangerous

person"- and

a statute which provides attorneys
fees only for certain cases
heard before

in

administrative law judges. 523
Conflicts involving questions of
federalism led to eight additional
statutes being

challenged and struck down.

One law were found

to conflict

with the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 524
while another conflicted with the Federal
Parental Kidnapping Act. 525

One

statute

which gave hiring preference

for certain state

jobs to state residents was voided as a
violation of the privileges and immunities

Communications v. James O'Brien, 403 Mass. 747
(1989) (procedure for compensating owner of rental
property for installation of cable lines must include
a jury trial - article 15 of the Declaration of Rights).
519

Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534 (1988) (violates confrontation
clause of art. 12 of the
Declaration of Rights).
520

Petition

ofDSS to Dispense

by Supreme Court
521

St.

art.

Germaine

v.

in

Santosky

with Adoption, 389 Mass. 793 (1983) (violates due
process as established
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 [1982]).

v.

Pendergast, 416 Mass. 698 (1993) (violation of fundamental fairness

in violation

of

10 of the Declaration of Rights).

522

Commonwealth v. Arment, 412 Mass. 55 (1992) (distinction between commitment proceedings for
sexually dangerous person as distinguished from other commitment procedures).
523

524

Murphy

v.

Commissioner of the Department of Industrial Accidents, 4

1

5

Mass. 2 8
1

(

1

993).

Commonwealth

acts).

v. Federico, 383 Mass. 485 (1981) (ERISA prohibits criminal punishment
for certain
Neither this case nor the following fit an exact definition of judicial review in which the Court

declares the statute unconstitutional.
statute (even

They are instances, however, of the Court overturning a state
though on federal statutory grounds) and can be seen as important to judicial-legislative

relations in the state.

1

have, therefore, decided to include them in the data

525

set.

Archambault v. Archambault, 407 Mass. 559 (1990) (statute cannot allow interference of a
Massachusetts court once custody proceedings have begun in another state).
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T

guarantee of Article IV of
the U.S. Constitute 52 " and
another two laws regarding
taxation were found to
v.olate the Congressional
supremacy ,n the realm of interstate

commerce. 527
Free speech and press protections
tmder
found

to

be violated

,n

two

relattvely routine cases,

the Firs.

Amendment were

one mvolving a

differential

treatment of newspapers in a tax
on manufacturers 528 and another
prohibiting charitable
organizations from using paid telephone
operators to
the Contract Clause
participate in

terms.

was found

to prohibtt the state

money-saving furlough program as

it

solicit contributions."'

from requiring

state

v.olated nego.tated

Finally,

employees

to

employment

530

Provisions specific to the Massachusetts
Constitution were the basts for striking

down

531
statutes in the last four "routine"
cases.

three of the

Amendments was

The

right to vote guaranteed in article

the basis for the challenge to a law

whtch did not allow

an exception for registration for prison
inmates domiciled outside their

home town. 532

526

Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers
527

v.

City of Boston, 384 Mass. 466 (198

American Trucking Association

Perini Corporation

v.

v. Secretary
ofAdministration, 415 Mass. 337 (1993) (fuel tax) and
Commissioner of Revenue, 419 Mass. 763 (1995) (method of computing
assets for

corporate excise tax)
528

Globe Newspaper Co.

v.

Commissioner of Revenue, 410 Mass. 188 (1991)

(unjustified burden

on the

press).
529

Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Attorney General, 391 Mass. 709
(1984)
of speech and is not narrowly enough drawn so violates
Amendment).

restricts content

(statute

sl

l

530

Massachusetts Community College Council

v.

Commonwealth, 420 Mass. 126 (1995).

531

One other case which didn't "fit" into any of the above categories is Massachusetts Wholesalers of
Malt Beverages v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 441 (1993) in which the Court struck down a portion of
the state's newly enacted bottle bill as being a taking without just compensation. This applied only
to the
distribution of unclaimed bottle deposits from before the law
532

was amended so had only

a limited impact.

Cepulonis v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 389 Mass. 930 (1983). Article 3 was added in 1821 to
eliminate the property requirement for voting. The inmates could also have based their argument on
Article 9 of the Declaration of Rights which contains the blanket guarantee of the right to vote for all
qualified citizens in Massachusetts.
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The prohibition on
striking

down

differently

a progressive tax structure
in Massachusetts

a law

which taxed

was

the basis for

from savings accounts of over
$100,000

assets

from accounts containing under
533
$100,000,
while requirements

that all

taxes on property be proportionally
assessed were the basis for another. 534
In the final

case the Court applied

art.

30 of the Declaration of Rights which
guarantees

government of separated powers
legislature

trial

and

when an

act

guard the judiciary against the
encroachment of the

to

was passed

a

to restore

court had originally dismissed. 535

an eminent domain proceeding
which a

interesting to note that

It is

it

is

only

in this

case

that involving legislative intervention
injudicial proceedings regarding child

custody that the Court adopts a

Firmly defending judicial

less than deferential tone

territory, Justice

toward the Legislature.

O'Connor wrote

for the

The Legislature may, in some circumstances, provide
remedy where the courts have determined there is no

may

however, instruct a court
that court has concluded that there
not,

to
is

the Declaration of Rights. 536

For the most

part,

Court

in Spinelli.

a legislative
judicial remedy.

It

provide a judicial remedy when
none, without violating art 30 of

however, the language of the Court indicates a great degree of

respect and deference for the actions of the Legislature.
Even in these relatively routine

Commissioner of Revenue
state's constitution

v. Lonstein, 406 Mass. 92 (1989).
In addition to attempts to amend the
(which have yet to prove successful), advocates of progressive taxation have tried a

methods to enact a "fairer" tax. This was a creative attempt, but the justices weren't fooled. As
Chief Justice Liacos said on behalf of the Court, while "the legislature has considerable discretion
variety of

in

designating different classes of property for the purpose of setting tax rates. .the discretion
unlimited." (94)
.

5 4

Guaranteed

in the

Massachusetts Constitution

at Pt. II, c.

1

,

§

1

,

art. 4.

Emerson College

is

v.

not

City of

Boston, 391 Mass. 415 (1984).
535

Spinelli

v.

Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 240

5ib

Spinelli, 243.

And

1987 amendment
disputes

is

in

(1984).

Archambctult the Court chided the legislature as follows. "The assumption of the

that other States' courts will be unwilling or unable to protect children in custody

unwarranted."
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cases one finds language like the
following.
construction]

"We

address this suggestion [statutory

so as to avoid the constitutional
question

first

if

it

is fairly

possible to

de C1 de the case on other grounds."Or, "[w]e are mindful of 'our
duty
statute in a

way

to

to construe a

avoid Constitutional problem'." 538
While the justices are willing

to

act as necessary, they will be
cautious and conservative in their
approach. This

approach

to judicial

review was summarized well by former
Chief Justice Wilkins.

If s an effort that has to be undertaken
with substantial restraint and most
of the standards that apply to deciding the
constitutional

issue are very
favorable to the Legislature, that we
don't expect them to do more in
most instances than do something that at
least has some reasonable
rational basis. So, when they are out
of line, that's our function It's
indispensable.

These routine applications of judicial review
once again point out

that the

justices of the state's high court can be
involved in incremental policy-making without

necessarily engendering conflict. Looking back
at the three theories surrounding the

separation of powers which were presented in Chapter

help to explain the relative ease of these interactions.

1,

the efficiency perspective can

It is

true that

some of these

could be understood from either a libertarian or Madisonian perspective.

Many

cases

did

involve the Court ensuring that individual liberties were protected from
actions by the
majoritarian branch of government (whether these be the right of a criminal
defendant
to confront her accuser or the right

of a wealthy citizen not

to

be taxed progressively).

A few others kept the legislature from imposing on the realm of other governmental
entities,

537

whether

Globe Newspaper,

™Waltham
5W

it

be the City of Boston, the justices of a Massachusetts

trial

court, or

192.

Tele-Communications, 751 citing Attorney General

Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

23 April 1999.
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v.

Colleton, 387 Mass. 790 (1982).

the Congress of the
Un.ted Sta.es.

However,

i,

beeause the Court

is

cons,der the application of
speeific laws to specifie
individuais that

problems eonld be

identified.

Withont attempting

legislature in enacting these
laws,

the unconstitutional effect
instance,

i, is

provisions

The

can be safely assnmed that

was secondary

to the original

many of tee

motives of the

in

many of these laws

purpose for the law. For

unlikely that the legislators
planned to create conflicting sentencing

drug statutes

in

it

to look a, the

best piaced to

is

of due process. This was simply
an oversight. 5 "

in v.olation

division of responsibilities
between the branches helps to ensure
that such

oversights can be corrected.

There are some cases, however,
justices' decisions

greater.

is

eight of the opinions issued

was overturned

legislature

cases involved

all

541

in

which

the potential political impact of the

Using potential measures of the justices'
own views,

by the SJC from 1981

rated higher

on the

to

This

may

541

This

in

which an

political Richter scale.

act

of the

Seven of these

seven justices and six of them involved dissents. 542
Another

indication of the broader significance of these
cases

not apply to

mind include

1995

all

of the

statutes discussed above.

is

that half

of them involved parties

Exceptions which

come immediately

to

the child videotape testimony law and the tax laws.

not to deny that each of the above-mentioned decisions had an
impact, sometimes on many
Changing tax laws, allowing prisoners to register to vote, giving landlords a right to
jury
trial when the actions of a local cable company result
in a taking of a portion of their property, allowing a
defendant to have a jury trial in her drug forfeiture case - these all had an impact
on citizens in the
is

individuals.

Commonwealth.
54
~

There

views.

is

In terms of political fallout, however,

no guarantee, of course,

Why all

seven justices chose

may

that these factors represent
to participate in a case

less important.

an accurate insight into the justices'

was not always

evident. In addition the
not really raise the case to a level of political importance. Similarly, five
participate and agree on cases in which the political fallout may be greater than expected.

dissent of one justice
justices

most of those cases were

The opinion on

may

the legislation regarding videotape testimony

advocacy agency

in

state's prosecutors,

decision had been

Massachusetts and

were

made

I

remember

less than pleased

that

many

is

one example.

in the

I

worked

for a child

advocacy community,

with the decision. Conversely, the defense bar

to interpret art. 15

as well as the

felt

the right

of the Declaration of Rights to guarantee a face-to-face

confrontation.
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who

filed

amicus curiae

cases were

more

briefs representing a
variety of parties.

controversial than others, they

use of power, the SJC and

when

they feel

Two

is

it

all

indicate that while cautious
,n their

justices are not afraid to use
the

its

While some of these

power of judicial review

necessary to uphold constitutional
protections.

of these cases are particularly
good representations of the forceful
yet

cautious approach of the Court and
the dialogue which can occur
with the Legislature
in constitutional questions.

of overbreadth a

statute

In

1988 the SJC, by a vote of 4-3, struck
down on the basis

which made

it

a crime to photograph a nude
minor.

As

Justice

Wilkins noted for the majority, the law
under question "makes a criminal
of a parent

who

takes a frontal view picture of his
or her naked one-year-old running
on a beach or

romping

in a

wading pool." 543 The

more conservative members of the Court

three

dissented from this decision, with Justice
O'Connor finding that posing children

conduct and not speech and
General Court didn't

left to

determine

(and found

it

whether the

543

4

MS

546

I,

As

546

not).

When

statute could stand

v.

asked

on

no time

in

amending

the statute to

the United States

its

to

consider for the

face under

at

605 (Oakes

art.

Supreme Court,

in

the

SJC was

question was overbroad

first

time on reargument

16 of the Declaration of Rights, the

I).

605. Justices Nolan and Lynch joined in the dissent.

Statute 1987, c.294, §1.

the legislature had

amended

the statute prior to oral

Court, the overbreadth issue on which the
to

lost

applied to the defendant

Oakes, 401 Mass. 602,

at

and

Amendment. 544 The

which the photographic representation was done "with

Upon remand from

O'Connor dissenting

Added by

in

if the statute as

was

Commonwealth
Oakes

545

therefore not protected by the First

like the result either,

cover only those instances
lascivious intent."

is

is

argument before the United States Supreme

Commonwealth had appealed

be moot.
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to the

Supreme Court was found

SJC

refused to eonside,- ,he
defendant's argument as h

been raised

had,,',

n, a

„n,l y

manner.

The second ease
as restrained a

manner

in

which the justices exercised

their

power of judicial review

as possible involved a
challenge to the

in

Commonwealth's newly

enacted stalking statute.The Court agreed with the
appellant that the statute as
written

was unconstttuttonally vague
and

Justice Wilkins, writtng for

the defendant's claim must
prevail.

seven justices, developed

all

Which would, prospectively, eliminate

a

However,

construction of the statute

the problem of consftuttonalhy.

It

is

appropriate lor this court to
interpret a statute prospectively
to eliminate uncertainties
-ts

construction and

Rather than strike
that the intent

in

order to reflect the presumed
intention of the Legislature." 548

down

the statute in tins instance,
the Court felt reasonably confident

of the Legislature could be determined

statute for future application in
a

To

m

this point the reader

in

such a

way which would avoid

could be

left

way

as to construct the

constitutional problems. 549

with the impression that the justices' use
of

judicial review rarely presents a true
challenge to the authority of the Legislature since
in the

few instances when they do

strike

down

a statute the intent

of the Legislature

rarely affected in the long run. There were
six cases decided by the

is

SJC from 1981

to

1995, however, which reinforce the tact that the Court will
challenge the Legislature

when

it

review

547

54x

549

feels this

in

is

necessary. These cases each represent classic instances of
judicial

which the justices say

Commonwealth

v.

to the legislators,

"we know what you

arc trying to

do

Kwiatkowski, 4 8 Mass. 543 (1994).
1

Kwiatskowski, 547.
/-t

•

Contrast this with the Court's action in Gagnon, Marrone, and Bongarzonv in which (he
justices
necessary to strike down the drug statutes being challenged as the legislative intent could not be

determined from contradictory clauses.
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fell

n

and you

can't

do

that."

The

first

two of these, while not
affecting broader

constituencies, clearly
challenged the Legislature's
political desires,
state senator

George Bachrach challenged

the validity of a statute

fa the first,

ormer

which prohibited an
,

individual from using the tern,
"independent" on nomination papers
and ballots
elections,

,n state

550

In a 4-1 decision, the

major parties

SJC

struck

down

this

obvious attempt by the two

to eontro. the election
process as a violation

of protections

in

both the

Federal and State Constitutions
regarding freedom of speech,
association, and equal
protection.

551

Justifying the Court's use
of judicial review in this ease, .lust.ee
Kaplan

quoted Archibald Cox, Lawrence
Tribe, and former Chief
Justice Burger on the

importance of judicial review

to protect the

democratic process. The quote from
Tribe

presents a particularly clear
enunciation of the vital role the
judiciary must play
instances

in this

in

such

system of separated powers.

Constitutional review of election and
campaign regulation amounts in
latge part, to accommodating
the fear of a temporary majority
entrenching itself with the necessity of
making the election a readable

barometer of the electorate's preferences.
It is not surprising,
therefore
of judicial review of election laws has been
roughly
proportioned to their potential for immunizing
the
that the vigor

from successful

attack.

current leadership

552

This view was not shared by the entire Court.
Justice Braucher, writing

in dissent,

called the majority's actions "an example of
premature, unnecessary, and mischievous
judicial interference with democratic procedures."' 51

550

Bachrach

v.

Despite this argument to the

Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1X2 Mass. 268 (1981

).

551

As Justice Kaplan noted in the majority opinion, "[ultimately the 1979 regulation might he expected
discourage from the beginning an appeal to voters on grounds of the candidates' independence
irom
fri
established parties and thus to protect those parlies from a conventional style
of criticism and attack
to

(276.)

v

Bachrach, 261 quoting L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional
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Law 774

(1

978).

.

contrary, the majority
had no difficulty informing
the Legislature that their
attempt to

control the legislative
process for the benefit of those
in

A
also

second case which involved

deeded

in

battles

power was

between individual

unconstitutional.

political players

was

1981 in a rare 4-3 decision.In the Fiscal Year 1982
Budget the

Legislature had conditioned
the allocation of Local
Aid funds to Boston on the

maintenance of a specified
political implications

level

of police and

of this case

in context,

fire

it

is

protects

in the City.

To

put the

important to remember that this

occurred short.y after Proposition
2-1/2 (provision for limiting
local property taxes)

was enacted by

the voters. There

were struggles going on

throughout the Commonwealth over

how

in cities

to live within the limits

and unions representing various groups
(including police and
active at this time. There

Boston area

On

is little

legislators at the urging

the other side, of course,

how

being told
action

limitation

was not

was

to allocate its

was based on

commonly

doubt that

article

called the

Home

the

budget

this

provision was added to the budget by

in

such

The

detail.

89 of the Amendments

in their

community.

to the

cities

all cities

Home

Massachusetts Constitution,
that since

and towns

in

and towns, or

no such

Massachusetts
to a class

Bachrach, Braucher dissenting, 28

Mayor ofBoston
decided

v.

Rule Amendment. Four justices of the SJC

money

1

Treasurer and Receiver General, 384 Mass. 7 18. Less than

in these years resulted in a full court dividing so evenly.
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this

of not

agreed, but instead of eliminating the conditional language and allocating the

553

bristled at

constitutional challenge to this

Rule Amendment. Boston argued

required by the

were particularly

fire)

government of the City of Boston which

a "general law which apppl[ies] to

is

which 2-1/2 imposed,

of fire and police associations

was imposed on any of the other 350

fewer than two" as

and towns

2%

of the cases

as

the City of Boston had
requested, the Court struck

down

the entire line

hem,

effectively

stopping Local Aid from going
to Boston until the
Legislature acted again.

Recognizing the repercussions of
this
are

action, Justice Wilkins
wrote for the Court,

aware of the disruptive consequences
of the

result

we

reach in this case... It

however, often precisely when
seductive, extraneous pressures
are most intense

need

greatest forjudges to focus

is

was eliminated, focusing on

on constitutional

constitutional principles

principles."

to other political actors

Three justices dissented

in the

when

it

in the

is,

that the

While the condition

its

decision. Clearly the

feels so compelled.

Boston Local Aid case. 556 Chief Justice

Hennessey, writing for himself and Justices
Lynch and Liacos, determined
challenged phrase

[w ]e

meant the majority of the Court

alienated both the Legislature and
the City of Boston with

Court will stand up

555

"

that the

budget was only a "condition upon a grant
of money" and not

an "obligation or mandate." 557 In a second
dissent, Justice Liacos, joined by Justice

Lynch, saw

this

Amendment,
Again,

case as presenting a conflict between two
provisions in the Articles of

63 which outlines the budget procedure and

art.

in the face

Boston

v.

of alternative arguments and

art.

political pressure

89,

Home

from

Rule.

a variety

of

Treasurer, 20.

556
It is

interesting to note that the Court split

conservative justices

on

this

case along atypical lines. The three most

who

often dissented together were Nolan, Lynch, and O'Connor, occasionally
joined by Hennessey. Liacos and Abrams dissented together most often on what
could be called "the
liberal

wing" of the Court.

In this case the majority included Wilkins,

Abrams, Nolan, and O'Connor

while Hennessey, Lynch and Liacos dissented.
557

Boston

States

v.

Treasurer, Hennessey dissenting, 726. This argument

Supreme Court

in

South Dakota

v.

is

Dole (483 U.S. 203 [1987])

made by the United
which the majority determined
which refused to raise their
not unlike that

in

that congressional action to withhold transportation funds from states
drinking age to 21 offered only "mild encouragement" to states and presented no mandate. The argument
is even less plausible in the Massachusetts case, however, since cities and towns are very
dependent on

the state's annual allotment of aid to supplement income from property taxes.
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sources, the majority of
the justices of the

and towns as provided
In

SJC acted

to protect the

autonomy ofch.es

for in the state's
constitution.

two other cases decided during
these

fifteen years the

SJC again

struck at the

heart of the Legislature's
intent and, in these instances,
the legislative intent

backed up by a variety of
organized

down

the state's

interests in the state.

newly enacted amendments

the due process clause of
the 14*

bill to

the Legislature

to the state's bail statute
as a violation

Amendment.- As

the train of events

to existing bail

law

in

in

United States

described

Weld had submitted

in

a bail

v.

Salerno

in 1987.

559

The

both the state and federal amendments
was to

allow the j udicial authority

to consider the potential

charged when setting

However, the

bail.

is

of

which closely mirrored the Federal
Bail Reform Act

which the U.S. Supreme Court had
upheld
primary change

clearly

In 1993 a 7-0 Court struck

the opinion written by then
Chief Justice Liacos, Governor

reform

was

bill

dangerousness of the individual

proposed by the Governor contained

procedural safeguards which the U.S. Supreme
Court found essential in upholding the
constitutionality of the federal law. In contrast,
"[t]he Legislature chose to eliminate

the procedural protections that were
originally incorporated in the Governor's

The Court acknowledged

that the Legislature

may have done

this out

concern for the major burden these safeguards would put on
the

system

in

which there

558

of a very

state's

Aime

real

criminal justice

are over 100,000 bail releases a year in police stations

county jails alone, as well as over 5,700 arraignments per week

560

bill."

in District

and

Courts

v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667
(1993). It should be noted that the majority opinion in this
representative of the high quality opinions which Chief Justice Liacos often wrote,
particularly in
criminal matters. He cites not only the appropriate federal and state precedents, but
also draws on a
variety of cases from sister courts and from law reviews to fully develop the Court's
opinion.

case

559

560

is

4 81 U.S. 739.

Aime, 683.
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throughout the
to tighten

Commonwealth,-

up the

bail

In effect the

SJC

said to the Legislature if
you

reform measures you must
ensure that

it

want

contains sufficient

safeguards to aeeord with due
process protections, regardless
of the costs. The justices
refused to bend to the political
desires of the Governor, State
Legislature and

prosecutors from throughout the
Commonwealth, and to the general public's
desire to
"get tough

on crime,"

in the face

of a challenge

of arrested individuals who regularly
face

The second case

in

bail

to the

due process

proceedings

in the

wh.ch the Court faced not only the

rights

of thousands

Commonwealth.

will

of the Legislature

but also the desires of an organized
constituency involved a tax statute in
which the
forces for progressive tax reform
again attempted to circumvent the
state's
constitutional requirement that

those individuals

who joined

the Massachusetts

Human

employees union, two

all

taxes be uniform. 562

together to

file

Tax reform advocates included

an amicus curiae brief in favor of the law:

Services Coalition, Massachusetts Fair Share,
the state

teachers' unions, the

League of Women Voters, and Senator John

563
Olver, Senate Chair of the Joint Committee on
Taxation.
Arrayed on the other side

of this

political battle

was

the appellant, Massachusetts

Taxpayer Foundation,

likely

joined by other anti-tax forces in Massachusetts, most
notably the Citizens for Limited
Taxation. The 1985

amendment

to the state's tax statutes

instituted a progressive tax exemption.

By

which was under challenge

a vote of 5-2, the

SJC

struck

down

this law,

561

Aime, 684. The information was compiled by the Attorney General and District
Attorneys of the state
filed an amicus curiae brief in this case. Representing the defense community
in amici were the
Committee for Public Counsel Services and the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers.

who

562

563

Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation

Members from

groups

in the state

v.

Secretary of Administration, 398 Mass. 40 (1986).

these organizations and a variety of other liberal, advocacy, and

worked together

in the

human

services

1980s and early 1990s as the Tax Equity Alliance for

Massachusetts (TEAM).
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noting that while

on

44 allows the Legislature

ability to pay," they

exemptions was

As

art.

Justice

still

said for the Court,

in this case, Justice

Hennessey, determined

of the Constitution.

"[whatever may be the merits of the system

described as the graduated income
tax,

Dissenting

exemptions "based

be uniform. The unmistakable
effect of these

to institute a progressive
tax structure in violation

Lynch

commonly

must

to enaet reasonable

it is

prohibited by article 44." 564

Wilkins, writing for himself and Chief
Justice

that legislative restraint should

have led the justices

to

uphold

the statute, particularly since
article 44 contains an inherent
conflict between the

requirement for uniformity and the
allowance of reasonable exemptions.

would have thought that this court, following
would have expressed deference to the
I

own

its

precedents

Legislature's

exemptions were reasonable
addresses

in this

judgment as to what
circumstance. .Where
this court
.

constitutional challenge to a tax measure,
premise that the tax is endowed with a
presumption
'a

we

begin with the

of validity and it not
be found void unless its invalidity is
established beyond a rational
doubt'. .The Legislature's judgment that
a minor exemption should be
apportioned according to each taxpayer's ability
to pay falls in the range
of reasonableness within which the Legislature
565
is entitled
to

.

to act.

This case represents perhaps the most surprising
exercise of judicial review by
the

SJC

since

heavy burden
Despite this

concerns not a fundamental right which requires the

it

order to

in

fact, the

that the exercise

The

last

were the most

64

565

act,

this statute to

which the Court exercised

politically charged.

In these cases the

to a "liberal"

its

outcome.

power of judicial review

Court rendered opinions dealing

Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, 48.

Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, Wilkins dissenting, 49, citing Andover Savings Bank

Commissioner of Revenue, 387 Mass. 229 (1982), 235.
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test.

be unconstitutional, a clear reminder

of judicial review need not always lead
in

meet a

but a tax law which must pass only a rational basis

Court found

two cases

state to

v.

wit* .he volatile issues of
abortion and the death penalty.
The Court's decision on the
abortion question shows no,
only the Court's willingness
to challenge the authority
of
the Legislature but also

its

independence from trends

decision on the death penalty
shows exactly

how

set

on the national level.*"

involved

In

Its

the state's policy-making

process the Court can become.
In 1981 the

SJC

issued a decision in

Moe

Finance which challenged the
provision of the

which prohib.ted
similar to the

the use of state

Secretary of Administration and

Fiscal

Medicaid funds

Hyde Amendment which

v.

the U.S.

Year 1980 and 1981

for abortion services in

state

language very

Supreme Court had upheld

constitutional against an equal
protection challenge in Harris

v.

McRae

budgets

as

in 19 8 0.

567

In

this

case the Court was asked not only to
overturn an act of the Legislature, but to do
so

in a

way which

ran contrary to

question

evident from the large

this

is

sides of this question.

who

argued

Supreme Court precedent. The

number of amicus

controversial nature of

briefs filed

by

parties

on both

568

that treating

In the face

of this pressure, the Court agreed with appellants

medically necessary abortions differently than other medically

necessary child birth services imposed an impermissible
burden on the exercise of a

fundamental right

in violation

of the due process protections of the Massachusetts

Declaration of Rights. Justice Quiroco, writing for the majority,
noted that "the
Legislature need not subsidize any of the costs associated with child bearing,
or with

m This independence
movement known
5(17

as

will also be seen in the Court's

new judicial

federalism which

development of state constitutional law
discussed at the end of this chapter.

in the

is

448 U.S. 297.

6

Eight amicus briefs were filed in this case. Only four other cases had eight or nine such briefs filed
from 1981 to 1995. Briefs were filed by Preterm, Inc., Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights,
various religion professors, Planned Parenthood Federation of American, Boston
Collective, certain Massachusetts physicians, certain

Women's Health Book
members of the General Court with the

Massachusetts Citizens for Life, and the Women's Bar Association of Massachusetts.
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health eare generally.
However, onee

area of choice,

defend

its

it

it

chooses

to enter the constitutionally
protected

must do so with genuine indifference." 569
The Court

actions against an argument

made by

the state that a judicial
decision

matter would violate the separation
of powers as guaranteed by
Declaration because

would

it

also had to

art.

on

this

30 of the

interfere with the Legislature's
control over the

appropriations process. Quiroco stated
that the Court had "never
embraced the
proposition that merely because a
legislative action involves an
exercise of the

appropriations power,

it is

on

that account

the relief sought by the plaintiffs

is

immunized

against judicial review... Clearly

within our power to grant." 570

Chief Justice Hennessey dissented from
the Court's decision, finding the
majority's distinction from Harris to be
unconvincing. In his dissent the Chief
Justice
issues a clear statement that the majority
had crossed the line

between judicial and

legislative authority.

"It is

clear to

me

which distinguishes
that the majority thus

equate a financial inducement toward childbirth
with an obstacle
to

choose abortion. The logic

Legislature but

it is

fails.

It

may be

to a

woman's freedom

an appropriate argument

to address to the

not a valid premise for a conclusion of unconstitutionality." 571

Dissenters in the final case for discussion were also
concerned that the SJC was

needlessly striking

down

a statute,

first

second because an interpretation of the

because the question was not yet ripe and
statute

which would have saved

constitutional infirmity

was

Colon-Cruz, the case

which the SJC struck down

569

570

571

in

possible. Neither

Moe, 654.

Moe, 642.
Moe, Hennessey

dissenting, 662.

231

view carried the day

in

it

from

Commonwealth

a Massachusetts death penalty

v.

statute for the third

time.- The

first

decision

was

Court determined that a
mandatory death penalty
art.

in

1975 when a majority of the

statute for

rape-murder violated the

26 prohibition against eruel or unusual
573
punishment.
Then

issued an Advisory

Op lni on

to the

House on

seven justices signed the
Opinion which

H0

8

court
c
o urtTn
in

a pending death penalty

bill.

v,e

the

s

was expressed

Justices

answer

*

a

that art

*****
26 of the

Declaration of Rights. .forbids the
imposition of a death penalty
the absence of a showing on
the part of the
.

Commonwealth
Commonwealth

Five of the

said, in part,

otrrtr
^8 v
ONealll,
undersigned
id

1977 the Justices

in

m

in this

that the availability of that
penalty contributes more to
the achievement of a legitimate
State purpose - for example,
the
purpose of deterring criminal conduct than the availability in like
cases of the penalty of life
574
imprisonment.

Paying

little

heed

to the

488 of the Acts of 1979,
considered

in their

Opinion of these five justices the
Legislature passed Chapter
a bill very similar in

down

provisions to the one the justices had

1977 advisory opinion. This law was challenged

of District Attorney of Suffolk County
struck

its

v.

Watson and by

that the

1980

in the case

a 6-1 decision the justices

the statute as being a violation of art.
26, finding that

contemporary standards of decency and

in

punishment was

it

violated

arbitrarily applied.

575

After Watso.n the conflict spread beyond the
Legislature and the Court to the
citizenry

when

in

1982 voters approved an amendment

to the

Massachusetts

Constitution which effectively overturned the SJC's interpretation
of art. 26. Art.

of the Amendments
572

573

3 93

to the

1

16

Massachusetts Constitution reads as follows.

Mass. 150 (1984).

Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 369 Mass. 242. Art. 26 reads as follows: "No magistrate or court of law,
demand excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual Punishments."

shall
574

Opinion of the Justices, 372 Mass. 912 (1977), 917.

575

381 Mass. 648. The history of the death penalty
Hennessey's opinion for the Court in this case.

in this

232

paragraph

is

drawn

largely

from Chief Justice

^er,

6 Constltu,i0 "' ho
shall be construed as
Prohibiting the tmpos.tton of the
punishment of death. The general
eourt
may, for the purpose of protee.ing
the general welfare of
the
uthonze the .mposition of the
punishment of death by the courts of
iaw
having junsdicfton of crimes
subjeet to the punishment of
death.

nlZ

1

The people had spoken and

ST

established that contemporary
standards of decency in

Massachusetts obviously did not preclude
the sentence of death. The
story does not end
here however.

In

December of 1982

(less than six

weeks

after the constitutional

amendment

had been approved by the voters) the
Legislature passed and the Governor
signed
law the death penalty

statute

Court had three questions

which was considered by the Court

to face

when confronted with

in

this case.

into

Colon-Cruz. The

The

first

was

the

threshold question of jurisdiction in which
the Court decided by a 4-3 vote that

although the case was before the Court on an
interlocutory appeal and no penalty of
death had yet been issued, the ramifications
of the Court's decision in
cases

was

serious

enough

that

it

should be answered

at this time.

this

and other

576

Justice Wilkins

dissented on this point, citing his concurrence in
Watson. "The court's approach

unnecessarily 'presents a constitutional confrontation between
Legislature.

I

would have preferred not

circumstances of a particular case make

to identify

it

its

views and those of the

such a conflict unless and

unavoidable'."

until the

577

576

393 Mass. 150 (1984). There were four justices in the majority (Hennessey, Liacos, Abrams,
O'Connor), three who dissented on jurisdictional grounds (Wilkins, Nolan, and Lynch) and two
who
dissented on the constitutional questions (Nolan and Lynch). Chief Justice Hennesssey also
wrote a
concurrence which will be discussed below.
577

Colon-Cruz, Wilkins dissenting, 181, citing Watson, 674. In Watson, Justice Wilkins concurred
because of the jurisdiction question, but ultimately agreed with the majority on the question of the
constitutionality of the death penalty under

question and

art.

26.

made no mention of his view of the

As Chief Justice, Wilkins showed

In

Colon-Cruz he dissented on the jurisdiction
of this new statute.

constitutionality

a strong concern for the administrative problems facing the state's

judiciary so that in addition to constitutional concerns, Justice Wilkins
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was aware of the challenges

a

The second threshold question
confronting

Amendments

prohibited the

Argument was made by

the

amendment, had intended

SJC from considering

Commonwealth

to shield

the Court

is

itself.

and

to

moved

1

16 of the

that the voters, in enacting
this

any death penalty

statute

to the question

from scrutiny by the Court

"that our invalidation

[not] equivalent to prohibiting
the imposition

Finally the Court

art.

a death penalty statute at
all

on any grounds. The majority
determined, however,
statute

was whether

of this

of the punishment of death." 578

of the constitutionality of the statute

Appellants argued that the statute violated
defendant's

art.

12 rights to a jury

be free from self-incrimination. 579
Writing for a 4-2 Court on

trial

this question,

Justice Liacos interpreted the statute
as allowing for the imposition of
the death penalty

only

when

the defendant has been found guilty
after a jury

could not be imposed

if

trial.

The penalty of death

an individual chose to plead guilty to murder

in the first degree,

thereby potentially encouraging an individual
to plead to the same so as to avoid the
possibility effacing the death penalty.

As Liacos

authorize the imposition of the death penalty in a
defendant's

art.

12 rights."

noted, "[t]he General court

way which

may

not

needlessly chills

580

death penalty statute presents to the judicial system. "We haven't
gotten to that [another death penalty
statute] and it will be a tremendous burden on this Court
and on the judicial system and prosecutors and
Committee for Public Counsel Services and everybody to have capital punishment."
(Interview by
author, Boston,

MA,

™ Colon-Cruz,

159.

23 April 1999.)

579

The relevant portions of art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights read as follows: "No
subject shall... be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself... And no subject shall
be
arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived

of his

protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his

property',

life, liberty,

immunities or privileges, put out of the
or estate, but by the judgment of his peers..."

Colon-Cruz, 171. It should be noted that the Court chose to interpret art. 12 of the Declaration
independently from interpretations of similar federal protections, although footnote 33 on p. 171 refers
federal guarantees.

"Although

the orders of the United States

we

rest

to

our decision solely on State constitutional grounds... our review of

Supreme Court since Jackson [United

234

States

v.

Jackson, 390 U.S. 570

1

Justice

that the

Nolan dissented, joined by

Court should have declined

Justice Lynch.

to hear the case since

While he agreed with Wilkins
it

was before

the court

prematurely, he found the other two
questions of such import that he
would respond to
the substance of the Court's
opimon.

1

16 of the

Amendments should

Nolan dissented on both

points, finding that

preclude the SJC from making any
determination on the

constitutionality of a death penalty
statute, whether based on an
12.

And

finally,

which

the Legislature on this topic

this

trial

the majority based

Perhaps most interesting

Recognizing

art.

26 complaint or

he determined that the statute could
be interpreted so as

the death penalty in cases of both
violation on

that this appeal

is

art.

in

and a
its

in

opportunity to address not only

allow for

plea, thereby eliminating the
constitutional

decision.

581

terms of the ongoing dialogue between
the SJC and

the concurrence written

was

to

art.

some ways
art.

by Chief Justice Hennessey.

similar to an advisory opinion, he took

12 concerns about this statute but also a
variety

of other constitutional claims which had been
raised by appellants and amici. 582 These

(1968)] persuades us that the result we reach would be mandated
by the Federal Constitution also "
Liacos, who wrote for the Court in Colon-Cruz, had
encouraged his colleagues to do this in Watson
While the language of the Eighth Amendment... and art. 26... is
not identical, our decisions have utilized
Federal precedent in interpreting our own constitutional
provisions.... While I do not disagree with this
approach, it is also likely that the Constitution of this
Commonwealth may have a separate and distinct

meaning which

is to

be interpreted and enforced by

this court."

58

This is one of the few cases decided by the SJC during the fifteen
years which I studied which could
have been different because of an individual appointment. The two justices
who dissented on the
constitutional question, Nolan and Lynch, were both appointed by
Governor King, a conservative, prodeath penalty Democrat. Justice O'Connor was also a King appointee. In
the Interview by O'Connor I
asked him about the appointment process. During the process he was, of course,
interviewed by the
Governor, first for the vacancy which Lynch filled. "I had, In talking with [Governor] King... I was
a
very strong advocate of no abortion and no death penalty. And he was with me so much on the abortion
question. .he was clapping, clapping when I told him. But when he heard the other, he didn't feel
the
same way. So I figured that's the end of that. And I didn't get the appointment anyway. But then
another appointment came up eight months later[.]" (Intervew with author, Shrewsbury, MA, 21 May
1999.) O'Connor was appointed to that vacancy. If King had appointed a third death penalty opponent,
.

Colon-Cruz might have ended

differently (although in that instance Wilkins might

majority on the constitutional question).
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have sided with the

included questions regarding
the vagueness of the statute,
consideration of whether the
statute allows for

meaningful appellate review, the
quest.on of whether the penalty

proportional to the deed in

all

instances provtded for under
the statute, and a discussion

of the adequacy of the indictment
procedure under the death penalty
If it is

is

assumed

that the Legislature
constitutional death penalty
statute,

statute.

may

intend to construct a
preferable that the court should
speak now rather than a year or
several years hence... By reason
of the
course we have chosen, the
opinion of this court, as well as the
briefs of
the many persons and
organizations who have addressed the
court in this
case, are available to the
Legislature and to any other concerned
person.
it

is

Hennessey's concurrence provides a
good example of the cooperative role which
the

Court and the Legislature can play.
While striking down
justices recognizes that the Legislature

may want

ease this process Justice Hennessey
(contrary to

provided guidance so as
constitutional law

From 1975

is

to

death penalty statute, the

to enact another in the future.

strict rules

To

of appellate review)

avoid the need for further discussion

finally enacted.

to

this

in the future

before a

584

1984 the SJC and the Legislature were involved

in

an ongoing

conversation (debate?) over the development of a death
penalty statute in

582

Five amicus curiae briefs were filed

in this case. Two separate briefs from two of the
(Delahunt of Norfolk County and Flanagan of Suffolk County), and
one each from the Attorney General, the Massachusetts Defenders
Committee (predecessor of the

Commonwealth's

district attorneys

'

Committee for Public Counsel Services), the Boston Bar Association, and Massachusetts
Citizens
Against the Death Penalty.

As Liacos notes in the majority opinion, while a fundamental principle of appellate review
is that "a
court should only consider the issue dispositive of the case," he does recognize
the value of Hennessey's
opinion which technically went beyond

this principle. "We add that we consider the partial summary of
other areas of constitutional concern by the Chief Justice, in his concurring opinion,
to be helpful in that
his comments and suggestions may alert the Legislature to other issues it may wish
to consider, should it

decide to take further legislative action." {Colon-Cruz, 153-154.)

Colon-Cruz, Hennessey concurring,
584
It

1

80.

should be noted that while the Massachusetts Legislature has considered various death penalty
none had been enacted as of 2001.

statutes since 1984,
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Massachusetts.

One of the more

this interaction is

Cruz. After

known

all,

that the

why

there

interesting questions

was not more

which comes out of a review of

from the Court's decision

fallout

the Legislature and the
citizenry had continuously

made

in

their

Colon-

views

Massachusetts system of criminal
justice should include the death

penalty as a punishment for the
most heinous of crimes. While the
Court
legal distinction

between the original

unconstitutional and the
suspect, the result

was

art.

26 basis

art.

made

a clear

for declaring such a statute

12 basis for finding a specific statute
to be constitutionally

the same.

The popular

will

was thwarted.

Justice

Lynch

provided an interesting answer when
asked about the lack of legislative
response

1984 decision. "Because the Legislature
subject of capital punishment.

1

itself, I

think,

is

to the

so delicately divided on the

mean, when the Court dealt with a

bill that

had been

passed, 49 or 50 percent probably agreed
with the Court." 585
Justice Lynch's response not only
provides insight into this specific question,

but

it

also serves as a reminder of when the
Court

policymaker. As with the SJC's

common

law

is

the

most effective

activities in tort

die cases of the 1980s, 586 the Court often has
the most impact
difficulty acting.

law and

when

Whether because of close divisions between

as a

in the right to

the Legislature has

legislators as

may have

existed in regard to the death penalty and right to die, or
because of a political desire

not to act if possible (as with questions of governmental immunity
in tort claims and

perhaps, for

some

legislators,

void or deciding a close

with the right to

call rather

Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

25

These developments were discussed

voice

is

than taking the polity in a direction

May
in

die), the Court's

1999.

Chapter

4.
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often filling the

it

clearly does

no, wan, ,o move, jud.cial
policymaking

may

not be as undemocratic as
critics often

fear.

SEPARATION OF P OWFRS
The SJC employed

its

THE EFFECT of U DIr iAI
i

power of judicial review sparingly

.

rf.vifu,

in the years

under

study and, except for a couple
of "big bang" cases, the impact of
judicial review on
policy questions affecting the
citizens of the state was limited.
Again, this
that this

power

is

unimportant.

As

Justice

say what you've done, Mr. Legislator,

and

it's

our job to say

Knowing

that the

SJC

that.

is

That really

there as a

the Legislature from enacting

is

is

Nolan noted,

violative of the Constitution.

the

power of the Supreme

watchdog may be enough

"reasonable minds

may

in

in

differ").

not to say

somebody

And we

to

say so,

Judicial Court."

many

what may be an unconstitutional law.

the Legislature rarely needs this, there
are instances

overstep their boundaries (or

"[tjhere has to be

is

587

instances to keep

In addition, even if

where they may inadvertently

which, as Justice Lynch described these instances,
588

All of the thirty-one cases in which the

SJC exercised

review between 1981 and 1995 could be seen as ways

to

the

power of judicial

keep the Legislature

in check,

avoiding the potential tyrannies which the separation of powers was
developed to
avoid.

As

detailed in Chapter

government impose

their will

one form of tyranny

1,

is

that in

which the minority

on the majority. These cases most often involve cases

which the Legislature has stepped

into the

Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

3

Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

25

588
"

May

1999.

May

1999.
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in

realm of another political actor; seven of the

cases analyzed involved such considerations. Four cases involved actions by the
587

in

.

Legislature which the Court found
to interfere with the
authority of the U.S. Congress,

while a sixth case found the
Legislature stepptng into
constitution to the cities and towns. 58 '
this

purpose occurred

activities, reinstating

tn Spinelli

The

when

territory reserved

under the

state's

prototypical exercise of judicial
review for

the Legislature

was

interfering with judicial

an eminent domain proceeding which
a lower court had

dismissed. Clearly the Court should
act to protect the judicial
domain from

encroachment by the Legislature.
that

Bachrach

,

little

one could argue

the case involving the use of the
term "independent" on nomination

papers and ballots,
there's

Finally, in the sixth such case,
while

doubt

is

a civil liberties case,

that the bill

was enacted

it

seems

to

fit

well in this category since

to protect those in

power from

electoral

challenge.

The other twenty-four cases involved

the Legislature overstepping

boundaries (in the eyes of the Court) and moving
into the areas of citizens'
are protected

from

all

government

activities.

Ten of these cases

its

lives

which

clearly involved

criminal due process rights, 590 while another two involved
the right not to have one's

property taken without just compensation. 591

Laws

in three cases

were found

to violate

equal protection or due process guarantees in various judicial and
quasi-judicial
settings,

589

592

one denied prisoner's the

Federal conflicts existed in

right to vote,

Commonwealth

v.

593

and one was found

Federico (ERISA); Archambault

v.

to infringe

on

Archambault

(Federal Parental Kidnapping Act); and American Trucking Association and Perini Corporation
(interstate commerce). Interference with Boston activities occurred in Mayor
of Boston v. Treasurer and
Receiver General.
590

Commonwealth v. One 1972 Chevrolet Van, Commonwealth v. Gagnon, Commonwealth v. Marrone,
Commonwealth v. Bongarzone, Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, Commonwealth v. Oakes, Commonwealth
v. Bergstrom, Commonwealth v. Arment, Aime v. Commonwealth, Commonwealth
v. Kwiatkowski.
591

Waltham Tele-Communications and Massachusetts Wholesalers of Malt Beverages
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free speeeh rights

rights

of private charitable organizations

were protected

in

Moe,

594

In addition,

women's privacy

the privileges and immunities
of state citizenship were

protected in Massachusetts Council
of Construction Employer, and contract rights
of
state

employees

consider

in

Massachusetts Community College
Council While

civil liberty

which the property

rights

by the

of individuals, or the right

their practice

however. In order

in the state

to

may

Petition
St.

593

5 4

595

ofDSS to Dispense

as "the

Pendergast.

Cepulonis

v.

Secretary of Commonwealth

Emerson College

v.

is

not the only influence the Court

state's constitution

state

with Adoption (1983),

v.

v.

This

it

in the

at the

movement over

federalism."

Murphy

v.

Department of Industrial Accidents and

Attorney General

City of Boston, Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation

Administration, Lonstein

in state public

necessary to look

is

of Massachusetts

new judicial

Germaine

Planned Parenthood

of

596

understand the overall role which the SJC plays

known

all

system of separated powers, limited

in a

be.

degree to which the SJC has involved the

592

of a different kind are

through the development of constitutional law,

policy questions as the interpreter of the

the last twenty years

in

be free of progressive taxation,

clearly accept the exercise of judicial
review, with

of this power

has on public policy

to

that minority interests

antidemocratic tendencies, as legitimate

though

easy to

state constitution. 595

The justices of the SJC
its

is

claims as only encompassing liberal
outcomes, the four cases

were upheld by the Court are a reminder
also protected

it

v.

v.

Secretary of

Commissioner of Revenue, and Globe Newspaper Company.

596

1 would emphasize that this assessment is only a statement on the overall impact of judicial review on
public policy questions in juxtaposition to the dominant role played by the Legislature. For those

individuals involved in these questions, and for those
activities are vital.

Overall, the Court seems to

who may come

remember

after, the

impact of the Court's

words of Sir William Blackstone -- "Every
wanton and causeless restraint of the will of the subject, whether practised by a monarch, a nobility, or a
popular assembly, is a degree of tyranny." Commentaries on the Laws of England, Volume 2, Bk. iv.
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the

SJC

AND THE NEW JIini dAL FFDFR 41 ism _
AN INDEPENDENT VOIPF ^
5

The

principle of separated

for intra-state relations.

activities

of other courts

to the

affects judicial activity

At the same time, however, the Court
in the nation

thirty years this principle has

judicial scholars

powers

is

"new" practice of some

interested in the

new judicial

state courts using provisions in their
state constitutions

that

which has been developed by the U.S. Supreme Court
under
of Rights.

Bill

develop an independent body of constitutional
law separate from

598

The SJC of Massachusetts has been an

movement, one which

SJC

sees

its

last

federalism which refers

bills

and

influenced by the

through the principle of federalism.
Over the

and

to

setting the context

been the subject of a substantial amount
of discussion by

who have been

of rights

by

is

active participant in this

important for a variety of reasons to understanding

role in the state's political system. First, as

section of this chapter, the state's high court

of constitutional interpretation
SJC's involvement in the

the U.S. Constitution

in

is

was noted

in the

how

the

previous

generally conservative in using

its

power

overturning acts of the Legislature. Looking at the

new judicial

federalism reminds us that the Court, while

at

times restrained, does not operate out of a fear of challenging standards established by

597

Much of this

section draws from two unpublished papers which

I

have written: "Protecting the

Individual: Search and Seizure in the Massachusetts Constitution" presented at the

Science Association, April, 1994

in

Salem Massachusetts; and "Banned

in

New

England

the Massachusetts Constitution," presented at the Northeastern Political Science Association,

1994
598

in

Political

Boston? Free Speech Under

November,

Providence, Rhode Island.

n

See chapter

movement

is

1

for a

list

of works which discuss

this

movement

perhaps a misunderstanding of history. As noted

the Bill of Rights

were applied

to the states, liberties

constitutions as interpreted by state courts.

A

in general.

earlier,

To

see this as a

new

before most of the provisions of

were only protected from

reminder of this can be seen

state infringement

by

state

on the
Massachusetts Constitution in many of the statutes declared unconstitutional before 1936. Another
reminder of this can be seen by the fact that 17 states had recognized the exclusionary rule as a
in the reliance

constitutional guarantee under their own state constitutions as early as the 1920s. (Massachusetts was not
one of these.) 9Charles Johnson and Bradley C. Canon, Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact
[Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1984], 43.)
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other authorities in the political
system.

As

will be

shown, the Massachusetts Court
has

often challenged trends set
by other states and by the federal
courts.
activity

of the Court also provides a
reminder

measure of a

state

supreme

court's level

via constitutional interpretation
the law

which the Court has developed

activity in questions

A
that

it

of activity

in the state's

would be misleading. At

a challenge to a co-equal branch
of
its

that looking to judicial

is

look

at this

review as the sole

policy-making process

least in the case

in constitutional questions

government

A

of the SJC,

which do not present

as vital to the policy of the state as

is

of judicial review.

third reason for taking a brief look
at the

provides another example of the

way

in

SJC and new judicial federalism

which the system of separated powers

Massachusetts tends not toward conflict, but toward
cooperation. As noted

One, the system of separated powers

is

sometimes the

case.

Chapter

There was certainly an

extended debate between the SJC and the Legislature over
the death penalty
Massachusetts, for instance. However,

is

in

in

generally assumed to generate conflict, with

is

each branch struggling for power. This

"area of expertise," there

is

when one branch

less conflict

in

or another operates within

and more cooperation.

It

its

does not mean that

other branches always agree with the outcome, but they do recognize
the other branch
is

operating within

its

accepted "circle" of responsibility. As will be shown below,

has largely been the case with SJC's participation in the

new judicial

particularly in extending state rights to criminal defendants

the U.S.

Supreme Court

in the last thirty years.

242

this

federalism,

beyond those provided by

THE

^SSS^S^
New judicial

federalism was, until the early
1990s, defined predominantly as
the

practice of state high courts using
their
to citizens

CONST,T, TI ON, AND THE RIGHTS OE

under their

own

constitutions to provide greater
protection

state constitutions than

was provided under

the U.S. Constitution

by interpretation of an increasingly
conservative Supreme Court. The
assumption was
that this

was

assumption.

a liberal

A

renewed

Burger ascended
1969.

The

movement. Looking

to its origins, this wasn't a
surprising

interest in state constitutions occurred
shortly after

to the position

shift in leadership

the appointment of Harry

Warren

of Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court

on the Court from Earl Warren

Blackmun

in

to Burger,

,n

combined with

1970 and Justices Powell and Rchnquist

in

1972, sent tremors through the civil libertarian
community. There were serious

concerns that the

liberal

advances won during the Warren Court

era, especially

in the

area of criminal due process rights, would be wiped
out by the Burger Court. Civil
libertarians

call

began

went out

to look

to state

state constitutions

avenue

to

elsewhere for continued protection of individual

supreme courts

to

fill

the void.

They were encouraged

be "taken out of the drawer," dusted

off,

A

to sec that

and reviewed carefully

as an

develop a jurisprudence of state constitutional law which would continue

protect individual rights.

William Brennan

who

One of the

now famous

found himself more and more frequently

article written in 1977, Justice

to step into the

breach

left

to

chief proponents of this measure was Justice

dissenting from decisions which were eroding rights

599

rights.

won under

the

Brennan issued "a clear

by the federal courts

Warren Court.

In a

call to state courts

in protecting rights."

"State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights," 503.

243

in the minority,

599

The assumption
liberal effect,

that a return to state constitutions

however, overlooked the

courts and constitutions did not

would necessarily have

fact that calls for a

come from

renewed emphasis on

promoted a greater reliance on

encouraged the federal courts

and innovate, particularly
justice,

maintaining states as viable political

Court was one of non-interference

autonomy

With

and allow

in the criminal justice area." 600

state

role for state courts.

state courts.

to restrain their actions

Rehnquist had encouraged

state

the liberal end of the spectrum alone.

Moderates and conservatives also advocated an
increased
Justice Burger

a

Chief

Justice Harlan, he

states to

While

still

in the judicial

"experiment

an associate

realm as a means of

entities.

In general, the attitude

in matters

considered to be "local,

of the Burger
in areas

such as

criminal justice, education, apportionment, censorship,
welfare assistance, interstate

commerce, and labor-management

The degree
influenced

its

to

relations."

601

which the conservative origins of the new judicial federalism

outcome were seen

in

Barry Latzer's extensive

years of state court activity in criminal law. 602
state

high courts

results

state

in

which they

rely

which many who advocated

on
the

their

He found

own

that

own

study of 20

most of the decisions of

constitutions do not have the liberal

movement would

high courts tended to interpret their

fifty state

expect. Instead,

constitutions to

many of the

match the conservative

600

Stanley H. Friedelbaum, "Independent State Grounds," in State Supreme Courts: Policymakers
Federal System, Mary Cornelia Porter and G. Alan Tarr, eds., 3
It has been suggested that Chief
1

in the

.

Justice Burger's desire to see state courts take on increased responsibilities

came from a practical desire
saw it as a mechanism for controlling the Supreme Court's caseload. See Susan P. Fino, The
Role of State Supreme Courts in the New Judicial Federalism, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 987),
as well; he

1

2.

601

Mary Cornelia

Inquiries for a
602

Porter, "State

New

Supreme Courts and the Legacy of the Warren Court: Some Old
Supreme Courts, Porter and Tarr, eds., 8.

Situation," State

State Constitutions

and Criminal Justice (New York: Greenwood
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Press, 199

1

).

interpretations

whieh were being developed by

the U.S.

Supreme Court

1970s and 1980s. Most interesting
for purposes of this study

is

in the late

that Latzer

found only

Massachusetts and Alaska matched the
expected outcome of liberal
interpretations of
the state constitutions.- In
the twelve cases in Latzer's study
in

option of accepting or rejecting the
federal lead

Rights as

it

affects criminal defendants,

it

in interpreting the state's

chose a more

This clearly shows an independent
court willing

which the SJC had the

liberal

path

Declaration of

of the time. 604

75%

to chart a path separate

from other

courts on both the federal and state
levels.
In all

of these cases the SJC was developing

state constitutional

law (and

effectively determining policy in the
criminal justice field) and, most interesting
of all,

these decisions rarely brought the Court
into conflict with the Legislative branch.
In

most instances these cases involved the justices of
the
law enforcement agencies
the state's

trial

courts.

in

state's

high court keeping local

check and overseeing the application of the law through

Furthermore, as the discussion of search and seizure law below

will indicate, the liberal results of this

with the Legislature rather than

in

SJC

activity

opposition to

it.

were sometimes done

Of the

in

conjunction

nine cases in which Latzer

found the SJC rejecting Supreme Court precedent, only one brought the justices
conflict with the Legislature. This

603

A

was

in

into

1980 when the SJC interpreted the "cruel or

variety of interesting studies have sprung from Latzer's work, trying to find an explanation for these

new judicial federalism. See, for instance, Beavers and Walz, "Modeling Judicial
Federalism;" Beavers and Emmert, "Explaining State High-Courts' Selective Use of State Constitutions;"

variations in the

and James G. Cauthen, "Expanding Rights under State Constitutions:

Law Review
604

A Quantitative Appraisal," Albany

63 (2000), 1183.

Latzer, 157-191, passim. Massachusetts rejected the U.S.

Supreme Court lead in nine cases and
more federal precedents in interpreting their
own constitutions, but all except Alaska also adopted an even larger number of conservative positions
from the federal courts. As a result the percentage of cases in which they rejected Supreme Court leads
was well below the 75 percent cut-off point which Latzer used to distinguish what he called "rejectionist"
followed

it

in three.

There were other

states

who

rejected

states."

245

unusual punishment" protection
of art. 26 of the Declaration of
Rights differently than
the

Supreme Court was

interpreting the Eighth

Amendment

in

1980.

605

This makes

it

clear that mterbraneh conflict
need not be present for significant
policymaking to occur.

Of the

nine U.S. Supreme Court precedents
which Latzcr found the SJC had

rejected between the late 70s
and early 90s,

two with

arrest,

two

dealt with search

and seizure, two with

effective representation of counsel,
one with self-incrimination, one

with jury make-up, and one with
the death penalty. 606 Cumulatively
these decisions,
issued between 1979 and 1989 (similar
years to

more

liberal

approach

to criminal defense issues

607
U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the
1960s.

much of this

study), maintained the

which had been representative of the

A

look

at the

way

in

which these nine

cases were decided indicates that the justices
were aware that these were important
decisions. Five of the cases were decided by a
full panel of seven justices (and another
5

District Attorney

v.

Watson, 381 Mass. 648.

606

The search and seizure cases will be discussed in more detail below
and
was discussed in the preceding section of this chapter. The cases in

the death penalty decision

which the SJC rejected other

standards are:

Commonwealth

federal

Robinson, 403 Mass. 163 (1988) (maintaining the Aguilar-Spinelli test
for warrantless arrest based on an informant's tip);
Commonwealth v. Borges, 395 Mass. 788 (1985)
(requiring probable cause for a Terry stop rather than a lower
standard); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 406
Mass. 135 (1989) (adopting a less stringent prejudice prong for the test of ineffective
counsel than that
which had been developed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688
[1984]); Commonwealth v.
v.

Hodge,
386 Mass. 165 (1982) (adopting a stricter standard regarding conflict for co-representation than in Cuyler
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335
[1981]); Attorney General v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790 (1982) (rejecting
Kastigar

v. U.S., 406 U.S. 441 [1972] and calling for a more
liberal requirement of transactional
immunity in exchange for testimony); and Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461 (1979) (rejecting
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 [1965], thereby making it harder for the prosecution to exclude

prospective black jurors).
607

While

Latzer's study

ended

justices issued an opinion in
that art.

1

in 989, the SJC has not backed away from this position. In 2000 the
Commonwealth v. Mavredakis (430 Mass. 848) in which they determined
1

2 provides greater protection to attorney-client contact during interrogations than the

Court required under the 5

th

and 6

th

Amendment

Moran

Supreme

Burbine (475 U.S. 412 [1986]). In
describing this opinion, Donald Harwood, appellate counsel to Mr. Mavredakis in this case, noted the
ongoing commitment of the SJC to protecting individual liberties. "Mavredakis was argued on

November

1

,

1999, the

first

Justice to replace Wilkins].

commitment
signals

its

refusal to be

Know

v.

day of the newly constituted Supreme Judicial Court [Marshall as new Chief

The

to the protection

Protects Right to

in

court's thoughtful

of individual

and well-reasoned opinion underscores

liberties

provided for

in the

its

Massachusetts Constitution, and

swayed by current pendulous trends eroding the rights of the accused." ("SJC
of Attorney Contact," Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, March 20, 2000,
.)
1
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1

by

six)

-

this contrasts

were decided by seven

with the fact that

in the total

The other

justices.

caseload less than

indicator

is

12% of all

cases

the presence of concurring and

dissenting opinions. Five of
these nine cases contained

a, leas,

one opinion

in

addition

to the majority opinion.

It is

real

interesting to note that only the
death penalty decision brought about
any

response from the other political
actors

to the SJC's decision in

Watson

with proposed amendments

what happened

is

in the state.

evidence of the

the exclusionary rule under state law,
effectively
th

Amendment
608

had so desired. This

to say with certainty

amendments

making

limiting the reach of

why something

While

it

is

never possible

did not happen, there are at least three possible

know what

the Court

was doing,

the Court and the

Legislature were working cooperatively, or the Court was
careful to limit
to

ways which would not bring

The

first

and

it

its

policy-

into conflict with the state's elected officials.

of these explanations can be rejected as out of hand. While Latzcr's

study wasn't issued until 1991,
legal

exactly

the federal interpretation of

there less conflict in Massachusetts?

explanations: the Legislature didn't

making

is

the fullest possible extent of protection for
citizens in these

So why was

states.

could have responded

regard to decisions by their high courts.
For

instance, California, Florida and
Michigan adopted

the 4

reaction of the Legislature

fact that they

to the Constitution if they

in several states in

The

it

had been the subject of discussion

political circles for at least ten years.

Some of the

in

Massachusetts

earliest articles

on the

See Latzer, State Constitutions, 36-38 for a review of these three amendments. The changes brought
in the jurisprudence of Florida and California were so dramatic that Latzer compiled different data
for each court, one set from before the amendments and one set for after. The pre-amendment court of

about

both Florida and California, like those of Massachusetts and Alaska, were high-rejection states, adopting
more liberal standards under their state constitutions. After the passage of the constitutional

amendments, however, both states became much more likely to adopt
Supreme Court when interpreting their own constitutions.

the U.S.
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the

more conservative standards of

f

movement coincided with

the 200th anniversary of the
Massachusetts Constitution

1980 while others followed throughout
the decade, many

in

widely read legal

publications such as the Massachusetts
Lawyers Weekly and the Massachusetts

Review m

It is

unlikely that the Legislature

ii

was unaware of these

decisions.

Law

The

second explanation, however, may
partly explain the lack of conflict
over SJC

policymaking

in

these cases, as can be seen by the
Court's activities in the area of

search and seizure law.

° SEIZURE "

TOGETHER

™ E SJC AND THE LEGISLATURE WORK

Three opinions handed down by the SJC

development of search and seizure law

Two

of these cases, Commonwealth

Upton (Upton

1

II

v.

in

in

1985 provide a good picture of the

Massachusetts under new judicial federalism.

Sheppard {Sheppard Iff 0 and Commonwealth

were opinions handed down

after the

overturned the original decisions and remanded the cases
action.

Supreme Court had
to the

SJC

for further

612

In both instances the defendants

searches under the 4

th

had brought challenges claiming of illegal

Amendment and under

art.

14 of the Declaration of Rights.

In

Some of these works include: Henry Clay, "Human Freedom and State Constitutional Law: Part One,
The Renaissance," Massachusetts Law Review 7 (1986), 161-172; Clay, "Human Freedom and State
Constitutional Law: Part Two, The Process," Massachusetts Law Review!] (1986); Edward F.
1

Hennessey, "The Extraordinary Massachusetts Constitution of 1780," Suffolk Law Review 14 (1980),
P. Wilkins, "Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in Relation
to Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution," Suffolk Law Review 14 (1980), 887-930; and
Alexander Wohl, "New Life for Old Liberties - Massachusetts Declaration of Rights: State
873-886; Herbert

Constitutional
M(,

611

612

Law Case

Study,

New England Law Review

25 (1990), 177-214.

394 Mass. 381.
393 Mass. 363.

Commonwealth

v.

Sheppard

(I),

387 Mass. 488 (1982); Massachusetts

v.

Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981

(1984).

Commonwealth

v.

Upton, 390 Mass. 562; Massachusetts

248

v.

Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984).

v

the original eases, the

SJC had deeided

favor of the defendant, basing
their opinions

in

on U.S. Supreme Court precedents
Ih
under 4 Amendment constitutional
law. The

Supreme Court overturned both cases
in

4

th

base

Amendment jurisprudence

in light

in Illinois

v.

of the modification which had been
made

Gates.™ On remand,

the

SJC chose

to

opinions squarely on independent
and adequate state grounds. In his
opinion

its

for the majority Justice Wilkins

further review

makes

this point clearly, shielding the

opinion from

by the Supreme Court with a "plain
614
statement."

While choosing

to

exclude the evidence

in

Upton but not

in

Sheppard,

in

both

cases the Massachusetts justices clearly
rejected the "totality of the circumstances"

of Illinois

v.

Gates and continued

to use the Aguilar-Spinelli test for

determining

probable cause exists to issue a search warrant
on the basis of a confidential
Interestingly, while

both

it

was

GL

1964

2A and 2B were added

to incorporate the exclusionary rule into law.

effects of the decision in the

Mapp

which were made necessary by

case,

462 U.S. 213 (1983)

(creating a

615

The Court

lenient, "totality

issuance of a search warrant based on an informant's

Texas (379 U.S. 108 [1964]) and Spinelli

v.

Chapter 276

and of a succession of decisions of this court

that case."

more

to

This addition "reflected the

notes, however, that the

General Laws do not establish a standard for probable cause, and for

613

tip.

c.276, §2B, thereby incorporating

Legislative policy into their decision. Sections
in

when

a constitutional decision they clearly tied their
decision to

14 and a Massachusetts statute,

art.

test

of the circumstances"

tip in

that the justices

test to

consider

in

place of the two prong test from Aguilar

v.

U.S. (393 U.S. 10 [1969]).

614

In Michigan v. Long (463 U.S. 1032 [1983]) the Supreme Court had made it clear that it would
continue to abide by the "independent and adequate state grounds" principle which it had enunciated

Murdoch

in

City of Memphis (20 Wall. 590 [1875]), refusing to consider a question of law when the state
court had made its decision on state law, as long as the opinion contained a "plain statement" of this
v.

intent.

1

Commonwealth

which applied

v.

Monosson, 35

1

Mass. 327 (1966), 330.

the exclusionary rule as a necessary

remedy

249

Mapp

for 4

lh

v.

Ohio (367 U.S. 643) was the case

amendment

violations to the states.

look to

art.

14 (and find the Aguilar-Spinelli standard

is

required).

It is

opinion, weaving together
constitutional and statutory
requirements
state's

interesting twist to this picture in
a third search and

seizure case decided on independent
state grounds later that

Commonwealth
art.

upholding the

independence from federal law.

The Court added one more

by

in

an interesting

v.

same week.

In

Ford, the SJC reiterated that the standard
of probable cause required

14 in cases involving a confidential informant
could only be met by the two-

pronged, Aguilar-Spinelli standard.
Further,

General Laws required exclusion, so did
majority of the justices

who

supported

law, that

is

While

it

decided that while Chapter 276 of the

One

art. 14.

can't help but

move were

this

Legislature should choose to change their
rule in Massachusetts.

it

mind on

would then

still

preparing the

wonder

way

in

if the

case the

the importance of the exclusionary

be required under federal constitutional

very different from setting an independent state
legislative or constitutional

basis for this protection.

The

controversial protection; but

ideal

if that

is

to

have a legislative-judicial united front on

should

fail,

the

SJC wanted

to

this

have an independent

constitutional basis for protecting individuals against unreasonable searches
and

seizures in the

Commonwealth. Their concern was

Massachusetts Legislature, unlike

never took steps

616

As noted

to

its

for naught,

however, as the

counterparts in California, Florida, and Michigan,

narrow the exclusionary

616

rule.

Part of the reason that there

was

above, Latzer found that the SJC charted an independent course on two search and seizure

One was the rejection of the totality of the circumstances test. The second was
Blood (400 Mass. 61) [1987] in which the Court rejected Supreme Court precedent
regarding electronic surveillance. In a stirring commentary on the importance of the right to be protected
from unreasonable searches and seizures, Chief Justice Liacos (the foremost civil libertarian on the Court
questions in the 1980s.

Commonwealth

v.

during the years under study), wrote for the majority. The SJC determined that warrantless electronic
surveillance with one-party consent

is prohibited by art. 14 despite the Supreme Court decision in U.S.
White (401 U.S. 741 [1971]). Liacos' criticism of the Supreme Court gives a flavor of the sometimes

caustic tone he could adopt. "To gauge the likely impact of unfettered surveillance on the individual's
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.

little

conflict

between the Legislature and the
judiciary, despite the SJCs

fairly

vigorous policy-making activities
since the 1980s, could be because
the Legislature
partner with

them

in

defending the

liberties

of citizens

in

is

a

Massachusetts.

THE SJC AND FREE SPEECH - A MORE
RESTRAINED VOICE
The SJC has continued

to actively use the

an extra layer of protections for persons

who

Massachusetts Constitution

in

developing an independent body of

constitutional law in other areas. In a
previous project

1978 and 1994, very
all

of the 43 cases

body of state

in

little

provide

are charged with a crime. Interestingly,

however, the Court has not been nearly as
active

involving free speech claims under

to

which analyzed SJC opinions

16 of the Declaration of Rights decided between

art.

independence from federal standards was found. 617 In
almost

which the SJC had

the opportunity to develop an independent

constitutional law under the Declaration of Rights,
the Court opted instead

to decide the cases

based on

First

Amendment

doctrine.

years did the SJC decide a case based solely on

be made between the federal and

618
art. 16.

The

one

In

art. 16.

state constitutions

required that a decision be based on

In only

while

two cases during these

a clear distinction could

in the other a state

law

interesting question, of course,

is

sense of security, and to appreciate the absurdity of the White rationale, one need only imagine the kind
of person who does think it reasonable that his every word is overheard and seized for use against him
[The court then quotes the definition of paranoia found in the American Handbook
of Psychiatry before
.

concluding.]

watchfulness
617

Art. 16, as

The world of the White
is

thesis

is

a topsy-turvy

one

in

which

.

the paranoid's delusory

the stance held 'reasonable'." (Blood, 73-74 [emphasis in original].)

amendment by Amendment

security of freedom in a state:

it

77, reads as follows:

ought not, therefore,

to

"The

free speech shall not be abridged." Interestingly, while the original

specific protection of speech

was not added

liberty

of the press

is

essential to the

Commonwealth. The right of
document protected the press, the

be restrained

in the

until 1948.

1

In Commonwealth v. Sees (374 Mass. 532 [1978]) the SJC declared that a local ordinance prohibiting
nude dancing on premises licensed to sell alcoholic beverages was a violation of art. 16, noting that the
state

guarantee could be distinguished from the federal guarantee

251

in this

regard because of the control

why

the difference

between SJC decisions

involving free speech claims?
While
areas of law, a partial explanation
for itself as a

As

policymaker

Latzer's

in the

in criminal justice

some explanation may be found

may

rest also in the role

in the different

which the SJC has adopted

system of separated powers

work looked only

questions and those

in

Massachusetts.

at criminal justice questions,
there

was some

assumption that the predominantly
conservative bent which he found might
be limited,

and

that in other civil liberties
claims state high courts

new ground.

619

However,

later studies

Beavers/Walz and Cauthen
to their

the

own

have found

find, instead, that state

state constitutions in areas

where the

Supreme Court has been most pronounced.

supreme

courts,

Cauthen looked

at

would be more willing

this to

to chart

be inaccurate. Studies by

high courts are more likely to look

retreat

from protection of rights by

In a study of 25

randomly selected

state

21 different areas of law over 25 years and found

the highest level of state constitutional activity
in cases concerning free exercise of
religion, jury trial,

and search and

seizure.

Two

of these were clearly associated with

severe retraction of rights by the U.S. Supreme Court. "Higher
levels of state
constitutional policymaking in the free exercise and search and
seizure areas suggest
that state

supreme courts

are

more

willing to extend rights in 'reactive' settings where

courts are only restoring a right previously guaranteed by the federal courts." 620 This

over liquor regulation granted to states by the 21st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In Batchelder
Allied Stores International (388 Mass. 83 [1983]) the SJC was asked to determine if art. 16 rights had
been violated in a claim raised under the state's civil rights act. While finding that art. 16 could be
implicated in the case, the SJC decided the question (whether a shopping mall could prohibit an
individual from using its facility to gather signatures for nomination papers) could be decided under

(guaranteeing free and
619

art.

fair elections).

See Michael Esler, "State Supreme Court Commitment

to State

Law," Judicature 78 (1994), 255.
i

620

James Cauthen, "Expanding Rights Under State Constitutions: A Qualitative Appraisal," 1 183.
Cauthen raises an interesting point based on this finding. As state courts in most of these cases are only

252

v.

9

would provide some explanation

for the difference

between the S JC's stance on

criminal justice and free speech
questions. While the Supreme Court
has undoubtedly

become more conservative
over the

last

in its rulings

30 years, a similar trend

Perhaps the SJC

felt

no need

to chart

regarding the rights of criminal
defendants

in free

speech protections has not been evident.

an independent course

in protecting free

speech

claims.

A

second explanation

may

lie in

the differences

between the Constitution of the United States
and
traditional practice

of judicial decision-making

is

its

to

which

exist, or

do not

exist,

counterpart in Massachusetts. The

determine federal constitutional

621
questions before questions raised by state
constitutions.
The SJC follows this model

carefully.

622

While

16

art.

is

similar in language to the First

Amendment, many of the

provisions of the Declaration which involve the rights
of criminal defendants are
lengthier and

worded

differently than the cognate provisions of the U.S.
Constitution.

This gives the SJC grounds on which they can distinguish federal
from
to

state protections

develop a separate body of state law.

Having looked
late

at constitutional

questions which the

1970s through the mid 1990s, however,

I

would present

SJC has addressed from

the

a third piece of the

explanation for the difference between the Court's decisions in these two general areas

of law. This
falling

is

that

policymaking while overseeing the

more squarely within

activities

of a criminal

trial

the generally accepted "circle" of judicial responsibilities.

reclaiming rights which had previously been protected by the Supreme Court, federal constitutional law
is still

in the

6J

622

controlling the development of state constitutional law
1998 study of Beavers and Walz.

This

is

despite

Hans Linde's

The only exception

call for state

to this practice

which

in the

U.S. Similar findings were reported

high courts to reverse this order.

I

have found was

253

in

Commonwealth

v.

Colon-Cruz.

This

not to say that there

is

government

(as there

is

no debate on these questions among
the other branches of

was with

the death penalty), but that the
SJC,

procedures on a case-by-case basis

in the

on the

(i.e.,

tip

accepted as a legitimate policy-making
partner

when does probable cause

of a confidential informant),

in the state's political

In acting as the interpreter
of the state's constitution,

conducting judicial review or
Court, the

SJC could be

in charting

said to

walk

at

these

course of hearing appeals, delineating
the

exact lines of relatively
complicated questions
justify the issuance of a search
warrant

which looks

whether

exist to

is

system.

this

be

in

an independent course from the U.S.
Supreme

softly but carry a big stick.

Avoiding judicial

overreaching, the justices exercise their
power firmly but with restraint. The lack of
conflict

which

generally

their

manage

The

role

policymaking

efforts

to stay within the judicial circle

which the SJC adopted

Commonwealth between
interpretation and

have engendered indicate

that the justices

of authority.

developing constitutional law for the

in

1981 and 1995 was not very different from

common

its

role in statutory

law development. Despite the potential differences

between these types of jurisprudence based on questions of democratic
the judiciary continued to exercise

its

power, but was willing

to

accountability,

"converse" with the

Legislature while doing so. This ongoing cooperation could be connected to the final

realm of judicial-legislative interaction
occurs

when

the

SCJ

is

to

be discussed. This

asked by the House or the Senate

We turn now to this.

254

is

the dialogue

to render

which

an advisory opinion.

CHAPTER

6

THE SJC AND ADVISORY OPINIONS:SFPAR 4
T/0N OF POIVFR* VIOLATED?
The Supreme

Judicial Court issued an average
of

244 opinions per year from

1981 to 1995. In only five percent were
questions of judicial review raised, and

in less

than one percent did the justices
of the high court actually declare an
action of the

Massachusetts Legislature to be unconstitutional.
The degree
activit.es ultimately

to

which these judicial

thwarted the will of the people's elected
representatives was even

smaller as the Legislature could easily
have accomplished

its

goal by enacting minor

modifications to several of the law declared
unconstitutional by the SJC
desired.

process through

interpretation,

it

has

of the SJC's relative willingness

In light

shown

somewhat

responsibilities in the area of

its

As noted
which

it

had so

to participate in the state's policy

common

law and statutory

and considering the streak of independence from the
U.S. Supreme Court

in interpreting the state's constitution, the
limited

all

judiciaries in the United States, the

SJC

for questions to be raised before addressing them. 623

in

it

use of judicial review

is

surprising.

Like

623

if

in

Chapter

5,

however, the Court, can

handles cases and the "messages"

it

It is

try to influence

sends

in its

is

a passive institution, waiting

difficult to say

what comes

with any

to its attention

opinions. In previous research

I

by the way

have done on

search and seizure and on free speech protections in Massachusetts, I frequently found footnotes in
opinions like the following. "The defendant correctly asserts that the court has left open the possibility
that it will retain the automatic standing rule of Jones which the United States Supreme Court overruled
in

United States

v.

Salvucci" (Commonwealth

present a clear message to attorneys
to raise this question.
their

"messages."

In

some

v.

Mora, 402 Mass. 262 [1988],

who may have

266.-)

This seems to

an appropriate case in the future that they

cases the justices are critical of attorneys

who seem

to

may want

have overlooked

An example

his brief the defendant

can be found of Commonwealth v. Eagleton, 402 Mass. 199 (1988). "In
makes no argument worthy of the name based on the cognate provision in art. 14

of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. At oral argument, the defendant said he did not rely on the
State Constitution but had concluded that the reasonable search and seizure standards under the State and
Federal Constitutions were the same for the purposes of this case.

conclusion was correct."

messages about

When

We need not decide whether that

asked during an interview whether the Court did sometimes send

the kind of cases

and arguments they wanted
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to hear,

Mr. Daniel Johncdis said

this did

certainty

why some

cases are brought to their
attention while others are not.

It

is

possible that few eases involving
judicial review are raised because
the Legislature
careful to avoid such problems.

is

interpretation (and the fact that

Given the ambiguous nature of
constitutional

many

legislators are at least as interested
in getting

votes as they arc in scrupulously
following constitutional limitations)
however, one

wonders

if

there

may

not be other reasons, either contributing
to the Legislature's

carefulness or independent of that, which
could help to explain the absence of
constitutional conflict between the
Legislature and the SJC.

could be the relatively unique authority
which the SJC has

One

contributing factor

to issue advisory opinions

under the Massachusetts Constitution.
Article

II

of Chapter

III

of Part

"Each branch of the Legislature,

Two

of the Constitution describes

as well as the

Governor or the Council,

this authority.

shall

have

authority to require the opinions of the Justices of the
supreme judicial court, upon

important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions:' 624

about the constitutionality of a law which

would come

to the court after the bill

in

most

states (and

It is

possible that concerns

on the federal

had been enacted, arc resolved

before the Legislature takes final action.

A

look

at

in

level)

Massachusetts

the advisory opinions issued by the

Court was kind of concerned about... the quantity of evidence that was allowed in through the hearsay
rule, and he said 'we invite,' in that opinion he specifically said, 'we invite' counsel who
had like cases
to address this particular issue."
624

Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

14 April 1999.

This section of the Constitution was amended by

article 85 of the Articles of Amendment in 1964. As
was said to lie with the legislature and "the Governor
language was generally ignored and the justices routinely

originally worded, the authority to request opinions

and Council." According to one scholar, this
answered questions asked by the governor alone. Beginning in 1912, however, the Court began to
demand that such requests come from the Governor and the Council. This was the practice until the
language was changed to "Governor or the Council" in 1964. Sec, Cynthia Farina, "Supreme Judicial
Court Advisory Opinions: Two Centuries of Intcrbranch Dialogue," in Osgood ed., The History of the

Law

in

Massachusetts, 353-392. Farina's

advisory process from 1780 to 1990,

See

also,

is

article,

which looks

the source of

at

much of the

the Massachusetts experience with the
historical information in this chapter.

Mel A. Topf, "The Origins and Harly History of the SJC Advisory Opinions," Massachusetts

Legal History 7 (2001), 21-54.
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justices in the 1980s and early
90s

Before looking
unusual power

at the specifics

in

perspective

shows

that this

may sometimes

of these cases, however,

- how does

it fit

in a

it

is

be the ease. 625

necessary to put

this

system of separated powers?

MAINTAI NING SEPARATION - THF FEDERAL APPROaph
All students of constitutional law
are familiar with the U.S.

Supreme Court's

decision to refuse to issue advisory
opinions in the early years of the nation's
history.
In

1

793 Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State

to President

Washington, wrote

to

the justices requesting their opinion
on questions regarding U.S. involvement in
the

ongoing war between France and Great

Britain.

In a letter to the President,

Chief

Justice Jay responded on behalf of the
Court.

We

have

considered [the] letter written by your direction to us
by the
Secretary of State [regarding] the lines of separation
drawn by the
constitution between the three departments of
government. These being
in certain respects checks upon each other,
and our being judges of a
court in the last resort, are considerations which afford strong
arguments
against the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions

alluded

to, especially as the power given by the Constitution
to the
President, of calling on the heads of departments for opinions,
seems to
have been purposely as well as expressly united to the executive

departments.

6" 6

Even if all advisory opinions would have come to the SJC as questions of judicial review, however, it
would not substantially affect the numbers. There were only 33 advisory opinions from 1981 to 1995.
This would have increased the number of cases involving judicial review from 178 to 209
(5% to 6% of
the total caseload).
626

Quoted in Lee Epstein and Thomas Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Institutional
Powers and Constraints, 4 th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001 ), 95 For an interesting appraisal of
the advisory role of justices in these years, one which sees the refusal of the Jay Court to be as

much

a

political position as a philosophical statement

on the separation of powers, see Stewart Jay, Most Humble
Servants: The Advisory Role of Early Judges (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997). James
Thayer also saw this response as pragmatic. "It was, perhaps, fortunate for the judges and their
successors that the questions then proposed came

twenty-nine of them, and they

fill

in

so formidable a shape as they did. They were

three large octavo pages....

Had

they been brief and easily answered,

the Court might, not improbably, have slipped into the adoption of a precedent that
the English usage

upon our national system." Quoted

Opinions," 355.
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in Farina,

"Supreme

would have engrafted

Judicial Court Advisory

The Supreme Court has maintained
of this can be found

in

Muskrat

v.

this position

ever since.

A

clear statement

United States, "The judicial power..

determine actual controversies arising
between adverse
courts of proper jurisdiction/'
Justice

Day

.is

the right to

duly instituted

litigants,

in

then distinguished between the act
of

declaring a law to be unconstitutional
in the course of normal litigation
and the act of

giving an advisory opinion. 'The
exercise of [judicial review]..

body with revisory power over

.is

not given to

it

as a

the action of Congress, but because
the rights of the

litigants in justiciable controversies
require the court to

fundamental law and a law purporting

to

choose between the

be enacted with constitutional authority!.]" 627

This has not always stopped some Supreme
Court justices from engaging
advising within the context of deciding an actual
controversy.

An example

Justice Powell's opinion in Regents
of the University of California

v.

Bakke

in

of this

in

is

which he

offered advice on what type of affirmative action
program might be constitutionally
acceptable.

628

Using the opinion

suggestions to a legislature

is

in a

controversy legitimately before the court to

make

not a practice confined to the federal level. 629 Chief

Justice Wilkins, discussing the activities of the SJC, noted that
Massachusetts justices

occasionally engage in this practice as well.

There are some areas where we may feel it helpful not simply
the given case and discuss policy considerations applicable to

to

decide

it,

but to

6 7

219 U.S. 346 (1911). This limitation refers only to the formal powers of the Court. Individual
justices have advised presidents and legislators even while serving on the bench. For a summary of such
activities, see
628

David O'Brien, Storm Center, 87-100.

4 3 8 U.S. 265. Such

activity did not

similar actions in Bellotti

As an example,

v.

go unnoticed. Powell was

criticized

see Chief Justice Hennessey's concurring opinion in

393 Mass. 150 (1984)

in

by

his colleagues for taking

Baird. See Justice Stevens footnote in this opinion. (443 U.S. 622 [1979].)

which he

Commonwealth

v.

Colon Cruz,

offers suggestions for rewriting the state's death penalty statute so

will pass constitutional muster.
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it

go on and

talk about related matters that
are likely to come up in
subsequent cases which will follow
whatever we've done.. .. Sometimes
it s very helpful to lay
out a road map as to how these
things can be
handled. Sometimes you stick your
neck out and you don't have briefs
on the point and you've thought the
best you can about it but
y
conclude that you didn't really take note
of the fact that some ing
would come up which makes whatever
you've said either wror

more

wrote

The

likely, not as universally
applicable as

refusal of the U.S.

a variety of grounds.

Supreme Court

One argument

at the original intention

Convention a proposal

of those

at the

a veto

to issue

time you
J

advisory opinions

is

justified

on

against such a practice could be found
by looking

who framed

to establish a

which would exercise

justices

you thought

it.

the Constitution.

At the Constitutional

Council of Revision involving Supreme Court

power over

acts of the legislature

was voted upon

and rejected four different times. 631 James Madison,
one of the proponents of this
measure, recognized there
eventually

become

to

the veto

be two concerns to including justices

power of the

in

what would

President. First, "that the Judges ought not to

be subject to the bias which a participation

in the

making of laws might give on

the

exposition of them." Secondly, he noted the concern that "the Judiciary
Department

ought

to

be separate and distinct from the other great Departments." 632

While the original

intent

argument would apply only

theoretical concerns underlying the exercise of this
630

Interview by author, Boston,

use of dicta.
"Well,

we

supposed

When

asked what

MA,

to the federal courts, the

power could be applied

to all

high

23 April 1999. Justice O'Connor was not as willing

activities the

to endorse the
Court should refrain from, he gave the following answer.

should only decide... the issue that's before us and not reach out.... [T]he rulings we make are
be necessary to the decision of the case." Interview by author, Shrewsbury, MA, 21 May

to

1999.

1

It is

interesting to note that the delegates

times even though their

own

from Massachusetts voted against such a proposal all four
had contained a provision allowing for advisory opinions

state constitution

saw a difference between a veto power and an advisory
power, although there are legitimate separation of powers concerns in either instance.
since 1780. This could be because the delegates

632

Quoted

in

Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry,

A

Publishing, 1990), 77.
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History of the Constitution

(St. Paul:

West

courts in a system of separated
powers.

From

the legislators' perspective,
this

power

can bring the judiciary into their
realm - a clear violation of the
understanding
legislature alone should

make

the laws.

for the justices could create
a conflict

From

proceeding.

And,

How

the judicial perspective, an advisory
role

between advising and

impartially interpret and apply the
laws which

come

their authority to

before them in a judicial

can one be impartial about a law one
has had a hand

will attempts to

do so damage the reputation of the Court?

A

in

making?

problem which

ancillary to this involves the
non-adversarial nature of an advisory request.

justices reach a

sides,

that the

Can

is

the

sound conclusion when they are not presented
with information by two

each with a vested interest

in

achieving their respective results?

Considering these problems - interference with
the legislative process, conflict
with the judicial process, and the lack of an
adversarial proceeding Jjustify

the continued use of the advisory process in
Massachusetts and the nine other

states in

which

this

power

is

exercised?

particularly strong criticism of this

Law Law Review.
in

how does one

In this piece

633

power

Some would
is

found

Mel Topf raises

in

an

argue that

it

can't be done.

article in the Detroit

A

College of

a series of concerns about this process

an article entitled, "State Supreme Court Advisory Opinions as Illegitimate
Judicial

Review."

An

aura of illegitimacy has always shadowed state supreme court
advisory opinions. In a constitutional system characterized by
3

This is obviously a theoretical question in those states with a constitutional provision like that in
Massachusetts. The other states whose constitutions contain advisory opinion provisions include:

Colorado, Florida, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. In Florida and
South Dakota only the governor is empowered to ask questions. Two states also have statutory
provisions which allow for advisory opinions: Alabama and Delaware. (Topf, "State Supreme Court
Advisory Opinions as Illegitimate Judicial Review," Detroit College of Law Law Review 2001 2001],
[

101-137, at 101.)

An

article in

The National

Law Journal

required advisory opinions at one time (although there
Strasser,

is

"Advisory Opinions: Legal Rarity," September

260

indicates that almost half the states allowed or

no

citation to support this position).

12, 1988, 3.

Fred

constraints, the advisory opinion
process has always been disturbingly
unconstrained. The ex parte nature
of advisory proceedings has raised
due process concerns persistently
at least since 1820. Further,
the extent

which advisory opinions

to

addressed

infringe on separation of powers
has been

at least since the

1787 Federal Convention and the rejection
of
advisory opinions by the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1793. The absence of
adversarial procedures in the advisory
opinion process has raised case
and controversy questions and called
attention
to the hypothetical

abstract, fact-deficient, prospective

and unfocused nature of the
questions addressed to the advisory
justices. Advisory opinions tend
compel the justices' engagement in policy
and politics, because most
advisory opinion provisions are mandatory
upon the justices

to

challenging public confidence injudicial
impartiality and independence
At the same time, the advisory process
impinges on political activity of
the executive and legislature, and
limits public

participation in political
issues as the very availability of the
process invites the political branches
not only to pass on controversial
matters to the justices, but also
to

surrender their obligation to independently
assess the constitutionality of
an act.

A

look

at the

Massachusetts experience with advisory opinions provides

a partial response to

many of these

assumption of most

who

concerns.

The

at least

criticisms of Topf, and the

teach about the Supreme Court's unwillingness to issue

advisory opinions, rest on assumptions regarding the separation
of powers which see
this structure as

being inherently conflictual. The Massachusetts system provides an

view - an advisory process which leads

alternative

to discussion

and collaboration

rather than conflict.

THE MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIENCE - A REBUTTAL
There

is little

doubt that theoretical criticisms of the advisory opinion process

a system of separated powers have

Topf, 101

almost

all

.

This

is

some

the opening paragraph of his article.

to

show

While the quote

do

in

Massachusetts

that his other concerns,

in

I

however, do not play out
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is

unusually long,

would agree with Topf on

may use this "to pass on
common and statutory law with

concern, that the legislature and executive
just as they

Despite concerns about the conflict

validity.

possible concerns regarding the advisory process.

in

it

contains

part of his last

controversial matters to the justices,"

questions like the right-to-die.

in practice in

Massachusetts.

I

hope

between these opinions and the

of the separation of powers, the

institution

Massachusetts Constitution contains
provisions for both. While requiring
the SJC

to

give advisory opinions upon
request, this document also contains
language

guaranteeing a clear separation of
powers between branches
Declaration of Rights. 635
the hands of the

than

is

SJC

is

It is

systems

lies

in the

no more inconsistent with a

Much

strict

all

51 political

United States have long experience with an
executive veto,

which the advisory process has been practiced

at the history

An

of this process as

it

IN

A

way

look

Massachusetts

is

at the

it

is

studied

way

in

important to show

in practice.

MASSACHUSETTS

of the advisory opinion process

provides a reminder of the evolutionary

have developed.

in

accommodated

HISTORY OF ADVISORY OPINIONS
Looking

in

of the difference from a contemporary

not in theoretical arguments but in
custom. Since

theoretical concerns can be

power

system of separated powers

not from a theoretical perspective but as
a political practice.

how

30 of the

interesting to note, however, that
an advisory

the governor's veto power.

perspective

in Article

in

which

in

Massachusetts

political institutions in

America

opinion issued by the SJC Justices in 1878 presents a brief history

was

inherited

from

Britain.

It is

interesting to note that while

concerns about maintaining the independence of the judiciary are not new, they did not
preclude British justices from participating

in the

advisory process.

This article [establishing the advisory process]... as
the

635

form

in

which

"In the government of this

it

was

may be

originally presented, evidently

Commonwealth,

had

inferred from
in

view the

the legislative department shall never exercise the

executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The executive shall never exercise the legislative and
judicial powers, or either of them:

or either of them: to the end

it

may

The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers,
be a government of laws and not of men."
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usage of the English Constitution,
by which the King, as well as the
House of Lords, whether acting in their
capacity, had the right to

judicial or in their legislative

demand

the opinions of the twelve judges
of
England. The practice of the Stuart
kings, in taking extrajudicial
opinions of the judges upon questions
about

to come before them
unconstitutional abuse of the royal authority
in this
respect. But, since the Revolution
of 1688, so sturdy an asserter of the
independence of the judges as Lord Holt
joined with the other judges of
the time in opinions to King William
III upon the extent of the
pardon. .and as late as 1760, Lord
Mansfield, Chief Justice Willes and
other judges, gave an opinion to King
George II upon the jurisdiction of
a court martial[.]" 636

judicially,

was an

.

It

was

a familiarity with this historic practice
which probably led the framers of the

Massachusetts Constitution to include
likely if

that

it

is

remembered

that the shift

it

in their charter in 1780.

its critics.

this historic

is

particularly

from "state" governance under colonial

under independence was very subtle, particularly

Recognizing

This

connection

is

in the judicial realm.

not to say that the practice

rule to

637

was without

During Massachusetts' 1820 Constitutional Convention the
committee on

the judiciary

recommended

repealing the advisory opinion process. 638

judicial figure as Justice Story, perhaps reflecting his
experiences

As eminent

a

on the U.S. Supreme

Opinion of the Justices, 126 Mass. 557 (1878), 561-562. All SJC advisory opinions are simply
referred to as either Opinion of the Justices or Opinions
of the Justices (when the opinion contains a
concurrence or a dissent) so this will be eliminated in future cites in this chapter. The cases will be
distinguished by their citation and year.
637

See Chapter

well.

2.

This

is

the conclusion

"Some commentators have

which was reached

suggested that John

in

an earlier study of the advisory process as

Adams and

others involved in drafting and
adopting the Constitution of 1780 would have perceived no incongruity between advisoiy opinions and
separation of powers because such opinions to the King and House of Lords were common in English

practice and because Montesquieu,

whose views on separation of powers greatly influenced early
Americans, had held up the British constitution as a model." Farina, "Supreme Judicial Court Advisory
Opinions," 354, citing a 1918 study by an A. Ellingwood entitled Departmental Cooperation in State
Government.
638

who were to be future justices of the SJC. (Farina,
Advisory Opinions," 355.) This attempt, as well as another in the
Constitutional Convention of 1853, failed. The reason for the failure was likely unrelated to the content
of the proposal, however. See Farina, 356-357.
This committee included two individuals

"Supreme

Judicial Court

263

Court, spoke out against this
practice at the Convention, seeing

it

as a violation of the

639
principle of separation of
powers.

Mr. Story, of Salem, said that it
was exceedingly important that the
judiciary department should in the
language of the constitution be
independent of the other departments;
and for this purpose, thai it should
not be in the power of the latter
to call in the Judges to aid them
for any
purpose. If they were liable to be
called on, there was extreme danger
that they would be required to
give opinions in cases which should
be
exclusively of a political character....
The power of calling on the judges
tor their opinion may be
resorted to in times of political excitement
with
the very view to make them odious,
and to effect their removal from
office ... It ought not be in the
power of the other departments

to involve

the judiciary in this manner. 640

This quote points to a concern which no
longer seems

While there arc

justices.

potential separation of

to

occupy the minds of the

state's

powers concerns about the advisory

process, the judiciary seems to have gained
a sufficient degree of respect as a co-equal

branch of government

that there is

no longer a worry

that the justices will

be drawn into

a political fray by another branch just to entice
the justices into a situation which

damage

their reputation.

641

This

may have been

a legitimate concern in 1820, but today

In "The Origins and Early History of Supreme Judicial
Court Advisory Opinions
Topf presents an interesting appraisal of Story's role at the 1820 Convention as the

in

Massachusetts,"

first

of this process in recorded Massachusetts
"vision of a legal science."

history.

may

Topf connects

this

concern

to

vocal opponent

what he

calls Story's

640

Journal of Debates and Proceedings of the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, 1820-1821, at
s
I
ed. 1853). (Quoted in Farina, "Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Opinions,
355.) The
following comment from a 1908 article written by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Maine
72 (Boston,

'

provides a similar view. "However diligent and sincere their [justices'] efforts to give correct answers,
they will give offence. If not openly accused they may be suspected of partisanship, of undue sympathy

with a class or some powerful

interest, or

with

some

political or

economic dogma. The submission of

every such question

is

for judicial integrity

and impartiality." Lucilius A. Emery, "Advisory Opinions from Justices," Maine
in Topf, "State Supreme Court Advisory Opinions as Illegitimate Judicial

Law Review
Review,"

1

2,

quoted

19.

641

In interviews,

Legislature

fraught with danger to the dignity of the Court and the reputation of the Justices

each of the justices was asked whether s/he had ever been concerned

would use

the "checks" at

its

disposal to retaliate for an

justices noted that this

was not

"No, I'm bold enough

to say that that not only

a concern.

SJC

opinion.

To

that the

a person, the

Representative was the following quote from Justice Nolan.

was never discussed, but

264

I

don't think

it

was ever

Justice Story's concerns

institution

seem outdated. This provides an example
of how

of the separate of powers has
pers,sted over the years while

have changed. While some of the
partisan interplay between

on both the

state

and national level indicate

that these

still

its

purposes

and executives

legislators

concerns are

the

valid in

some

instances, the concern has diminished
as regards the judiciary. 642

Two

other concerns deserve

more

attention:

whether advisory opinions promote

judicial interference in the legislative
sphere and whether this process
judicial process itself.

will

show how

A

look

at the

compromises

the

development of the advisory process since 1780

the justices have adapted

it

to

concerns over these separation of powers

issues.

ADVISORY OPINIONS - THE PROCESS
Were

the justices of the

legislature or the governor

may

SJC justified today

in

being concerned that the

look to harm them by the questions they present

through the advisory process, they have developed a mechanism

Beginning

in the

to protect themselves.

second half of the 19 lh century the justices began refusing

to

respond

to certain requests if the question in their eyes did not present
an "important question

law" or a "solemn occasion." While both of these phrases had been
since 1780,

it

wasn't

until

in the

1877 that the justices used these terms for the

basis for refusing to answer a question in their advisory capacity

Constitution

first

time as a

which was otherwise

MA, 3 May 1999. This is not to say that there has not been
tension over the years in regard to administrative matters as was seen in Chapter 3.

considered." Interview by author, Boston,

some
h4

~

An example

of this kind of interaction between executives and legislators can be seen in the game of
is often played around the executive veto -- Clinton's shut-down of the government in

"chicken" which

1996 was a case

in

which the executive came out on the top

265

in the

game.

of

properly proposed to

them*

words of one

,„ lhc

involved a ease which presented
a "patent attempt
It

was perhaps

this blatant

commcmmo

,.

to shortcut the

m

fa(

adversary process."'""

attempt by one individual to abuse
the advisory process

(with the acquiescence of the

House of Reprcsentattves) which

led the justices to break

with over one hundred years of
consistently answering every
question proposed to

them."

why

5

Assuming

this assertion

with certainty.

It

that this

was not

the

of power happened

may simply

first

at this

reflect the

such abuse of the process, the question
of
time and not earlier

development of a more mature

relationships between the judiciary
and the other

Massachusetts. In Farina's words,

is difficult to

"it reflects

set

ascertain

of

two branches of government

in

a progressively stronger sense of
judicial

confidence and independence vis-a-vis the
other branches, as well as an increased
6
sophistication in manipulating constitutional
doctrine.""

The

fact that the

advisory process has always presented a challenge
to the

system of separated powers may help
justices

would respond

to explain this

development. Originally, the

to all questions presented while occasionally
noting a reluctance

643

22 Mass. 600. This is not dissimilar from the practice used by the U.S. Supreme
Court to avoid
appeals coming to it from the state high courts by determing
that they present no "substantial federal
question." Both are techniquest to give the respective courts more
control over their docket. On the
federal level the need for this formula practically disappeared

Supreme Court were eliminated
Judicial Process,
644

r-1

1

in the

Act

to

when almost all mandatory appeals to the
Improve the Administration of Justice. (See, Abraham, The

80.

*
•

Farina,

"Supreme

Judicial Court

Advisory Opinions," 380.

45

There appears to be some confusion about the first time this occurred. Farina's article contains
of the percentage of cases over the years in which the justices refused to answer some or all of the

a chart

questions proposed
that in the

in a request. (A request for an opinion can contain more than one question.) It shows
1810s they answered only some of the questions of a request in approximately 35% of the

1 1, 372.)
However she makes no mention of these cases in the text. Topf also cites the
1877 case as the first refusal by the justices to answer a request. ("State Supreme Court Advisory
Opinions as Illegitimate Judicial Review," 120.)

cases. (Figure

6 6

Farina,

"Supreme

Judicial Court Advisory Opinions," 374.

266

because of a particularly strong
separation of powers concern
impact of the justices' responses

in

these cases

was seen

in specific cases. 647

as limited

by the

The

tact that

advisory opinions were (and
are) not binding. Speaking
as a collection of individual
justices, these opinions

do not have precedential value.
Distinguishing these from

opinions of the Court, Justice
Lynch said that
theory

is

that

Upon
the

we're acting

like a

law firm

when

[to the

requesting body]." 648

analysis of the advisory opinion
process in several states,

development of such a jurisprudence of
refusal

questioning

issuing an advisory opinion, "the

why

to

answer questions,

the justices should have the
responsibility for

determination and not the party asking the
649
question.

what he argues was evidence

that despite

what was

Topf criticizes

He

making

finds

it

to

in part

this

be an offshoot of

said, advisory opinions

were

generally treated as binding. 650 Less critical
of the process, Farina hypothesizes that the

Following

an example.

"As we have no means, in such case, of summoning the
parties adversely
interested before us, or of inquiring, in a
judicial course of proceeding, into the facts upon
which the
is

controverted right depends... [an opinion] would
be cont.ary to the plain dictates of justice, if such an
opinion could be considered as having the force of a
judgment, binding on the rights of the parties But
as we understand that the session of the legislature
is drawing to a close.. .and as an
opinion upon an
abstract question, without any investigation of facts,
and without argument, must be taken as an opinion
upon the precise question proposed, which cannot affect the rights
of parties, should they hereafter be
brought before the court in a regular course of judicial
proceeding, we have thought it best, without
further delay, to submit an opinion upon the questions
proposed." 46 Mass. 596 (1844), 597-598.

M*

Interview by author, Boston,

MA, 25 May 1999. As a result of this, the signature of each of the
contained on advisory opinions and the actual author is not identified. There are
occasional dissents which are also signed by each dissenting justice.
There were dissents in 12% of the
advisory opinions issued from 1981 to 1995 (4 of 33). This corresponds with
Farina's
participating justices

is

findings that

90%

of these opinions from 1780 to 1990 were unanimous. ("Supreme Judicial Court
Advisory Opinions,"
371 .) This is only slightly higher than the 9% dissent rate in the SJC's "traditional"
opinions from 1981
to 1995.
649

This was the same question raised by the Massachusetts General Court.

justices

began refusing

to

answer some requests, the

legislators

In

1

889, shortly after the

adopted a resolution which read,

in part,

House of Representatives does not acquiesce in the conclusion of the justices as the
limitation of the authority of the House to require the opinions of the justice; and affirms the authority of
the House, under the constitution, to require their opinion upon said questions." (Quoted in Farina, 375.)
as follows. "That the

650

The precedential value of these opinions today will be discussed in more
impact of advisory opinions on judicial process which is discussed below.
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detail

when reviewing

the

concerns regarding the advisory
process wh.ch were expressed
conventions

to

1820 and ,853 led justices to be
more cautious

criticisms.- These faded
efforts

who were
their

"reform"

within acceptable bounds

it

to

avo.d future

m ay a,so have encouraged any justices

supporting the constitudonal
proposals to eliminate

own method of keeping

powers.

a,

in constitutional

to a

this

power

to

develop

system of separated

652

If the justices

were going

to refuse to

answer questions unless they met the

constitutional requirements of
presenting a "solemn occasion" or
"an important

question of law,"

When may

meant?
first

how were

the other departments of
government to

they expect to have their questions
answered?

refusal the justices provided an

answer

to this question

know what

One year

this

after

which has remained

its

the

basis of their jurisprudence on advisory
opinions ever since.

The opinions of the

Justices can be required only 'upon
important
questions of law,' not upon questions of fact;
'and upon solemn
occasions,' that is to say when such
questions of law are necessary to be

determined by the body making the inquiry,
legislative or executive

power entrusted

of the Commonwealth.
opinions of the Justices

is

to

it

in the exercise

of the

by the constitution and laws

No

other limit of the authority to require the
expressed in the Constitution. In giving such

opinions, the Justices do not act as a court, but
as the constitutional
advisers for the other departments of the government,
and it has never
been considered essential that the questions proposed should
be such as

might come before them
651

652

Farina,

From

"Supreme

Judicial Court

in their judicial capacity.

653

Advisory Opinions," 374.

a separation of

questions,

we

powers perspective, it is interesting to note that in refusing to answer certain
see the Court removing itself from the exercise of political power rather
than fighting for

more.
653

26 Mass. 557 (1878). The last sentence of this description also points to ways in which this power is
not limited. Other justiciability thresholds which must be met for traditional
judicial cases need not be
met for advisory opinions. An obvious example would be concerns regarding ripeness.
It should be noted that this is the same opinion which
establishes the history of this process back to
the Stuart kings. The extensive discussion of this power is different than in most other
advisory opinions,
and provides an interesting example of the justices' recognition of the need to justify the changes they are

making

in the

advisory process.
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.

The justices adjusted

the process of

deeding advisory opinions

seeming

in

response to concerns regarding
separation of powers. As.de from
continuing
the standards for

today

when

in basically the

to

respond

same way

system of separated powers

,

to requests, the

as in the

1

advisory opinion process

870s.- The

potential for a conflict with the

into an unacceptable degree

of

involvement with the legislative process
and whether the process allows the
avoid responsibility for decisions
they should be making. The analysis

which follow of the twenty-eight substantive
advisory opinions issued by
between 1981 and 1995 show

practiced

however, remains. These include two
specific concerns:

whether advisory opinions bring the
judiciary

to

is

develop

to

that neither

legislators

in the

the

pages

SJC

of these theoretical problems present a great

challenge to either the judiciary or the
legislative branch

in

Massachusetts.

655

THE ADVISORY PROCESS - ENCOURAGING JUDICIAL
LEGISLATING?
In

is

some ways

the concern of justices being too involved in
"policy and politics-

no different from concerns about

be seen as more legitimate

A

more

presented

in that

it

judicial review.

is

656

In

one way

this practice

could

specifically established in the state's

detailed look at the kinds and

in

numbers of questions which the justices refuse to answer is
the discussion of the conflict between advisory opinions and the
judicial process which is

found below.
655

While there were 33 advisory opinions in these years, live of these were cases in which the justices
refused to answer any of the questions proposed. Aside from an indication of when
justices may refuse
to answer questions, these opinions presented no substantive information. These
opinions are all called

Answer of the Justices,

as distinguished from the title Opinion of the Justices which is used in those cases
which the justices do answer some or all of the questions. These 5 Answers to the Justices can be
found at: 399 Mass. 1201 (1987); 401 Mass. 1234 (1988); 406 Mass. 1220 (1985); 409 Mass. 1201
(1991); and 413 Mass. 1219(1992).
in

This quote comes from Topfs criticism

in

"State

Judicial Review," 101
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Supreme Court Advisory Opinions

as Illegitimate

constitution."" This provides
another indication that

at least in

concept of separation of powers
has been an evolving concept.

Court was allowed

to

be involved

in a variety

an advisory process seem
so unusual?-

such a blending of powers

proceedings on

its

process by their

On

own

to give

also interesting that the

up certain duties but each branch
choosing
its

involvement

answer certain questions. This

countering ambition" view of separation
of powers with which

Assuming, then,
is

a legitimate

move away from

branches involved not

while the justices limited their
involvement

refusal to

the General

of judicial matters into the 1800s,
would

one hand the Legislature stopped

own

When

to a greater "specialization"
within the

one branch pushing the other
up certain powers.

It is

Massachusetts the

that judicial review,

power of the Court, how does

is

in the

in

to give

divorce

advisory

not the "ambition

we

are

most

familiar.

whether constitutionally sanctioned or

not,

the advisory process involve the justices in

the legislative realm to any greater
degree than does judicial review? In a "traditional"

opinion of the Court

in

1988 the SJC decided that a legislative provision which
allowed

for videotape testimony of certain child
witnesses in criminal proceedings violated
659
defendants' article 12 rights to confront witnesses against
them.
In 1989, seven

justices signed onto an advisory opinion

would allow

which declared

that a

proposed law which

certain out of court statements of child witnesses to be admitted in

evidence would similarly violate

Perhaps that turns the

title

of Topf s

article 12

article

on

its

of the Declaration of Rights. 660 Looking

at

head - Judicial Review as Illegitimate Advisory

Opinions?
658

659

See Chapter 2 for a discussion of these responsibilities of the Legislature.

Commonwealth

v.

Bergstrom, 412 Mass. 534.

660

406 Mass. 1201 As with tort reform and the death penalty, these two cases provide an interesting
example of the ongoing dialogue which can occur between the SJC and the Legislature. When the Court
.

270

the degree of judicial
involvement in the legislative
sphere,
differ? In regard to
legitimacy, there

There does seem

to

to

these two decisions

be no difference.

be a pragmatic difference,
however. As Justice O'Connor

noted, if an unconstitutional

money by

seems

how do

bill

various actors which

becomes law,

may

it

could entail an expenditure of time
and

ultimately be for naught

when

the law

is

later

challenged before the court and
struck down.
think

a good idea that we have that
power [advisory opinionsl
because otherwise what you're saying
is go ahead and do it and
down
the road we 11 tell you you
couldn't. And on a difficult issue.
.to say
well, go do it and we'll spend
fifty million hours and fifty
million dollars
and we 11 get everybody's hopes up
or everybody mad at you
and
down the road we're going to say, well you
can't do that, that doesn't
make any sense.
I

it's

.

A

perfect

example of how such a problem was avoided
involved two advisory

opinions from 1960 which dealt with the
development of certain land in the Back Bay
area of Boston.

offices

662

and shops

That land

is

in the city.

known today

as the Prudential Center, a

major area for

Millions of dollars were involved in this development,

declared that videotape testimony out of the defendant's
view was unconstitutional, legislators attempted
to accomplish a similar goal (protecting an
alleged child victim from the potential harm of testifying in a
sexual abuse trial) in a different way. Again, however, the
justices indicated (this time in the advisory
opinion) that this would not be acceptable. The Legislature
persisted. In 1990 the Legislature enacted
Statute 339 which presented a modified version of the
bill found to be unacceptable to the 7 justices in
the 1989 advisory opinion. In Commonwealth v. Colin C.
(419 Mass. 54 [1994]) the justices were asked
to rule on the constitutionality of this new statute. Since
the case was remanded on other grounds they
refused to answer the constitutional question directly. However, as
questions would be raised about the
applicable statute (G.L. c.233, §81) on remand, the Court addressed some
possible concerns. Writing for
the majority, Chief Justice Liacos said, "[t]he present statute, for the
most part, seems to address the

we expressed in Opinion of the Justices, supra. We would, however, impose a further
requirement for the use of child hearsay statements pursuant to the statute. We believe that, if a child
witness's out-of-court statements are to be admitted substantively, there must be other evidence,
independently admitted, that corroborates those hearsay statements." (62.)
concerns

661

"It

MA, 21 May 1999. Chief Justice Wilkins voiced a similar position.
[advisory opinion process] provides a handy means of straightening out a problem before it becomes a

Interview by author, Shrewsbury,

problem -

up some issue which, once the bill is passed might have
life, which could be years, everything is up
author, Boston, MA, 23 April 1999.
to clear

during the time of the lawsuit's

662

341 Mass. 738 and 341 Mass. 760.
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to

produce a lawsuit, and

in the air."

Interview by

and the

state's role

Wilkins noted

in

was

essential.

These opinions of the Court were,
as Chief Justice

an understated way, "beneficial » 663

A key concern regarding this

project (and other renovation
projects of the 1960s and 70s)
project sufficiently

or whether this

renewal.

664

imbued with

was an attempt

was whether

a public interest to justify
expenditure

to aid private investors

The importance of the

this

was

of public funds

under the guise of urban

role of the justices in this instance
can be seen

the following quote contained in
the

a

from

of the opinions.

first

The Governor's message

points out that "The [Massachusetts
Turnpikel
Authority has conferred at length with
the Prudential and has developed
an arrangement, formally approved in
principle" by Prudential; and that
Prudential has formally voted and publicly
stated that if the proposed
legislation, including the tax exemption
and indemnity provisions is
enacted and its constitutionality assured by
an advisory opinion it will
go ahead with its part of the project." 665

The justices found

several problems with this proposed legislation,
but they

were problems which could be

rectified.

666

The opinion

then closes with the following paragraph. "To question
questions are so interwoven with question

must answer only with respect

663

664

Interview by author, Boston,

This

is

341 Mass. 738,

binding. This

is

at

1

we answer

'No.'

The other

no answers are presently required.

bill.

Many

of the questions

We

if directed to

23 April 1999.

The

a total of 21 questions

747-748. This

that

pending

the political formation of the question.

two advisory opinions included
665

MA,

to the

1

outlines these problems, and

is

were much more complicated. The
which were presented to the justices.

legal questions

an example of how the advisory process

despite that fact that the justices, citing

Bowe

v.

may be viewed

as

Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320

Mass. 230 (1946), continue in the next sentence to warn the parties that these opinions are "are advisory
in nature, given by justices as individuals in their capacity as constitutional advisors
of the other
department of government and without the aide of arguments, are not adjudications by the court, and do
not fall within the doctrine of stare decisis."
6

Proposed legislation for

Turnpike Authority

this

to finance

opinion was House Bill No.3093,

and construct,

in

"An Act

authorizing the Massachusetts

connection with the construction of

Boston, a public truck terminal and a public garage

in

its

turnpike into

Boston, and providing for operation of such

terminal and garage, leasing rights to construct and use building units and other improvements, service

charges to the city of Boston, and related matters."
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an appropriate

till relating to

a clearly defined project
for a putUc purpose would

present themselves in a
different aspect.""7 The
advisory, S.634,

open

"An Act concerning

areas, deeadent areas

constitutionally acceptable

project.

suit

the Justices said, "No,

sure a lawsuit

decision of the Court[.]

we

really

meant

From

it

this

In 1961, after a final version

be OK."

A

when we

said

it

He

of this law had

challenged grounds.

all

the

you did

further explained,

time."

first

this,

"And

[an] opinion

was brought just

turned this knob and

then they did that, and

of the justices

to get a declaratory

is

not a

judgment

that

668

a purely pragmatic perspective, the advisory
process allowed this

complicated public-private transaction

to

proceed more smoothly.

guarantee the kind of certainty that investors are looking for
transactions involving large

6

be

relief against the Prudential Center

right.. .but if

it

was brought because
lawsuit

to

interchange as follows. In the advisory
opinions

you haven't got

that button. .you'd

make

of Boston," was generally found

the project to be constitutional
on

.

just to

in the eity

by the justices.

Chief Justice Wilkins described

pushed

development or redevelopment of blighted

was brought seeking declaratory

The SJC found

covered by the second .960

and sub-standard areas by urban
redevelopment eorporat.ons

w.th special provisions for
projects

been enacted, a

the

bill

sums of time or money. Since

It

helped to

when engaging

in

the nature of this legislation

757, emphasis added.

MA, 23 April 1999. An even earlier example of this was shared by the
"There was an advisory opinion early on with respect to the
constitutionality of compulsory motor vehicle insurance, covering a wide range of issues. [Opinion
of
the Justices, 271 Mass. 582 (1930).] [It] put all of them to rest, and it wasn't for decades, I think that's
the right word, before somebody even thought to challenge in court anything that related to what had
been decided." Perhaps decade is more appropriate. A Lexis search under "motor vehicle liability
Interview by author, Boston,

Chief Justice

in his interview.

insurance" and "constitutional" shows that the

been

in

1940 (Mulligan

Liability Insurance Co.

v.

v.

Hilton,

302 Mass.

5)

first

and

challenge to the statute as applied appears to have
to the statute

Aronofsky, 308 Mass. 249).
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on

its

face in 1941 {Service

Mutual

such that

is

would have been challenged

it

after

passage whether the Legislature had

requested an opinion or not,
the degree of judicial
involvement
exercising judical review.
This

is

no different than

in

same view could be held of three of
the advisory

opinions which the justices wrote
between 1981 and 1995. These
opinions

all

involved

proposals for establishing or
coordinating large scale financial
investments. The

first

opinion concerned the development
of a "Massachusetts Development
Bank" to

provide funding and support for
needed infrastructure repair

began assessing the corporate tax

state

to

fund

constitutionality to be reviewed in
advance.

instance

if the

this

bank

Would

it

in the state.

made

669

sense for

there have been great

Before the

its

harm

in this

question of the statute's constitutionality
had not been raised until after

passage of the act? Perhaps not, but since
the Legislature was concerned about the
"urgent need to repair, rehabilitate, and
replace unsafe and outmoded highways,
bridges, tunnels" and recognized that
"governmental units within [the
...are

unable to undertake these infrastructure projects,"

revenues and

new

that all potential

problems with the

bill

were ironed out

said for the second

change the source of funding

in

advance.

"new

670

example which involved

for the Massachusetts

would

a proposal to

Convention Center Authority.

to the justices this proposal to set aside a portion

the hotel-motel tax to fund the Authority

669

desire to create

financing mechanisms" would be met most surely by
guaranteeing

The same could be

According

its

Commonwealth]

of the

state's receipts

from

violate article 63 of the Articles of

393 Mass. 1209 (1984). While the justices found no constitutional problems with any of the proposed
Mass/Bank was never developed. This case, like several others raised in these years,

questions, the

makes one wonder why

the Legislature asked for the justices' opinion and then did not pass the law.

670
1

21

1.
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.

Amendment which

establishes procedures for budge,
and appropriation matters. 6"

The

proposal was never enacted.

Another example of an advisory
opinion serving as
challenges facing the Legislature

in

attempting to implement

justices' response in 19X7 to a
series

Commonwealth,

it

is

clear that

it

pragmatic response

to .he

was found

in .he

plans

its

of questions on proposed legislation

restructuring the state's savings bank

change the existing savings bank

a

life

life

insurance system/'

72

As

this legislation

insurance system and would affect

would have faced challenges

at

some

problems

a

little

earlier in the process.

were no problems with the
It

issued

in

would be

is

The

legislation.

interesting to note that this

bill

In this

would

banks

in the

This

to eliminate all

case the justices found there

was enacted

was one of only

all

point.

simply enabled legislators and those
involved with the banking industry
potential

for

in

1990.

673

three opinions out of the 33

these years in which a) the justices issued an
opinion stating that the law
constitutional and b) the

was eventually enacted. Overall,

bill

thirty-three statutes under consideration

by the

in ten

of the

justices in their advisory capacity they

found no constitutional problems. Three were eventually enacted, one
was enacted
with substantial changes (unrelated

''
'

396 Mass. 1201 (1985). The

expect.

politics

to

any comments by the justices), and three were

behind

The Massachusetts Convention Center

proposal are more complicated than one might

this

Authority, created

in 1982, was a special project of the
powerful Senate President William Bulger, and its operation created controversy throughout
the 1980s.
Part of this was due to the fact that Fran Joyce, the Executive Director of the Authority,
was a close
friend of Bulger. In addition, the Authority was involved in questions of replacing Boston Garden,
a

"sacred" Massachusetts institution. Bulger

may no

subject of conflict. Sec, for instance, Steve Bailey,

Boston Globe,
672

May

3,

2000,

longer be President of the Senate but Joyce

"Downtown/Steve Bailey; and

the

Winner

is still

the

Is..."

1)1

401 Mass. 1211. The same questions had been raised

in 1986 but the justices had
answer the questions" since they had been submitted to the justices loo late in
the legislative session for the justices to solicit briefs from interested parties or to thoughtfully consider
the questions. (Answer of the Justices, 399 Mass. 1201, at 1205)

"regretfully... declined to

673

Statute 1990, chapter 449.
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never enaeted.

<

(The other three, eoneerning the
governor's veto authority or

questions on the initiative and
referendum process, are more procedural
than
substantive and will be discussed
below.)

approval the legislators

may

not always choose to

In looking at the legitimacy

powers,

it

Even when

the justices give their stamp
of

act.

of advisory opinions

appears as though the process

is at

in a

least as legitimate as that

review. If separation of powers

was

operation of government, and

most Americans have come

have an expertise (even

if

advisory opinion process

combined with

if

system of separated

intended, at least in part, to further the
efficient
to accept that the justices

they are not the only experts) in
constitutional law, the

is

perfectly logical and consistent with this
institution.

in those cases in

which the question of a law's

by interested

constitutionality

is

is

weakened. At

it

may

parties after the bill has passed, the only thing that
changes

affect the legislative process

- so we

least

almost certain to be

timing of the question. This should not affect the legitimacy
of the justices'
although

When

the pragmatic benefits already noted the
argument that advisory

opinions involve the judiciary too deeply in the
legislative realm

raised

of judicial

is

the

activities,

turn to that question next.

THE ADVISORY PROCESS - LETTING THE LEGISLATURE OFF THE
HOOK?
One
is

point which should be noted from the start

is

that if the legislative process

affected in any way, positively or negatively, this happens almost exclusively at the

The other opinions involving

statutes which were eventually enacted are 408 Mass. 1201 (1990) (the
on services) and 408 Mass. 1215 (1990) (clarifying titles on certain Nantucket
property). One enacted with changes was 390 Mass. 1201 (1984) (amending state's anti-discrimination
statutes to include sexual orientation). Three which considered legislation which was never enacted
include the opinion on the Mass/Bank discussed above and two opinions involving the question of

constitutionality of tax

settling title questions regarding certain

Boston tidelands (383 Mass. 895 [1981] and 383 Mass. 927

[1981]).
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.

request of the Legislature

While

itself.

this

may

from the process of judicial review.
However, even

different

produce no greater interference by the
judiciary
still

not justify any negative effect,
if

it

is

advisory opinions

in the legislative

sphere overall, there

is

the possibility that the ability
of the Legislature to request adviee
from the justices

may be
way

detrimental to the process established
by the separation of powers. 675 In one

this

concern

is

similar to Justice Frankfurter's
concerns about judicial review

once the court becomes involved the
degree of broader

-

political participation in a

question diminishes. 676 In the words of
Topf, the advisory process "limits public
participation in political issues as the very
availability of the process invites the
political

branches not only to pass on controversial
matters

to the justices but also to

surrender their obligation to independently
assess the constitutionality of an act." 677
If

one looks back

at the

advisory process in Massachusetts over time, however,

these concerns are not borne out.

From 1780

to

1990 the justices issued

advisory opinions per year. If the 1981-1995 era

is

less than

two

any indication, the numbers have

increased minimally, to 2.2 opinions per year. 678 With
thousands of bills considered by
the State Legislature each year, the fact that questions are
raised on only two pieces of
legislation

I

shows

that advisory opinions are only a part of the legislative process,

have been referring predominantly

clarification.

to questions

propounded by "the Legislature." This needs some
came from the Senate, 14 from the

In the fifteen years under analysis 16 sets of questions

House of Representatives, and 3 from the Governor. Therefore, questions which come from "the
Legislature" are really coming from one house or another. Of the three answers to the Governor, two
dealt with the constitutionality of specific legislative acts which the Governor was considering vetoing,
and only one dealt exclusively with Executive authority. This one will be discussed in more detail
below.
676

Justice Frankfurter's position
677

"State
678

is

discussed in more detail in Chapter

Supreme Court Advisory Opinions

Farina's data in

"Supreme

Judicial Court

5.

as Illegitimate Judicial Review," 101

Advisory Opinions" shows

than two per year, "the vast majority of requests have
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come

that

while the average

since 1910." (357)

is

less

leaving ample opportunity
for broader public participation
in policymaking.
this is the fact that

power

many of the

are informed

by a variety of amicus

12% of all

There was substantially more amicus

briefs.

traditional cases

and

in just

under

30%

While there were

of those cases raising

questions of judicial review, amicus
curiae briefs were filed in almost

advisory cases.

679

to

opinions which the justices issue
under their advisory

participation in these cases
than in the SJC's "traditional"
caseload.
briefs filed in

Added

70%

of the

These questions actually benefited from
more public participation

than those raised in cases involving
"traditional" judicial review. Over 104
briefs

involving 144 parties were submitted
for consideration by the justices

advisory cases decided between 1981
and 1995. These

range of participation
Court.

in the legislative

benefited from the

process and from additional public input

full

at the

680

The other way
that they

may

in

which advisory opinions may

affect the legislative process

is

allow legislators to avoid their responsibility for
independently assessing

the constitutional legitimacy of their actions.

pronouncements on the

The

fact that the

SJC makes

constitutionality of statutes should not excuse elected officials

from considering the relationship between

679

bills

in the thirty-three

their actions

and the constitutional

Data compiled by author. This extensive involvement should not be a surprise as the
justices must
if they want to create some semblance of an adversarial process.

hear from amici
680

An example

of this extensive involvement can be seen

the Senate presented seven questions to the justices on a

1986 opinion (397 Mass. 20 1 ) in which
which was drafted to implement an initiative

in a

bill

1

measure regarding citing of facilities for storage or disposal of low-level radioactive waste which was
approved by the voters in the 1982 election. First the voters spoke; then the Senate gave full
consideration to the

bill to

implement

this;

then fifteen interest groups and industry representatives filed

eight amicus curiae briefs for the justices' consideration.

The justices found several problems with the
1987 the Legislature enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act
(chapter 549) which must have resolved the constitutional concerns as there have been no cases brought
proposed

bill.

In

SJC

in which the constitutionality of the act has been challenged. Considering the array of
on both sides of this question (environmentalists on one side and various utilities and hospitals
on the other) we can be certain that any constitutional concerns would have been raised.

to the

interests
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framework within which they
operate.to the justices before
a bill

enacted,

is

it

If the Legislature

easier for

is

them

ean pass these questions off

to shirk their responsibilities.

All justices recognized
that this possibility exists.
Justice Nolan, as

most

direct in noting that there

have used the process for more

may

have every right

to

to

"Once

drop a hot potato on

drop hot potatoes on us as long as

in a

us,

it's

a

Using different language, Justice
Abrams also recognized
[legislators]... have a... real
constitutional

court says

we

can't do

their] support."

it.

Especially

is

if

dilemma

it

is

while

which

we

was

may

got the

is all right.

They

solemn occasion[.]" 682

this possibility.

"If they

helpful to be able to say that the

they have constituencies that are pushing
[for

683

To determine whether
it

his wont,

be specific instances when the
Legislature

political reasons.

impression that they were trying

was

helpful to look at

this creates

any problem for a system of separated powers

some of the opinions which could conceivably be seen

as falling

within this category. There were eight advisory
opinions issued between 1981 and

1995 for which
raised.

this

would be

Having already seen

of attempts

to enact

prohibitions,

it

a plausible explanation as to

in

why

the questions

were

Chapter Five that there were, over the years, a number

some form of progressive income

tax despite constitutional

should not be surprising that there were also advisory opinions dealing

When asked whether the Legislature has a role to play in constitutional interpretation, Chief Justice
Wilkins said that while they do have a responsibility to the Constitution, "they also may feel
that... it's
not their job to resolve close constitutional questions." Interview by author, Boston, MA, 23 April
1999.
There are many legal theorists who are critical of the assumption that the constitutional discourse should

be confined

to the courts. See, Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2000) and Keith Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers
and Constitutional Meaning (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001 ).
682

683

Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

3

Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

25

May

1999.

May

1999.
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with this question. Parties
encouragmg progressive tax reform filed
a
the state

income tax

1981 to set

bill in

as a fixed percentage of
an individual's federal tax

and

1982 the

in

Legislature considered a
measure to institute progressive tax
exemptions. In both
instances the

House of Representatives requested
an advisory opinion on

constitutionality of the statute in light
of article

the

44 of the Articles of Amendment. The

4
justices found problems with
both bills.- In 1986 the constitutionality
of a statute

establishing a structure of progressive
tax deductions, a statute not unlike
the
the justices considered in their
advisory capacity in 1982,

before the Court. The Court struck
see

how

down

the law as unconstitutional. 685

the Legislature's asking for the
justices' opinion

1982 shows the legislators

to

be any

less

the following year

on the two

when

by the SJC. One could just as easily argue

constitutional question, turned to the justices for
advice. Is this any

accountability than

This

is

685

686

bill later

not to deny that there

is

words of Justice Abrams

684

more challenging

passage of a

may

hard to

It is

bills in

case

1981 and

they passed the law which was struck

that the legislators

were being more conscientious and, facing what they may
have seen

the legislative process or

in a

which

concerned about the constitutional

ramifications of their actions than in 1985

down

was challenged

bill

to

as a close

more damaging

to

an understanding of democratic

declared unconstitutional? 686

be instances

for the justices to handle

in

which

it

some of what

is

"helpful" in the

Justice

Nolan would

383 Mass. 940 (1981); 386 Mass. 1223 (1982).
Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation

The

opinion

v.

Secretary of Administration 398 Mass. 40.
,

fact that a bill regarding progressive tax
in 1982,

however,

while a

exemptions was sent to the justices for an advisory
on the same subject was enacted without such a request in 1985 may,

reflect the increase in political

Loosely organized
create the

bill

power of the progressive

in the early 1980's, a variety

Tax Equity Alliance of Massachusetts (TEAM)

more progressive

tax reform lobby in Massachusetts.

of advocacy groups joined together

tax structure in Massachusetts.
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in the

to better coordinate efforts in

mid-1980's

to

working toward a

call

"hot potatoes." For instance,
in 1984 the Senate sent
questions to the justices on

S-2166,

"An Aet

to increase opportunities
for

projects." This bill

was not unlike

the statute

Massachusetts residents on state-funded

which had been struck down

as

unconstitutional in 1981 under the
Article IV privileges and
immunities Cause of the

U.S. Constitution. 687 Initiated
because of the unemployment problems
facing the
the

bill

would have given preference

in hiring to state res,dents
in certain publicly

funded contracts. Considering
the Court's opinion

would reach

a different conclusion in

legislators could

and union

have just said

interests).

may have been

in 1981

1984 (and they did

this to those

it

was not

not).

most interested

688

in the legislation

bill

would

limit rights

in

money

candidates for state office could raise

of smart

politics.

Amendment

bill

called

"An Act

it

In a similar

of free speech and association under the U.S.

not have been in favor of this

one's opposition to a

(worker

1994 asking whether a certain

Constitution could have taken the heat off the
legislators. While

may

Perhaps the

Rather than confront good campaign
contributors, however,

from the House of Representatives

campaign finance

legislators

likely that they

easier to pass the bill along to the
justices for their advice.

vein, the request

state,

bill

in

which would

many of the

limit the

elected

amount of

non-election years, publicly stating

for accountable politics"

Getting a statement from the justices that this

protections as established by precedent of the U.S.

would not be an

bill

act

ran contrary to First

Supreme Court got

them "off the hook." 689

687

ft8K

Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers

v.

Mayor of Boston, 384 Mass.

466.

393 Mass. 1201.

689

418 Mass. 1201. While not as certain, it is likely that two other requests were motivated by concerns
of political expediency. Not unlike questions on campaign finance reform, the Senate raised questions in
1985 on a proposal to impose criminal penalties for violations of confidentiality of certain proceedings

281

The 1987 request

for an opinion

deductions for educational
expenses

The

"anti-aid"

Amendment)
First

amendment

is

more

bill

which would have allowed tax

both private and public schools
was similar.

Massachusetts Constitution

(art.

46 of the Articles of

specific than the language
of the Establishment Clause in the

Amendment - any

fairly clear that the

in the

at

on a

aid to private schools
(secular or parochial)

proposed

bill

would have violated

this

is

prohibited.

amendment. Asking

It is

the

justices for this opinion enabled
the legislators to "consider" this
legislation (pleasing

the parochial school constituency)
while never enacting

happy).

it

(keeping the teachers' unions

690

One

other opinion issued in these
years which clearly involved a controversial

issue concerned a

House request on

voluntary prayer or meditation

Supreme Court precedent on
the First

Amendment. 691

in

the constitutionality of a bill to provide
for

public schools. Five of the justices, following

the Establishment Clause, stated that the bill

would

violate

In addition, these justices found the bill to
be "almost

indistinguishable in substance from the statute this
court held unconstitutional in Kent
before the State Ethics Commission. (The justices
determined that the proposed
speech rights protected by the First Amendment - 396 Mass.
1211.) While

bill

would

the legislators

known

that this statute

was

unconstitutional,

it

violate free

may have

doesn't look very good to be voting against strenethenintr

conflict of interest laws.

Avoiding unnecessary political conflict could also have been the
motive behind a 1982 request in
which the Senate asked for an opinion from the justices on a bill which would
have established
procedures by which counties could establish charters. There has been conflict
over the reform of county
government over the last 20 years and the conflict is of the type that is particularly challenging
to the

Legislature.

Rather than dividing officials along party

lines, differences often result

from geography.

It

may be more

"cost-effective" for the Legislature to see if the proposal is constitutional before expending
political energies to resolve these differences. In 387 Mass. 1209 the justices
found that a portion of the
bill would violate the Home Rule Amendment.
690

691

401 Mass. 1201.

387 Mass. 1201 (1982).

Nolan and Lynch issued a separate, dissenting opinion on this
be indistinguishable from the action of using public funds to pay chaplains
for the House and the Senate when part of their responsibility is to open the sessions of the respective
bodies with a prayer which the SJC upheld in Colo v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 378 Mass. 550
question, finding this

Justices

bill to

(1979).
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v.

Commissioner ofEducation, 380
Mass. 235 (1980)."

the representatives were
looking to the justices to

could

tell

are cases in

we

which one can assume

justices to "get

may have been

make just

the interested constituencies
that "no matter

this legislation, 'the court'
tells us

It

determination so they

how much we may want

can't." This case,

that the legislators

this

possible that

to enact

and the seven discussed above,

may have been

looking to the

them off the hook."

There was one other opinion which
could appear

at first

glance to be a case of

using the advisory process to assist
the legislators out of a politically
challenging
situation, although the legislators'
incentives are less clear

concerned

their

further analysis.

It

1984 request on the constitutionality of H.6665,
"An Act eliminating

certain discrimination

on the basis of sexual preference." The challenge
was aimed

specifically at the portion of the statute
violation.

upon

The Senate asked whether

which would provide criminal penalties

the term "sexual preference"

is

for

its

unconstitutionally

vague and therefore void under due process guarantees.
The justices found no such
problems with the proposed law. 692 This does not seem
the Legislature

November
first

was hoping.

15, 1983.

Wednesday

in

First, the

two major holidays before

new

•

692

693

bill

could not be considered after the

legislative session began,

then, the legislators could

substantive response to their liking, the justices

time.

be the response for which

Senate sent the request to the justices on

Considering the fact that the

January when the

to

and

have been hoping

would refuse

to

that there

that,

answer due

were

absent a

to a lack

693
It is

interesting that the justices, instead, did respond, although not until

390 Mass. 1201.

The justices were

clearly

Representative of this

is

aware

that the Legislature

may

occasionally time their requests in this way.

Chief Justice Wilkins comment. "Occasionally one
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may have

the sense... that

of

January 3

r

one day before the new

,

reading too

wanting

amicus

mueh

le gl slative

into the timing, this could

to respond, but not

wanting

briefs indicated that there

perhaps the justices wanted to

session

was

to begin.

At the

of

have been an instance of the justices

to force the Legislature's hand. 694

was

risk

The presence of

active political participation on
this question, so

assist the Legislature

with this timing while

still

responding to the question. 695 The
Legislature took a good deal of time
considering the
justices' response.

It

wasn't

until five years later in

which criminalizes discrimination

in public

1989

that the

G.L. c.272,

accommodations was amended

§92A

to include

sexual orientation. 696

While suppositions can be offered
of thirty-three)

that the Legislature

the justices clearly

felt that

in

almost one-quarter of the cases (eight out

was taking advantage of advisory opinions, most of

neither the Legislature nor the

Governor abused

this

process. Chief Justice Wilkins noted that "on
balance the advisory opinion system has

worked very

well." This

was echoed by

"always seemed legitimate

When

asked

if

to

Justice

O'Connor when he

said the requests

me." Justice Abrams, however, was a

more

little

critical.

she thought that over the years the advisory requests she'd seen were

the request for an advisory [opinion]

is

sent over here as a

way

to kill

it.

.

.they will send

it

over

late

enough so they hope we won't answer it in time, before they prorogue. We occasionally disappoint
them
by answering it rather more promptly than they'd hoped." Interview by author, Boston MA 23 April
1999.
694

Of course

there could also be nothing

justices finished their opinion.
695

Amicus

Advocates

briefs

&

were

The

more

Inc., the

First

to the timing than the fact that

the saying goes,

filed for consideration

Defenders,

Association, and

As

is

January 3

rd

Gay

Political

is

when

the

just a cigar.

by the justices on these questions by: Gay

Massachusetts

Church of Christ

sometimes a cigar

&

Lesbian

Caucus, the Massachusetts Teachers

Scientist in Boston.

696

Statute 1989, c.5 1 6, §

5. It is also interesting to note that rather than adding sexual orientation to a
of characteristics, the following language was added: "sexual orientation, which shall not include
persons whose sexual orientation involves minor children as the sex object." This addition adds more
1

list

weight

to the

assumption that the Legislature was feeling "conflicted" about
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this

piece of legislation.

generally ones she eonsidered
to be reasonable uses of
that power, she responded as
follows.

don't think there

'<]

sends us

this

we

want

to

None of the
skewed

do

it.

seventeen advisory opinions discussed
to

legislators could

to

make

immediately

it

have been using the process

was generally

would

likely

in a

they

to striking

to

that the justices will strike

mind

here.

it

because they

few of these instances

knew

down

constitutionally.

-

assist the Legislature

1999. Justice

Lynch
it

to

comes

May

of these cases the early decision

(and other parties with a financial or other

needed

to ensure that their goals

in practice appears to

MA,

could be met

pose no greater threat

to

23 April 1999; Justice O'Connor, Interview

1999; Justice Abrams, Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

25

May

made the following interesting observation about this process. "I've noticed
more requests for advisory opinions in election years than in non-election years.

also

frequently get

And... I'll leave

21

down, thereby saving them from

in several

Chief Justice Wilkins, Interview by author, Boston,

MA,

not very

is

be unconstitutional

the federal flag burning statute

Furthermore,

The advisory process

by author, Shrewsbury,

it

(or should have

the law. This

to

to

698

interest in the opinion) in responding as

In

when

in cases

have led

a hard political decision

of the justices could

h9x

end of the

at the

this point necessarily

from the Legislature enacting a law which
they know

under an assumption

we

it

do something." 697

that precedent

different

that

Sometimes they send

say 'not a solemn occasion.'
Sometimes they send

avoid political damage,

having

to

think that sometimes the
Legislature

I

the legislative process. These
opinions simply changed the timing of the
result.

While the

known)

a general rule.

because they don't want

session and then
really don't

is

you

to figure out

why

that is." (Interview

1989 the Supreme Court struck down a Texas

by author, Boston,

MA,

25

May

1999.)

which prohibited desecration of the American
(Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397.) There
was a fair degree of public outrage at this decision. Congress responded, in part, by enacting the Federal
Flag Protection Act that same year, a law which the Court also struck down. (17.5. v. Eichman. 496 U.S.
Flag as a violation of First

3

1

0[ 990].)
1

One

statute

Amendment freedom of expression.

can't help but

wonder

if the legislators

would have been so willing

they couldn't depend on the Supreme Court to uphold First
conflict, see

Amendment

to enact the

Robert Justin Goldstein, Burning the Flag: The Great 1989-1990 American Flag

Desecration Controversy (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1996).
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law

if

freedoms. For a history of this

the legislative process than
does judicial review and, in

pragmatic benefits which make

The

similarity

to the justices

it

some

cases,

may have

a better option than judicial
review.

between the two processes can be seen
by looking

which involved proposed criminal

The questions

statutes.

at

two requests

raised in these

cases were identical to those
which a defense counselor would raise after
the law had

been enacted.

In all three cases

it is

apparent that the state's elected representatives

were seriously considering the constitutional
ramifications of their
allowing them

to

in a

to

dialogue with the justices on the constitutional
legitimacy of

For instance, the Senate asked for an opinion

of legislation which would affect the rules
of evidence
allowing the refusal to take a breathalyzer

to

in

in

1992 on a proposed piece

criminal proceedings,

be admitted as evidence

This seems like the perfect case for the legislators

to

in a

Supreme Court had determined

that

criminal

trial.

ask for advice from the justices as

the elected representatives could be unsure of the
answer to the question.

Amendment

Far from

renege on their responsibilities, these
questions show the legislators

be actively engaged
their actions.

actions.

The U.S.

such a procedure would not violate the 5 th

prohibition against self-incrimination but the

SJC had been providing

greater protections to Massachusetts residents through the cognate provision of
the

Declaration of Rights. Particularly

wouldn't

legislation,

advance?
violate

6 9

it

make sense

if there

for

In this instance, the justices

12 of the Declaration.

art.

its

would be some way

proponents

to

to

"save" the

save time and find

informed the Legislature

that the bill

this out in

would

699

412 Mass. 1201. The protection against self-incrimination was

also the subject of the 1989 opinion

involving the proposal to allow for the admission of certain out-of-court statements of child witnesses
criminal

that a statute

in

which was discussed above. (406 Mass. 1201 [1989].) In light of the SJC's determination
involving child witnesses was found unconstitutional the year before, the request for an

trials
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The Legislature would perhaps
have benefited

similarly on a response to their

request for an opinion on a
proposed bail reform statute in 1988.
to

answer, however, as they
had received the request too

parties to prepare

thereafter."

700

and

The

file briefs,

legislators did not

considered a similar

bill in

made

this

to

permit sufficient deliberation by the
Justices

choose

to

resubmit questions

down

this

law

in

Aims

when

they

v.

Commonwealth™ What

statement in an advisory capacity in
1988 rather than as a

opinion of the Court after the law
had been enacted
interfered substantially with the
legislative process?
is little

"permit interested

1992. Perhaps their time would
have been better spent

they had since the SJC struck
justices had

and

late to

The justices refused

in

1993? Would

It is

if

if

the

full

have

this

hard to see how. Again, there

difference between the practice of judicial
review and that of issuing advisory

opinions. While one can be critical of
both powers,

advisory opinion practice

in

Massachusetts

system of separated powers than

is

it is

difficult to see

more damaging

how

to the legislature in a

the practice of judicial review. 702

is

In looking at the final nine advisory
opinions issued in the 1980s

the justices play what

may be

the

and early 90s,

considered their "ideal" role in a democratic system of

separated powers. Four of these cases concerned questions of
overseeing the

democratic process while the other five involve the justices as arbiters between the two

opinion on the

new

seems quite reasonable. This shows the Legislature engaging in a
an attempt to accomplish a goal but to do so within the limits set by the

legislation also

dialogue with the justices

in

federal and state constitutions.
700

701

Answer of the Justices, 401 Mass.

1234,

at

1235.

414 Mass. 667 (1993).

702
It is

possible, however, that passage of legislation puts

legislative action.

The Court's willingness

to act

more pressure on

on questions

the Court to uphold

like the death penalty in a

challenges the Legislature and the voters, however, makes this questionable.
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way which

more democrat, branches of
government. Even
the rarmfications of
judicial policymaking
judicial activity in these realms.

And

individuals

who

are concerned about

would generally be more accepting of

a closer look at the cases will

show

that to the

degree that one can make a distinction
between process and substance, the
justices
place themselves consistently
on the process side of these questions.

Four advisory opinions can be categorized
as involving democratic process
questions

the

Home

- two

entail questions

about the

initiative

and referendum process, one about

Rule process, and one about ballot access.
All four asked the justices

advice on procedure. For instance, the

Home

substantially affecting only one city or

town

three categories.

703

While

it

was

to give

Rule Amendment prohibits legislation

in

Massachusetts unless

it

one of

falls into

clear that the bill under consideration in the
1993

request would not be acceptable under two
of the categories, the justices were asked

whether

it

was acceptable under

As

the third.

the

Home

Rule Amendment exists

to

protect the local governments from encroachment
by the state, the role of the justices in
this instance is really

bounds and impose

one of "referee," making sure the Legislature doesn't overstep

its

will

on residents of a

locality against their will.

its

In this instance,

the justices decided that a proposal to study the possibility of
incorporating certain

wards

in

Boston into a new

city

was not

new

a vote to officially create a

city

and

therefore could not be considered by the Legislature. 704

703

*

A bill affecting one city or town may be enacted: a) at the
request of the locality; b) upon request of the Governor with approval of 2/3 of both houses of the
Article 89 of the Article of Amendment.

Legislature; or c) if it deals with the creation or dissolution of a city or town.
7J4

416 Mass. 1201

chose
the

.

There were other options open

to follow the justices' opinion.

SJC

rules that the bill

petition or raise private

is illegal,

money

to

to

proponents of this law, even

if the

advocates could either lobby the City Council

to

fund the feasibility study." Adrian Walker, "Panel

Secession Vote," Boston Globe, June

Legislature

As noted by Representative Byron Rushing, sponsor of the

2,

1993, 26.
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bill,

"if

pass a home-rule

OK

Predicted for

The two

requests sent to the justices in
these years regarding the
initiative and

referendum proeess are very
similar

to the nineteen procedural
questions

on

this

process which came to the
Court through the traditional
route during these same years.

The only

difference

that

is

it

was

the legislators

who chose

whether the proposed referenda
were allowable under

Amendment
remove

rather than interested citizens

who

48 of the Articles of

filed suit after legislative

the question from the ballot
before the election. 7 -

question of tax reform

in

proposal or whether
proposal.

706

This

is

was

legislators

the kind of question in

to a citizen initiative,

meeting

would need

in

a majority vote to pass.

would need

the measure by

different

As opposed

to

was

it

If the justices said

was considered

new

was an

it

were of the opinion

substantially different and therefore, in order to be

a majority vote

which one assesses

of the convention.

707

Expediency

is

the validity of the advisory process, but

most of the previous cases involving

politically popular position,

it

a new, legislative proposal,

In this instance the justices

tax limitation reforms and not progressive tax reforms.

have been much more

386 Mass. 1201 (1982).
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certainly not

when

this question.

tax questions, however, this proposal concerned

Not

surprisingly, tax limit proponents, with a

likely to use the initiative process in

than have progressive tax proponents.
707

to qualify as a

which the advisory process can make the

Except, of course, this docs allow legislators to avoid taking a vote on
706

enough

passage would require a vote of one-quarter of the

convention. If

that the legislator's proposal

it

involved the perennial

could be considered as an amendment
to a citizen initiated

it

organs of government function more
smoothly.

amendment

One

approval to

which the primary question was whether
a proposal by a

legislator offered in constitutional
convention

enacted,

art.

to ra.se questions as to

Massachusetts

expediency ean be gained with

no

little to

affect

on the legitimacy of the outcome,

the

practice can be worthwhile. 708

The
is

fourth and final advisory
opinion involving a democratic
process question

politically the

most

interesting.

In this instance

requested the justices' opinion
on a

was awaiting

his action.

The

bill

certain procedures to have
her

bill

it

was

actually the

Governor who

which had been enacted by the Legislature
and

would have allowed an individual who
followed

name placed on

the Democratic State Primary
Ballot

despite a state party rule which
required any candidate for statewide
office to obtain a

vote of at least

15% of the

on the primary

ballot.

delegates at the Democratic State
Convention to be placed

What makes

this

question so interesting

is

that the

Governor, Ed

King, was a Democrat (who was
running for reelection) and the large majority
of the

House and Senate were
ballot

away from

violation of First

also Democrats, yet this bill

the Democratic Party.

Amendment

of the advisory process was

members of the Democratic
serving on Beacon

The justices of the SJC found

association rights as established

precedent. Governor King vetoed the
result

would have taken control of the

bill

the

bill to

be a

by Supreme Court

and the Legislature did not override. 709 The

to leave the

nomination process

in the

hands of the

party rather than under the control of elected Democrats

Hill.

The remaining

five advisory opinions

of this era dealt specifically with

questions in which the Legislature and the Governor were in conflict. While the
708

The second question involving a proposed constitutional amendment concerned whether a term limits
proposal violated certain state or federal constitutional guarantees so as to be precluded from
consideration by the initiative process.
this

proposal before voting on

legislators using the process in

since they said the
709

amendment

3 8 5 Mass. 1201 (1982).

it

It is

not surprising that the legislators

in constitutional

convention. This

hopes of avoiding a

difficult vote.

is

would

offer questions

In this case, the justices

were no help

did not violate article 48. (413 Mass. 1201 [1992].)

Governor King

lost the

primary election
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on

another possible example of

to

Michael

S.

Dukakis.

1

decision ofthejust.es in
these eases would surely affect
the outcome, no matter what

they decided the proeess
eould not be seen as undemocratic -

which democrat, braneh would

prevail.

it

was just

The most common question

a matter of

raised in these

cases concerned the Governor's
exereise of the line-item veto as
provided for

in article

63 of the Articles of Amendment. 710 In each
instance either the House or the Senate

asked the justices

to

determine

if a

veto override was necessary in light
of their

asserting that the veto(s) under
question were
specific items involved this

Legislature

would not have

was an important
to

come up with

beyond

the Governor's authority. For the

question. If the veto

was

illegitimate, the

the two-thirds vote necessary to override
a

veto.

In developing their answers to
these questions the justices

seemed

to

be guided

predominantly by a concern with maintaining a
balance between the Governor and the
Legislature in the appropriation process, drawing
on their view of the intent the
Constitutional Convention which drafted
details the

art.

63 of the Articles of Amendment which

budget process.

An

examination of the Debates in the Constitutional Convention of 1917
reveals that the framers of art. 63 were agreed on at least three

fundamental points.

First, they intended to give the executive a central
role in the State budgetary process; second, they recognized that

appropriation bills are by their nature unique; and third, they agreed that
the unitary executive veto granted in Part II, c.l, Section 1, art. 2, of the
Constitution could not provide an effective

mechanism for balancing
proper legislative and executive powers with respect to the State
7"
budget.

710

The following cases involved such questions: 384 Mass. 820 (1981); 384 Mass. 828 (1981); 41
Mass. 1201 (1991); 419 Mass. 1201 (1994). It is interesting to note that there were three different
governors during the time of this study, two Democrats and one Republican. These differences over the
use of the veto power occurred during the tenure of all three executives: Edward King (Dem), 19781982; Michael

Dukakis (Dem), 1983-1990; William Weld (GOP), 1990-1997. (He resigned in July to
to be Ambassador to Mexico. The nomination eventually failed
opposition by Senator Jesse Helms).
S.

pursue nomination by President Clinton

due

to

291

The question generally involved
was "general

purpose" of the appropriation. 713
In the

necessary because, without
attaching

it

it,

the Legislature could

first

make any

in their favor.

Governor's veto would allow her
under the line-item veto

In the

to direct the

would

instance the veto

is

general legislation "veto-

as an outside section to the
annual appropriation

balance of power strongly

bill,

shifting the

second instance, however, the

use of funds. This

is

beyond her power

which she can only reduce or eliminate an
714
expenditure.

in

In these cases the justices
advised that thirteen

Governor's authority and nine were
is

whether the vetoed section

legislation included in a
general appropriation bill" 712 or if
the veto

"alter the legislative

proof by

a determination of

not.

of the challenged vetoes were within the

For our purposes, however, the specific

less interesting than the fact that
the justices exercised their

power

result

in these cases

with

primary concern for maintaining the constitutional
balance between the Legislature and
the Governor. This concern can be seen in
their opinion regarding a veto by the

Governor of a portion of an outside
Governor

to

have a

partial veto

section. This

would be

similar to allowing the

over general legislation. The justices' desire for

balance can be seen in their discussion of the problem with such
a situation.
[I]f the

Governor were to have veto power over portions of outside
power over general legislation in outside sections

sections, his veto

would exceed

his veto power in the normal course. The Justices have
never been asked, and are not now being asked, for their opinion on
whether general legislation properly may be attached as an outside

711

712

713

714

384 Mass. 820 (1981), 823-824.

384 Mass. 820 (1981), 825. These

are generally called the "outside sections" of the budget.

411 Mass. 1201 (1991), 1212.

The exact language of section

reduce items or parts of items

in

5

of article 63 reads as follows. "The governor

any

bill

appropriating money."

constitutional terms has focused on the definition of the term "item."
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may

disapprove or

The discussion of this matter

in

approbation Wl...b* we are of the
opinion that,
assuming the propriety of
outside sections, the Governor's
veto power
with respect to them ought
not be greater than it would
be if thos
sections had been separately
715
enacted.

A

system of separated powers
assumes

relatively equal in their

power

that there will

relationships.

be three branches which are

These requests regarding the budget
put

the justices in the position
of ensuring that this relative equality

would continue

to exist

between the Governor and the
716
Legislature.

At the

risk

of being repetitive,

it

is

hard to see exactly

how

the practice of the

legislators presenting these
questions to the justices for their advice
can negatively

influence the legislative process.

have happened

in

Of course

any of these cases

if the

instances if the law had been enacted
a question of judicial review.

moving

it

it

is

hard to imagine exactly what would

advisory process had not existed. In

would eventually been brought

The change

in

to the

many

Court as

timing which the advisory process allows,

the role of the court from after enactment
to before, could affect the internal

dynamics of the House and the Senate and,

thus, the

outcome of the process.

If,

for

instance, the legislators had to spend a great
degree of time resolving a political

controversy over the constitutional interpretation of the
Anti-aid

Home

715

Rule Amendment, that would leave

less

Amendment

or the

time for enacting other legislation. Or

411 Mass. 1201 (1991), 1216.

716

Three additional advisory opinions involved legislative-executive struggles. In two of these, the
answer the questions raised, one because the proposed bill, "An Act to reorganize
certain departments and offices of the commonwealth to make the operation of government more
efficient," was no longer pending in the Legislature {Answer
of the Justices, 409 Mass. 1201 [1991]) and
the other because the questions had been dealt with in an opinion of the full court issued earlier that year
{Answer of the Justices, 4 1 3 Mass. 1 2 1 9 [ 992]). In a third opinion the justices advised the Governor

justices refused to

1

that the bill awaiting his signature,

"An Act

requiring legislative approval of Federal options which

substantially change public benefit programs,"

amounted to a legislative veto and would operate as an
infringement on the Governor's authority. (384 Mass. 840 [1981].) The Governor vetoed the bill with
no repercussions in the Legislature.
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perhaps too

mueh

political capital

eould have sent off to the
justices
legislative agenda.

would be expended on
in

its

bill

which the party leaders

hopes of delaying action, affecting
the

members work on

mechanisms through which

of their

a regular basis.

It

the

does not negatively affect the

legislative process or the
legitimacy of the Legislature's actions.
Rather,

one more piece

rest

These scenarios (and hundreds more)
could be imagined but they

are really no different than
the other structural

Legislature and

a

in the political superstructure
in

houses of the Legislature have found
the constitutionality of their

own

it

it

provides

Massachusetts, a piece which both

useful to

employ from time

to

time

in

assessing

actions.

DANGER TO THE JUDICIARY?
Advisory opinions may not affect the

legislative sphere, but as Justice Story

indicated, they could bring disrepute to
the justices and the SJC. After

all,

Chapter

III

of the Massachusetts Constitution says the Governor,
Legislature and Council may
"require the opinions of the Justices of the supreme
judicial court." This would seem to

give the justices

in a politically

little

control over these questions.

The wrong question could put them

untenable position, whether or not the questioner intended this

addition, the differences

between the advisory process and the

result.

In

traditional judicial

process could lead to a lack of respect for the judiciary overall. Again, however, look
a
at the

process in practice shows that these theoretical problems

daunting than

we might

expect.

Over

are, in actuality, less

the years the justices of the

SJC have developed

procedures for avoiding potential threats to their independence, authority, or integrity

from advisory opinions. The justices are aware

294

that the advisory process

is

different

from the

traditional judicial process

the potential pitfalls
caused

One of the
asked

them

to

and have developed mechanisms

for adjusting to

by these differences.

greatest limitations of the advisory
process

is

that the justices are

respond to a question(s) without
the benefit of the adversarial
process

in sorting

through

all

sides of an issue.

To compensate

to assist

for this the justices, over

the past 35 years, have regularly
issued a call to interested parties to
submit amicus
briefs

on the questions.

This practice seems to have been
instituted

proposal on legislative reapportionment. 717

From 1981

to

opinions had the benefit of some amicus
participation; a
in briefs in these

in

1967 regarding a

1995 over two-thirds of the

total

of 144 parties participated

twenty-three cases. If one excludes the five
cases

in

which the justices

issued no opinion, there were only five
advisory opinions (15%) from the justices in
these years which did not have the benefit
of amicus participation. While the justices

cannot guarantee equal participation on both sides
of a question, they make every
attempt and will delay their deadline for submitting
such briefs to accommodate
interested parties.

718

Amicus

briefs

were

filed

by governmental

authorities including

both houses of the Legislature, the Governor and the Attorney
General, by public

353 Mass. 790. According to Farina, this was the first modern example of this practice although
a few
such requests can be found in earlier cases. Today the SJC's webpage
contains a link entitled "Amicus
Invitations."

< www.state.ma.us/courts/courtsandiusaes/courts/suprcmeiudicialcourt. >

718

See 41 1 Mass. 1201 (1991). "We invited interested persons and organizations to file briefs on or
before October 4, 1991, and thereafter approved requests to extend the deadline to October
9, 1991."
(1202.) Even greater accommodation was made in a 1989 question on allowing certain out-of-court
statements of children to be used as evidence,

28

th

and then again

Justice

October 4

.

when

the

August 28

th

didn't].

everybody

the importance of hearing all sides of an
of an argument are represented, he said "[we] try to.

They

[legislators]

to help us

who

deadline was extended to September

(406 Mass. 1201.)

O'Connor noted

that both sides

we

to

th

want us

to really think

stands on one side of the

it

issue.
I

When

mean

it

asked

if the justices

would be

through and advise them, and so

beam and

see

unjust, really, [if
[if]

we

get

ignore everybody else... [that would be

He goes on to note that this semblance of fairness is important for a two-fold reason. "[A]part
from just feeling an obligation to be fair, the system would generally break down if people lost respect
unfair]."

for the Court, for the

SJC." Interview by author, Shrewsbury,
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MA,

21

May

1999.

interest

groups such as

Common

Cause and the Coalition

by industry and trade groups
such

for Basic

Human

Needs, and

as the Associated Industries
of Massachusetts. This

practice not only gives the
justices the benefit of reading
contrasting positions, but also

provides some assurance that that
individuals and organizations most
directly affected

by

the proposed legislation will
have a chance to be heard by the justices. 719

The advisory process has
integrity

of the judiciary.

On

a second

the one hand, the assumption

essential to a fair judicial process

as

humanly

possible.

problem which could negatively

is

that the justices

If the justices face the

they had faced in their advisory capacity,
justices will not already have

made up

their

assured can the parties be that the

mind on

to consider the question in light

If they reach a different conclusion,

to

change

First,

their minds. This

the question involved? This

of the appellant's specific

in the context

This process

Even

a

may

situation.

however, they face the embarrassment of seeming

problem has been addressed through two, related

practices.

opinions of the justices do not have precedential value. The justices are aware of

of a concrete situation and thus

the advisory process.

71

is

both instances, they

in

the difference between advising on a statute in the abstract and

law

probably most

in their official capacity as

two-fold problem. If the justices reach the same
conclusion

appear unwilling

is

perform their duties as impartially

same question

how

which

affect the

if

may

720

try not to

Chief Justice Wilkins recognized

making

a decision on a

bind themselves through

this

problem.

"[It]

could be

thereby help to avoid a concern on the part of the public toward advisory opinions.

not happy with the result, citizens

may

be more satisfied with the process.

7

"°Topf s criticism of advisory opinions in Massachusetts and other states focuses primarily on the
nonbinding doctrine. "Advisory opinions are taken as binding by virtually everyone including at times
the advising justices. Like that

which looks

like a duck,

walks

like a

duck and quacks

like a duck,

advisory opinions have looked, behaved and sounded like adjudicated decisions, and have not

unreasonably, been perceived and employed, as such." "Supreme Court Advisory Opinions as
Illegitimate Judicial

Review," 129-130.

I

would argue
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that

while

it

may

be easy to

make

the distinction

[that] the

circumstances under which the
problem comes up,

permit us to g lve a

much more

in real life

thoughtful, introspective, logical
answer

circumstances,

»™ On

a

concrete level this recognition
helps to avoid any embarrassment
in a justice deciding

one way

in

an adv,sory capacity and
then seeming

While

in reality

similar question

opinion

is

it

may be more

comes before her

difficult for a justice to

when reviewing

capacity than they do

when asked

this

"The

Justices,

conduct.

With
on

its

trial

A

It

the constitutionality of an act in
an advisory

to exercise their

is

power of judicial review.

facial validity

of a statute

in

First,

and

an

can't be assessed "as applied" since
there has been no application.

of course, can say

statute

first

problem. In addition, the justices employ

most obviously, the justices can only
assess the
advisory capacity.

be impartial when a

a second time, the repeated
admonition that the

only advisory helps to counter

different standards

to reverse herself in a full
opinion.

that

§23

is

facially invalid only if

this distinction, justices

not facially invalid as applied to future

it

would be vague

in all its applications."

could advise that a proposed statute

may be

constitutional

face while the specific application of the law in
a factual setting established in a

court proceeding

may be

unconstitutional.

decision on the constitutionality of a statute on

As
its

a result the justices could

make one

face in an advisory opinion while

finding a variety of applications of the same law to be impermissible
under the
constitution without feeling

between the two fuzzy, there

bound by

is still

a previous decision or appearing inconsistent.

a line of distinction which the justices try to reinforce with the

procedures described below.
721

722

Interview by author, Boston,

3 96

722

MA,

23 April 1999.

Mass. 1211 (1985), 1213.

297

The second

distinction in process

which predominates

in

is

that the

questions of judicial review

advisory opinions. "Unenacted
legislation,

presumption of constitutionality
is

not held by justices in issuing

when considered by

the Justices in an

advisory opinion, does not benefit
from the presumption of constitutionality
that applies

when

the

Supreme

legislation."

723

Judicial Court considers a
postenactment constitutional challenge to

Again, the difference between the

way justices handle

advisory

opinions and opinions of the Court provide
justification for any difference between
her

views

in

an advisory opinion and the

the Court. Further,

it

way

that

same justice may vote

in a

decision of

provides a different framework for assessing
the question so that

justices can approach the question from
a fresh perspective, unbiased by an opinion

they

may have made
The

in

an advisory capacity.

fifteen years

of advisory opinions assessed for

this

study indicate that the

problems created by the justices' consideration of the same
question

in

an advisory

capacity and then in a real controversy before the Court are
more theoretical than
actual.

into

Of the

law

33

bills

in the years

justices found

same format

on which an opinion was requested, only seven were enacted

which followed.

no constitutional

as requested.

725

724

Three of these involved

infirmities

bills

and which were enacted

with which the

in substantially the

These have presented no problem with impartiality

•723

401 Mass. 1201 (1987), 1205. Presumptions also vary regarding proposed constitutional

amendments. "Since we are asked our opinion on a measure not yet approved by the people as an
Amendment to our Constitution, we do not extend a presumption of validity to the measure (as we would
with respect to an enacted statute or approved constitutional Amendment)." 386 Mass. 1201 (1982),
1217.
724

These seven

bills

covered eight requests. Basically the same

bill

was considered

in

two

different

requests.
725

The justices found no

constitutional infirmities in answering the questions proposed

guarantee that the remainder of the

bill

has no problems. These
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bills

-

that

is

no

covered the following topics:

however

as

no constitutional challenge was
raised before the SJC on these

Two

enactment.

other bills were enacted in
substantially different format

bills after

in later

(even though the justices had
found no constitutional problems with
the proposed

when

they were considered under
their advisory power), so any
challenge to the

would
of the

raise

new

quest,ons for the justices. 726

bail system, but as

was noted above,

request due to time constraints. 727

without benefit of advice
that

same

year.

728

The

in

final bill

accommodate

SJC faced questions on
substantially different

legislation

similar

bills

addit.onal request involved a reform

bill

regarding the bail system was enacted

down by

the

SJC

as unconstitutional

involved the admissibility of out-of-court testimony
of

was

substantially modified

constitutional concerns. This

was

upon

the advice of the

the only case in

the statute after enactment, and in this case

it

which the

was on

a

729
bill.

In all seven of these cases (eight requests) involving

which the Legislature enacted

SJC was never asked

bills

the justices refused to respond to this

1993, and was struck

certain child witnesses. This bill

justices to

A

One

years

after requesting advice

from the justices, the

to consider questions raised in regard to enacted legislation

which

application of a tax to services (408 Mass. 1201
[1990]); regulating certain tax titles on Nantucket (408
Mass. 1215 [1990]); and an initiative law limiting terms of elected officials
(413 Mass. 1201 [1992]).
726

The

first

responded

concerned the reorganization of the savings bank life insurance system. While the justices
of question from the House in 1987 that the proposal then under consideration was

to a series

constitutional, the Legislature did not enact changes until 1990.
legislation

same

was

substantially different.

"The

bill

According

to the

SJC, the 1990

then pending before the Legislature [1987]

as the bill that the Legislature enacted in 1990 inserting G.L. C.178A. Nothing that

opinion (Opinion of the Justices, 401 Mass. 1211] bears on the issues on which
v. Commissioner of Insurance, 428 Mass. 755 (1999), 757.

we

is

we

not the

said in that

decide this appeal."

Dibiase

The other involved

legislation adding the category

discrimination statutes in the

state.

As previously

of "sexual preference"

limiting language to ensure that this did not apply to individuals
children. {Opinion of'the Justices,
727

whose sexual preference included young

390 Mass. 1201 [1984].)

401 Mass. 1234 (1988).

m Answer of the
729

to various anti-

noted, the Legislature enacted this law but added

Justices, 401

Mass. 1234 (1988); Aime

Care and Protection of Rebecca, 4 9 Mass. 67
1

(

1
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v.

994).

Commonwealth, 414 Mass.

667.

was

similar to questions raised
about a proposed

judicial impartiality never

Of the

became

The hypothetical eoneerns about

bill.

a reality.

remaining twenty-five requests for
advisory opinions coming

justices in these years, twenty
involved legislative ideas

implemented through the year 2001.™
All together,

few opportunities

to the

which had not been

this

means

that the justices

for confronting a similar
question in both their advisory

and

had

their

traditional judicial roles.

This

may

rarely occur because the justices
have initiated a final

mechanism

to

protect the integrity of the judicial
process while meeting their constitutional obligation
to

respond

to requests for advisory opinions

government. This

is

from the other branches of Massachusetts

the previously discussed jurisprudence
of refusal

justices have developed since the 1870s

when

the justices refused for the

answer a request of the justices which did not present
"important question of law" as provided for

either a

in Article III

Massachusetts Constitution. The frequency with which
the justices first

began

this practice at the

notes that the justices responded to

all

which the

Two

of the

occurs has increased since

th

end of the 19

century. In her article, Farina

questions in almost

67%

of the requests

presented to them in the 210 years from 1780 to 1990. However,

this

number has

dropped consistently from the 1870s on. By the 1980s, justices answered
in a request in

730

The remaining

only

33%

of the cases, no questions

five requests dealt with the governor's veto

annual appropriation legislation.

It is

in

time to

"solemn occasion" or an

of Part

this

first

all

questions

another 50%, and some of the

power over

individual line items in the

highly unlikely that procedural questions about these matters

would ever be

raised in a question before the Court after enactment. It never occurred during this era.
This information raises two interesting points. First are questions about the reason the House or the

Senate makes these requests

in the first place, especially in cases in

with the proposed legislation.

problems with the
guarantee that

this

legislation

One

sees,

however,

which

the justices found

that in 14 cases the justices

no problem

found constitutional

and the Legislature never pursued the matter further (although there

was because of the justices'

opinions).
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is

no

questions in a request

answer

all

in

17% of the

questions proposed

can be seen

in the

if

eases.

one looks

The justices were
at all

slightly

more

of the requests from 1981

likely to

1995 as

to

following table.

TABLE

6.1

- Frequency wi th which Justices
Respond
Requests

to

Advisory Opinions 731

fo r

Requests w/all

Requests w/some

Requests

Questions

Questions

Answered

Answered

w/no Questions
Answered

66.6%

24.6%

8.8%

1980-1989*

33%

50%

17%

1981-1995+

42.4%

42.4%

15.2%

Years

1780-1990*

Data from Farina,

+Data compiled by

Supreme Court Advisory Opinions," 372.
author.

These numbers look

slightly different,

however,

if

we

look

at

the frequency

with which justices answered individual
questions. The thirty-three cases during the

1980s and early 90s contained 151 individual questions.
The justices refused

to

answer

seventy-two, almost half of the questions presented to them
by the House, Senate, or

Governor. The obvious question
gives us

some

insight into the

why do

is

way

in

the justices refuse to

answer? Knowing

which the justices have limited

their use

this

of this

power. These refusal can be divided into four categories: mootness, vagueness,
statutory interpretation, and conflict with pending matters.

Most of the questions which
category could be applied to

fifty

the justices

do not answer are moot. This general

of the seventy-two questions

to

which the justices

refused to respond. Almost fifteen percent of the questions (twenty) were removed
731
I

recognize that the division of years

article is

in

Table

5.1 is

somewhat confusing, but

the data in Farina's

provided either for the entire time period or by decade. The 1980-1989 information

as representative of the continuing decrease in cases in

asked. This matches closely with the data

I

which the SJC chooses to answer
developed for the 1981-1995 period.
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all

is

provided

questions

from consideration when the
justices "were informed
Senate, the legislation

is

that,

by reason of the actio, of the

no longer pending before the
General Court" 732 An almost

equal number were not answered
by the justices because answers to
other questions
the request had

made an answer

determined that
reform,

under

it

article

when

the justices

44 of the Massachusetts Declaration
prohibited

was not necessary

article 30.

unnecessary. For instance,

for

them

to consider

whether

it

in

would

a certain tax

also be prohibited

733

Similarly, after an opinion of the
justices that legislation to reserve

a certain percentage of jobs in
state-funded contracts

wculd

violate the privileges and

immunities guarantee of Article IV of
the U.S. Constitution, the justices did
not go on

and consider the legitimacy of the proposed
law
Refusal
to

in light

in these instances is related to
the

answer only those questions which

express no opinion on whether

it

constitutionally sound, since that

is

Commerce

Clause.

734

general care exercised by the justices

are presented

would be

of the

by the requestor.

'

However, we

sufficiently less intrusive to be

not the question before us, nor need

we

consider

whether any provision of the constitution of the Commonwealth
might prohibit the
proposed enactment." 735 While the justices are willing

to

answer questions upon request, they are very careful not

meet

to

their obligation to

respond to any more

questions than are asked.

732

733

734

735

on

Answer of the Justices, 409 Mass. 1201
3 83

Mass. 940(1981).

3 93

Mass. 1201 (1984).

(1991), 1201-1202.

385 Mass. 1201 (1982), 1207. Another excellent example of this can be found in the justices' opinion
a proposed sex offender registry law which will be discussed at the end of this chapter. (423 Mass.

1201 [1996]).
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Similar to the

worded so vaguely
request. This

was

moot questions

that the request

are those in

sounds more

wh 1C h

the justices find the question

like a fishing expedition
than a speeifie

the ease with four questions
the justices chose not to answer.
In

four instances the Legislature
raised general concerns that
a statute

may

federal due process or equal
protection guarantees without
specifying

the legislation

was of concern or how

the bill

is

may

violate these limits.

all

violate state or

which section of

The justices

find

limitation in the constitutional
language regarding advisory opinions.

The words of Part II, c.3, art. 2, of the
Constitution, as amended by
85 of the Amendments, are "clear to the effect that
'opinions
justices'

may be

words mean

art

of the

required 'upon important questions of
law

that the important questions

'

Those

of law must be explicitly

stated: they cannot be left to
equivocal implications.
question of constitutional law cannot be
so framed

An

opinion upon a

as to be helpful to

legislators without a definite statement
of the point of difficulty which
736
has been developed through hearings and
discussion."

As with many
demarcation

is

threshold questions injudicial proceedings,
however, this line of

not always clear.

The justices

do, at times, refine questions so as to be

able to respond. In one 1985 opinion the justices
did just that, noting that "[i]n

some

circumstances, the Justices have not been averse to pointing to the
existence of obvious

problems

in a

proposed

bill,

raised

by well-formed and

this in

some

Two

even when those problems are not clearly and directly

specific questions at hand."

instances and refuse to answer in others

737

is

Why the justices choose

to

not clear.

questions which the justices refused to answer due to vagueness were of a

different sort, however. Rather than the question being vague, the federal precedent
736

386 Mass. 1201 (1982), 1221,

citing

Answer of the Justices, 299 Mass. 617

(1938), 629.

737

396 Mass. 1201 (1985), 1204. Another example is found in 408 Mass. 1201 (1990). "When
confronted with comparably broad questions, the Justices have requested to be excused from
responding... Mindful of this constitutional limitation on our power and duty to render advisory
opinions,

we

do

restrict

our response

to the important,

broad issue, clearly implicit

question[.]" (1205.)
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in the

Governor's

was unclear so

the justices chose not to
act.

about the constitutionality
of a

In this

case the justices were being asked

law which would

state

limit the

terms of office of U.S.

Senators and Representatives,
an issue on which the federal
courts had not given
direction in

1992.- Since

U.S. Constitution even
threat to the prestige

much

the justices of the state courts
are not the final voice on the

when

exercising their traditional powers,
they risk even greater

of the j udiciary

if

they venture into a realm where, as
Farina notes,

they can only give an educated
"guesstimate" of the outcome of a concrete
federal

challenge to a proposed state statute.
Farina notes the problem with requests
for advice

on the constitutionality of proposed

bills

under the federal charter.

[I]f the

motive for seeking advice is to resolve legal
uncertainty in order
may proceed with confidence, the advantage conferred
by the
Justices' speed in rendering an opinion
is considerably offset by the
relatively low value, as "security," of
their views on federal questions.
Indeed, this is the one category of question
in which the Justices' advice
has periodically been ignored. 739
that action

Again, however, the justices don't always refuse to
answer questions regarding
federal claims, although the reason for the distinction

willing to give an answer

when

is

clearer here

they feel that federal precedent

is

-

the justices are

clear.

For instance,

the justices gave opinions on three questions raising concerns
under the First

Amendment

during the years under study. 740 There was sufficient direction from

413 Mass. 1201. The justices did determine

that the initiative petition under question was a legitimate
48 of the Articles of Amendment of the Massachusetts Constitution. It was
not until 1995 that the U.S. Supreme court determined that change to the terms of office of federal
legislators could only occur through an amendment to the U.S. Constitution. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779.

topic for the ballot under

739

"Supreme

art.

Judicial Court

Advisory Opinions," 370.

740

3 8 5 Mass. 1201 (1982) (finding proposed law regarding primary nomination procedures would violate
freedom of association of the Massachusetts Democratic Party); 387 Mass. 1201 (1982) (finding statute

for voluntary prayer in school

would

violate the Establishment Clause); and

(determining that certain campaign finance limits would violate free speech
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418 Mass. 1201 (1994)
rights).

Supreme Court precedent, however,

to

allow thejusttces to

of what the Supreme Court would
decide should a
this

statute

make

a solid

"guesstimate"

be challenged before

under

i,

Amendment.
The

last

two categories of questions which
justices refuse

to

answer, those

involving statutory interpretation
and conflicts with pending matters, touch
on items

which would be most

likely to put the justices in the
untenable position of

making

a

decision on the same question in
both their advisory and judicial capacities.
Thirteen

questions raised in these cases involved
the interpretation of existing statutes
which,

according to the justices, do not present
a "solemn occasion" as required by the
Constitution.

They have

traditionally defined a

'solemn occasion' arises when the answers

to certain 'questions

be determined by the body making the inquiry,
executive power entrusted to

it

solemn occasion as follows. "A

in the exercise

is

to take action in future legislation.

Whether or not

of the dictates of an existing law

a question

wisdom

.

.

The

to

of the legislative or

by the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth:' 741

Interpretation of an existing statute

wise or expedient.

of law are necessary

is

not necessary for the House, Senate, or Governor

Justices are not

a

new law

should be enacted in light

which asks "whether

empowered

to

it

[proposed

bill] is

answer questions bearing on the

or expediency of proposed legislation." 742 Avoidance of such questions,

whether specifically required by the language of the Constitution or
of problems which advisory opinions can

create.

not,

is

wise

in light

Interpreting an existing statute in an

advisory capacity would lead into territory which the same justices are likely to traverse

741

Answer of the Justices, 406 Mass 1220 (1989) quoting Opinion of the Justices, 126 Mass. 557

1224.
742

385 Mass. 1201 (1982), 1203.
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(1878),

to their

formal, judicial capacity.

occasion" helps them

to

Abiding closely by

this definition

avoid .he double-edged sword of
appearing partial due

prcv.ous considerations or
of embarrassing themselves through

Topf hypothesizes
to

of "solemn

that the

answer questions winch do

a reversal.

thai the

unrealistic.

their refusal

meet the justices' interpretation of the
constitutional

requirements of a "solemn occasion"
or an "important question of law"

fad

743

development of a docfrine surrounding

no,

to

is

a result

of the

non-binding doctrine regarding advisory
opinions was increasingly
Farina agrees that while on a formal level
advisory opinions

precedential weight, the reality

is

somewhat

cany no

different.

[T]he Justices do not change their minds any more
readily
advisory opinion context than they do in "rear' cases.

in the

The

legal and
communities routinely act as ifadvisory opinions are to
be
taken as "the law" (in ways as technical as
legislatures sending them
towns or lower court judges citing them as dispositive,

political

to

as a governor invoking
legislation).

The Court

them

to justify his position

itself is careful to deal

expressions of legal principle, even
surprisingly, given

all this,

if

ways

to

as public

on controversial

with them as significant

not literally precedent.

Not

the citizenry does not distinguish

between

advisory opinions and real cases. Aspects of contemporary
advisory
practice such as the routine solicitation of briefs from
interested parlies

confirm and entrench these professional and
rhe hypothesis that justices have developed
the

weakness of the non-binding doctrine

this dissertation: that the relationship

is

741

this as a

mechanism

44

to

between the Legislature and the SJC

the non-binding doctrine alone

in a

There were also two questions which the justices refused

to

to protect the integrity

answer regarding

a

proposal

which

Justices."
744

arise

from circumstances already

396 Mass.

Supreme

121

I,

at

in

existence should not he dealt with

121 V

Judicial Court Advisory Opinions," $98.
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lo

of the

amend

the

pending before the State Ethics Commission. The

justices noted the unfairness of this. "These potentially affected persons are not before us.
issues

in

generally consensual manner.

became too weak

siaie ethics law, as their response could affeel matters

overcome

reasonable, and supports a central thesis of

Massachusetts has been one which has evolved

When

lay understandings.

m

a

in fairness,

response of the

Court, the justices developed
a

some
late

indication that this

was

new

745
tool to help accomplish this
end.

criticized

by some

largely accepted

involvement

and commentators

legislators

1800s and early 1900s, the right of the
justices

to

make

by the other branches of government
since

in the

While there

this

is

in the

determination has been

The justices'

then.

advisory process, like that in the development
of the

common

law,

the construction of statutory law,
and the interpretation of the Constitution,
has

developed
bounds.

in a

It is

way which

gives them control over their role without
overstepping then-

again an example of the efficiency goal of the
separation of powers

becoming more dominant over time

One more

as the conflictual roles take a back seat.

piece of circumstantial evidence which suggests
that this relationship

has developed cooperatively

is

the fact that the Legislature rarely enacts a law after
the

justices have noted problems, and has not done this since
1977. According to Farina

there

were only four advisory opinions issued between 1780 an 1990

justices suggested that a proposed statute

may

Legislature enacted the law regardless. 746

It is

it

is

likely a result

which the

be unconstitutional but that the
unlikely that this general acceptance of

the justices' advice exists because the Legislature

judiciary. Instead,

in

is

unwilling to challenge the

of the recognition by both branches of their

respective roles. Since the justices have carved out a reasonable niche in which to use

745

While we may agree about the development of this tool, Topf and I part company on its ramifications.
is much more critical of the advisory process overall, including the justices' refusal to answer
questions. "It was not only a startling development but doubtfully grounded as well." "State Supreme
Court Advisory Opinions as Illegitimate Judicial Review," 115. Farina takes a more sanguine approach

He

to this

development, emphasizing the pragmatic nature of the development of the advisory process over

time.
746

The four cases were

in

1

93

1

,

1

967,

1

975, and

1

977.

It is

interesting to note that three of these four

involved the justices' interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, an area
legislators to

"second-guess" the justices since they do not have the

Judicial Court Advisory Opinions," 388-391.
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in

which

final say.

it

makes more sense

for the

See Farina, "Supreme

their advisory

power, being careful not

the advice of the justices

when

to overreach, the legislators
are willing to accept

they do speak. The cooperative
relationship between

the judiciary and the
Legislature in Massachusetts

policing in

all their

is

a result of this kind of self-

interactions.

SEX OFFNDER REGISTRY - am
EXAMPLE OF AN ONGOING DISCUSSION
The

closest the Legislature

came

in the last ten

years to acting despite an

advisory opinion to the contrary
involves the development of a sex
offender registry
Massachusetts.

It is

a

good case with which

to

conclude as

it

in

exemplifies the ongoing

nature of the discussions in which
these two branches engage in the development
of
public policy.

In

1996 the justices issued an advisory opinion on a
proposed

which was intended

to bring the state into

statute

compliance with federal requirements

for

receiving criminal justice monies, and to respond
to public concern engendered by the

1993 abduction, rape, and murder of a young

New Jersey

girl

named Megan, by

implementing a sex offender registration program. 747 The questions
which the Senate
proposed and the justices answered are as interesting
they are for what they include.

The sex offender

components, registration of the offender with
of this information

to the public.

bill.

infirmities as the questions

were presented,

were not comfortable with

the

747

what they do not include

registration

as

(SOR) program has two

governmental entity and dissemination

All four questions raised by the Senate concerned the

dissemination portion of the proposed

which

a

for

bill.

While the justices found no constitutional
it

There are

is

obvious from their opinion that they

at least

nine places in this opinion

in

the justices emphasize the limited nature of their response, including at least five

423 Mass. 1201.
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references to the faet that
"the questions presented to
this eourt eoneern only the
notification provisions of the
proposed Massachusetts statute."748
Chief Justice Liacos,

while signing onto the original
opinion,
to

felt

it

necessary to write a concurring opinion

emphasize the limited nature of this
opinion.
write separately to emphasize
that what the Senate did not ask
about
th.s bi
may reveal more about it than what it did
ask. This, the opinion
carefully read, points out. It
must be made clear that we are not asked to
render our opinion on, among other
matters, the constitutionality of the
registration provisions of the bill..
..Thus, I write separately to
I

emphasize

we have commented,

that

selected portions of the

bill in

a

as requested only on
most limited fashion. 749

This limited opinion of the justices
was issued on July

was approved by

bill

the

Governor on August

attention to the warnings that there

may be

1996.

The

18, 1996,

Why

and the

Legislature paid

other sections of the

redrafted to avoid constitutional problems. 750

these warnings

5,

certain

bill

SOR

little

which should be

the Legislature refused to heed

impossible to say. They could have feared losing federal crime

is

prevention monies, or they could have been responding
to political pressure to toughen
certain criminal laws.

Had

they taken the time to draft a cleaner

bill,

the years of

dialogue which have gone on between the Court and the Legislature
since that time

may have been

avoided.

On

the other hand, if the justices hadn't been quite so

scrupulous about their policy of answering only those questions which are presented,
they might have been able to offer concrete advice on the more troublesome portions of

748
1

2

1

1

.

See also

at

1

2 1 7,

1

229,

1

233, and

1

234.

749

1243. In addition to the general point that the Senate did not ask about the registration process, Liacos
detailed five specific constitutional questions which could be asked about the proposed

were
750

bill

but which

not.

The warnings were

enough

Lynch remembered this as an instance in which the
"Sometimes we said some things in
advisory opinions and the Legislature has gone ahead and passed it anyway. The Sex Offender
Registration Law now, I think, is an example of that." Interview by author, Boston, MA, 25 May 1999.
clear

that Justice

Legislature had ignored an advisory opinion of the justices.
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the

bill.

Both of these

criticisms,

have been resolved "best"
overlook the degree

to

if

however, imply

The

would somehow

no further court challenges were
necessary. This may

which the dtalogue described
below contributes

understanding of the arguments
involved
legislators,

that this situation

in

to

a greater

an issue on the par, of the
justices, the

and the public.
first

serious challenge to the

General a unanimous Court decided
(and therefore to

all

SOR Law

arose in 1997. In

Doe

v.

Attorney

that the law, as applied to a
particular individual

similarly situated individuals),
violated his due process rights. In

this instance the appellant

one" sexual offense, the
declared that individuals

pled guilty in 1990 to an offense that
was considered a "tier

least serious category

who were

of offense under the

categorized as

tier

SOR

law.

one offenders were not

The law
entitled to

a hearing or an opportunity to
challenge a determination that they continued
to be a
threat to

minors or others. (Individuals convicted of
a

entitled to such hearings.)

The SJC agreed with

tier

two or

tier

three offense

were

the plaintiffs contention that "the act

denies him procedural due process guaranteed
by the Constitution of the

Commonwealth." 751 Foreshadowing
which detailed

further problems

cases to come, Justice Fried wrote a concurrence

which were

Registration and notification

may

to

be found with the law.

be useful, and in any event are

constitutionally permissible

means for protecting the public, but only if
they are narrowly tailored to a grave danger. Indiscriminate extensions
such as appear in this case will only provoke continuous and often
successful litigation. This will burden the courts and the relevant
administrative agency to such a point that the purposes of the scheme
will be delayed and perhaps defeated even in the carefully limited class

of cases

751

Doe

v.

which

it

properly applies.

752

Attorney General, 426 Mass. 136 (1997), 137.

752

151.

to

Justices

Abrams and Marshall joined

in this
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concurrence.

In 1998 the

wh 1C h

SJC heard another important case
involving

the

SOR

Board

in

the Court determined that
while the law can be interpreted
so as to meet due

process requirements, this will
require a hearing before the
Board on each defendant,
after

which the Board

is

to issue findings

which are

"specific, written, detailed,

and

individualized" in support of the
classification. Although hearings
were anticipated in

challenged cases, such hearings
were not specifically provided for

Rather than strike
save

it,

down

the law, the Court interpreted
the statute in such a

modifying the policy

in the process.

would be necessary. 753 The

however, indicates
In

in the

money was

defendants were entitled

whether they needed

already in the pipeline,

to the

to address

SOR Law,

In

jump

particularized hearing.

754

of certain crimes necessarily posed sufficient

and privacy

From

order to

interests

that

board on the question of

to register, effectively overruling the Legislature's

that their liberty

in

August of that year the Court determined

to individualized hearings before the

that individuals convicted

some of the

but not before the

for the offender registration process to

meet constitutional requirements.

in the

not have been surprised by this decision.

1997 and 1998 challenges

SJC added one more hurdle

as to

Board which were pending

1999 the Legislature was considering new legislation

concerns raised

and others

SOR

fact that the

may

that the Legislature

way

Before individual hearings could be
held,

the additional staff positions
and funding for the

Legislature

in the legislation.

determination

risk to

minors

could be infringed upon without a

a practical perspective,

it

also

meant

that the

"The Board currently has five, part-time volunteer members, a staff of 12 and a $500,000 budget. A
proposal pending in the Legislature would create a full-time board with seven paid members to address
the requirement for hearings." Martin Finucane (AP), "Court OK's Sex Offender Registry," New
Bedford Standard Times, July 25, 1998, A8.
754

Doe

v.

Attorney General, 430 Mass. 155 (1999).
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registration system

was going

to face

an even greater backlog.
These decisions had

serious repercussions for the
state's attempt to develop
a sex offender registry system.

The Legislature

new law on September

finally

responded

to all

of these eomplaints when

1999.- Th ls new law was again
delayed by

10,

it

enacted a

a preliminary

injunction issued by a Superior
Court judge in a class action suit
challenging
constitutionality.

Judge Xifaris found the requirement

providing the Board with their

name and

its

that individuals register

by

present address, without being
provided the

opportunity for a hearing as to whether
they should be registered, was a
violation of due
process. His decision

was overturned, however, when

determined that the new statute was
constitutional on

a closely divided Court (4-3)

its

face.

756

However,

in a sign

of

continued challenges, Justice Cowin, while
siding with the majority, issued the
following statement in her concurrence.
"I would hold that the
valid,

may

be susceptible to

'as applied' challenges

statute,

while facially

which individuals would have

standing to bring based on their constitutional
right not to have their liberty infringed

by indiscriminate identification of them

to the police as 'sex offenders'." 757

It is

clear

that the dialogue will continue.

•

The law also increased penalties for certain sex offense crimes and reinstated a
commitment procedure for "sexually dangerous persons" which had been discontinued
in 990. It
interesting to note that news coverage in one of the two major Boston
papers, The Boston Herald, was
Statutes 199, c.74.

civil

1

is

highly critical of the Legislature in this process, but not of the Court.
For example, the editors made the
following comments in a September 13, 1999 editorial. "The bill was signed
just two days before the
state

would have

Legislature over

Supreme

lost

some

federal crime aid funds.... This point has been the sheer irresponsibility of the

many months

Judicial Court." (26)

message. "First

it

was

in failing to replace the

A

December

the Legislature's fault.

system largely struck down

last year by the
from the Herald conveys a similar
Despite advisories from the state's highest court the

2,

1999

editorial

Legislature went ahead and passed a not terribly well crafted sex offender registry law. The
Judicial Court not surprisingly wasted little time striking it down." (40)
756

Three of the justices

Supreme

in the majority were not on the Court when the SJC had decided on these issues
and 1999: Francis Spina, Judith Cowin, and Martha Sosman. They were all appointed by
Governor Argeo Paul Celluci in 2000. One of the dissenters, Robert Cordy, was also a Celluci appointee.

in 1997, 1998,
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Beginning with an advisory
opinion
have been involved

in the

in

responding

to acfions

1996, the justices and the
Legislature

development of a poliey for
protecting the communily

against dangerons sex
offenders
justices have used their

in

whde

still

guarding the rights of all

power of statutory construction and
of the

citizens.

The

constitutional interpretation

state's elected representafives.

And

while there has been

occasional disappointment
voiced by the state's law enforcement
officials from tune to
time, the Legislature has
remained publicly silent, accepting
that both institutions of

government have a

7^7

Roe

v.

role to play in a system

of separated powers. 758

Attorney General, 434 Mass. 418 (2001), 445.

758

This conclusion is drawn from
from 1996 through June, 2001.

a Lexis search

of all

313

articles

from the Boston Globe and Boston Herald

CHAPTER

7

SEPARA TION OF POWERS IN MASS CHI jkfttv
^
COOPER A TI QN OVER COMF1 irr
i

A
conflict.

system of separated powers
presents a potential framework

for delay

and

Traditional discussions of the
origins of such a system on the
federal level

generally emphasize the
benefits of separating powers
as a mechanism to ensure that
no

one body of government becomes
too powerful. American
government

moving beyond

a basic description

texts,

of the system of separated powers
with checks and

balances, tend to emphasize
the founders' fears of tyranny
and quote Madison
Federalist #47, noting that
«[t]he accumulation of
judiciary, in the

same hands, whether of one,

self-appointed, or elective,

The emphasis

is

may justly

all

in

powers, legislative, executive, and

a few, or

many and whether

hereditary,

be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." 759

on the competitive atmosphere engendered
by such a system, with

each branch struggling

to gain

power, a case of "ambition countering ambition" 760

system of "Competition by Design." 76
be enacted some cooperation

to

when

is

'

There arc nods

necessary, but

it

is

to the reality that for

in a

any policy

viewed largely as forced

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, The Federalist Papers,

ed. Clinton Rossiter

(New

York: Mentor, 1961), 301.
760

Federalist Papers, Federalist #51, 322. This is probably the best quote to highlight the
potentially
competitive nature of a system of separated powers. What is often forgotten, however, is
that the

were written as propaganda to convince voters of New York to ratify the new
Since the predominant fear about the proposed government is that it would be too powerful,
not surprising that advocates for the proposal would emphasize the way in which separation of

Federalist Papers
constitution.
it is

powers would limit government.
of a system of separated powers.
761

Stcphcn

York:

J.

That does not necessarily mean, however,

that this

was

the only goal

Rockwell and Peter Woll, American Government: Competition and Compromise (New
Hill, 2001), 131. This is the title of their section of an American government text which

McGraw

discusses the constitutional structure of the U.S. government.
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cooperation:

when

ihe branches

do work

together, they are involved
in bargaining and

negotiation rather than a
762
discussion.
In extending this
perspective to appointed judiciaries
an additional factor

added

to the

mix. This

is

concern over the undemocratic
nature of judical

policymaking. The picture that
emerges
within the policymaking
process, with

may

description

recognize

it

is

its

of a judiciary struggling

to exert

power

actions having questionable
legitimacy. This

be slightly exaggerated, but

in criticisms

is

it

is

not so far from reality that one cannot

of the United States Supreme Court
found

in

works

like

Robert Bork's Tempting of America
and Alexander Bickel's The Least
Dangerous

Branch?62 While
democracy

is

the question of the legitimacy of
judicial policymaking in a

the focal point of these works, the
criticisms often refer to a problem of

judicial supremacy, implying that
the desired apportioning of

powers within a system of

separated powers has been distorted by improper
judicial activity.

Whether or not
Court

is

beyond

depth look

at the

this is a valid

concern with respect

the scope of this analysis.

work of a high

However, the

to the

results

United States Supreme

of this study, an

in-

court in a state-level system of separated powers,

indicates that conflict and illegitimacy are not the
necessary outcomes of judicial

762

In one text it was interesting to find that the quote used to support this view
of the origins of separated
powers came not from the Federalist Papers but from Justice Louis Brandeis' opinion in Myers v.
United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). "The doctrine of the separation of powers was
adopted by the Convention of
787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to
1

avoid

friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental
powers among three departments, so save the people from having one institution dominate the
government."

763

Bork (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990); Bickel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).
These are only examples of many more such works on the subject. While these two authors represent the
more conservative end of the ideological spectrum, liberals have also been critical of the United States
Supreme Court. See, for instance, Max Lerner, Nine Scorpions in a Bottle, ed. Richard Cummings (New
York: Arcade Publishing, 1994).
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policymaking, whether

in the

interpreter, This chapter

realm of common law,
constitutional law, or statutory

will present a

summary of these

of why the picture of judicial
policymaking

in

findings, and a discussion

Massachusetts

may

be different than

general assumptions of this power
might expect.

JUSTICES MAKING

LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS-

The writings of legal
various levels. State courts

realists

* JC

POI ,, rYMA

of an opportunity

engage

to

practice as the

common

And of course

high courts, with ultimate authority
to interpret the law

is still

important to

respective political systems, have the
most
last

,

of all shades note that courts are
lawmakers on

may have even more

law

„ Nr

many of the

in this

cases which they decide.

in their

power of all. The work of the SJC over

the

twenty-five years, with a particular emphasis
on the opinions issued between 1981

and 1995, shows

that this pattern holds true in Massachusetts.

The general impact of the justices' work on

Commonwealth should come
ways

in

which

this occurs.

as

no

surprise.

What

public policy questions in the

is

more

interesting,

however, are the

In almost all instances discussed in the previous chapters in

which SJC opinions were instrumental

in

shaping policy development, the SJC acted

in

active cooperation with the Legislature (as with several tort reform
questions), or with

the acquiescence of a Legislature which has either chosen not to act or not to
act again
in light

The

of an SJC opinion.

effect

Rather,

it

It is

this

seeming absence of conflict

of a system of separated powers has not been

that

is

most

to create conflict

interesting.

and struggle.

has been to create a system in which each branch develops policy as

appropriate within

its

institutional

framework. While there will
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still

be cases near the

edge of the

eirele

of authority for each branch,
they seem

Massachusetts. Interbranch efforts

The question which

COOPERATION
The

picture

collective effort

arises

IN

from

at

policymaking

this conclusion,

to

be few and

between

in

result in a dialogue, not a
battle.

of course,

is

why?

PO LICYMAKIN G - HOW HOPS t HE SEPARATUM n.
POWERS FUNCTION?

which

this

study paints of policymaking

between branches. More

specifically,

in

Massachusetts

to set the direction

which the

view of separation of powers as an

is

polity will follow. This does not

in the

General

match the general

institutional structure creating a struggle for

between branches regarding whose views

will prevail.

of a

on some important policy

questions the state's highest court works with
the elected representative

Court

far

power

764

If the Legislature

and the

public accept that the judiciary has a role to play
in policymaking questions, however,

then conflict will not result unless the justices act
outside this accepted
it

is

role.

And

while

unlikely that legislators and citizens think about
judicial-legislative interactions in

terms of possible theories for which powers were separated back
provide a framework for understanding the role of high courts
long as judicial activities

fit

within these theories, conflict

is

in 1780, these theories

in setting policy.

As

less likely.

SEPARATION OF POWERS - A HELPFUL FRAMEWORK
The

SJC

to

activities

of the Court described

have had a hand

in setting policy in

in

chapter three

both

common

show

the justices of the

and statutory law.

In the

realm of common law, the SJC has had an influence on questions of familial roles and
764

The

picture in regard to administrative matters

is

relationship between branches.
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closer to the traditional understanding of the

responsibilities as determined
through the laws of probate
visitation.

largely has taken the
Legislature off the

It

raising right to die questions.
Finally,

it

be seen

to statutory law.

in these cases.

tort

is

in

responding to cases

reform by forcing the law

In general, the efficiency

The judiciary

hook

brought the Legislature into the

questions of governmental
immunity and

common

and child custody and

vew

do

is

this.

it

to the fabric

In the case

position.

as

needed

best at handling questions

In all

which

When

of the law, however, the Legislature

of tort reform,

it

was

the Court

to

era in

move from

of separation of powers can

specific cases, and modifying
the law in an incremental fashion.

change

modem

is

arise out

of

wholesale

best equipped to

which recognized and promoted

this

of these cases the justices acted moderately,
approaching each question

arose and acting only incrementally
or, as in the case of threatened
action on

governmental immunity
the justices of the

case to

come

in tort cases, after a sufficient

period of time has elapsed. If

SJC had eliminated governmental immunity on

before them with this question, there

may have been

their

own

conflict.

in the first

Similarly, if

the justices had adopted a blanket approach
to the right-to-die question (as did the

New

Jersey court in In re Quinlan) rather than the case-by-case
approach to deciding these
questions, there might have been

The SJC's involvement

more controversy.

in constitutional law,

whether through the use of

judicial review or the advisory process, has generally been quiet but consistent.

there

While

were two instances between 1981 and 1995 when a decision of unconstitutionality

affected a question of major public import (state funding for abortion and the death
penalty), the majority of the Court's activity in the area of constitutional law has often

been confined

to actions

which

either did not thwart the overall goal of the elected
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officials or ,n overturning
laws ,ha. fairly clearly vtolated
constitutional provisions (like

the article

activities

44 prohibition on progressive

fit

Cher the Madisonian

of a minority.

765

of the

Even

And when

the Court did act,

its

or libertarian view of separation
of powers.

libertarian perspective, the
justices used
their interpretation

taxes).

then authority

state or federal constitution

less controversial

was

to strike

down

which would

From

a

legislation under

violate the liberties

the use of judicial authority to
decide

questions of conflict between the
other two branches, particularly as
regards the

Governor's veto power.

Teg^sIators

EEMENT? SHARED NORMS AMONG JUSTICES AND

While theories of separation of powers may
provide an

framework

may be

for understanding

accepted

the question

in

some

- why do

why

the use of judicial

power

instances and not in others, this

the justices and legislators

the system of separated powers in the

same

light?

seem

interesting theoretical

in affecting public policy

still

doesn't get to the heart of

to see the role

What keeps

of the Court

in

the justices in

Massachusetts so moderate and the legislators so tolerant? 766
It is

possible that the tensions between high courts and legislatures with which

most are familiar are drawn from

a look at the federal system, and that legislative-

I do not mean to claim that any libertarian
use of judicial power will not engender controversy. Most
of the controversial decisions of the Warren Court, for an example, could be categorized as such. It is the
combination of this factor and the relatively restrained approach of the Massachusetts justices which

helped them
766

One

to

avoid conflict.

caveat regarding this picture should be highlighted from the

start.

It is

possible that the

cooperation which existed between 1981 and 1995 (with a few views backwards into the 1970s)

is

time-bound phenomenon. Some of the debates from the 1918 constitutional convention mentioned
Chapter 5 certainly indicate that the judiciary was not always a respected and trusted branch of
government.
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a
in

judicial interactions in
states are generally

be that the United States
Supreme Court

number of "hot-button"

may

issues.

differ over questions

veto, or even a

more

,s

more cooperative. One reason

more

likely to hear

While the justices and the

arguments

could

in a a larger

legislators in Massachusetts

of when the Governor has exercised
a legitimate line-item

political question like

how

far the Legislature

can go

ballot access for the primary
election, these are not the kind
of questions

individuals ideologically in one
direction or another.
in

for this

questions such as these, even

if

An

in controlling

which

pull

exercise of judicial authority

a majority of the legislators disagree
with the

outcome, aren't the kind of issues which
are likely

to

engender heated debate. While

discussing a different kind of conflict.
Justice O'Connor's response to the
question of

why

there

is

so

much unanimity on

seems appropriate

My guess

the

SJC and so much

dissent on the

Supreme Court

in this instance as well.

is

that

Court than go

more

difficult cases

go to the United States Supreme
would hate to belittle our effort but I do think
United States Supreme [Court]... Talk about

to us and...

the issues that go to the

I

screening, they only take things that are both difficult
and very

important nationally... and that gets back again to whose
kitchen did you
in. You know a lot of them grow up with
a certain amount of
value judgment, you can call it moral judgment if you want,

grow up

they're the kind of questions that

then; if three of you think that, good.

principles that the

makes them
It

may be

to

US Supreme

some degree

true that the kinds

but, and
"Oh, well, what the hell
sign." They're basic

you can't

Court

I'll
is

say,

talking about, basic legal

basic moral questions.

of issues which come

likely to create conflict with the other branches.

which

767

to state courts

may be

However, while the SJC did not

confront a large number of "basic moral questions"

in the

cases which

came before

between 1981 and 1995, they did confront some, many of which were discussed
Chapter Five. For instance, the Court confronted questions about funding
Interview by author, Shrewsbury,

MA,

23

May

1999.
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less

it

in

for abortion

and the death penalty
the justices of the

( 1S

sues which eertainly tend to
ereate division), yet a majority
of

SJC did not

hesitate to take a stand contrary
to the

view of the

majority of the legislators by
finding the laws in question to be
768
unconstitutional.
In
addition, the cumulative affect
of decisions of the Court

which struck down

criminal laws (drug statutes,
a law to protect victims of
crimes

who

testifying in court, or a statute
prohibiting the photographing of a

easily have angered a -get
tough

on crime"

volatile questions than the
United States

them

a variety of

are minors from

nude minor) could

While the SJC may hear fewer

legislator.

Supreme Court, they hear some and

on

act

as they feel necessary. This
does not appear to have created any great
legislative-

judicial conflict in Massachusetts.

The

story of what

happened

indicates that states are not

occur

is

taxes.

decision, the

was

state's children

little

pay.

770

were

few years also

"hot button" issues which can create

Hampshire, an issue over which conflict

which has come

769

entitled.

many members,

The

in the last

to

is

likely

be called the "Claremont

that the

widely varying property

insufficient to adequately fund public education services to

from the electorate and from the
legislature with

Hampshire

Hampshire Supreme Court declared

tax system in the state

which the

New

In a 1997 decision

New

New

immune from

legislative-judicial conflict. In

to

in

New

The decision

elicited a volatile response

Hampshire Legislature,

a classic "citizen"

representing small districts and serving part-time for

political reaction

toward

this

admittedly activist decision of the

New

768

While the Legislature may not have reacted to this exercise of authority these opinions did engender
Moe (abortion funding) was decided by a decision of 6-1 (Hennessey dissenting) and ColonCruz (death penalty) was decided by a vote of 5-2 (Nolan and Lynch dissenting).
769
Claremont School Disrict v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462 (1997).
conflict.

770

While the following should be read with caution

from a website dedicated

to the actions

of the

New

as

I

know

little

about the

site,

the following quote

Hampshire Supreme Court may be
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indicative of the

Hampshire High Court would be
almost unthinkable

in

Massachusetts. While the state

capitals are less than
seventy-five miles apart, the state
of legislative-judicial relations
in the

two

political

constitutional

systems are worlds apart. There were
immediate

amendments

for action to be taken

to strip the

Court of its authority

by the House of Representatives

to

calls for

hear certain cases, and

impeach the justices.

to

This reaction to the Claremont
decision had barely died

down when

of numerous ethical lapses were
made against several of the justices of the

Hampshire Supreme Court. While not denying

that theie

were problems

allegations

New

in the

which the Court operated, the timing
of these two events makes one question
coincidental nature.

The

all

their

trial

of the Chief Justice, David Brock. 771 While

charges, the remaining tension between the judiciary
and the

other branches of government in

New

over education funding continue, and
continue.

in

allegations resulted in the resignation of Justice
Steven

Thayer, and the impeachment and
eventually acquitted on

way

Hampshire
calls for

is still

evident. State budget battles

reform of the Court by the Legislature

77?

Hampshire. "The Claremont decision is a judicial power grab, usurping the power
of the people and their
representatives to tax and violating the separation of powers. ..If we allow
this judicial expansion to go
.

unchecked, within the next few years the court will succeed in completely redefining our Constitution
and will usurp the executive and legislative powers. All power will be centralized in the court."
(

http://www.mainstream.net/nhpolitics/coactivism.shtml .)

771

In July

of 2000, the

New

Hampshire House approved articles of impeachment which involved
court matters and lying under oath before the House Judiciary
th
Committee. On October 10 Brock was acquitted by the New Hampshire Senate.
improper interference with

trial
,

772
"

This tension

is

exemplified by a

President, and Speaker of the

which Chief Justice Brock sent to the Governor, Senate
September of 2001. The letter opened as follows. "On behalf of

letter

House

in

members of the Supreme Court, I am writing to inquire whether you would have any interest in
meeting with leaders of the three branches of government on a regular basis for the purpose of improving
the

inter-branch communication. While our Constitution calls for the three branches of government to be

separate and independent of each other,
to serve the

it

also recognizes that cooperation

needs of the people." (A copy of the

http://www.state.nh.us/coui1s/suprcmc/prcss

.

letter

)
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can be accessed

is

at the

essential for the

government

Court's website,

Not only does

this story

prove that

m heated political battles as the United

state

supreme eourts can be just

Supreme Court,

States

high eourts with similar
institutional characteristics
their counterparts in a

The

New

may

structurally,

is

even

in

Massachusetts.

almost identical to the SJC,

consisting of five justices (as
opposed to Massachusetts' seven),
the

that

up

not necessarily operate with

system of separated powers as
smoothly as

Hampshire Supreme Court,

shows

also

it

as caught

Governor with the approval of an
Executive Council. They

who

are appointed

also serve during

by

good

behavior, or until mandatory
retirement at age 70. These structural
similarities,

however, don't lead
states,

even

in

to a similar level

of cooperation between branches

in the

two

regard to the same issue, quality of
funding for public education. In

1993 Massachusetts SJC was also faced with a
constitutional challenge

system for funding education. The Court
responded with McDuffy

v.

to the state's

Secretary of the

Office of Education™ an opinion which one
commentator has called the "best model
to date for third

could do

wave judicial

much worse

analysis.... Courts confronted with this issue in
the future

than imitate the Massachusetts court." 774

criticized the existing funding

mechanism and

which state-funded education must meet. As
involved in making public policy

way which recognized
The opinion ended

in

was

a decision

which

established a high level for the quality

ever, the justices

were willing

to

become

important ways in the Commonwealth, albeit

in a

the limitations of their role in the system of separated powers.

in just the

way an

dictating to the Legislature and the

773

It

observer of the Court would predict. Rather than

Governor how they should resolve

this

problem, the

4 1 5 Mass. 545 (1993).

74

William A. Thro, "Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The
Massachusetts Decision as a Model," Boston College Law Review 35 (1994), 597-617.
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Court said

it

sufficient to

was

the duty of the

Commonwealth

to "devise a plan

and sources of funds

meet the constitutional mandate."
Procedurally, the Court remanded

case to the Single Justice
session for oversight.

Suffolk University

Law

School, the

And, according

to Professor

Commonwealth's response came

the

Dodd of

quickly.

n
19 1993 G ° Vem0r
0f Massachusetts
signed the Education Reform
Act of 1993.... Through a series of
amendments to Chapter 71 the Act
revolutionizes not only the financial
organization of public education in
Massachusetts, but also its
educational structure and theory....

^nedSr\°

'

Wdd

'

,

The scheme is a visionary one, and
would seemingly more than fulfill the
seven indices of
education as required by the Supreme
175
Judicial Court in
realized,

if

McDufJy.

It

would take

a

much more

two case on education funding
different.

culture.

776

may

It

While

be due

New

to

extensive comparison to begin to sort
through these

attempt to determine

to a variety

Hampshire

is

why

of factors, not the

known

for

its

the stories are so

least

of which

fiscal austerity

and

its

is

dislike of taxes,

Massachusetts was the birthplace of public education.
In a case such as
different histories lead to different outcomes.
There

is

also

no denying

a different

this,

these

that the

difference between the professional legislature in
Boston and the citizen legislature in

Concord may have an impact.

possible, however, that relations in Massachusetts

It is

are smoother because of the awareness

Massachusetts that their role

in the

of eliminating governmental

tort

on the part of the justices of the SJC

policymaking process

is

limited.

immunity, they were willing

to

As

make

in

in the

question

their

constitutional statement and then bide their time while the Legislature developed a
to

775

at

77

adequately fund public education

"An (Adequate) Education

for All:

in the

McDuffy

v.

Commonwealth.

The following comment

Secretary of Education" Advocate 24 (1993), 20-24,

23-24.

This

is

a study

which

I

have tentative plans

to

way

begin
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in the

summer of 2002.

from Chief Justice Wilkins
Court plays

in the state's

m

l

S

;'
Chief Justice,
Chie

which

least

seem

'

is

H

T

Pe ° P

work

fr
u

"

a high degree

18
11

I told David Brock,
the
there's a constitutional right to

Renting
mCreaSmg

u^ Ught
"°

it.

And,

for the

moment

am ° Unt Education

the

that aCtl °n

WhlGh

is Sti11

'

P £ndin g' are

why

as to

this is the case is not.

for the fact that the Legislature

There are

so cooperatively in questions affecting
public policy. Both are

possible that actors in both branches of
government,

have been acculturated

branches. There

"political

at

and the High Court

potentially connected, and they relate
to questions of the state's culture.
First,

state,

in

at a rate

of cooperation between the SJC and
the Legislature

The answer

is clear.

two possible explanations
to

UP there [New

it

nk H

th

Massachusetts

reSting

H^Pshire],
v s easy enough to announce

LTg

That there
in

system of separated powers.

T

2*

*

representative of this recognition
of the special role the

is

may be

to share the

implicit

realm" and what

is

many of whom

same perspective on

agreement on the question of what

for this explanation.

is

are natives of the

the role of the three

acceptable in the "judicial realm."

Burke presents anecdotal support

it

is

legitimate in the

A quote

from John

In discussing interactions

between the SJC and the Joint Committee on the Judiciary when he was
the
Administrative Assistant to the Court, Burke described interactions with
Representative

Michael Flaherty, then House Chair of the Committee. 778

And
... .1

it

was

who was the one that you could deal with
experience with him he never went looking for a

actually Flaherty

must say

in

my

quid pro quo, never said, 'yes, you can have such and such a statute

Interview by author, Boston,

case yet to
778

know

if the justices

MA,

23 April 1999.

I

am

not familiar enough with the

New

if

I

Hampshire

of that court share a similar perspective.

Except for the Ethics Committees and

Ways and Means,

legislature are joint committees, co-chaired

all standing committees in the Massachusetts
by a Senator and a Representative and with membership

drawn from both houses.
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$

SOmethln 8--[H]e made

clear that he
^Tu"
m one world,
the courts were another world.
And there
were, there were things that
were OK in the Legislature that were
not
OK in the courts, He just kept them apart. 779

was worlC
working

it

Obviously a recognition of the
difference between the two worlds
would not
lead to cooperation unless
the view were shared by
individuals in both worlds. In part,
the generally restrained,
moderate, and incremental approach
which the justices of the

SJC take
where

in their

legal reasoning

(and as

is

is

to the

law

fits

with a view of the judicial realm as a
place

used to reach decisions; not a world of
bargaining as occurs

expected) in the Legislature. This
moderate approach to the law

by the broader

which

approach

legal

community, and can be seen

in the

scientific studies

which attempt

to

show

that attitude

judicial decision-making, this restraint and
moderation

However, one cannot

sit

think that they believe

it

reinforced

few constitutional challenges

are raised before the state's high
court. For political scientists

jaded by

is

is all

may seem

who have become

that matters in

like a

sham.

through interview after interview with the justices and not
in their hearts

when

they explain the judicial role in terms

similar to those of Chief Justice Hennessey.

This volume focuses to a great extent on what courts do at the limits of
the law where the legitimacy of the court's action may be in question.

We point out that the court as an institution is not good

at

discovering

the popular mindset. Because, unlike a legislature, a court
institutionally

whim

equipped

may

of the judge

to discover the will

control at the edges of the law.

areas that the legitimacy of the court

uses self-restraint.

is

is

not

of the people, the subjective
It is

in these

problematic, and the wise judge

780

Perhaps even more

telling

is

the language

from a 1972 opinion written by then

Chief Justice Tauro. The case involved a clear exercise of judicial authority,
779

780

Interview by author, Boston,

Judges Making

Law

(Boston,

MA,
MA:

5

May

1999.

Flashner Judicial Institute, 1994), p.
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2.

as the

justices decided that the
courts have an inherent
for an expenditure

which

is

power

to

bind a county or state treasury

essential to the operation of the
courts.

Recognizing the

potentially charged nature
of this opinion, Tauro writes as
follows.

We are mindful that exercise of this inherent
power is a duty which must
be borne responsibly. A spirit
of mutual cooperation among the
legis ative, executive,

people

and judicial departments is unquestionably
the
best guaranty of constitutional
government. It is therefore

s

incumbent upon the members of the
judicial department
cautiously, and with due consideration
for the

to

proceed

prerogatives of the

executive department and the
Legislature, whenever exercise of an
inherent judicial power would bring
us near the sphere of another
department.

The second
judicial

harmony

Massachusetts

is

in

related hypothesis

which may,

in part, explain the legislative-

Massachusetts has to do with the concept of shared
communities.

a relatively small state, and

it

seems

as

though many of its elected and

appointed officials claim an area within a twenty
mile radius of Boston as their home.
It is

a geographically close

community. Furthermore, many of the

state's public figures

attended law school, and did so in one of the five law
schools in the Boston area. In
these geographic and academic communities, individual
develop shared norms,

experiences, and friendships. Trust

is

built

which may,

at later

points in

life,

help to

ease the institutional tensions created by a system of separated powers.
Several
references were

made

in

Chapter Three

to the role

which Cornelius Moynihan

is

credited with playing in the passage of the Rules of Civil Procedure because of his
prestige and connection to Boston College

this

Law

School alumnae. Another example of

was conveyed by Chief Justice Wilkins when discussing

What
to the

has happened recently

is, the House particularly has been sensitive
needs of the Judiciary and the Senate has been willing to go

along.... Sometimes these things are very

O 'Coin,

Inc.

the budget and the courts.

v.

much

a matter of luck and

Treasurer of the County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507,
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at

515-51 6.

personalities

The principle major domo for the
Speaker of the louse
used o be a clerk for the SJC
for the County of Suff olk.
And he
1

^^

2

Speler^

A

further story

Civil Procedure in

is

found

in

Bone's

cares

SyStem and he has the ear of
*•

on the development of the Rules of

article

which he comments on

the possible role of another individual
in

ensuring that the Governor's
office would be interested

in

Governor Sargent's secretary was William
Young, now

a federal district court judge.

Young had

clerked for Chief Justice [Raymond]
Wilkins and was teaching a course

Boston College

Law

School

at

encouraged Governor Sargent

the time.

after another.

different sources

see

how

political

This

is

He was keenly

a pattern begins to

especially true as the stories

accurately these perceptions of the links

Is this all,

interested in procedure and

does

First,

it

if

is

wc

as

came from

reflect reality,

however? Docs

it is

in the

one anecdote
a variety

of

a question

worth pursuing.

this single-state analysis

return to the lens of separation of powers

a vivid reminder that while

of the relation between a

is

more broadly applicable?

which has informed

most discussion of this

emphasize the conflictual nature of inter-branch

to

Massachusetts legal and

high court and a legislature have anything to teach us that
It

emerge

and were unsolicited. While further research would
be necessary

community

at

to support the bill's passage." 783

While these are only anecdotes,

comes

reform. "Furthermore,

relations,

this

work.

institutional structure

such discussions are too

narrow. The Madisonian meaning of separation of powers, one which sees the structure

78?

Interview with author, Boston,

MA,

23 April 1999.

"Procedural Rules Reform," footnote 200, pp. 442-443.

In this

note

Bone

also

conveys the story

regarding Kiernan's reaction to the legislative changes needed to enact the Rules of Civil Procedure as

confirmed by other sources.
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as intended to foment
struggles for

balance,

states.

may no

In

longer have

power which

much

will result in

some

sort

of Newtonian

impact, at least in the operation of
the high courts of

only one ease was there a
dear exercise of power by the SJC to
protect the

jud.emry from intrusion

into

the four advisory opinion
in

domain.- Even

its

if one also

which the Court was asked

includes in this category

to referee the

determining the legitimacy of certain
line item vetoes, there was
very
the part of the Court in

which

this

budget process by
little

activity

on

view of separation of powers was prominent. 785

There were times when the SJC played
-protector of liberties" or "guardian of
the Constitution" as envisioned
by the libertarian view of separation of
powers. This

occurred most frequently

in

cases raising questions of the constitutionality
of a statute,

the action of law enforcement, or
the decisions of a lower court judge.

The seeming

acceptance of these actions by the Court as
evidenced by the lack of public outcries or
legislative action

aimed

at

curbing the Court indicates that

role for justices to play, despite

its

become an accepted

this has

"undemocratic" nature. Conflict did not really

develop.

Most importantly,

the efficiency

one most strongly reflected
for conflict to determine

policy,

we

view of separation of powers seems

in the activity

when high

will develop a picture

of the SJC. This means

Spinelli

attempted

v.

of the role of high courts which

Supreme

•

It is

this

look only

is

incomplete. Over

Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Commonwealth,

to reinstate

a case in which the SJC determined that an act of the Legislature that
an eminent domain case after the judicial branch had taken final action was an

unlawful attempt of the Legislature to exercise a power belonging exclusively
785 t

we

be the

courts are taking an active role in developing public

the last twenty-five years the justices of the

7X4

that if

to

m

possible that the struggles of the

SJC

to

to the Legislature.

develop more control over the lower courts could

category as well.

329

fit

in

have engaged

in a

dialogue with the state's elected
representatives over a variety of

public policy questions that
arc important to the citizens
of the

Commonwealth. The

dialogue has rarely dared up
into argument. Coopcraiion
has been the norm. This

is

largely because the players
in each branch have
respected the limits of their authority.

Unlike textbook notions of
separation of powers, however, these
limits are no, imposed

by jud.cial-lcgislature struggle,
but come from both branches
making law by doing

what they do

best.

which come before

For the Court,
it,

this

recognizing the expertise of the Legislature
to

wholesale change, but not hesitating
the

law-making

roles

means making law slowly but

to force this action if necessary.

of the two bodies

observation comes into play -

when

is

a story of what happens

a political question

330

becomes

surely in cases

make more
The

when

difference

in

Tocqueville's

a judicial question.
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